Nature's Goodness: An Aristotelian Account

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CCiittyy UUnniivveerrssiittyy ooff NNeeww YYoorrkk ((CCUUNNYY))
CCUUNNYY AAccaaddeemmiicc WWoorrkkss
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects CUNY Graduate Center
2-2014
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Nathan K. Metzger
Graduate Center, City University of New York
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NATURE’S GOODNESS: AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT

by
Nathan Metzger

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New
York

2014
© 2014
NATHAN METZGER
All Rights Reserved

ii
This
 manuscript
 has
 been
 read
 and
 accepted
 for
 the
 Graduate
 Faculty
 in
 Philosophy

in
 satisfaction
 of
 the
 dissertation
 requirement
 for
 the
 degree
 of
 Doctor
 of

Philosophy.

  Peter
 Simpson

 .

 .

 .

 Date

 Chair
 of
 Examining
 Committee

  Iakovos
 Vasiliou

 .

 .

 .

 Date

 Executive
 Officer

  Jesse
 Prinz

 .

  Douglas
 Lackey

 .

Iakovos
 Vasiliou

 .

  Supervisory
 Committee

THE
 CITY
 UNIVERSITY
 OF
 NEW
 YORK

  iii
Abstract
NATURE’S GOODNESS: AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT
By
Nathan Metzger

Adviser: Peter Simpson
Neo-Aristotelians have made major headway in moral theory, and it is now commonplace
to find philosophers defending the reality of goodness through a teleological analysis of
human being. Whatever the merits of this approach, it has suffered from a lack of a
sustained defense of its pre-modern metaphysical panorama: the Aristotelian conception
of the human good gets traction only if its decidedly pre-modern and ‘robust’ philosophy
of nature is defensible in its own right. In this dissertation, I aim to give a partial
breakdown of the particular sort of metaphysical project that the Aristotelian moral
theorist assumes, but does not always explicate. In particular, I aim to show how neo-
Aristotelians rely on a particular view of substance that, while certainly challenging
contemporary naturalist construals of the same, is nevertheless defensible in its own right.
Moreover, it might well be the case that even ‘liberal’ contemporary naturalist construals
of ‘moral facts’ face difficulties that cannot be overcome; for they might only be able to
countenance the less deflationary moral ontologies they desire by first assuming a view
of substance that puts pressure on the entirety of the ‘modern’ project. The first part of
this dissertation will focus on the ways that an Aristotelian nature is defensible. The
second part will show in more detail how this pre-modern vision of reality helps to locate
and in some cases even ‘solve’ certain metaethical conundrums. The goal is to show why
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an Aristotelian moral theory can offer a credible alternative to the usual ‘moral realist’
positions in contemporary metaethics, by offering not just a more plausible view of
human goodness, but a more plausible view of nature as a whole.

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Acknowledgements

This modest work represents the end-result of a philosophical conversion. I
wouldn’t have put my name to any of these ideas at the start of my graduate career—back
when I knew a thing or two. I am grateful to Peter Simpson, not just for his own work,
which played a part in my change of views, but also for our many conversations over the
course of my graduate tenure, and for his help with this project. He patiently put up with
many inchoate attempts at making my new-found point, he dogged me to be clearer and
more charitable, and he pressed me to investigate my own arguments and their
implications more deeply. I couldn’t have asked for a better advisor. I’m also grateful to
my two readers, Douglas Lackey and Jesse Prinz, for their generous, kind, and
challenging comments on these pages.
Like any student, my ideas evolved through many ‘spirited’ conversations with
professors, friends, and colleagues. I need to especially thank my two dear pals Tim
Czech and Kevin Byrne, with whom I spent countless hours talking, arguing, and
philosophizing. They witnessed first-hand my slow evolution in world-view, and were
extraordinarily patient through it all. I’m also blessed to have supportive parents, who
didn’t flinch when I told them that I was going to move to New York to try out
philosophy for a living.
Lastly and most importantly, I must thank my wife, Elizabeth. I don’t know where
I’d be without her angelic patience and extraordinary help. If I were to begin to delve into
the ways that I’ve leaned on her during these years, I’d have another book on my hands.
I’d like to dedicate these pages to our three boys—Peter, John, and Charlie.

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1 1
Preliminary Reasons for Accepting Substantial Form

1.1. Introduction 1
1.2. A Short-Form Argument for Aristotelian Value Realism 3
1.3. Why an Aristotelian Account is More Satisfying 7
1.4. Arguments Against Formal and Final Cause 12
1.5. The Weak Argument: Substantial Form and Design 13
1.6. The Strong Argument: Ockham’s Razor and Explanatory Success 15
1.7. Conclusion 18

Chapter 2 20
Substantial Form and Mechano-Atomism
2.1. Introduction 20
2.2. Naturalism is Strict Naturalism, and Strict Naturalism is Eliminativism 23
2.3. Physicalism as Mechano-Atomism 27
2.4. Ceci n’est pas une table, or The Problem of Making Distinctions that Matter 31
2.5. Eliminativism About Organic Substantial Form 32
2.6. Aristotelianism is a Physicalism 35
2.7. Substantial Form vs. Mechanism 37
2.8. Irreducible Consciousness and The Sliding Tile Puzzle 41
2.9. Substance Dualism is Parasitic on Cartesian Dualism 47
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2.10. Substantial Form and Observation 48
2.11 Conclusion 54

Chapter 3 56
Consequences of Mechano-Atomism

3.1. Introduction 56
3.2. Intentionality, Teleology, and Mentality 57
3.3. More is Different 64
3.4. The Problem With Nominalist Readings of Form 66
3.5. What’s it Like to Be a Form? 72
3.6. Conclusion 75

Chapter 4 78
Moral Naturalism in Light of Aristotelian Metaphysics

4.1. Introduction 78
4.2. What are the Alternatives to Naïve Moral Realism? 79
4.3 Classical Ontology is Top-Down Ontology 83
4.4 Aristotle as an Inflationary Reductionist 84
4.5. The Parmenidean Constraint 85
4.6. Aristotle’s Four Causes Understood in Light of the Parmenidean Constraint 87
4.7. Mind, Form, and Emergence 89
4.8. Potentiality and Actuality 90
4.9. Supervenience, Emergence, and Value 93
4.10 Conclusion 97
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Chapter 5 99
The Legitimacy of Aristotelian Philosophy of Nature

5.1. Introduction 99
5.2 Human Goodness is Not Sui Generis 100
5.3 Contemporary Naturalism Entails Mind-Body Dualism 102
5.4 Irreducible Formal and Final Cause Cannot Weakly Emerge 111
5.5 Aristotelian Substantial Forms and the Theory of Evolution 115
5.6 Aristotelianism and Evolution Part 1: Teleology and the Scala Naturae 116
5.7 Aristotelianism and Evolution Part 2: Aristotle’s Anti-Hobbesianism 127
5.8 Aristotelianism and Evolution Part 3: Kripke, Efficient Causation, Convergence 133
5.9 Conclusion 141

Chapter 6 142
Aristotelianism and Natural Human Goodness

6.1. Introduction 142
6.2. Aristotelianism and Non-Naturalism, Part 1 144
6.3. Aristotelianism and Metaethics: Realism and the Parallel Metaethical Tracks 147
6.4. Natural Goodness and Natural Oughts 148
6.5 Happiness Is Parasitic On Virtue, Not the Other Way Around 151
6.6 Morality as Aristotelian Necessity 158
6.7 The Anti-Realist Response 164
6.8 Sorts of Relativism 168
6.9 A Realist Relativism? 172
6.10 Arguments Against Epistemologically Motivated Relativism 176
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