Normativity and Control

258 Pages·2017·1.498 MB·English

by  David Owens

Normativity and Control

Normativity and
Control
David Owens
1
3
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP,
UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford.
ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship,
andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof
OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries
©DavidOwens2017
Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted
FirstEditionpublishedin2017
Impression:1
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin
aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe
priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted
bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics
rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe
aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe
addressabove
Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform
andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress
198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
Dataavailable
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2017935193
ISBN 978–0–19–871323–4
Printedandboundby
CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY
For Sam

Preface
ThisbookcollectstenessaysonmattersIfirstdiscussedinReasonwithoutFreedom
(2000).Eightof the essays arepreviously published andappearwith only minor
alterations,oneispublishedhereforthefirsttime(‘HumanTestimony’),andoneis
a heavily revised version of a previously published essay (‘Value and Epistemic
Normativity’).Theessaysarearrangedthematicallyratherthanchronologically.In
order to ensure that each essay remains self-standing, I have not attempted to
eliminateareasofoverlapbetweenthem.Thereisalsoasubstantialintroduction,
the purpose of which is to restate the general view of normativity, control, and
responsibilitysketchedinReasonwithoutFreedom,asdevelopedormodifiedinthe
essayscollectedhere.
‘Epistemic Akrasia’ first appeared in The Monist Vol. 85 No. 3 (July 2002):
381–97; ‘Does Belief Have an Aim?’ in Philosophical Studies Vol. 115 No. 3
(August 2003): 275–97; ‘Deliberation and the First Person’ in Self Knowledge
Ed.A.Hatzimoysis(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress2011):261–77;‘Valueand
Epistemic Normativity’ in Teorema Vol. 32 No. 3 (2013): 335–58; ‘Scepticisms:
Descartes and Hume’ in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary
VolumeLXXIV(July2000):119–42;‘Descartes’sUseofDoubt’inACompanion
toDescartes,EdsJ.BroughtonandJ.Carriero(Oxford:Blackwell2007):164–78;
‘Freedom and Practical Judgement’ in Mental Action, Eds Lucy O’Brien and
Matthew Soteriou (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009): 122–37; ‘Habitual
Agency’ in Philosophical Explorations, Volume 20 (2017), special issue on The
NormativeSignificanceofIntentions,EdsUlrikeHeuerandMatthewSmith;and
‘Testimony and Assertion’ in Philosophical Studies Vol. 130 No. 1 (July 2006):
105–29.
While writing these essays I was sustained by the love and friendship of Sam
Ishii-Gonzales.

Contents
Introduction 1
Part I. Normativity: Epistemic and Practical
1. EpistemicAkrasia 37
2. DoesBeliefHaveanAim? 51
3. DeliberationandtheFirstPerson 69
4. ValueandEpistemicNormativity 87
Part II. Scepticism
5. Scepticisms:DescartesandHume 113
6. Descartes’UseofDoubt 132
Part III. Practical Freedom
7. FreedomandPracticalJudgement 151
8. HabitualAgency 169
Part IV. Testimony
9. TestimonyandAssertion 193
10. HumanTestimony 211
Bibliography 239
Index 245