Naturalized metaphilosophy - Chris Alen Sula

17 Pages·2009·0.26 MB·English

Synthese
DOI10.1007/s11229-009-9662-1
Naturalized metaphilosophy
DavidR.Morrow · ChrisAlenSula
Received:6January2008/Accepted:30November2008
©SpringerScience+BusinessMediaB.V.2009
Abstract Traditionalrepresentationsofphilosophyhavetendedtoprizetheroleof
reasoninthediscipline.Theseaccountsfocusexclusivelyonideasandargumentsas
animatingforcesinthefield.Butanecdotalevidenceandmorerigoroussociological
studiessuggestthereismoregoingoninphilosophy.Inthisarticle,wepresenttwo
hypothesesaboutsocialfactorsinthefield:thatsocialfactorsinfluencethedevelop-
ment of philosophy, and that status and reputation—and thus social influence—will
tendtobeawardedtophilosopherswhoofferrationallycompellingargumentsfortheir
views.Inordertotestthesehypotheses,weneedamorecomprehensivegrasponthe
fieldthantraditionalrepresentationsafford.Inparticular,weneedmoresubstantialdata
aboutvarioussocialconnectionsbetweenphilosophers.Thisinvestigationbelongsto
anaturalizedmetaphilosophy,anempiricalstudyofthedisciplineitself,anditoffers
prospectsforafullerandmorereliableunderstandingofphilosophy.
Keywords Philosophy·Sociology·Networks·Reason·Naturalism
In addressing questions of how to represent philosophy, we should begin—in good
philosophical fashion—by first asking what philosophy is. Historical answers have
oftenprizedtheroleofreasoninaddressingquestionsofexistence,knowledge,and
value.Thus,Platorecommendscontemplationoftheforms,Descartes’meditatorat-
temptstodeduceself-evidenttruthsfromfirstprinciples,Spinozadiscussesanactivity
carried out sub specie aeternitatis by a rational thinker who has removed all traces
ofsubjectivityandindividualityfromhisthought,andKantdescribesphilosophyas
B
D.R.Morrow·C.A.Sula( )
TheGraduateCenter,TheCityUniversityofNewYork,365FifthAvenue,
NewYork,NY10016,USA
e-mail:[email protected]
D.R.Morrow
e-mail:[email protected]
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thesystemofprinciplesofpurereason.Thesemetaphilosophieshavetendedtoprize
theroleofreasoningivinganaccountofthefield.Butforanysuchaccount,acuri-
ouspuzzlearises:nearlyallphilosophersareinfluencedbyotherphilosophersaround
them,andinfluenceisnotnecessarilyrational,warranted,orwise.
Cohen(2000)providesavividillustrationofthepersistentlysocialnatureofphi-
losophyindiscussingtheanalytic/syntheticdistinctioninthetwentiethcentury:
peopleofmygenerationwhostudiedphilosophyatHarvardratherthanatOxford
forthemostpartrejecttheanalytic/syntheticdistinction.AndIcan’tbelievethat
this is an accident. That is, I can’t believe that Harvard just happened to be a
placewherebothitsleadingthinkerrejectedthatdistinctionanditsgraduatestu-
dents,forindependent reasons—merely,forexample, intheindependent light
ofreasonitself—alsocametorejectit.Andviceversa,ofcourse,forOxford.
Ibelieve,rather,thatineachcasestudentswereespeciallyimpressedbyreasons
respectivelyforandagainstbelievinginthedistinction,becauseineachcasethe
reasonscamewiththeaddedpersuasivenessofpersonalpresentation,personal
relationship,andsoforth.(p.18)
AnecdoteslikeCohen’sarecommoninthepublishedrecordofphilosophy,especially
inmoreinformalsettingssuchasbookintroductions,autobiographies,interviews,and
correspondence.Theseconfessionssuggestthatphilosophydoesnotproceedpurely
through“rational”reflection;thesocialdimensionsofthefieldmaybeasimportant—
perhaps even more important, in some cases—than the exercise of our “rational”
faculties.
Inordertounderstandhowmuch,ifatall,thesesocialfactorsinfluencephiloso-
phy,weneedamorecomprehensivegrasponthefieldthantraditionalrepresentations
afford. Where traditional representations have focused almost exclusively on ideas
andarguments,alternativerepresentationsmightalsoconsiderwhatcausesideasand
positionstoemerge,whysomegainphilosophicalcurrencyovertimeandotherslose
credit, and how the commitments, questions, and boundaries of the field shift over
time. Where traditional representations focus on what has been talked about in past
and present philosophy, these alternatives might ask why or how those views have
achievedorlostdominance.Toanswerthesequestions,weneedmoreevidenceabout
thepracticeofphilosophyinthepastandpresent.Weneedtodevelopandtesthypoth-
esesabouttheinteractionbetweensocialandrationalfactorsinthedevelopmentofthe
field.Thisinvestigationbelongstonaturalizedmetaphilosophy,anempiricalstudyof
thedisciplineitself.
1 Twomodelsofrepresentation
Questions of how to represent philosophy depend, in part, on what the content and
limits of the field are taken to be. From a rationalistic perspective, representing the
discipline is a fairly straightforward task. Good philosophy is a success story, a tri-
umph of human capacity in ascertaining the rational order of the universe, includ-
ing ideal states of social, political, and moral affairs. In turn, good representations
of philosophy should contain ideas and arguments that have survived the test of
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rational scrutiny. They should capture the cumulative knowledge we have obtained,
and the more truths a representation contains, the better the representation. One
couldevenarguethereissomesinglebestrepresentationthatreflectsthemosttruths
ascertainedandendorsestheleastfalsehoods.Thisaustererepresentationcouldstill
mention “mistakes” in the history of philosophy if their errors or oversights would
prove instructive or fruitful for further discoveries. But failures and lesser theories
would be footnotes to a larger history of successful claims supported by decisive
reasons.
Alas.Wedon’tallagree—andrarelyhave—onwhichclaimsarerecommendedby
rightreason.Ifanything,presentandpastphilosophylooksmorelikeahistoryofdis-
agreement,ratherthanconvergenceoncertainclaims.Maybethereisnodeterminate
rationalorderguidingourwork,ormaybewesimplylackenoughaccesstothatorder
to sort the true claims from the false ones in any widely accepted manner. In either
case,morerecentphilosophershavetendedtoregardtheiroverallworkasthesearch
forgoodquestions,ratherthananswers.AsRussell(1912/1997)saysinhispopular
introductiontothefield,
Philosophyistobestudied,notforthesakeofanydefiniteanswerstoitsques-
tions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather
for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our
conceptionofwhatispossible,enrichourintellectualimaginationanddiminish
thedogmaticassurancewhichclosesthemindagainstspeculation…(p.161)
Againstthispluralisticbackdropofspeculation,thebestrepresentationsofphilosophy
(and we had better assume there can be more than one) should take a value-neutral
approachthatdoesnotbiasone(now-admittedly)contentiouspositionoveranyother.
Goodrepresentationsshouldsimplycatalogtheimportantideasofphilosophyinthe
broadestandmostcharitablesense.
Thislineofthoughtprobablyundergirdsmuchoftheencyclopediceffortsmadeby
philosophersinthepastfewdecades.SinceMacmillan’s1967EncyclopediaofPhi-
losophy,therehasbeenamovementtowardcollectivelyauthoredvolumesthattreat
individualtopicsinanallegedlybalancedway.Contrarypositionsarepresentedwith
equalregard—oratleastgiventheirdayincourtforthebenefitofnovices,scholars
ofother(sub)disciplines,andexpertsalike.Theseaudiencesexpectthatinconsulting
thecatalog,theyarereceivinganaccurate,thorough,andundistortedrepresentationof
philosophy.Butissuchanexpectationreallyfulfilled,and,toaskthepriorquestion,
issuchanexpectationevenwarranted?
Ifrationalisticrepresentationssufferempiricaldefeatatthehandsofdisagreement,
encyclopedic models face a parallel problem from the limits and biases of human
cognition. Decisions about the content of encyclopedias and the exposition of their
topicsarethechoicesofscholars,who,incidentally,havetheirownviewstodefendon
theverytopicstheyattempttopresentinanunbiasedfashion.Individualsmayover-
comebiasinsomecases,anddecisionsmayimproveiftheyaremadebycollectives
rather than individuals. Still, as we discuss in Sect.2, there are strong psychologi-
caltendenciesthatbiasonetowardsargumentsandevidencethatsupportone’sown
positionandagainstpositionsandobjectionsthatdonot.Itisnotunreasonabletothink
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that these tendencies compromise the neutrality advertised by many encyclopedic
representationsofthefield.
Even if encyclopedists are successful in overcoming psychological biases, their
modelimposesanoverlyrestrictiveviewofwhatinformationbelongsinrepresenta-
tionsofphilosophy.Encyclopediaspresentatime-sliceviewofthefield:theideasand
argumentsthatarecurrentlyconsideredimportantforunderstandingthetopicofany
givenentry.Peopleshowupincidentallyasthevehiclesoftheseideasandarguments,
butdonotplayanysubstantialroleinexplanation.Asanexampleofthispoint,con-
sider two answers to the question, Why did Kant disagree with Hume’s account of
morality?Oneexplanation mightbethatHumeand Kantbothbegan withthesame
basicpremises,butHumemadesomemistakeindrawingasentimentalistconclusion
from them, which Kant corrected (or vice versa, as you like). If so, there is noth-
ingmoretotheirdisagreementthanasimplelogicalerroronthepartofatleastone
author.AnotheranswermightbethatKant(orHume)suppliedorassumedadditional
premises to derive his conclusions. This, too, could be explained purely in terms of
therationalmanipulationofideas.
Butsurelythereismoretobesaidaboutthefield.Why,forexample,didspecific
premisesorspecificinferencesseemsoundtoonephilosopher,butnotanother?How
didspecificideasearntheirplaceinthecanon,whileothersneverattainedsuchstatus?
Amongthosethatdidfindtheirwayintothecanon,whatexplainstheebbandflowof
theircredibility?Thesequestionsgobeyondideasandargumentstoconsiderchanges
withinthefieldasawhole.Assuch,theyrequirediachronicrepresentationsofphilos-
ophyfortheiranswers.Intheserepresentations,peoplewillplayamoresubstantial
role.Considerwhy,forexample,Confucianism,ratherthanMohism,cametodominate
Chinesethought.DuringMozi’slifetime,“hisfamewasasgreatasthatofConfucius,
and his teaching no less influential” (Fung 1948, p. 49). Chinese philosophy might
haveresembledWesternphilosophymuchmorecloselythanitdoeshadtheMohists
cometodominatetheConfucians,ratherthanviceversa.Conversely,Westernphilos-
ophymighthaveresembledChinesephilosophymorethanitdoesifdifferentschools
ofthoughtachievedculturaldominanceinancientGreece.IntheChinesecase,itwas
notforobviouswantofphilosophicalabilitiesthattheMohistsarenowfoundonlyin
historybooksandtheConfuciansstillplayanimportantroleinChineseculture.To
understandtheriseofConfucianism—andlikewise,perhaps,theriseofPlatonismand
Aristotelianism—weneedtoplacethedevelopmentofthesephilosophicalschoolsin
theirsocialcontexts.Wesuggestthatthedominanceandsurvivalofsomephilosophi-
calideasattheculturallevelisdue,notonlytotheirrationalsignificance,butinstead
tofactorssuchasinfluence,dissemination,conflict,andloyalty.Withthisobservation
in mind, we turn to the influence of social factors on the field and to the alternative
representationofphilosophytheysuggest.
2 Socialinfluenceinphilosophy
Ifweabandon afetishismofideas,whatmightweincludeinourwiderrepresenta-
tionsofphilosophy?Letusbeginwiththesimpleobservationthatnearlyallphiloso-
phers’viewsareinfluencedbytheviewsofthosearoundthem,eitherthroughactual
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interactionwithone’steachers,students,colleagues,andcritics,ormerelyimagined
dialoguewithpastfiguresandfoes.Ineithercase,one’sownphilosophicalideasdo
notcomepurelyfromconsultingreason,butinsteaddependonprocessesoftraining
andenculturationinthefield.
Collins(1998)developsthispointinTheSociologyofPhilosophies:AGlobalThe-
oryofIntellectualChangetodescribethepersonalties—oftenconflictual—between
major figures,which drive thefieldof philosophy. Collinsdistinguishes four senses
of ‘school’, only some of which are relevant to understanding the development of
philosophy. First,there may be “schools of thought,” or individuals who have simi-
larmodesofthought,butneednotbepersonallyconnected—present-dayPlatonists
havepresumablynothadcontactwithPlato.Thesetaxonomicclassificationscanbe
rathervagueandneedtobestudiedthroughmoretangiblestructures.Second,intellec-
tualhistoriansoftenusetheword‘school’todemonstratetransmissionofintellectual
influence.AsCollinspointsout,this“isnotanexplanation,inthesenseofshowing
why,outofallthepersonswhocouldreadorhearofanidea,acertainfewbecome
important…” (p. 65). Such an explanation depends on a rigorous study of the final
twosensesof‘school’.Oneoftheseinvolveschainsofpersonalrelationshipsbetween
teachersandpupils(verticalties)andpersonalcontactsbetweencontemporaries(hor-
izontal ties). Another consists of organizations, such as the Platonic Academy, the
AristotelianLyceum,theViennaCircle,orperhapstheHarvardPhilosophyDepart-
ment, where teaching and discussion take place and authority may be passed down
throughexplicitsuccession.
Intheselattersensesoftheterm,schoolsareenginesofinquirythatsteerthecourse
ofphilosophyasadiscipline.Theyareplaces(physicalandsocialabstractions)where
philosophershavedevelopedtheirpositionsundertheinfluenceofothers.AsCohen
pointsout,twoideasmaybeequally(ornearlyequally)compelling,andone’sdecision
aboutwhichtoendorsemaybemadeonnonrationalgroundsincludingthepresenta-
tionoftheideaorone’spersonalrelationshipwithitsproponent.Whileitishardto
pinpointtheexactcausesofaphilosopher’sviewsandtheirrelativecontributionsto
his or her beliefs,we can observe rather strikingtrends of association between spe-
cificpeople,places,andideas.Collins’studyofsocialnetworksacross2,000yearsof
EasternandWesternphilosophyrevealsthat“Themostnotablephilosophersarenot
organizationalisolatesbutmembersofchainsofteachersandstudentswhoarethem-
selvesknownphilosophers,and/orcirclesofsignificantcontemporaryintellectuals”
(p.65,emphasisCollins).
As an illustration of the master–pupil tie, consider the importance of teachers in
one’s own philosophical training. Most beginning students in the field do not have
well-worked-out philosophical positions, but only develop them under the tutelage
of more experienced figures, who have arrived at their own views through the very
sameprocess.One may, onoccasion, seekout aparticular teacher because ofone’s
antecedentphilosophicalinterests.Butwheredidthoseinterestsarise?Mostlylikely,
theyhavedevelopedundertheinfluenceofearlierteachersanddiscussionwithone’s
peers, or perhaps from a chance encounter with one text rather than another. It is
moreplausibletoexplainphilosophicaldevelopmentintermsofsocialinfluencethan
purereasonforthesamereasonCohensuggests:twosetsofequallyrationalinquirers
may disagree about a certain claim (e.g., the analytic/synthetic distinction), where
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the primary difference between them is their members’ closer interaction with one
proponentinthedebate,ratherthantheother.
Weneednottakethesesociologicalclaimstosuggestsomespookysocialcausa-
tioninordertounderstandhowsocialtiesinfluencephilosophicalpractice.Thereare
ordinary,well-documentedpsychologicalmechanismsbywhichindividualphiloso-
phers’socialenvironmentscanaffecttheirjudgments.AsCollinshimselfpointsout,
theseclaimsabouttheinfluenceofgroupscanbebroughtdowntoearthintermsof
familiarsocialinteractions:“Thehistoryofphilosophyistoaconsiderableextentthe
historyofgroups.Nothingabstractismeanthere—nothingbutgroupsoffriends,dis-
cussionpartners,close-knitcirclesthatoftenhavethecharacteristicsofsocialmove-
ments” (p. 3). Although more empirical study is needed to determine the precise
effectsofvariousmechanismsonphilosophicalpracticeinparticular,wehypothesize
thattwobroadpsychologicalmechanismsoperateintandemtoinfluencethecourse
ofphilosophy.
Thefirstmechanismiswhatsocialpsychologistscall“uniformitypressure,”which
isaformofsocialpressurethatinducesmembersofagrouptoseekuniformityofopin-
ionwithinthegroup(Kruglanskietal.2006,pp.88–89).Psychologistshaveobserved
uniformity pressure at work in enduring social groups, such as political parties and
families, as well as ad hoc groups formed in experimental contexts. Such pressure
makesitselffeltthroughinteractionwithothergroupmembers,whoaremotivatedby
peerdisagreementtoeliminatediscrepanciesamonggroupmembersincertainkinds
ofbeliefs.Groupmembersmightseektoeliminatethesediscomfitingdiscrepancies
througheithera“changeother”strategy,inwhichtheytrytobringothers’beliefsin
linewiththeirown,ora“changeself”strategy,inwhichtheychangetheirownbeliefs
inordertomatchthoseoftheirfellows(Festinger1950).The“changeself”strategy
mightplayanespeciallyimportantroleinshapingtheviewsofnewerstudentsinan
academic departmentwhofindthemselves unabletomatchtheargumentative abili-
tiesofhigher-statusfacultyandmoreadvancedstudents,allofwhomhavethemselves
beenshapedbyuniformitypressurealready.Theendresultisastrongconvergence,
withinsocialgroups,onasetofsharedbeliefs.
Althoughphilosophersmaybebetterthanothersatovercomingsuchbiases,philo-
sophical claims are precisely the kinds of claims for which uniformity pressure is
strongest.Festingercitestheempiricaltestabilityofthebeliefsinquestionasamajor
determinantofthestrengthofuniformitypressure.Tousehisexample,anindividual
whoformsajudgmentthataparticularobjectisfragilebysmashingitwithaham-
merisunlikelytobeswayedbyanothergroupmember’sinsistencethattheobjectis
unbreakable;buttotheextentthattheindividual’sclaimscannotbeeasilytested,as
counterfactualsaboutcomplexsocialeventscannot,thatindividualismorelikelyto
depend on others’ agreement in deciding whether to hold fast to his or her opinion.
Manyphilosophical claims,ofcourse,fallnearertotheuntestablepoleofthatcon-
tinuumthannot,andsoweshouldexpectevenstrongeruniformitypressureamong
philosophersthanamongsomeotherdisciplines.Thismayoffsetwhatevercognitive
advantagesphilosophersgainfromtheirinsistenceoncarefulargumentation.
This is not to say that philosophers will not tolerate disagreement in their ranks.
As in any discipline, there are always prominent points of contention in philoso-
phy.Thepointisratherthataknownsocialpsychologicalphenomenonpredictsthat
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philosophers who form stable social groups, such as within academic departments,
willconvergeinsomeoftheirphilosophicalopinions.Thisconvergenceisenoughto
beginaprocessbywhichsocialinteractioncanshapethecourseofphilosophy.
Once social influence begins to affect individuals’ philosophical views, a second
psychological tendency known as confirmation bias will often entrench that influ-
ence more deeply. Following Raymond Nickerson, we take “confirmation bias” to
subsumeseveralmorespecificpsychologicaltendenciesthatleadindividualstoseek
and believe information that is consistent with their existing beliefs and to ignore,
disbelieve,ortobemorecriticalofinformationthatisinconsistentwiththeirexist-
ing beliefs (Nickerson 1998). Confirmation bias is so pervasive and so potent that
Nickersonsuggests,“Ifoneweretoattempttoidentifyasingleproblematicaspectof
humanreasoningthatdeservesattentionaboveallothers,theconfirmationbiaswould
havetobeamongthecandidatesforconsideration”(p.175).Whatmakesconfirma-
tionbiassoinsidious,however,isthatitoperatesunconsciouslyratherthanthrough
thedeliberatedistortionofevidence,and,accordingtosomepsychologists(Dittoet
al. 1998; Fischer et al. 2005), it can sometimes arise from reasonable methods for
allocatingcognitiveresources.
Wehypothesizethatfourmechanismsofconfirmationbias,outofthemanyidenti-
fiedbyNickerson,areparticularlyrelevanttophilosophy.First,the“primacyeffect”
consistsinindividuals’tendencytogivemoreweighttoinformationacquiredearlierin
aninquirythaninformationacquiredlater.Thus,formativephilosophicalexperiences,
whichmaybesaturatedbysocialinfluence,arelikelytocarrymoreweightthanargu-
mentsencounteredlater,tiltingthebalanceofreasonsconcerningcontentiousissues
inonedirectionratherthananother.Second,“motivatedskepticism”involvesaten-
dencytobemorecriticalofinformationorargumentsthatchallengeone’sbeliefsthan
of information and arguments that confirm them. For instance, a patient is far more
likelytoaskforasecondopinionortoentertainalternativehypotheseswhenadoctor
informsherthatshehascancerthanwhenadoctorgivesheracleanbillofhealth(Ditto
and Lopez 1992). This tendency probably causes philosophers to devote more time
andenergytorebuttingargumentsagainsttheirpositionthanthinkingcriticallyabout
argumentsfortheirposition.Third,the“preferentialtreatmentofevidence”involves
giving more weight to belief-consistent evidence than belief-inconsistent evidence.
Thissometimesoccursjustbecausepeoplearemorelikelytonoticeorrecallevidence
that supports their beliefs than evidence that does not. It sometimes occurs because
people are likely to interpret evidence in ways that support, rather than challenge,
theirbeliefs,evenwhenotherindividualsinterpretthesameevidenceintheopposite
way. Thus, philosophers are likely to give more weight to arguments and informa-
tionthatsupportstheirviewsthantootherargumentsorinformation,perhapssimply
becausethesearetheargumentsthatcomemostfrequentlytomind.Fourth,“selective
exposure” is the tendency to seek out information that confirms one’s beliefs rather
than information that challenges it. This tendency may lead philosophers to devote
moreenergytofindingorconcoctingargumentsthatsupporttheirownpositionand
undermineothers’thantheydoseekingoutobjectionstotheirownposition.
Ofcourse,academiaisstructuredtocounteractconfirmationbias,andphilosophers
inparticularmaybewellsuitedtoresistingit.Noneofthisismeanttosuggestthat
philosophers never seek out objections or that they fail to take objections seriously.
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Confrontingobjectionsisacentralpartofphilosophicalpractice.Butitisanempirical
questionwhetherprofessionalphilosophersavoidthisubiquitouspsychologicalbias
altogether. The point of invoking confirmation bias is only to show that there is a
widespreadandpowerfulpsychologicaltendencythatmaycausephilosopherstoper-
severe in the beliefs that uniformity pressure may cause them to adopt within their
socialgroups.
Taken together, these psychological processes could explain how social factors
influenceindividuals’philosophicaljudgments.Theseapplicationsofpsychological
theoriestophilosophicalpracticewould,ofcourse,needtobetested,andweshould
expectthattheactualprocessesatworkaremorecomplicated.Nevertheless,thesecon-
jectureslaygroundsforthehypothesisthatsocialfactorsinfluencethedevelopment
ofphilosophy.Testingtheseempiricalclaimsisdoingnaturalizedmetaphilosophy—
studyingthedisciplineitselfinanempiricalfashion.InSect.5,wewillproposemore
sophisticatedformsofdatacollectionandanalysistoassistthiseffort.Beforeconsid-
eringsuchmethods,itwillbeusefultoreflectontheviewofthedisciplineimpliedby
naturalizedmetaphilosophy.Inparticular,wewillconsidertherolethatreasonplays
inthepracticeofphilosophyandtheimplicationsofnaturalizedmetaphilosophyfor
theideaofprogressinphilosophy.
3 Theroleofreason
Some may fear that naturalized metaphilosophy will deny reason any role in the
practice of philosophy. If we can explain why philosophers adopt the philosophical
positionstheydobyappealingtopsychologicalandsociologicalfactors,itmayseem
thattheyarenotbasingtheirpositionsonrationalargument.Thissuggestionclashes
with philosophers’ subjective understanding of what they are doing. Most philoso-
pherstakethemselvestoholdthephilosophicalpositionsthattheydoonthebasisof
rationalargumentation.Butifeachindividualphilosopheradoptstheoriesonthebasis
ofreasonalone,thensociologicalfactorsplaynosignificantroleinthefield.
We take as a provisional assumption that reason does play an important role in
philosophy.“Reason,”asweunderstandithere,isapsychologicalcapacitytoengage
inreasoning,where“reasoning”is“thecognitiveactivityofdrawinginferencesfrom
given information” (Grafman and Goel 2002). Some types of inferences are more
likelytoyieldtruebeliefs(giventruepremises)thanothers.Goodreasoninginvolves
usingthose,andonlythose,typesofinferences.Tosaythat“reason”or“reasoning”
playsanimportantroleinphilosophy,then,istosaythatphilosophersaresignificantly
morelikelytoacceptaclaimif(theybelievethat)itissupportedbygoodreasoning
basedontruepremises.
We do not intend to exclude from naturalized metaphilosophy philosophers who
arepronetomoreinflatednotionsofreason.Thechallengeforsuchphilosophersisto
craftadefinitionofreasonsuitableforempiricaltesting,withoutwhichitisimpossible
todetermineempiricallywhether“reason”doesplayanimportantroleinthefield.
Onetaskofnaturalizedmetaphilosophyintheimmediatefuture,then,istoexplain
theconnectionbetweenthesocialhypothesisputforwardintheprevioussectionand
thehypothesisthatreason,asdefinedabove,playsanimportantroleindetermining
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whichviewsphilosophersadopt.Inadvanceofempiricalinquiry,therearereasonsto
think that some kinds of social influence coincide with philosophical reasoning. As
Collinsputsit,“intellectualsareorientedtowardwhattheybelieveisthetruth.They
donotwanttoundermine theirown truths,even though itissociallyusefultohave
flawedtruthswhichwillkeeptheirnamesaliveinsubsequentgenerationsofcreative
workers”(p.33).Philosophersconstantlychallengeoneanothertodefendtheirclaims
throughargumentation.Philosopherswhoholdfasttoclaimsthatcannotberationally
defendedpresumablyinvitetheridiculeoftheirpeersandtheexclusionoftheirviews
fromthephilosophicalmainstream.Contrapositively,itisreasonabletohypothesize
thatmostphilosopherswhodorisetopositionsofsocialprominencewithinthefield
arethosewhoexcelatofferingcompellingargumentsfortheirclaims.Totheextent
that these individuals shape the social influence at work in the field, that influence
willreinforcetheeffectsofargumentationonothers’philosophicalviews,ratherthan
runcountertoit.Bothoftheseprocesses—themarginalizationofthosewhocannot
rationallyjustifytheirclaimsandtheexaltationofthosewhocan—requirethatreason
playsaprominentroleinshapingthediscipline.Ifempiricalstudyshowsthesepro-
cessestobeasimportantastheyinitiallyappear,thenthisstudywillhelpclarifythe
waysinwhichreasonandsocialinfluenceinteractinphilosophicalpractice.
Naturalized metaphilosophy may be able to do more than just clarify this inter-
action; it may help us harness social factors for the good of the discipline. We can
appreciatethispointbywayofaparalleldiscussioninthehistoryandphilosophyof
science.Ascriticshavepointedout,varioussocialfactorsaffectwhichhypothesesget
proposed,howtheyaretested,andwhetherresultsreceivedrecognition.Thesefactors
includedemographics(TheBiologyandGenderStudyGroup1989;Hays-Gilpinand
Whitley1998;Hrdy1981;Keller1985;Lloyd1993;LonginoandDoell1983;Spanier
1995); science funding, administration, and policy (Hull 1988; Kitcher 1990, 1993;
Solomon2001;Strevens2003);institutionalstructuresofreward(Keller1983;Latour
andWoolgar1979/1986;Waring1990);moralorpoliticalviews;etc.Understanding
theeffectsofthesefactorsisapreconditionformitigatingundesiredbiasinscience.As
Antony(1991)argues,“anempiricalstudyofbiases”isneededto“tellussomething
aboutthereliabilityandcorrigibilityofbiasesofvarioussorts.Itmayturnoutthatwe
canonthisbasisgetsomethinglikeaprincipledsortingofbiasesintogoodonesand
badones,althoughitwillbemorelikelythatwe’lllearnthatevena‘good’biascan
leadusastrayincertaincircumstances”(p.216).Similarly,anempiricalstudyofthe
social factors at work in philosophy may help to reveal which kinds of social influ-
ence resulted in interesting and original philosophical ideas, and which have led us
downmorefrustratingorlessfruitfulpaths.Theseobservationsaboutthebeneficialor
detrimentaleffectsofvariouskindsofsocialinfluencewouldhelptoinformpractical
decisionsaboutadmission,employment,tenureandpromotion,evenpublicationand
citationinthefield.Theclaimhereisnotthatnaturalizedmetaphilosophywillreveal
determinateprinciplesthatoughttogovernourpolicies.Instead,thehopeisthatby
understandingmorefullythewaysinwhichthefieldoperates,wemightinturnrevise
ourpracticestoenhanceargumentationinthefield.
Even if social influence is present in philosophy, it need not be deleterious. Phi-
losopherscanrelyonreasontojustify(orreject)beliefsthattheyhaveadoptedpri-
marilyforsocialreasons,evenifconfirmationbiasmakesthisdifficult.Byawarding
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opportunitiesforsocialinfluencetoindividualsatleastpartlyinaccordancewiththeir
good use of rational argument, social forces can enhance the role of reason in phi-
losophy.Achievingalevelofunderstandingsufficienttoshapephilosophicalpractice
wiselywillrequirecarefulempiricalstudy,towhichweturninSect.5.
4 Thepossibilityofprogress
Anotherfearraisedbynaturalizedmetaphilosophyisthattheinfluenceofsocialfac-
torsunderminesthepossibilityofprogressinphilosophy.Ifphilosophicaltheoriesrise
andfallbecauseofpurelysocialfactors,theirdominanceanddeclinemayhavemore
todowithfashionthanwithtruth.TheruffledcollarsofElizabethangentrymaybe
hardtofindtoday,butthisisforsocialreasons,notbecausefashionhas“progressed”
beyond“false”beliefsabouttheattractivenessofruffledcollars.Iftheexplanationsfor
thegeneralrejectionoftheteleologicalargumentforGod’sexistencearesociological
orpsychological,itmightbesimilarlydifficulttoexplainitsrejectionas“progress.”
If we understand progress in philosophy to consist in coming to have more true
beliefsandfewerfalsebeliefs,therearethreeargumentsfortheclaimthattheinflu-
ence of social factors will undermine progress. Two of these arguments come form
theliteratureonscientificrealism:Putnam’s(1978)metainductiveargument(MI)and
Sklar’s (1981) unborn hypothesis argument (UH). The third is more specific to the
fieldofphilosophybecauseitdependsonthefactthatphilosophersreturnconstantly
toancient,medieval,andearlymodernsources.
MItakesasitsstartingpointtheobservationthatpastscientifictheorieshavebeen
wrongintheirfundamentalpositsabouttheworld.Itamassescasesofluminiferous
ether, phlogiston, the four humours, and even Newtonian mechanics—all of which
were leading candidates in their day yet subsequently rejected for newer theories—
and then concludes that it is highly likely that our present theories will suffer the
samedefeat.AccordingtoMI,wehavenoreason,atanytime,tobelievethatcurrent
scienceiscorrect,giventhatishasbeenincorrectinmanypastcases.AsPutnamputs
theobjection,“justasnotermsinthescienceofmorethanfifty(orwhatever)years
agoreferred,soitwillturnoutthatnotermusednow…refers”(p.25).Theappear-
ance of progress throughout the history of science is merely illusion foisted upon a
seriesoferrors.Thereis,ofcourse,agoodKuhnianexplanationforwhytheseviews
survivedforaslongastheydid:eachwasregardedasauthoritativeduringitsdayand
passeddowntosuccessivegenerationsofscientistsinthecourseoftheirtrainingin
thediscipline.
In a parallel way, one might run MI on the naturalized view of the discipline we
haveproposed:Manypastphilosophicalviewsareregardedtodayascrude,incorrect,
oversimplified,andsoon.Theywerebelieved,inlargepart,becauseofsocialfactors,
ratherthanthelightofreason.Thoughsometakethisjudgmenttoreflectphilosophical
progress—theapproximationoftruthinthelimitofinquiry—thefailureofthesepast
casesshouldinviteskepticismof,ratherthaninspireconfidencein,ourcurrentphilo-
sophicalviews.Wehaveeveryreasontobelievethatourcurrentviewsareaserroneous
asourpastones,andnaturalizedmetaphilosophyexplainsourshiftingallegianceto
differentideasbasedonthepullofsocialfactors.ThedifficultyposedbyMIiseven
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