Table Of ContentPublished by Macmillan in association with the International Institute
for Strategic Studies
Studies in International Security
Hedley Bull: THE CONTROL OF THE ARMS RACE
James Cable: GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY, 1919-1979
Donald C. Daniel: ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND
SUPERPOWER STRAT EGIC STABILITY
Paul Dibb: THE SOVIET UNION: The Incomplete Superpower
Lawrence Freedman: THE EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY
Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (editor): ARMED FORCES AND THE
WELFARE SOCIETIES: CHALLENGES IN THE 1980s
Robert Jackson: SOUTH ASIAN CRISIS: India-Pakistan-Bangladesh
J. M. Lee: AFRICAN ARMIES AND CIVIL ORDER
Hanns W. Maull: RAW MATERIALS, ENERGY AND WESTERN
SECURITY
Adam Roberts: NATIONS IN ARMS: The Theory and Practice of
Territorial Defence
Robert Thompson: DEFEATING COMMUNIST INSURGENCY:
Experience from Malaya and Vietnam
International Institute for Strategic Studies conference papers
Christoph Bertram (editor):
NEW CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND EAST-WEST
SECURITY
PROSPECTS OF SOVIET POWER IN THE 1980s
THE FUTURE OF STRATEGIC DETERRENCE
THIRD-WORLD CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 1980s
DEFENCE AND CONSENSUS: The Domestic Aspects of Western
Security
Robert O'Neill (editor):
THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THE 1980s
NEW TECHNOLOGY AND WESTERN SECURITY POLICY
Fram;ois de Rose:
EUROPEAN SECURITY AND FRANCE
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Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, RG212XS, England.
NEW TECHNOLOGY
AND WESTERN
SECURITY POLICY
Edited by
ROBERT O'NEILL
M
in association with
Palgrave Macmillan
MACMILLAN
©International Institute for Strategic Studies 1985
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 1985 978-0-333-39717-6
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission
of this publication may be made without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied
or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance
with the provisions of the Copyright Act 1956 (as amended).
Any person who docs any unauthorised act in relation to
this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and
civil claims for damages.
First published 1985
Published by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LT O
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
New technology and western security policy.
(International Institute for Strategic Studies
conference papers)
I. Military policy-Effect of technological
innovations on
I. O'Neill, Robert, 1936- II. Series
355'.0335'1713 UAII
ISBN 978-1-349-08196-7 ISBN 978-1-349-08194-3 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-08194-3
CONTENTS
STRATEGIC SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY:
WHERE SHOULD WE BE GOING? .
L T-GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT
Formerly o/'the USAF and National Security Advisor to
President Ford. Currently a Consultant on Foreif{n and
National Security Policy. Washinf{ton DC
THE FUTURE OF LAND-BASED STRATEGIC WEAPONS: PART I 12
DR PETER J. SHARFMAN
Prof{ramme Manaf{er. International Security and
Commerce. Conwessional Office o/'Technolof{y
Assessment (OTA). Washinf{ton DC
THE FUTURE OF LAND-BASED STRATEGIC WEAPONS: PART II 24
LOUIS C. FINCH
Assistant Chief. Foreif{n Affairs and National De[ense
Division. Conf{ressional Research Service (CRS).
Washinf{ton DC
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE WITHIN THE
WESTERN ALLIANCE: PROSPECTS FOR RATIONALIZATION AND THE
DIVISION OF LABOUR: PART I. 38
DR INGEMAR DORFER
National Defence Research Institute. Stockholm. Sweden
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT AND FORCE STRUCTURE WITHIN THE
WESTERN ALLIANCE: PROSPECTS FOR RATIONALIZATION AND THE
DIVISION OF LABOUR: PART II 46
JOHN ROPER
Editor. International Affairs. Royal Institute of
International Affairs ( Rl/A). London ·
NEW TECHNOLOGY, STABILITY AND THE ARMS-CONTROL DEADLOCK:
PART I 53
PROF. WOLF GRAF VON BAUDISSIN
Formerly Director. Institute for Peace Research and
International Security A.ff'airs. University of Hamburf?,
West Germany
CONVENTIONAL FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY:
HOW REAL ARE THE GAINS IN PROSPECT? . 60
HENRICONZE
Deputy Director, International Division, Armaments
Directorate, Ministry of Defence, Paris
NEW CONVENTIONAL FORCE TECHNOLOGY AND THE NATO-WARSAW
PACT BALANCE: PART I . 66
DR STEVEN L. CANBY
Fellow. The Wilson Center for International Scholars.
Washington DC
NEW CONVENTIONAL FORCE TECHNOLOGY AND THE NATO-WARSAW
PACT BALANCE: PART II. 84
DONALD R. COTTER
Director, Center for Strategic Concepts, McLean,
Virginia, USA
TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF ARMS CONTROL 98
WALTER B. SLOCOMBE
Lawyer, Member oft he firm ofC aplin and Drysdale,
Washington DC, and formerly Deputy Under
Secretary for Policy in the US Department of Defense,
I98I-84
NEW TECHNOLOGY, STABILITY AND THE ARMS-CONTROL DEADLOCK:
PART II 107
DR BARRY M. BLECHMAN
Institute for Defense Analyses, Alexandria, Virginia, USA
NEW TECHNOLOGY AND INTRA-ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIPS: NEW
STRENGTHS, NEW STRAINS . 116
HON. DAVID M. ABSHIRE
US Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic
Council, Brussels
DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND WESTERN INDUSTRIAL
POLICY: PART I. 130
PROF. SIR RONP LD MASON
Professor ofC hemistry, University ofS ussex, andformerly
Chief Scientific Adviser to Ministry of Defence. London
DEFENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND WESTERN INDUSTRIAL
POLICY: PART II 134
HENRI MARTRE
President and Director General. SNIAS. Paris
THE 'STAR WARS' DEBATE: THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND STRATEGIC
DEFENCE: PART I 140
FRED S. HOFFMAN
Director, Pan Heuristics, Marina-dei-Rey, California
THE 'STAR WARS' DEBATE: THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND STRATEGIC
DEFENCE: PART II . 149
PROF. LAWRENCE FREEDMAN
Professor of War Studies. Kings's College, University of
London
CONCLUSIONS 166
ROBERT O'NEILL
Director, lnternationallnstitute.for Strategic Studies,
London
Index 173
Strategic System Development and New
Technology: Where Should We be Going?
L T -GEN. BRENT SCOWCROFT
Any discussion of strategic system develop was integral to military force development
ment and technology, focused on the prior to World War I. Any conflict which
question of where we should be going, must occurred would obviously be brief, with a
be anchored in something more than abstrac clear edge going to the side which was able to
tions, theoretical constructs or pursuit of strike fmt. Those assumptions, as we know,
technology for its own sake. Consideration were a factor in the precipitating events of
must be given to the strategic concepts, World War I, but they turned out to be very
political imperatives and constraints, econ wrong. One of the major reasons the expecta
omic limitations, 'mirror-imaging' and other tions were so far from the mark and the war
factors which have heavily influenced the such a bloody stalemate was the underestima
course of strategic system development. Nor tion of the impact of a new weapon - the
does the present state and process of strategic machine gun. The machine gun, properly
force development occur in a historical employed, offered an important advantage to
vacuum - though we frequently tend, the defence.
especially in the United States, to behave Conventional wisdom during the interwar
otherwise. Some historical sense of the route period (outside Germany at least) was that
we have travelled in order to reach our the defence had obtained a decisive advan
present condition may therefore help to put tage in warfare and that the next war, if one
our choices for the future into somewhat occurred, was likely to be a repetition of
better perspective. World War I. Once again this assumption
had an impact on force development and
Weapons and Warfare planning, and again the prognosticators were
The history of efforts to analyse and predict wrong. They were wrong in part because of
the impact of major weapon developments the development late in World War I of a
on the nature and conduct of warfare and the weapon system designed to counter the
inter-relationship with strategy are not such machine gun - the tank. The crude early
that we should undertake to analyse such versions of the tank masked the full potential
major future developments as strategic of this new development. There were strat
defence with any great sense of confidence. egists who recognized the implications of the
Indeed, our estimates of the future character tank but, except in Germany, they tended to
of conflict based on major weapon develop be ignored.
ments have frequently infact been very wide Likewise, we have made, and continue to
ofthe mark. make, assumptions about the impact of
For example, the use of the railroad in the nuclear weapons on the nature of conflict.
American Civil War, and especially in the Those assumptions, in some aspects, began
Franco-Prussian War, led strategists to the shortly after World War I, with a strategic
conclusion that future wars would be based assessment made by an Italian general,
on mobility and that decisive advantage Guilio Doubet. Doubet concluded that
could be expected to go to the side which World War I had demonstrated the perm
utilized the railroad to mobilize rapidly and anent ascendancy of the defence over the
attack, thus getting in a decisive blow before offence in land warfare. A new weapon had
the opponent was prepared. This assumption come along, however, which could overcome
that situation and revolutionize warfare. That buted to the German defeat, but, in Doubet's
weapon was the airplane. Doubet hypothe own terms, it had been a failure.
sized that the airplane offered an alternative The development which rescued Doubet's
to the traditional necessity to defeat the strategy from probable oblivion and, indeed,
enemy's forces in the fteld in order to obtain saw it triumph, was the advent of the nuclear
victory. The airplane could take the conflict weapon. The damage which could be done
directly to the enemy population and, in a by only a few nuclear weapons was so
brutal but brief assault, break the enemy's horrendous that Doubet's hypotheses seemed
morale and thus his will to resist. Paradoxic fmally to be fulftlled many times over.
ally, attacking population centres would
actually be humane, because that would be Massive Retaliation
the quickest way to break national morale Thus it was that the ftrst US strategy of the
and terminate the conflict. It would all be missile age vindicated Doubet. That strategy
over with great rapidity, avoiding a repetition was massive retaliation, and it was based on
of the awful carnage of trench warfare. the notion that the United States would
Quick, even pre-emptive attack would des respond to any Soviet aggression anywhere,
troy enemy airftelds and air forces on the not at that point and in kind, but with a
ground, leaving the population naked to 'massive' attack on the Soviet heartland
aerial bombardment which would quickly employing nuclear weapons.
lead to surrender. Whatever the influence of Doubet within
The logic was impressive, once the basic the US Air Force, however, it seems clear
assumptions were accepted. After a brief but that massive retaliation was adopted for
all-out aerial assault, victory would go to the reasons more economic than strategic in
side which had struck first with the greatest nature. Faced with the troop requirements
force. for the defence of NATO and the costly
Doubet's writings struck a responsive experience of the Korean War, massive retal
chord in many of the young airmen in iation seemed a 'cheap' way to defend the
Europe and the United States. Only in the West against any Soviet expansionist designs.
Soviet Union did his views appear to make It was doubly attractive because the Soviet
little impression. In both Great Britain and Union had no reciprocal military capability.
the United States, Doubet's principles had a While massive retaliation made consider
profound impact on the strategy for the air able military sense under the circumstances
war against Germany in World War II. of the time, it seemed to lack adequate
In practice, Doubet's assumptions proved political credibility. It was never imple
wrong in two critical, closely inter-related mented in the case of third-world conflicts
aspects. He vastly underestimated both the and much of the military history of NATO
weight of effort which would be required and involves attempts to bolster its credibility.
the resilience of civilian morale, at least in Whatever its military legacy, however,
the case of World War II. The tonnage of massive retaliation had a fateful impact on
bombs dropped in that war exceeded attitudes within the Atlantic Community
Doubet's estimates many times, without the towards nuclear weapons and warfare.
decisive results he predicted. The period of Western nuclear monopoly
Strategic bombing was an important ele was short-lived, and soon there began a
ment in the Allied victory, especially in the debate about how to respond to the growing
impact on industrial installations playing a Soviet nuclear arsenal. There were two alter
critical role in the German war effort. That native approaches which received serious
effect, however, was produced only over an consideration. The first was to continue the
extended period and in conjunction with a philosophy of massive retaliation by promis
massive military ground campaign which ing to 'punish' Soviet aggression by direct
consumed resources at a prodigious rate. and massive attack on the USSR herself. The
There has been considerable debate about the other alternative was to revert to a more trad
extent to which strategic bombing contri- itional military approach, that is, to focus US
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