Table Of Content
NEW LIES FOR OLD
The Communist Strategy of Deception and
Disinformation
ANATOLIY GOLITSYN
TO THE MEMORY OF
Anna Akhmatova
CONSCIENCE AND SOUL OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE
Contents
Editors's Foreword xiii
Author's Note xvii
PART ONE
The Two Methodologies
1 The Problems Facing Western Analysts 3
The General Difficulties 3—The Special Difficulties: Disinformation
4—Disinformation in Communist Regimes S
2 The Patterns of Disinformation:
"Weakness and Evolution" 10
The "Weakness and Evolution" Pattern 10—The Precedent of the NEP
11—The Results of the NEP 16—The Lesson of the NEP
3 The Patterns of Disinformation:
"Facade and Strength" 18
Official Speeches and Party Documents 20—Special Disinformation
Operations 21
4 The Patterns of Disinformation:
Transition 23
The Misrepresentation of De-Stalinization 24—Anticommunism 25—
Anti-Stalinism 26—De-Stalinization in Practice 29—Improvised De-
Stalinization from 1953 to 1956 29—Re-Stalinization 31
5 The New Policy and Disinformation Strategy 33
The New Policy 34—The Disadvantages of Apparent Unity 36— The
Advantages of Apparent Disunity 37—The Political Use of De-
Stalinization 39—Sources of Inspiration 41
6 The Shelepin Report and Changes in Organization 46
Department D. 50
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viii CONTENTS
7 The New Role of Intelligence 52
8 Sources of Information 58
Western Sources 58—Communist Sources 61—The Analysis of Infor-
mation from Communist Sources 62
9 The Vulnerability of Western Assessments 65
The Consequences of Different Patterns of Disinformation 67—The
Crisis in the Bloc, 1949-1956 68—The Second World War 68
10 Communist Intelligence Successes,
Western Failures, and the Crisis in
Western Studies 70
Factors in Communist Intelligence Successes 71—Obsolete Western
Methods of Analyzing Communist Sources 73—The Western Failure
to Detect Disinformation and Its Current Pattern 76
11 Western Errors 79
12 The New Methodology 85
Factors Underlying the New Methodology 86—The New Methodology
and Western Sources 93—The New Methodology and Communist
Sources 96—Official Communist Sources 96—Unofficial Communist
Sources 100—"Secret" Communist Sources 101—To Sum Up . . . 102
PART TWO The Disinformation Program and Its Impact on the West
13 The First Disinformation Operation:
The Soviet-Yugoslav "Dispute" of 1958-60 107
Yugoslavia's Final Reconciliation with the Bloc 107—Open Evidence of
Yugoslav Participation in the Formulation of the Policy 110— Further
Anomalies in the "Dispute" 114—Objectives of the Soviet-Yugoslav
"Dispute" of 1955-60 118
14 The Second Disinformation Operation:
The "Evolution" of the Soviet Regime,
Part One: Major Changes in the USSR 120
Economic Changes 120—Political Changes 124 -- Changes in Diplo-
CONTENTS ix
macy 127—The Influence of Ideology 131—The Revival of De-Stalin-
ization 135—The Position of Soviet Scientists and Other Intellectuals
139—Objectives of Strategic Disinformation on Soviet "Evolution" and
"Moderation" 141
15 The Third Disinformation Operation:
The Soviet-Albanian "Dispute" and "Split" 143
The Overt Picture of Soviet-Albanian Relations 143—Inside Informa-
tion and Its Interpretation 144—Anomalies in the "Dispute" and "Split"
147—Comparison with the Tito-Stalin "Split" 149—Conclusion 151—
Objectives of the Disinformation Operation 152
16 The Fourth Disinformation Operation:
The Sino-Soviet "Split" 153
CPSU-CPC Collaboration, 1944-49, 153—Sino-Soviet Friction, 1950-
57, and Its Removal 156—The Historical Evidence of Sino-Soviet
Differences 162—The Form of Sino-Soviet Differences 163— The
Content of Sino-Soviet Differences 168—Ideological Differences
168—Economic Differences 170—Military Differences 172—Differ-
ences in National Interest 175—Differences in Political and Diplomatic
Strategy and Tactics 177—Differences over Tactics for Non-bloc
Communist Parties 179—The Technique of the "Split" 179— Strategic
Objectives of the "Split" 182
17 The Fifth Disinformation Operation:
Romanian "Independence" 183
Special Relations between the Romanians and Soviets 184—The
"Evidence" of Soviet-Romanian Differences 186—The Motives for the
Projection of Romanian "Independence" 191—Objectives of the
Disinformation Operation 194
18 The Sixth Disinformation Operation:
The Alleged Recurrence of Power Struggles in the Soviet,
Chinese, and Other Parties 195
Succession in the Soviet Leadership: New Stabilizing Factors 196—
The Failure of Lenin and Stalin to Solve the Succession Problem 197—
Khrushchev's "Removal"an Agreed Transfer of the Leadership to
Brezhnev 200—Objectives of Disinformation on Power Struggles 206
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19 The Seventh Disinformation Operation: "Democratization" in
Czechoslovakia in 1968 208
The Western Interpretation 208—Western Errors 209—A Rein-
terpretation of Czechoslovak "Democratization" 210—The Role of
Historians and Economists in "Democratization" 211—The Roles of
Barak and Sik 212—The Role of Writers in "Democratization" 214—
The "Struggle" between the Novotny "Conservatives" and the Dubcek
"Progressives" 216—Conclusions 220—Communist Gains and Losses
from "Democratization" 221—Possible Implications of "Democratization
"for the West 223—Objectives of the "Quiet Revolution" 224
20 The Second Disinformation Operation: The
"Evolution" of the Soviet Regime,
Part Two: The "Dissident" Movement 227
Sakharov 231—Objectives of Disinformation on "Dissidence" 241
21 The Eighth Disinformation Operation:
Continuing Eurocommunist Contacts with
the Soviets—The New Interpretation
of Eurocommunism 243
The Manifestations of Eurocommunism 244—The French Party 245—
The Italian Party 246—The Spanish Party 246—The British Party
247—Joint Statements 247—The Soviet Attitude 248—The Yugoslavs
and Romanians 249—The New Analysis 240—The Emergence of
Eurocommunism 250—The Revival of Dead Issues 251— Exploitation
of the "Independent" Image of Eurocommunist Parties 252—The
Inconsistencies in Eurocommunism 253—Continuing Eurocommunist
Contacts with the Soviets 255—The New Interpretation of
Eurocommunism 257—The Possible Adverse Effects on International
Communism 259—Implications for Western Propaganda 261—
Conclusion 261—Objectives of Eurocommunism 262
22 The Role of Disinformation and
Intelligence Potential in the Realization of
the Communist Strategies 263
The Major Strategy 264—The Disinformation and Strategic Role of
Yugoslavia 266—Sino-Soviet Disinformation and the Cultural Rev-
olution: A New Interpretation 268—Sino-Soviet Duality and Commu-
nist Strategy in the Third World 272—Sino-Soviet Duality and Mili-
CONTENTS xi
tary Strategy 274—Sino-Soviet Duality and the Revolutionary Move-
ment 279—The Advantages of Sino-Soviet Duality 281—The Intelli-
gence Potential and Agents of Influence 282—Strategic Exploitation of
KCB Agents among Prominent Soviet Intellectuals and Religious
Leaders 291
23 The Evidence of Overall Co-ordination
between the Communist Governments and Parties 295
Coordination within the Bloc 295—Summit Meetings 296—Coordi-
nation through Diplomatic Channels 299—Bilateral Coordination
within the Bloc 301—Coordination between Bloc and Non-bloc Parties
306—Conclusions 307
24 The Impact of the Disinformation Program 309
The Shaping of Western Assessments of the Communist World 309—
The Effect on Western Policy Formation 313—The Practical Effects
on Western Policies 316—Conclusion 317
PART THREE The Final Phase and the Western Counter-Strategy
25 The Final Phase 327
Western Interpretation of Events in Poland 328—A New Analysis
328—Developments in the 1970s 320—Final Preparations for the
"Renewal" 330—The Polish Communist Party within Solidarity 332—
Motives for the Creation of Solidarity 332—The Threat to the West
from the Polish "Renewal" 335—Sino-Soviet Relations 343—The
Third World 344—Disarmament 345—Convergence 345—The
Worldwide Communist Federation 346—Comments on the
Appointment of Andropov and on Other Developments Following the
Death of Brezhnev 347—Sino-Soviet Developments 350—The
Attempted Assassination of the Pope 351
26 Where Now? 355
Reassessment 357—End to National Rivalries 360—Ideological Soli-
darity 361—Inward Heart-Searching 362—Widening Defense Alli-
ances 362—Reorientation of Intelligence Services 363—Diplomatic
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Disengagement 363—Denial of Trade and Technology 364—
Isolating Communist Parties 364—Addressing the Peoples of the
Communist Bloc 365—The Next Half Century 365
Glossary 367
Notes 371
Editors' Foreword
VERY RARELY disclosures of information from behind the Iron Curtain
throw new light on the roots of communist thought and action and
challenge accepted notions on the operation of the communist system.
We believe that this book does both these things. It is nothing if not
controversial. It rejects conventional views on subjects ranging from
Khrushchev's overthrow to Tito's revisionism, from Dubcek's
liberalism to Ceausescu's independence, and from the dissident
movement to the Sino-Soviet split. The author's analysis has many
obvious implications for Western policy. It will not be readily
accepted by those who have for long been committed to opposing
points of view. But we believe that the debates it is likely to provoke
will lead to a deeper understanding of the nature of the threat from
international communism and, perhaps, to a firmer determination to
resist it.
The author's services to the party and the KGB and the unusually
long periods he spent in study, mainly in the KGB but also with the
University of Marxism-Leninism and the Diplomatic School, make
the author uniquely well qualified as a citizen of the West to write
about the subjects covered in this book.
He was born near Poltava, in the Ukraine, in 1926. He was thus
brought up as a member of the postrevolutionary generation. From
1933 onward he lived in Moscow. He joined the communist youth
movement (Komsomol) at the age of fifteen while he was a cadet in
military school. He became a member of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1945 while studying at the artillery school
for officers at Odessa.
In the same year he entered military counterintelligence. On
graduation from the Moscow school of military counterespionage in
1946, he joined the Soviet intelligence service. While working in its
headquarters he attended evening classes at the University of
Marxism-Leninism, from which he graduated in 1948. From
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