Table Of ContentSTUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR NATURE AND CREATURE
GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES
Thomas Aquinas's Way oj Thought
MITTELALTERS
HERAUSGEGEBEN VON
BY
Dr. ALBERT ZIMMERMANN
PROFESSOR AN DER UNIVERSITAT KOLN
JAN AERTSEN
BAND XXI
NATURE AND CREATURE
Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought
,
E.J. BRILL
LEIDEN • NEW YORK • K0BENHAV N • KOLN
1988
'ublished with financial support from the Netherlands Organization
for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z. W.O.)
CONTENTS
Translated from the Dutch by
Herbert Donald Morton List of Abbreviations .................................... . XI
Preface. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. From questioning towards knowing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.1. "An- men by nature desire to know" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1. 2. The natural desire to know the causes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3. "All that can be questioned or known can be reduced to four
questions" ......................................... . 12
1.3. 1. Every question is in a certain sense a quaestio medii .. 14
1.3.2. The "katallel" structure of questioning and of the
Library of Congress Cataloging~in~Publication Data bel.. ng II questl•O nab le " ......................... . 16
Aertsen, Johannes Adrianus. 1.3.3. The "katallel" structure of the "what" question .. . 18
[Natura en creatura. English J 1.3.4. The "if" question (an est) and the order of questioning 20
N,ature and creature: Thomas Aquinas's way of thought/Johannes
1.4. The sense of the "what" question (quid est) ............. . 25
Adnanus Aertsen; translated from the Dutch by Herbert Donald
Morton. 1.4.1. "The 'what' question ... sometimes inquires into the
p. cm.-(Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des supposit" .................................... . 25
Mittelalters. ISSN 0169·8125; Bd. 21)
1.4.2. "The 'what' question sometimes inquires into the
Translation of: Natura en creatura.
Rev. version of thesis (Ph.D.)-Free University in Amsterdam essence" .................................... . 26
1982. '
1.5. The question: What is nature? ........................ . 31
Bibliography: p.
Includes index. 1.6. The legitimacy of the desire to know ................... . 33
ISBN 90·04·08451·7 (pbk.) 1.6.1. Augustine: Unvirtuous desire to know (curiosity) .. . 34
1. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274-Contributions in doctrine 1.6.2. Thomas Aquinas: Studiositas and curiositas ......... . 36
of nature. 2. Thomas, Aquinas, Saint, 1225?-1274-Contributions in
doctrine of the creature. 3. Nature. 4. Creation. I. Title. 1.7. The natural desire to know and the idea of circulation .... . 40
II. Series. 1. 7.1. "It is desirable for each thing to be united to its princi-
B765.T54A6713 1987
pIe": The Neoplatonic motif of circulation ........ . 40
189',4-dcI9 87.21896
1.7.2. The desire to know in Thomas's reinterpretation of the
CIP
circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 42
1,8. The order of the questions an est and quid est and being as
ISSN 0169·8125
creature ........................................... . 45
ISBN 90 04 08451 7
1.8.1. Another mode of questioning ................... . 46
© Copyright 1988 by E. j. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands 1. 8.2. The origin of things and the question of being .... . 47
1. 9. The twofold sense of questioning ...................... . 50
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or
translated in any form,. by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche
or any other means without written permission from the publisher
PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS BY E. J. BRILL
VI
CONTENTS CONTENTS VII
2. By the way of predication (Per viam praedicationis): Defi-
3.6.2. Creation and participation ................... . 123
nition and participation ........ ...................... .
54 3.7. Con-cursus ........... ............................... . 127
2.1. "Being is said in many ways" (Ens multipliciter dicitur) .... . 55 3.7.1. Per viam naturae-per viam crealionis . ......... , .... . 127
3.7.2. Duplex ordo ................................... . 128
2. 1.1. Predication (per se and per accidens) and being (per se and
per accidens) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 3.7.3. Intelligibility ................................ . 131
56
2.1.2. The division of ens per se into the predicaments of 3 7 4 Grades of causality ............................ . 133
... fh"h"
substance and accident. ....................... . 58 3.7.5. Subiectum-essentia-esse: The problem 0 t e ot er 136
2.1.3. "Substance is said in two ways": SubJectum and essentia 61
2.2. In search of identity: Scire per viam diffinitionis ............ .
64 4. The way of truth (Via veritatis) ........................ . 141
2.2.1. "The definition consists of what is predicated per se" 65
2.2.2. Definition as "horizon" ....................... . 4.1. Intelligibility of being: Truth ......................... . 142
67
2.2.3. The way towards definition: Per viam divisionis ..... . 69 4.1.1. The desire to know and truth ................... . 142
2.3. Definitional thinking: Definitiones sunt sicut numeri ......... . 4.1.2. Being and true are convertible (Ens et verum convertuntur) 144
72
2.4. The definition of nature ............................. . 4.1.3. "Measure" .................................. . 147
76
2.5. Predication per essentiam and per participationem ........... . 4.2. "Measurel}: Truth and nature .... , ... '. ... , ........... . 148
79
2.5. 1. Another mode of predicating ................... . 80 4.2.1. Science is "from what is truel} (ex veris) .......... , 148
2.5.2. Every creature is being by participation (Omnis creatura 4.2.2. Per viam naturae: Termini stabiliti as truth ......... . . 152
est e~s participative). . . . . . . . ..................... . 83 4.2.3. The natural thing as the measure of the truth of
2.5.3. Predication per participationem and per se ........... . knowledge ................................... . 153
86
2.6. The two tracks of predication ......................... . 4.3. "Measure": Truth and creature .. , ... , ............... . 157
89
4.3.1. "There is the same disposition of things in being and
in truth" (Eadem est dispositio rerum in esseet ventate) .. 158
3. By the way of causality (Per viam causalitatis) ............ . 92 4.3.2. Per viam creation is: Natura imitatur artem (dwznam) .... . 162
3.1. Per viam divisionis: Cause, ......... , .................. . 93 4 .3. 3. God's science as the measure of the natural thing .. . 166
3.2. The reason for the division: The cause of generation (via in 4.4. Con-cursus .... ............................. , ... , .... . 170
uu) ............................................ . 4.4.1. The unity of origin of the diversity of forms ...... . 172
94
3.3. Division of the causes of generation ................... . 96 4.4.2. Per viam exemplaritatis-per viam naturae . ....... .... . 177
3.3.1. Causa per se versus causa per accidens (chance) ....... . 96 4.4.3. Are things more true in themselves than in the ex-
3.3.2. Division of the causes per se: Ars imitatur naturam ... . 100 emplars? .................................... . 180
3.4. Per viam naturae ............ , ...... .................. . 104 4.5. Retrospect ...... ................... .' ..... , ......... . 182
3.4.1. Natura ... est via in natuTam: Circulation .......... . 105 4.5.1. The reduction to Esse and Essenl ... ..... . 182
3.4.2. The common motive of both the way of thought and the 4.5.2. The double metaphysical reduction .............. . 185
way of being ................................. . 107
3.4.3. The prior and later in the division of the causes ... . 109 5. By the way of reason (Per viam rationis) ................. . 191
3.5. Another mode of causing (alius modus causandi) .......... .
112
3.5.1. The necessity of another mode of becoming ....... . 5.1. The discursive reason ..... .......... , ... , ........... . 192
112
3.5.2. The necessity of an origin of being in general: Emanatio 5.2. The historical reason: "The ancient philosophers gradually
113
3.5.3. "That which is said to be so by virtue of its essence is advanced in the knowledge of truth" .................. . 196
the cause of everything said to be so by participation" 116 5.3. "By the way of faith"-"By the way of reason" ........ . 201
3.6. Per viam creation is .................................... . 119 5.3.1. Creation as an article of faith ................... ; 202
3.6.1. Creatio ex nihilo ................................ . 5.3.2. Creation as a truth of reason: Christian philosophy. 205
120
5.3.3. "Reason," "faI.t h " and "V"I SIon " .............. . 210
I
IX
CONTENTS
VIII CONTENTS
324
7.4.3. Matter as creature ........... ................. .
5.3.4. The "distress" of philosophy and the liberation
331
7.4.4. Being is consequent upon form (Esse consequitur formam)
through faith ................................. . 213
5.4. The first known: Being (ens) .......................... . 218
5.4.1. The nature of being which is first conceived by the 8. Finis ......... ·.································ ... . 337
intellect ..................................... . 219
337
8.1. "The good is what all desire" (Bonum est quod omnia appetunt)
5.4.2. The origin of the knowledge of being ............ . 223
8.1.1. Being and good are convertible (Ens et bonum conver-
5.5. Via ex' nobis notioribus ................................. . 227
tuntur) ....................................... . 338
8.1.2. " N ature "-" appetl' te "-" nat ura l d eS.lr e" ... . . . . .. 342
6. Hodo-logy ......................................... . 230 "The end corresponds with the principle" ........ . 345
8.1.3.
347
8.2. "Nature" and "end" .... , .................. ........ .
6.1. Per viam sensus: The phenomenon of motion ............. . 231
347
6.2. Necessity and nature ................................ . 234 8.2.1. Natura est via in naturam ............ ·············
8.2.2. "Nature" and "providence": "All naturally desire
6.2.1. The desire to know and the necessary ............ . 234
the good" (Omnia naturaliter bonum appetunt) ....... . 350
6.2.2. Necessity and physical contingency .............. . 236
354
6.3. Contingency and creature ............................ . 239 8.2.3. Nature and circulation ......................... .
356
6.3.1. The mutability of the creature .................. . 239 8.3. "All naturally desire God" (Omnia naturaliter appetunt Deum)
6.3.2. Thomas's view of contingency .................. . 241 8.4. The super-natural fulfillment of the natural desire in man to
361
6.3.3. The creature as "sign" and as "thing" ... ....... . 248 know ......... ···································· .
361
6.4. "By the way of resolution" (Per viam resolutionis) ......... . 252 8.4.1. The supernatural end of the "vision of God" ..... .
364
6.5. Resolution of movement. ............................ . 256 8.4.2. Duplex ordo? .................................. .
6.5.1. Principle and terminus: Matter and form ......... . 256 8.4.3. "Two things concur towards the perfection of the lower
6.5.2. Per viam motus: Nature ......................... . 261 nature" (Duo concurrunt ad perfectionem naturae in/erions) 366
6.5.3. Principle and terminus: Agent and end (finis) ..... . 263 8.4.4. The elevatI.O n to supernatura l b em. g: "Gr ace " .... . 370
373
6.5.4. Movement-Nature-Unmoved Mover .......... . 269 8.5. "Perfect": What has attained its end .................. .
374
6.6. Metaphysical resolution .............................. . 271 8.5.1. Threefold circulation .............. ·············
6.7. Esse is "the actuality of all acts" ...................... . 275 8.5.2. Circulation and perfection ..................... . 375
379
8.5.3. The circulation in the divine ................... .
384
8.5.4. "Grace perfects nature" ....................... .
7. Principium ........................................ . 279
391
Epilogue ............................................... .
7.1. Nature ............................................ . 279
7.1.1. Nature is "principle of motion" ................ . 279 Bibliography ........................................... . 397
"I .. .. I "
7 . 1 . 1 .1. ntnnslC pnnclp e .................. . 279
409
Index Rerum .......................................... .
7.1.1.2. "Active" and "passive" principle ....... . 283
7 .1.1.3. Potentia oboedientialis: Nature and miracle .. . 290
7.1.1. 4. The definition of nature and definitional
thought .......... ' ................... . 292
7. 1. 2. Matter is the nature ........................... . 297
7.1.3. Form is the nature "more" .................... . 300
7.2. "Universal nature" ................................. . 302
7.3. "Creator of the world" .............................. . 310
7 .4. Nature and creature ................................. . 313
7 . 4. 1. Concursus .................................... . 315
7.4.2. The work of nature and creation ................ . 319
I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
I
I Compo Theo/. Compendium Theologiae
De ente De ente et essentia
De pot. Quaestiones disputatae De potentia
De quat. opp. De quatuor oppositis
De spirit. CTeat. Quaestio disputata De spiritualibus creaturis
De subs!. sepal'. De substantiis separatis
De vent. Quaestiones disputatae De veri tate
De virt. card. Quaestio disputata De virtutibus cardinalibus
In Boeth. De trin. In librlUll Boethii De trinitate expositio
In De diu. nomin. In librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus expositio
In De general. In libros De generatione et corruptione Aristotelis expositio
In De hebdom. In librum Boethii De hebdomadibus expositio
In Ethic. In decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis expositio
In Mattk. In Evangelium Matthaei expositio
In Metaph. In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio
In Meteor. In libros Meteorologicorum Aristotelis expositio
In Perih. In libros Peri Hermeneias Aristotelis expositio
In Phys. In octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio
In Polito In libros Politico rum Aristotelis expositio
In Post. Anal. In libros Posteriorum Analyticorum Aristotelis expositio
In Sent. Scriptum super Sententiis magistri Petri Lombardi
Quod/. Quaestiones de quodlibet
s.c.G. Summa contra Gentiles
S. Th. Summa Theologiae
PREFACE
The study presented here is the revised version of a doctoral dissertatio:
that was submitted to the Central Interfaculty (Faculty of Philosophy) c
the Free University in Amsterdam in fulfIllment of the requirements of th
Doctorate of Philosophy and defended publicly on April 16, 1982. Tha
this dissertation was originally published at a Protestan'i university ma:
be .considered a sign of common responsibility for a Doctor of the still un
divided western Christendom.
With gratitude I remember tbe supervisors of my doctoral research pro
gram. Prof. dr. M.C. Smit (Free University Amsterdam) did not live t(
;ee the completion of my dissertation. Following a long illness, he passec
away on July 16, 1981. My interest in the world of the medieval mind ant
particularly in the thought of Thomas Aquinas was awakened througl
his teaching. After Professor Smit's death, Prof. dr. Th. van Velthover
(University of Amsterdam) was prepared to act as supervisor. To him)
am deeply indebted for his encouragement and assistance at crucial mo·
ments. His tragic passing in May 1986 meant a profound loss for me ·per·
sonally. Philosophically, too, he has meant much to me, for he provided
a stimulating example of thinking philosophical problems through from
the perspective of a metaphysics of being.
Professor van Velthoven was also the one who took the initiative to
have this study of Thomas made available in an international language.
Scholars from the Netherlands and Belgium supported this undertaking;
to them I am grateful. The Board of Directors of the Free University made
it possible for me to experience in actu the international atmosphere of
present-day research on Thomas. I was privileged to spend the academic
year 1983 -84 at the "Thomas-Institut" of the University of Cologne and
at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto.
Grateful acknowledgements for financial support must be made to
The Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research
(Z.W.O.), whose munificent grant made it possible to translate and to
publisb this study.
Amsterdam, The Netherlands Jan A. Aertsen
Octoher 31, 1986
INTRODUCTION
This study arose from involvement with the works of Thomas Aquinas
(1224/5-1274) that was not only intensive, but also extensive in the time
devoted to it. As to the latter, certainly a factor is that Thomas's oeuvre is
voluminous-taking up dozens of hefty folios in the critical Leonine edi
tion. The main reason is however that in the reading of his writings a diffi
culty develops that attends the study of many medieval thinkers. In their
works the intelligibility of what is is unveiled by means of a multiplicity
of determinations, principles; and distinctions-a diversity that may ini
tially confuse rather than enlighten the reader. Consider two examples,
taken from the beginning of the Summa Theologiae. In q. 2, art. 3 Thomas
sketches five ways (quinque viae), which prove the existence of Cod. All are
causal arguments. They end in the Unmoved Mover, in the first efficient
cause, in what is Necessary by itself, in the "maximum," and in the final
cause. Yet what causality is and the manner in which it is differentiated
(what is the difference, for example, between the first way and the second
way?) remains unstated. In q. 3 Thomas speaks of the simplicity of God
by denying of Him various kinds of composition: the composition of mat
ter and form, of subject and essence, of essence and being, of subject and
accident. What the meaning of these diverse forms of composition is, what
composition is in the internal structure of a being, is not indicated but pre
supposed.
The order, meaning, and systematic coherence of the intelligible struc
tures are not immediately graspable, because Thomas's writings are often
constructed according to the so-called "scholastic" method. On account
of a concrete question certain possibilities of thought are proved; here
these principles are advanced, there other ones. It is "piecework," from
which an imposing edifice is built up "summarily." A systematic exposi
tion of the foundations and joints is only seldom presented expressly. One
who would understand Thomas must go in quest of these, must w.f)nder
what the fundamentals and the ruling principles of the architectonic are.
Is Thomas's thought a continuation of Aristotelianism (as most older
monographs maintain)? Or is it dominated ·by the Platonic notion of
participation (FABRO, KREMER)?l
1 G. Fabro, Participation el CausaLite scion S. Thomas d'Aquin (Louvain and Paris, 1961),
p. 196: " ... les theses les plus caracteristiques du thomisme soient exprimees et comman
dees par la notion platonicienne de participation. " K. Kremer, Die neuplatonische Seinsphiio
sophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin (Leiden, 1971).
2 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 3
It could be rightly objected that such descriptions do not touch what is . dl'stinctively and essentially Greek.6
proper to Thomas's view. Even so, however, is his philosophy then a IS "What is natural in each thing is the most powerfu1 . "7The on.g'm a ll' ty
Christian philosophy (GILSON), 2 a philosophy of synthesis which at of nature is also the horizon of Thomas's understanding of the world and
tempts to reconcile the impossible (Reformational philosophers), 3 or a "What belongs to a thing naturally (natural,ter) must be the foun-
ofm an. d .
first step towards modern anthropocentrism (RAHNER, METZ)?< dation and principle of all else" (S. Th. 1,82, :). By natu~e man eSlres
A first aim of this study is to disclose avenues whereby, on the basis of to know, the natural is presupposed for the ethIcal (naturaha praesupponun-
a dose reading and analysis of the texts, an interpretation can be pre tur moralibus), 8 by nature all things tend towar~s God.. ,
sented of the inner coherence and direction of Thomas's thought. To this In Phys. II, c. 1 Aristotle thematizes the questIOn concermng the phy
end, three "ways" will be traversed. . , There he presents, in the judgement of HEIDEGGER, who devoted a
SIS. ., h'hb d
(1) To the driving forces of Thomas's philosophizing we come closer by rching study to this text, "the explanation of' physis ,w IC ears an
sea f "9 F h'
tracmg and pondering his way of thought. By this I do not mean a re ides all subsequent interpretation of the essence 0 nature. or t ~s
construction of an individual" history of development" in the sense in gu son and because of the 'auctoritas' accr~dited to Aristotle as "the Phl-
rea , h I 'fi . f
which that has become prevalent in studies of Aristotle. Although there I~ sop her", we shall take as, our .point. of d epartu10r e for t e c an IcatlOn 0
have been attempts to discover some notable development or "turn" in the natural origin Thomas s lectIo of thiS text.
Thomas's thought, there is something forced about them. What we intend In Thomas's commentary on Phys. II, 1 (Iect. 1 and 2)-hereafter re
is more general and fundamentally philosophical in character. Character ferred to as the first basic text-we encounter in the explanation of nature
istic of man as man is a dynamics towards knowing. Aristotle put this into a number of central philosophical notions such as cause, principle, defini
words in ~e renowed opening sentence of his Metaphysica: "All men by tion, movement, 'per se', matter and form, potency and act, as well as
nature deSIre to know." What matters is to discern this tendency in its the character of nature as a way. These notions will be unfolded gradually
~haracter as a :vay (S.c.G. III, 143: per viam intelligibilem) and to analyze in the chapters to come. Here I only indicate them briefly in their context.
It m Its begmnmg and end, in order to be able to fathom its motives. In response to the question "What is nature?" (quid sit natura) Aristotle
The intelligibility which is sought of that which is is determined by its begins by saying that of all beings, some are by nature and some are by
origination. Philosophy turns out to be an urge towards the origin. other causes. "By nature" are animals, plants, and the elements. These
Thinking comes to rest when it has reduced things to an larche' whence natural beings differ from non-natural beings because the former are seen
they originate. "Origin" (origo) means, so Thomas says, via quaedam are, to have in themselves a principle of movement. From this Aristotle con
vel ad rem (s. Th. 1,40, 2), a certain way from something, or to something, cludes the definition of nature: it is a principle and cause of motion in that
a movement from a principle or to an end. Our thesis is that in Thomas in which it is 'per se'. Nature is an intrinsic principle of movement. This
this originality is twofold, that of nature and creature. can be twofold, namely, matter and form. Aristotle's thematizing of the
. (2) ':Natu;e" is the Greek im~wer to the problem of being. The 'physis' 'physis' is unmistakably a synthesis of ancient -thought on the ori?'in of
IS the. ousla , the essence of thmgs (Phys. II, 1). "What is by nature," things. The form, to be sure, is the nature "more" tha~ ~~tter IS, for
so Anstotle says in his Ethic. Nic. V, c. 10, "is unvariable and has every thing is more what it is when it is in act than when It IS m potency.
everywher~ the same power.'" 'Physis' is a notion that was deVeloped in Nature is also "end." Nature (in the etymological sense of' genesis') is the
•
the Hellemc world during the transition from mythos to logos. It is a con
ception "that in one way or another lies at the foundation of the whole
of Greek philosophical thought,"5 a conception that, as no other,
rich and Stuttgart, 1955), p. 44.·
6 O. Gigon, Grundprobleme der antiken PhilQs~phie (Bern, 1959), ~. 154.
7 S. Th. 1-II, 31, 6: Manifestum est quod Id quod est naturale In unoquoque, est po
:l See 5.3.2. tentissimum.
:1 See 3.7.2.
8 De correctionejraterna q. un., a. 1 ad 5.
4 J .B. !'1etz, ~?ri~tli:he Anthropozentri~: Vber die Denkjom des Thomas von Aquin (Munich, , 9 "Vom Wesen und Begriff der 'Physis', Aristoteles' Physik B, 1," in Wegmarken
1962), With an Emfuhrender Essay' by K, Rahner who is stamped by Fabro as (Frankfurt am Main, 1967), p. 313. . . ,
"deformator thomisticus radicalis" (in Divus Thomas 74'(1971): 338). 1 iO For this manner of philosophizing, which is typical of medieval phl~osoph>:, see W.
:, E. Frank, "Der Wandel in der Beurteilung der Griechischen Philosophie," in Wi's Kluxen "Charakteristik einer Epoche: zur Gesamtinterpretation der Philosophle des la
sen, Wollen, G/auben, Gesamm. Aujsiitze zur Philosophiegeschichte und Existentialphilosophie (Zu- teinisch~n Mittelalters," Wissenschaft und Weltbild 28 (1975): 83ff.
1
4 INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION 5
way (Aristotle uses the term 'hodos') towards nature (via in naturam). This writing De substantiis separatis, c. 9_16 hereafter referred to as the second
way, which reveals the nature of nature, is the-second dynamics we shall basic text. It likewise contains a number of central philosophical notions,
follow, in connection with the first, which is the desire to know. " ... such as "another mode of causing," participation, resolution, and being
[TJhe true philosophical problem upon which the historian of the Middle (esse). Here I again only indicate them briefly in their context. Thomas ob
Ages must reflect is first of all that of the significance of nature." 11 serves that with regard to the mode of existing of the separate, that is, im
(3) At the beginning of Thomas's era, the 'auctoritas' of the Philos material substances, certain people have deviated from the truth by taking
opher was suspect. "Lecturing" on precisely the writings on natural phi away from spiritual substances the origin (originem) by the first Author.
losophy from the corpus Aristotelicum was forbidden on the ecclesiastical This opinion seems to prpceed from the fact that the intellect cannot be
side on pain of excommunication.12 As late as 1228 Pope Gregory IX raised to see another mode of causing than the one which is suited to
sent a warning to the University of Paris. Let the theologians not deviate material things. In all things, however, a resolution must take place, in
"to the doctrines of the natural philosophers" and not falsify the Word the sense that each of them is resolved by the intellect into that which is,
of God with "the fictions of philosophers. "13 Obviously, the Aristotelian and its being. For this reason, it is necessary to conceive another origin
concept of nature was considered a threat to a Christian understanding than that whereby form comes to matter, an origin according as "to be"
of reality from the Origin. 14 is bestowed upon things. This other, metaphysical origin is interpreted by
Already by the first sentence in the Bible, in the book of Genesis, it is Thomas as "participation." The way of creation (via creationis, S. c. G. III,
revealed that the world is creature, a term which means" all that is by God" 69) relates to what is innermost in each thing, namely, being.I7
(De pot. 3, 3 ad 2). The Judaeo-Christian idea of creation plays a central
The ways which are investigated in order to see through Thomas's
role in Thomas's thought. If one had to provide him with a by-name,
then, as J. PIEPER says, it would have to be: Thomas a Creatore. That the thought refer likewise to a concrete historical situation. They are directly
related, as was already noted above, to the intellectual historical cir
world is qualified by creatureliness-"to have sustained and thought to
cumstances of the thirteenth century. The university, one of the most im
the end this conception with all consequences is indeed something that for
Thomas Aquinas ... is utterly distinctive. "15 portant innovations of the Middle Ages, 18 was determinative for the life
of Thomas Aquinas. It left its stamp on his work as well, not just qua
The idea of creation is worked out philosophically by Thomas in his
("scholastic") form but also qua intellectual task. In this center of study
and education the two principal sources of Western culture, the classical
heritage and Christianity, had come into confluence.
II A. Forest, in Bulletin thomiste III, 837. A comprehensive explanation of this basic On the one side, the desire to know led to the reception of an extensive
term in Thomas is l.acking. Cf. L. Oeing~Hanhoff, "Mensch und Natur bei Thomas von
body of Greek and Arab science. Under its influence, the propaedeutic
Aquin," Zeitschrifl for katholische Theologie 101 (1979), 302, n. 4.
Worthy of mention are the studies by J.A. Weisheipl, "The Concept of Nature," The faculty of arts developed during the course of the thirteenth century into
New Scholasticism 28 (1954): 377 - 408; R. Pannikar, El concepto de naturaleza, Analisis histonco, a philosophy faculty where students received lengthy education in pagan
y metafisico de un concepto, 2nd ed. (Madrid, 1972); M.~J. Nicolas, "L'idee de nature dans
philosophy, especially in Aristotle. On the other side, in the theology fa
la pensee de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue thomiste 74 (1974): 533-90.
12 H, Denifle & A. Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis vol. 1, p. 70: Nec li~ culty there was a deepened interest in the Bible and in the tradition deter
bri Aristotelis de naturali philosophia nec commenta legantur publice vel secreto, et hoc_ mined by this 'auctoritas'. How to connect the Christian interpretation
sub pena excommunicationis inhibemus.
of the meaning of reality with Greek philosophical rationality was tfIe epo
I:! Ibid., 114-15.
14 That they are inconsistent with each other is argued by C.J. Dippel, "De incon~ chal task thought through by Thomas Aquinasl9
sistentie tussen scheppingsgeloof en natuurbegrip," in GelooJ en Natuurwetenschap, vol. 1
(The Hague, 1965), p. 186.
15 j. Pieper, "Kreatiirlichkeit, Bemerkungen uber die Elemente eines Grundbe~ Hi See for this writing (datable to 1270-1273): F.J. Lescoe, "De Substantiis Separatis:
griffs," in Thomas von Aquin 1274/1974, ed. L. Oeing~Hanhoff(Munich, 1974), p. 47. He Title and Date," in St. Thomas Aquin.as 1274 -1974: Commemorative Studies, vol. 1 (Toronto,
follows here the suggestion made by G.K. Chesterton. 1974), pp. 51-66.
It is remarkable that also this basic idea of Thomas's has been relatively seldom the ob~ 17 In II Sent. I, 1,4: Operatio Creatoris magis pertingit ad intima rei.
ject of systematic reflection. I would mention the studies by A.D. Sertillanges, L'idee de IH On the medieval university, see: A.B. Cobban, The Medieval Universities, Their Devel·
creation el ses retentissements en philosophie (Paris, 1945); J. F. Anderson, The Cause ojB eing, The opment and Organisation (London: 1975); H. Grundmann, Vom Ursprung der Universitat im
Philosophy oJ Creation in St. Thomas (St. Louis and London, 1952); L. Dumpelmann, Kreation MiUe/alter, 2nd ed. (Darmstadt, 1960); G. Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth
als ontisch-ontolo~isches Verhldtnis (Freiburg and Munich, 1969). and Fourteenth Centuries: An Institutional an.d Intellectual History (New York, 1968).
19 Cf. the commendatory opening address by M.-D. Chenu at the international con-
6 INTRODUCTION
What follows is an unfolding and justification of what has only been in
dicated here. It can be read as an "itinerary," as a description of a
CHAPTER ONE
"way." Along the way the motives of the train of thought will gradually
come to light and the "hodo-logy" -the rationale of the way-will be
FROM QUESTIONING TOWARDS KNOWING
come graspable. The moment of tension in this investigation is the ques
tion to what extent the ways of nature and of creature come together. It
The question posed in the first basic text (In II Phys., lect. 1, 141) men
is this 'concursus' which determines the distinctive character and prob
tioned in the Introduction is: What is nature (quid sit natura)? That is a
lems of Thomas's way of thought.
question which must be thought in terms of its own, that is Gree~, nature.
So the question is to be elucidated, from the desire to know (1.1.-1.2.),
gress commemorating the seventh centennial of Thomas Aquinas's death (Rome and as question posed (1.3.); as "what" question (1.4.); and as question con
Naples, 1974): "S. Thomas innovateur dans la creativite d'un mande nouveau."
cerning nature (1.5.).
This mode of questioning puts us upon a specific way. The motive be~
hind such questioning may itself become ~'questionable," that is, worthy
of inquiring into. Did not Augustine speak of an unvirtuous desire to
know, of" curiosity"? In confrontation with this authority, it is necessary
for Thomas to legitimate the desire to know (1.6.).
In his justification Thomas introduces the motifof circulation (1.7.): the
process frorn and towards God. Orientation to this Origin opens up new
room for philosophical questioning. It is nO longer the nature of that which
is but the being as creature that Thomas poses as the task of thought (1.8.)
in the second basic text, that of De substantiis separatis. Thereby the order
and direction of the traditional questions acquire a twofold sense (1. 9.).
1.1. {fAll men by nature desire to know n
~'All men by nature desire to know." With this arresting statement
Aristode opens the Metaphysica (A 1, 980 a 21). He does not furnish a strict
proof for this assertion, but only what he himself calls a "sign": an indica
tion of man's natural desire to know is his disinterested esteem for sensa
tion. "For even apart from their utility, the senses are appreciated for
themselves, most of all the sense that functions by means of the eyes. " Why
this preference for seeing above the other senses? "Because sight most
enables us to know reality." The advancement, by way of verification, of
both these elements-the priority of sight, and disinterestedness-makes
sense only if there is a correlation between them and the nature of the
knowledge envisioned-a "vision" (theoria) pursued for its own sake.
The renowned opening statement of the Metaphysica plays an important
role in Thomas's work. In numerous loci he refers to it, especially (see
1.9.) in his account of the "natural desire" for the vision of God (visio
Dei). From this it may be inferred that for Thomas the dictum puts into
I words something essential. It will therefore be important to view the vari
ous elements in the dictum more closely.
