Table Of ContentInternational Library of
NORM AND ACTION
Philosophy and
Scientific Method
A LOGICAL ENQUIRY
EDITOR: A. J. AYER
ASSISTANT EDITOR: BERNARD WILLIAMS
INDUCTIVE PROBABILITY by John Patrick Day.
SENSATION AND PERCEPTION: A History of the Philosophy of Perception
by D. \Y/. IIamlyn.
TRACTATUS LOGICO-PI-IILOSOPBICUS: Ludwig Wittgenstein's Logisch
phi/osophische Abhand!ung -..vith a new Translation by D. F. Pears and B. F.
McGuinncss and with the Introduction by Bertrand Russell, by
PERCEPTION AND THE PHYSICAL WORLD by D. M. Armstrong.
I-IUME'S PHILOSOPI-lY OF BELIEF: A Study of I-Iis First Inquiry by Antony Georg Henrik von Wright
Flew.
KANT'S THEORY OF I<NOWLBDGE: An Outline of One Central Argument
in the CritiqHe of Pure Reason by Graham Bird.
CONDITIONS FOR DESCRIPTION by Peter Zinkcrnagel, translated from the
Danish by Olaf Lindum.
AN EXAMINATION OF PLATO'S DOCTRINES by I. M. Crombie. Two
volumes. I: Plato on Man and Society, II: Plato on l(nowlcdge and Reality.
PI-iENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION by M. Merlcau-Ponty, translated from
the French by Colin S1nith.
THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT by Ch.
Perehnan, translated from the French by John Petric.
LECTURES ON PSYCHICAL RESEARCH by C. D. Broad. Incorporating the
Perrott Lectures given in Cambridge University in 1959 and 1960.
THE VARIETIES OF GOODNESS by Georg Henrik von Wright.
METHOD IN THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES by G. Schlesinger.
METHOD IN ETHICAL THEORY by Abraham Edel.
SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND REALITY by Wilfrid Sellars.
NORM AND ACTION: A Logical Inquiry by Georg I-Ienrik von W'right.
PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM by J. J.C. Smart.
STUDIES IN METAPI-IILOSOPI-IY by Morris Lazerowitz.
REASON, ACTION AND MORALITY by J. Kemp.
TI-IE HIDDEN GOD: A study of tragic vision in the Penstes of Pascal and ~~e
tragedies of Racine by Lucien Goldmann, translated from the French by Phthp
Thody.
THE EXPLANATION OF BEHAVIOUR by Charles Taylor. LONDON
TI-IP, STRATIFICATION OF BEI-iAVIOUR: A System of Definitions Pro-
ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL
pounded and Defended by D. S. Sh\vayder.
STUDIES IN PLATO'S METAPHYSICS edited by R. E. Allen.
NEW YORK: THE HUMANITIES PRESS
NEW ESSAYS ON PLATO AND ARIST01T,E edited by Renford Bambrough.
POLITICAL ARGUMENT by Brian M. Barry.
BRAIN AND MIND: Modern Concepts of the Nature of Mind by J. R. Smythics.
First p11blished 1963
ry Routledge & Keg an Pa t1l Ltd
Broadway Ho11se, 68-7 4 Carter Lane
London, E.C.4
Printed in Great Britain PREFACE
ry Richard C!qy (The Cha11cer Press), Ltd
B1111gqy, Suffolk
THE present work is a thoroughly revised version of the first of
© Georg Henrik von Wright 1963 the two series of Gifford Lectures on 'Norms and Values', which
I gave at the University of St. Andrews in 1959 and 1960. The
No part of this book v1qy be reproduced
content of the second series was published in 1963 in the Inter
in any for111 ivithout permission fro111
national Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method under the
the publisher, except for the quotation title The Varieties of Goodness. The latter work and the present are
of brief passages in criticism
substantially independent of one another. There is, however, a
minor amount of overlap between the discussion of the onto
logical status of prescriptions in Chapter VII of this book and
the discussion in the last three chapters of The Varieties of
Goodness.
In 1951 I published in Mind a paper with the title 'Deontic
Logic'. In it I made a first attempt to apply certain techniques of
modern logic to the analysis of normative concepts and dis
course. Since then there bas been a growing interest in the logic
of norms among logicians and, so far as I can see, among legal
and moral philosophers also. Moreover, the name deontic logic,
originally suggested to me by Professor C. D. Broad, seems to have
gained general acceptance.
The thoughts which are contained in the present work are the
fruits, partly of criticism of ideas in my early paper, and partly
of efforts to develop these ideas further. I should like to say a few
words here about the growth of my thoughts and the plan of this
book. Readers who have no previous familiarity with deontic
logic may skip this part of the Preface.
In my original paper the two 'deontic operators', 0 for obliga
tion and P for permission, were regarded as interdefinable. 0 was
treated as an abbreviation for ~P~. The operators were pre
fixed to what I regarded as names of acts, A, B, ... and to mole
cular compounds of such names. The acts were conceived of as
act-categories, such as, e.g., murder or theft, and not as act
individuals, such as, e.g., the murder of Caesar. Act-categories
v
PREFACE PREFACE
were treated as 'proposition-like entities', i.e., entities on which thing which results in an opposite state of affairs? If the first
the truth-functional operations of negation, conjunction, dis answer is the right one the question will arise what we are to
junction, etc., can be performed. The meanings of expressions understand by 'not-doing': the mere fact that a certain thing is
such as OA or P(A & ~B) I regarded as propositions to the not done, or the forbearance of some agent from doing this thing,
effect that certain categories of acts are obligat~ry or permitted. when there is an opportunity to do it? If the second answer is
Thus the possibility of combining the expressions by means of correct, how shall we then distinguish between leaving something
truth-connectives was taken for granted. I also, however, im undone and undoing it?
plicitly regarded these meanings as norms enjoining or permitting These and similar considerations made it plain that the sym
acts. It did not then occur to me that this made the applicability bolism for acts which I had been using was inadequate for ex
of truth-connectives to the expressions problematic. Since the pressing logical features of action, which are of obvious relevance
expressions OA, etc., obviously could not themselves be regarded to a logic of obligation-concepts. The same inadequacy would
as names of acts, iterated use of the operators 0 and P was not have been there had I regarded A, B, etc., not as names of cate
allowed by the rules of the calculus. Expressions such as OOA gories of acts, such as manslaughter or window-opening, but
were accordingly dismissed as meaningless. as sentences describing states of affairs, such as that a man is
I have since come to entertain doubts on practically all issues dead or a window open. In short, the symbolism of so-called
of importance in my first publication on deontic logic. These propositional logic was inadequate for symbolizing the various
doubts have been of two kinds. Some concern the validity of modes of action. New logical tools had to be invented. A Logic
certain logical principles of obligation-concepts, which I had of Action turned out to be a necessary requirement of a Logic of
originally accepted. Others concern the interpretation of the Norms or Deontic Logic.
symbols and expressions of the calculus. We could say that formal logic, as we know it to-day, is essenti
One of my doubts of the first kind relates to the nature of per ally the logic of a static world. Its basic objects are possible
missive norms. Is permission an independent normative concept, states of affairs and their analysis by means of such categories
or can it be defined in terms of obligation (and negation)? If as thing, property, and relation. There is no room for change in
it can be so defined, what is the correct way of defining it? this world. Propositions are treated as definitely true or false
These questions are discussed in the last four sections (13-16) .not as now true, now false. Things are viewed as having or lacking
of Chapter V and briefly touched upon in various places else given properties and not as changing from, say, red to not-red.
where in the book. Acts, however, are essentially connected with changes. A
Other doubts of the first kind have to do with the principles of state which is not there may come into being as a result of human
distributivity of the deontic operators and the various principles interference with the world; or a state which is there may be
of 'commitment'. When these principles are formulated in a more made to vanish. Action can also continue states of affairs which
refined logical symbolism it turns out that they do not possess would otherwise disappear, or suppress states which would
the unrestricted validity which I originally claimed for them. otherwise come into being. A necessary requirement of a Logic
These various laws of the 'old system' are discussed and corrected of Action is therefore a Logic of Change.
in the last four sections (15-18) of Chapter IX. Our first step towards building a Deontic Logic will be to
My dissatisfaction and doubts relating to questions of inter survey the traditional logical apparatus with a view to con
preting the calculus were even more serious, and became in the structing out of its ingredients a new apparatus which is adequate
end destructive of the entire original system. for dealing, at least in gross outline, with the logical peculiarities
If A denotes an act, what does ~A mean? Does it signify the of a world in change. This is done in Chapter II, which contains
not-doing of the thing, the doing of which is symbolized by A? Or the fundamentals of a Logic of Change. After a general discussion
does it signify the t111doing of that thing, i.e., the doing of some of the concept of action in Chapter III the fundamentals of a Logic
vi vii
PREFACE PREFACE
of Action are presented in Chapter IV. The elements of Deontic and do not feel at all satisfied with the details of my proposed
Logic are not treated until Chapters VIII and IX. solution to it. But I feel convinced that, if deontic logic is going
In my 1951 paper I took it for granted that the expressions to be anything more than an empty play with symbols, its
which are formed of the deontic operators and symbols for acts principles will have to be justified on the basis of considerations
can be combined by means of truth-connectives. This assumption pertaining to the ontological status of norms.
would be warranted if the expressions in question could be safely I still adhere to the opinion of my original paper that iteration
regarded as the 'formalized counterparts' of sentences which of deontic operators to form complex symbols, such as 00 or
express propositions. If, however, the expressions are also in PO or 0 ~ P, etc., does not yield meaningful results. Some
tended to be formalizations of norms, then it is not certain that kind of 'iteration', however, is certainly possible. For there can
the assumption is warranted. Propositions, by definition, are true be prescriptions (and maybe norms of other types too) concern
or false. Norms, it is often maintained, have no truth-value. ing the obligatory, permitted, or forbidden character of acts
The question whether norms are true or false challenges the of giving (other) prescriptions. In a symbolic language, which
question, what norms are. It is readily seen that the word 'norm' contained expressions for such norms of higher order, deontic
covers a very heterogeneous field of meaning, that there are operators would occur inside the scope of other deontic operators.
many different things which are or can be called by that name. No attempt is here made to develop the adequate symbolism. But
These things must first be classified, at least in some crude manner, some problems concerning higher order norms (prescriptions)
before a discussion of the relation of norms to truth can be are discussed informally in the last chapter (X) of this book.
profitably conducted. This I have tried to do in Chapter I. One of The building of a Deontic Logic has thus turned out to be a
the many types of norm which there are, I call prescriptions. After much more radical departure from existing logical theory than I
a more detailed analysis of the structure of norms, with the main at first realized. The more I have become aware of the complica
emphasis on prescriptions, in Chapter V, the discussion of norms tions connected with the subject, the more have I been compelled
and truth is resumed in Chapter VI. No attempt is made to settle to narrow my claims to be able to treat it in a systematic and
the problem for all norms. The view that prescriptions have no thorough way. What is here accomplished, if anything, covers
truth-value, however, is accepted. only a small part of the ground which has to be cleared before
The deontic sentences of ordinary language, of which the Deontic Logic stands on a firm footing.
expressions of deontic logic may be regarded as 'formaliza The main object of study in this book is prescriptions. Origin
tions', exhibit a characteristic ambiguity. Tokens of the same ally, I had planned to include in it also a fuller treatment of that
sentence are used, sometimes to enunciate a prescription (i.e., to which I call technical nortJJs about means to ends, and the closely
enjoin, permit, or prohibit a certain action), sometimes again to related topic ofp ractical inference (necessity). But I have come to re
express a proposition to the effect that there is a prescription en alize that this is an even more extensive and bewildering conceptual
joining or permitting or prohibiting a certain action. Such pro jungle than the topic of prescriptions. I therefore eventually de
positions are called norm-propositions. When expressions of cided not to attempt to penetrate it here. But I think that a theory
deontic logic are combined by means of truth-connectives we which combines a logic of prescriptions with a logic of practical
interpret them as sentences which express norm-propositions. necessities is an urgent desideratum for the philosophy of norms
The conception of deontic logic as a logic of norm-propositions and values.
challenges the question, what it means to say of prescriptions,
or of norms generally, that they exist. Wherein does the 'reality' I have lectured on norms and deontic logic both before and
of a norm lie? This is the ontological problem of norms. Some after my Gifford Lectures in 1959. I wish to thank my classes
aspects of it, relating chiefly to the existence of prescriptions, are collectively for the stimulating opportunities which lecturing has
discussed in Chapter VII. I find the problem extremely difficult, given me to present ideas-often in an experimental and tentative
viii ix
PREFACE
form. In particular, I wish to thank two of my colleagues in
dividually. These are Professor Jaakko Hintikka, whose criticism
has effected profound revisions of some of my earlier views in the
Logic of Action, and Mr. Tauno Nyherg, by whose advice and
assistance I have greatly profited in preparing these lectures for
CONTENTS
puhlication.
GEORG F-IENRIK VON \VRIGHT
PREFACE page v
I. ON NORMS IN GENERAL
1. 'The heterogeneous nature of the field of meaning of the
word 'norn1'. The aims of a General 'Theory of Norms
must be restricted 1
2. 'The meaning of 'la\v'. The la\VS of nature arc descriptive,
the laws of the state arc prescriptive 1
3. 'The laws of logic. Arc they descriptive or prescriptive?
Realism versus nominalism in the philosophy of logic
(mathematics). 'fhc conception of the la\vs of logic as
'rules of a game' 3
4. Rules-a main type of norm. Rules determine a concept.
They arc neither 'descriptive' nor 'prescriptive'. Rules of a
game, rules of grammar, rules of a calculus 6
5. Prescriptions. Prescriptions arc the cotnmands, per
missions, and prohibitions given by a norm-authority to
some norm-subject(s). The notions of promulgation and
sanction 7
6. Customs. Con1parison with rules, prescriptions, and
natural regularities. Customs determine patterns of con
duct and exert a 'normative pressure' on the members of a
community. Customs as anonymous prescriptions 8
7. Directives or technical norms concerning means to an end.
Technical norms are based on necessary relationships
(anankastic propositions). Technical norms must be dis-
tinguished from hypothetical norms 9
8. :rvroral norms. 1'hcir affinity to custon1s. Arc n1oral norms
prescriptions? Or arc they directives for the realization of
moral values? The deontologist position 11
9. Ideal rules. 'Their connexion with the notions of goodness
and virtue, Ideal rules are conceptual 13
10. Summary of the main types of norm \vhich \Ve have dis-
tinguished in this chapter 15
xi
x
CONTENTS CONTENTS
6. Distinction between act and activity. Which concept is
II. PRELIMINARIES ON LOGIC. THE LOGIC OF
prior? Bodily activity as a prerequisite of human acts.
CHANGE
Acting and doing 41
1. In origin, deontic logic was an extension of modal logic.
7. The four types of elementary acts. '!he conditions of
In the present work deontic logic is studied from a
acting 42
different point of vic\v, Familiarity '\Vith modal logic and
quantification theory not presupposed, but desirable. 8. The notion of forbearance. Degrees of forbearance. Re
Familiarity with propositional logic presupposed 17 sults and consequences of forbearance. The conditions of
forbearance. The four types of elementary forbearance 45
2. The fundamentals of propositional logic. Propositions and
sentences. Sentences express propositions. Names of pro 9. Act and ability. 1'he two tneanings of 'can do'. 'Can do'
positions and of sentences, Definition of p-cxpressions. and 'kno\v ho\v>. Ability, skill, and capacity 48
The p-calculus 18 10. Doing and trying. Forbearing and unsuccessful trying 51
3. The fundamentals of propositional logic continued. 11. The reciprocal nature of the abilities to do and to forbear.
Truth-functions. 'fautological equivalences. Normal The logical independence of the abilities with regard to
forms. State-descriptions, and possible \vorlds. Descrip the four types of elementary acts 53
tive sentences express contingent propositions 19 12. Compelling and preventing. 'Their relation to the agent's
4. What is a proposition? Generic and individual proposi ability to do and to forbear 54
tions. The occasion for the truth or falsehood of a proN
position. Universals and individuals. General and par IV. 'I'l-IE LOGIC OF ACTION
ticular propositions 22
1. The d.f-calculus. Definition of tifNexpressions 56
5. Facts. Division of facts into states of affairs, processes, and
2. Elementary d-and.f-expressions 56
events. Sentences which express contingently true pro
3. Every ij-cxpression is a truth-function of elementary d-and
positions describe facts. Names of facts 25
/-expressions. The distributive properties of the d- and
6. The conception of events as ordered pairs of states of
/-operators. tif-tautologies 58
affairs. The event as state-transformation. The initial state
4. The positive normal form of d/Nexpressions 61
and the end-state 27
5, Act-descriptions. Corresponding statcNdescriptions, changc
7. The T-calculus. Definition of TNexprcssions. The four
dcscriptions, and act-descriptions 62
types of elementary state-transformations 28
6. External and internal negation of d/-cxpressions. Com
8. Every state-transformation is a truth-function of element
patibility and incompatibility of ij-expressions 64
ary state-transformations. Tautologous state-transforma
tions 30 7. External and internal consequences of tif-expressions 66
9. The positive norinal form of T-expressions 32 8. Uniform tif-expressions. The intensional character of d/
expressions with regard to T- and pNexpressions 66
10. Change-descriptions 33
V. '!'I-IE ANALYSIS OF NORMS
III. ACT AND ABILITY
1. Human acts. The importance of this notion to a theory of 1. The six 'components' of prescriptions. The concept of
norms. There will be no discussion of frce-\vill in this the norm-kernel 70
book 35 2. The normNcharacter. Division of norms into obliging and
2. Acts and events. Types of act. Generic and individual acts 35 permissive norms, and of prescriptions into commands,
permissions, and prohibitions 71
3. The occasion on which an act is performed. Occasion and
opportunity 37 3. 'The normNcontent, Division of prescriptions into regula
tions of action and regulations of activity. The secondary
4. The agent. Types of agent 37
nature of the latter 71
5. Results and consequences of action. The connexion be
4. (Cont,) Division of norms into positive and negative,
t\veen an act and its result is intrinsic. The connexion be
Elen1cntary norms. OP-expressions 72
tween an act and its consequences is extrinsic, Relativity of
the notion of result. Result and intention 39 5. The conditions of application of norms 73
xii xiii
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
6. (Cont.) Division of norms into categorical and hypo
4. The language of 1norals is not a species of prescriptive
thetical. Note on I(ant's 'hypothetical imperatives' 74
discourse, and the language of norms is not the same as
7. The norm-authority. Normative action. Division of language in the imperative 1nood 98
prescriptions into theonomous and positive. Impersonal
5. Observations on dcontic sentences. Their richer semantic
and personal norm-authorities. The concept of an office.
capacity as co1npared to imperative sentences for the
Individual and collective norm-authorities 75
purposes of enunciating norms. 'I'he use of deontic sen
8. (Cont.) Division of norms into hetcronotnous and autono tences for stating anankastic relationships 100
mous. Can an agent give orders and permissions to him 6. The use of (ordinary) indicative sentences, in the present
self? 76 or future tense, as norm-formulations 101
9. 'I'hc nonn-subjcct. Can there be prescriptions for the 7, Whether a given sentence is a norm-formulation can never
whole of mankind? Can a prescription address its subject be seen from thestfinalone. Warning against a conception of
'disjunctively'? The 'someone ought to leave the boat'
deontic logic as a study of certain ling#istic forms of dis
case 77 course 102
10. The occasion 79 8. Do norms have a truth-value? 'The question n1ust be
11. (Cont. 9 & 10.) Division of prescriptions into particular and raised separately for the various types of nonn \vhich
general. Particular prescriptions and the meaning of 'law' there arc. Prescriptions are outside the category of truth.
and 'rule'. 1'he opinions of Austin and Blackstone 81 Norm-fortnulations have 1neaning, even if nonns lack
12. Com1nand and prohibition. Relation between 'ought to' truth-value 103
and 'must not' 83 9. 'fhe systematic ambiguity of deontic sentences. 'Their use
13. 'fhe concept of permission. Weak and strong pennission. as norm-formulations must be distinguished from their
Only strong permissions arc norms 85 use to n1akc normative statements 104
14. Note on the principle n11llu111 cri1ne11 sine lege. Closed and 10. The truth-ground of a normative staten1ent is the exist
open systems of nonns 87 ence of a norm. Nonnative statements and norm-pro
15. Degrees of strong permission. Permission as toleration, positions 105
as right, and as claim 88
16. Is permission an independent norm-character? Permission VII. NORMS AND EXISTENCE
as toleration can be either a declaration of intention or 1. The ontological problem of nonns. Contingent and
a pro1nisc of non-interference. The normative status of necessary existence 107
promises 90 2. The principle that Ought entails Can, Discussion of
'Ought'. 'fhc extension of the principle to permissive
VI. NORMS, LANGUAGE, AND TRUTrI norn1s 108
1. Distinction between norm and norm-formulation. A pre 3. (Cont.) Discussion of 'entails'. The principle that Ought
scription is neither the sense nor the reference of its entails Can does not conflict \Vith the idea of a sharp
formulation in language. The notion of promulgation. separation bet\veeo nonn and fact. Facts about human
The language-dependent nature of prescriptions 93 ability as a logical presupposition of the existence of
2. Arc all types of nonn language-dependent? 'fhe relation norms 109
of rules, technical norms, and customs to language. The
4. (Cont.) Discussion of 'can'. Failure to follo\v the norn1 in
different positions of norms and valuations in relation to
the individual case docs not annihilate the nonn. But
language 94
generic inability to follo\v it is destructive of the norm 111
3. Observations on sentences in the imperative mood. Not 5. 1'he application of the principle that Ought entails Can
all typical uses of imperative sentences are for enunciating to ideals. \Vhat a man ought to be be can becov1c 112
norms. Not all norms can be formulated by means of im
6. (Cont.) 'fhe application of the principle that Ought entails
perative sentences. When used as norm-formulations, im
Can to rules and technical norms. 'fhe various meanings
perative sentences are used 1nainly, but not exclusively, to
of \vant'. Pursuit of something as an end (of action) pre
give prescriptions (commands and prohibitions). 'Per
supposes that the agent can do the things \Vhich are
missive imperatives' 96
necessary for the attainment of the end 113
xiv
xv
CONTENTS CONTENTS
7. (Cont.) The application of the principle that Ought entails 6. Theorcins on cotnpatibility and incompatibility of norms.
Can to prescriptions. The giving- and the rcceiving Sisyphos-commands and the notion of deontic equilibriutn 144
aspect of prcscdptions. The existence of prescriptions as 7. Compatibility and possible co-existence of nonns. 1'he
dependent upon the giving-aspect alone. Docs this make notion of a c()rpus 147
existence independent of ability to follow the pre- 8. Norms and necessary existence. 11autologous norms 152
scriptions ? 114
9. Entailment bet\vcen norms 155
8. Normative action. The result and consequences of nor
10. Entailment and the necessary co-existence of nortns. De
mative action. The successful performance of normative
rived prescriptions and the committnents of a norm-
action establishes a relationship between authority and
authority 156
subject. Analogy between prescribing and promising.
The existence of a prescription is its being 'in force' 116 11. 'Ought entails i\1Iay' 158
12. 'The Rule of 0-distribution 158
9. The intention and reasons involved in normative action.
13. 'fhe Ruic of P-distribution 160
The aim of commanding is to 'make do' 118
14. 'Ihe constituents of a norm 161
10. Permitting is letting do. Active and passive letting 119
15. 'The internal consequences of norn1-contents reflected in
11. The \Vill-theory of norms. Commands as an expression or
relations of entailment bet\veen norins 163
n1anifestation of a norm-authority's will to make norm
subjects do and forbear to do things. Permissions and the 16. Truth-tables in Deontic Logic. Their use for deciding
\Vill to tolerate 120 whether an OP-expression is a deontic tautology 165
12. 'The art of con1manding conceived of as ability to make
IX. DEONTIC LOGIC: I-IYPOTI-IETICAL NORMS
agents do 01· forbear to do things. Ability to command
1. Hypothetical prescriptions. Difference bet\veen categorical
does not entail that the commander succeeds in making
and hypothetical prescriptions. The proble1n of con-
the commanded do that which he \Vants him to do. 'l'hc
ditionality involved in hypothetical prescriptions 168
notions of obedience and disobedience. Deduction of the
principle that Ought entails Can fro1n the presuppositions 2. I-Iypothetical propositions about categorical norms, cate
gorical propositions about hypothetical norms, and
of commanding 121
hypothetical norms. In hypothetical norms it is the content
13. The matching of abilities to give and to take orders.
and not the character \vhich is subject to condition 168
Commanding, trying to command, and commanding to
3. I-Iypothetical norms and technical norms. 'fhe latter often
~ 1~
belong to the 'n1otivation background' of the former.
14. Promulgation and effective sanction as ingredients of
Technical norms arc not hypothetical nor1ns about means
normative action. The measure of efficacy 125
to ends 170
15. The ability to command presupposes a superior strength
4, Conditioned action. /-expressions 171
of the commander over the commanded. Cominanding is
5. The conception of tff-expressions as degenerate cases of
not possible among equals 127
/-expressions 171
6. Elementary /-expressions 172
7. 'I'hc conditions of consistency of atomic /-expressions.
VIII. DEONTIC LOGIC: CATEGORICAL NORMS The 'shorter' and the 'longer' form of /-expressions 173
1. Deontic Logic. Its basis is a theory of norm-kernels. Its 8. Uniform /-expressions 175
division into a study of categorical and a study of hypo- 9, Every /-expression is a truth-function of elementary
thetical norms 129 /-expressions 175
2. The prescriptive and the descriptive interpretation of 0- 10. The constituents of a /-expression. Truth-tables. /-tauto-
and P-expressions. Truth-functional and non-truth- logies 176
functional uses of the connectives 130
11. 1'hc normal forms of /-expressions 176
3. Consistency of norms. Consistency and possible existence 134
12. The conception of categorical norms as degenerate or
4. Norms and negation. The notion of a negation-norm 135 limiting cases of hypothetical norms. Redefinition of
5. Compatibility of norms. Statement of definitions 141 OP-expressions 177
xvi xvii
B
CONTENTS
13. 'fhe principles of the logic of categorical nonns arc also
the principles of the logic of hypothetical norms. Re
definition of the notions of the content, the conditions of
application, and the negation-norm of a given nonn. 'fhe
n1etalogical notions of consistency, compatibility, and
entailment 17 8
14. Some theoretns on the relation bct\vecn categorical and
hypothetical norms 180
15. 'fhe conjunctive distributivity of the 0-operator 181
I
16. 'fhe disjunctive non-distributivity of the P-operator 182
17. 1'he notion of com1nitment ..D iscussion of some formulae
of the old systetn of dcontic logic and their equivalents in ON NORMS IN GENERAL
the new system 184
18. The Paradoxes of Cotnmittncnt. Redefinition of the
notion of commitn1cnt. Commitment as a voluntary loss
of normative freedo1n 187
1. THE word 'norm' in English, and the corresponding word in
X. NORMS OF f-IIGHER ORDER other languages, is used in many senses and often with an unclear
1. Norms, norn1-propositions, and normative acts as sug meaning. It can hardly be said to be a well-established term in the
gested contents of norms. Definition of norms of higher
English philosophic vocabulary. This can be said, however, of the
order. Nonns of higher order and prescriptions 189
adjective 'normative'.
2. 'fhe issuing and cancelling of prescriptions. 'The t\VO
'Norm' has several partial synonyms which are good English.
notions of cancellation 191
'Pattern', 'standard', 'type' are such words. So are 'regulation',
3. 'fhe notions of sub-authority, supcdor authority, and
supreme or sovereign authority 191 'rule', and 'law'. Directions of use and prescriptions are perhaps
not often called 'norms', but we should not hesitate to call them
4. 'fhe prominence of permissions among higher order
norms. Competence norms and the delegation of power 192 'normative'.
5. The concept of validity. Factual and normative validity. Since the field of meaning of 'norm' is not only heterogeneous
Validity and truth. Invalidity 194 but also has vague boundaries, it would probably be futile to try
6. Chains of subordination. 'fhe notion of a normative to create a General Theory of Norms covering the whole field.
system. Validity in a system. Do the la\vs of the state form
The theory of norms must be somehow restricted in its scope.
a system? 198
When constructing a restricted theory of norms, however, it is as
7. Invalid nonnative acts and the usurpation of normative
well to reme1nber that the various meanings of '11orm' are not logi
po\ver. 'fhc concept of a revolution 200
cally unrelated. The word is not 'ambiguous' in the ordinary sense.
8. Independent and intersecting normative systems 202
A restricted theory of norms runs the risk of being defectiveifit does
9. Conflicting normative systems 203
not pay due attention to conceptual affinities and logical relation
10. Is conflict \Vi thin a normative system logically possible?
The conception of competence norms as toleration of ships between the various parts of the whole field of meaning.
normative action and as right to normative action. 'fhe In this chapter I shall try to single out and briefly characterize
conception of the normative system as a corpus. The some of the chief meanings of the word 'norm' or, as we could
transmission of the sovereign \vill 203
also say, species or types of norms.
INDEX 209 2. We have said that one of the meanings of 'norm' is law. The
word 'law', however, is used in at least three typically different
xviii
1
ON NORMS IN GENERAL ON NORMS IN GENERAL
senses. First, we speak of the !aivs of the state. Secondly, we speak the authority behind the laws tries, in the first place, to correct
of the laws of nature. Thirdly, we speak of !aivs of logic (and the behaviour of men. Sometimes, however, the authority alters
mathematics). the laws-perhaps in order to make them conform more to the
Obviously, the laws of nature and the laws of the state are very capacities and demands of 'human nature'.
different. Yet the identity of name is no pure coincidence. The contrast 'prescriptive/descriptive' can be used for distin
Thus, with the Greeks the conception of the world as a kos111os guishing norms from things which are not norms. The laws
or harmonious order seems to have been connected historically nature are descriptive, not prescriptive-and therefore they are
with their conception of the city-state as a just and lawful order not norms. That is: we thus delineate the use of the word 'norm';
for a human community. The natural philosophy of the pre we draw the boundaries of the concept. Under another use of the
Socratics has been called a projection of ideals of a social order on term the laws of nature can perfectly well be called 'norms'.
to the entire universe. In the philosophy of Plato we could say, Someone may think that the attribute 'prescriptive' gives the
this idea of the world as a kosmos is projected back on to human clue to a general characterization of norms. Normative discourse
conditions and made a pattern or standard of the good life. is prescriptive discourse, it is often said. With prescriptive dis
With the Greek conception of law as the conditions of equilib course is then contrasted descriptive, and sometimes also evalua~
rium and harmony may be contrasted the Hebrew (Old Testa tive, discourse.
ment) conception of it as the expression of a commanding sovereign To identify the meaning of 'normative' with that of 'prescrip
will. The idea of God as lawgiver may be regarded as an analogy tive' and 'norm' with 'prescription' would, however, be too
or a projection on to a supernatural plane of the idea of a sovereign narrowing. Besides, 'prescriptive' and 'prescription' are words
chief or king in a human community. As the king gives laws to with a vague meaning and must be made more precise in order
those over whom he is set to rule, so in a similar manner God rules to be useful. As we shall soon see, there are things which we
the whole universe by His law or 'word'. The Christian idea of a may without hesitation wish to call norms, but to which the attri
king 'by the grace of God' is a projection back on to human butes 'prescriptive' and 'descriptive' both appear equally inappro
affairs of this idea of a supreme lord of the universe. The idea of priate.
the worldly kingdom is given a foundation in the same super
natural idea, for which it originally set the pattern. 3. Let us briefly consider the meaning of 'law' in the phrase 'laws
As we tend to see it, the laws of nature and the laws of the state of logic (mathematics)'. The laws of logic were often in the past
are toto coelo logically different in spite of affinities in the origins of also called the Laws of Thought.
the ideas of the two 'laws'. The difference can be briefly character On closer inspection we find that there are, in logic and
ized as follows: mathematics, several types of proposition which are or may be
The laws of nature are descriptive. They describe the regularities called 'laws'. We need not here inquire into these distinctions.
which man thinks he has discovered in the course of nature. They As examples oflaws oflogic, we shall instance the Law of Excluded
are true or false. Nature does not, except metaphorically, 'obey' Middle in the formulation 'Every proposition is either true or
its laws. If a discrepancy is found to exist between the description false' and the Law of Contradiction in the formulation 'No
and the actual course of nature it is the description, and not the proposition is both true and false'.
course of nature, that must be corrected.-This is a superficial Are such laws 'descriptive' or 'prescriptive'? If the first, what
characterization of what the laws of nature are. But I think it is do they describe? The way people think? This suggestion is not
basically correct. very satisfactory. For, first of all, it is not clear in itself what it
The laws of the state are prescriptive. They lay down regulations means to think according to the law, for example, that no proposi
for the conduct and intercourse of men. They have no truth-value. tion is both true and false. Secondly, the idea that the laws of logic
Their aim is to influence behaviour. When men disobey the laws describe how people think seems difficult to reconcile with the
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