Natural disaster and human actions in the Soviet famine of 1931-1933

67 Pages·2002·11.459 MB·English

by  Mark B. Tauger

The
Carl Beck
Papers
inRussian &
EastEuropeanStudies
Number1506 MarkB. Tanger
Natural Disaster and
Human Actions in the
Soviet Famine of
1931-1933
Mark B. Tauger is Associate ProfessorofHistory at WestVIrginia University. He
has publishednumerousarticlesandreviewsonSovieteconomicandagrarianhistory.
Hisworkhasbeensupportedby!REX,theSocialScienceResearchCouncil,theUCLA
HistoryDepartment,theWestVtrginiaHumanitiesCouncil,andtheWestVirginiaUni
versityHistoryDepartment Heispreparingabookonfamineandagriculturaldevelop
mentinlateimperialRussiaandtheUSSR.
~o. 1506,June 2001
© 2001 byTheCenterforRussianandEastEuropeanStudies,aprogramofthe
UniversityCenterforInternationalStudies,UniversityofPittsburgh
ISSN0889-275X
TheCarlBeckPapers
WilliamChase,BobDonnorummo,RonaldH.Linden,Co-Editors
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Introduction
Untilrecentlybothscholarlyandpopulardiscussionsofthecatastrophicfamine
intheSovietUnionin1931-1933invariablyhavedescribeditasanartificialor"man
made"famine. Certainwell-knownscholarshavedominatedthisdiscussion,expressing
twomaininterpretationsofthefamine. AUkrainiannationalistinterpretationholds
thattheSovietregime,andspecificallyIosifStalin,intentionallyimposedthefamineto
suppressthenationalistaspirationsofUkraineandUkrainians;revisionistsarguethat
theleadershipimposedthefaminetosuppressmorewidespreadpeasantresistanceto
collectivization.Accordingtotheseviews,anaturaldisasterthatcouldhavecauseda
faminedidnottakeplaceinthoseyears.1
Whiletheintentionalistinterpretationsofthefamineremainwidelyheld,recent
researchhascastsubstantialdoubtonthem. Severalstudiesanddocumentcollections
haveshownconclusivelythatthefaminedidnotstopatUkraine'sborders,butaffected
ruralandurbanareasthroughouttheSovietUnion,andeventhemilitary.' Studies
basedonthisevidence, andonareevaluationofpublishedSovietstatistics,have
shownthatthegrainharvestsof1931and1932musthavebeenmuchsmallerthan
officiallyacknowledged. Astables1and2show,whattheregimecalled"netgrain
marketings"fromthe1932harvest-theamountsofgrainremovedfromthevillages,
includinggovernmentprocurementsandestimatedprivatesalesbypeasants,minus
theseed,food,andfodderaidreturnedtofanns-approximated13.7milliontons.
Table 1: Soviet omdal Harvest and Marketing Data, 1930-1934, (sown area
in million hectares, harvest in million metric tons, yields in centners per
hectare)
Harvest Yields
Sown Bio- Biological Biological Barn Barn Procure-
Area logical Bam Average Kolkhoz Average Kolkhoz ments
1930 101.8 83 8.5 22.1
1931 104.4 69.5 6.7 22.8
1932 99.7 69.9 7.0 6.8 18.5
1933 101.6 89.9 68.5 8.8 8.5 6.7 22.9
1934 104.7 89.4 67.7 8.5 6.5 22.7
Sources:Sel'skoekhoziaistvoSSSR.Ezhegodnik1932(Moscow,1936),215,243-49,269;
I.E.Zelenin,"Osnovnyepokazatelisel'skokhoziaistvennogoproizvodstvav1928-1935gg,"in
1
Ezhegodnik:poagramoi tstoriivostochnoiEvropy1965g.(Moscow: Nauka, 1970),473.The
biologicalyieldwasa projectionmadebeforethe harvest,by a special network ofagencies
establishedin 1933,whichtook littleaccountof potentialharvestinglosses; the biological
harvestwascalculatedbasedon regionalaveragebiologicalyieldsandestimated crop areas.
Thebarnyieldwasinprinciplebasedonactualharvestsandharvestyieldsdrawnfromannual
farmreports,whichwerepreparedlongafterprocurementsandhencecould notbe usedasa
basisfordemandingreducedprocurementquotas,andthereforewereconsideredreliable. The
figuresforkol/chozyaredisaggregatedfromtotalaverageyieldsandharvestsinthesources.For
furtherinformationonsources,seeTauger,"The1932HarvestandtheSovietFamineof1932
1933,"SlavicReview,50,no.1(Spring1990):72.
Table 2: Soviet Rural GrainBalance from OfficialData (million metric tons)
Barn Est.Gross Returnsto Net Rural
Harvest Marketings Agriculture Marketings Remainder
1931 69.5 23.7 4.9 18.8 50.7
1932 69.6 19.4 5.7 13.7 55.9
1933 68.5 25.6 1.3 24.3 44.2
1934 67.7 27.1 1.1 26.0 41.6
Sources: Tauger,"The 1932Harvest,"74; A.A.Barsov,Balansstoimostnykkobmenov
mezhdugorodom i derevnei(Moscow: Nauka, 1969),103,citingarchivalsources on grain
returnedtoagriculturein 1931-1932; Iu.V.Moshkov,Zemovaiaproblemavgody sploshnoi
kollektivhatsii(Moscow: MOU,1966),131,forgrainreturnedtoagriculturein1933;Spravochnik
partiinogorabomika,(Moscow,1935),9:212,forgrainreturnedtoagriculturein1934.Thelatter
twosourcesreferonlytostaleseedandprovisionaidandprobablyunderestimatetheamountof
grainreturned.Grossmarketingsincludegovernmentgrainprocurementsandestimatesofprivate
marketsalesbypeasants; returnstoagriculturecomprisesprocuredgrainthatthegovernment
returnedtovillagesforfood,forage,andseed; netmarketingsarethedifferenceresultingfrom
subtractingreturnstoagriculturefromgrossmarketings,andrepresentthetotalavailabletothe
governmentforextra-ruraluse; theruralremainderisthedifferenceobtainedbysubtractingnet
marketingsfrom the "barn harvest," and represent the amounts left in and returned to the
countrysideaftergrainprocurementswerecompleted.
2
Thisamountwassubstantiallylessthanthenetgrainmarketingsfromthe1931harvest,
18.8milliontons.Consequentlythe1932procurementsshouldhaveleftmorefoodin
thevillagesduringfall 1932andspring1933thanin 1931-1932. The factthat a
disastrousfaminefollowedthe 1932procurementsmusthavebeenatleastinpartthe
resultofasrnallerharvest Newarchivalsources,includingannualreportsfromcollective
farmspreparedafterallharvestworkandgrainprocurementswerecompleted,show
thatcollectiveandstatefarms (kolkhozyandsovkhozy)producedmuchlessgrain
thanofficialstatisticsindicated. Thesedata,partiallypresentedintables3and4,
indicatethatthe 1932harvest wasintherangeof50-55million tons,some20-30
percentbelowtheofficialfigureofalmost70milliontons,andeventhismaybean
overestimate. Thesedataalsoshowthattheharvestof1933wasmuchlargerthan
thoseof1931and1932: inUkrainetheyieldincreasedfromfivecentnersperhectare
toeight; inAzovo-Chernomorskiikrai (territory),formerlythemostfertilepartofthe
NorthCaucasus,fromlessthanfourcentnerstomorethansix.'
Table 3: Official and Archival Kolkhoz Yields and Implied Harvests, 1932
(harvests in million metric tons, yields in centners per hectare)
Percentageof
Official Official Official AllKolkhozy Archival Implied
Kolkhoz KolkhozGrain Kolkhoz inNKZ Yield Kolkhoz
Region Yield Sown Area Harvest Reports NKZ Harvest
USSR 6.8 69.1 46.99 40 5.6 39.5
RSFSR 6.5 53.0 34.45 33.6 6.0 31.8
UkrSSR 8.0 13.0 lOAD 47.3 5.1 6.6
NorthCau. 6.1 7.1 4.30 86.6 3.9 2.8
Sources: Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest,"78, 85, based onSel'skoe khoziaistvoSSSR, 271;
RGAE7486.3.4456,112ff.Thearchivalyieldsareaveragesofkolkhozannualreportscontainedin
Narkornzemarchivaldocumentsforinternaluse; theimpliedkolkhozharvestistheproductofthe
archival yieldandtheofficialkolkhozgrainsownarea.
3
Table 4: Recent Estimates of Soviet Rural Grain Balance
(million metric tons)
Wheatcroft& Davies Tauger
Net ImpliedRural ImpliedRural
Marketings Harvestest Remainder Harvestest. Remainder
1931 18.8 56±9% 38
1932 13.7 56±10% 42.3 50 36.3
1933 24.3 65±4% 41.7
Sources: R. W.Davies, Mark Harriston, and S. G. Wheatcroft,eds., The Economic
Transformationo/theSovietUnion,1913-1945(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,1994),
286;figuresobtainedbyreducingofficialharveststatisticsbyapercentagebasedon rainfall
data; Tanger,"The1932Harvest,"76,84,estimatebasedonarchivalsummariesofyieldsand
sownareasfromannualkolkhozreportsfor1932containedinthearchivesofNarkomzemandthe
CentralStatisticalAdministration.
Certainly,theharvestdeclinewasnottheonlycauseoftheSovietfamine: the
regimeexportedfoodduringthecrisis,"Theamountofgrainexportedduringthe
peakofthefamineinthefirsthalfof1933,however,approximately220,000tons,
wassmall,lessthan1percentofthelowestharvestestimates,andtheregimewas
usingvirtuallyalltherestoftheavailableharvesttofeedpeople. Theactualamounts
ofgrainneededandutilizedforthispurposecanonlybeapproximated. A I.Mikoian,
thecommissaroftrade(Narkomtorg)estimatedin1928thattheregimeneeded11.2
milliontonsofgraintomeetthedemandsoftownspeople,militarypersonnel,and
othergroupswhodidnotproducetheirownfoodorsufficientfood. Withtherapid
industrialization,collectivization,anddekulakizationmeasuresinthefollowingyears,
however,thenumberofconsumerswhomtheregimesuppliedrapidlyincreased.
Simultaneously,cropfailuresandfamineconditionsin1927and1928,the"graincrisis,"
forcedtheSovietregimetoestablishafoodrationingsystemthatby1932encompassed
morethan40millionpeopleintownsandindustrialsites.Inaddition,severalmillion
moreinthemilitary,inprisonsandcamps,andevenmanypeasantsandotherpeople
invillagesreceivedfoodsuppliesthroughotherrationingsystems. Despitetheincreasing
numberofconsumers,theSovietgovernment'scapacitytosupplythemdecreased
duringthefaminecrisis. Accordingtoofficialfigures,thesupplysystemdistributed
approximately16.3milliontonsofgrainthroughrationingsystemsfromJuly1931
throughJune1932,butonly14.5milliontonsfromJuly1932throughJune1933.
4
During thosesameperiodstheregimedrasticallycurtailedgrainexports,from4.7
milliontonsto1.6milliontons. Ascanbeseenfromcomparingthesestatisticswith
thedataonprocurements intables 1and2,thetotalofsupplyandexports nearly
exhausts the totalgrain available fromprocurements in these years. The Soviet
governmentdidhavesmallreservesofgrain,butcontinually drewthesedown to
allocatefoodtothepopulation.' Sincevirtuallytheentirecountryexperiencedshortages
offood,indicatingthattheprocurementanddistributiondataarereasonablyaccurate,
clearlytheSovietUnionfacedasevereshortage,andthemostimportantcauseofthat
shortagehastohavebeensmallharvestsin1931 and1932.
ConsequentlyanunderstandingoftheSovietfamine,andoftheintenseconflict
betweenregimeandpeasantsovergrainprocurementsemphasizedinmoststudies,
requiresanexaminationofthecausesofthosesmallharvests. Twoexamplesfromthe
vasthistoriographyoffaminesdemonstratesthelegitimacyandimportanceofsuchan
investigation. InthecaseoftheGreatIrishFamineof1845-1851,anationalistliterature,
similartotheUkrainiannationalistliteratureontheSovietfamine,holdstheBritish
governmentresponsible. WithoutdenyingthattheBritishgovernmentmishandledthe
crisis,however,everyserioushistorianofthefamine,fromCecilWoodham-Smithto
theleadingIrishspecialistCormac6Grada,attributesitfirstofalltotheextraordinary
naturaldisasterofthepotatoblight.PeterSolarcalculatedthatIrelandexperiencedan
absolutefoodshortageinthemainfamineyearsof 1845-1848.6 Russiaitselfhas
enduredmorethanonehundredfiftyfaminesinitsthousandyearsofrecordedhistory,
virtuallyallofwhichresulteddirectlyfromnaturaldisasters,inmostcasesdrought,and
RussianandSovietspecialistshavepublishedmanystudiesofthecausesandeffects
ofdroughtandcropfailuresinRussiaandelsewhere.' ThesecropfailuresinIreland
andRussiaareestablishedfactsthatmustbeconsideredinanyattempttoexplainthe
famines.TheNobellaureateeconomistAmartyaSenhascriticizedanarrowfocuson
shortageinexplainingfamines. InhisclassicstudyPovertyandFamines,however,
Senexaminedagriculturalconditionsandharveststatisticsineachofhisfourfamine
casestudiesbeforerejectingshortageasanexplanation. Hisargumentsminimizingthe
importanceofshortages,moreover,havebeenchallengedintwoofthecaseshestudied.8
HarvestsduringtheSovietfamineof1931-1933havenotreceivedcomparable
attention,ingreatpartbecause oftheassumptionthatthefaminewasnotdue toa
smallharvest. RobertConquest,forexample,employsthewordinthetitletohiswell
knownbookHarvestofSorrow,butdoesnotactuallyanalyzetheharvestorexamine
itsrelationshiptothefamineinanydetail." JamesMacehasrecentlyreassertedthe
argumentthattheharvestwaslarge,citingtestimoniesbeforeaU.S.congressional
commissioninthe1980s(fiftyyearsaftertheevent);onthisbasishearguesthatthe
faminewasthereforetheresultofhighprocurementquotas. Hedoesnot,however,
discussstatisticaldataandotherevidence,somefromhisownsources,showingthat
5
procurementsweresubstantiallylowerin1932thanin1931,butleftruralpeoplewith
muchsmallerreservesthanafterthe1931harvest Thiscouldonlyhavehappenedif
the1932harvestwassmall." Thefactthatmemoirsourcesdescribealargeharvest,
however,suggeststhatcropsmayhaveappearedtobeinbettercondition(atleastto
thepeasants)thantheywereinfact; theevidencethatIpresentbelowdocumentsthat
thiswasthecase.
Nonetheless,twostudiesdiscusstheharvestsinthoseyears.RobertDavies
andStephenWheatcroftarguethatthe1931and1932harvestsweresmalldueto
droughtanddifficultiesinlaborandcapital,especiallythedeclineindraftanimals.
II
D'AnnPenner,intwostudiesofthefamineintheNorthCaucasusandDonregions,
rejectsdroughtasanimportantfactorintheregion'ssmallharvestin1932andinstead
attributesittopeasantresistance,specificallyastrikeagainsttheSovietregime.
12
ThesestudiesthusrepresenttwocontrastingPerspectivesontheharvest,andtherefore
onthefamine: onefocusingontheoldRussianagrarianproblemsofweatherand
poverty,exacerbatedbycollectivizationandtheeconomiccrisesofthefive-yearplan,
theotherfocusingonfamiliarpoliticalaspects,theconflictbetweentherapacious
Sovietregimeandtheresentful,resistantpeasantry. Theirstudiesworkfromdifferent
assumptionsandemploydifferentsources: DaviesandWheatcroftreliedmoreon
publishedsourcesandconsiderthecountryasawhole,Pennermoreonarchival
. materialsthatfocusonone region,albeitanimportantone. They alsodiscuss
environmentalconditionspurelyintennsofdrought,whentheIrishcaseatleastsuggests
thatotherfactorswerefullycapableofcausingadisastrouscropfailure.
InthisessayIreexaminetheharvestsof1931andespecially1932onthe
basisofnewlyavailablearchivaldocumentsandpublishedsources,includingsome
thatscholarshaveneverutilized. Ishowthattheenvironmentalcontextofthesefamines
deservesmuchgreateremphasisthatithaspreviouslyreceived:environmentaldisasters
reducedtheSovietgrainharvestin1932substantiallyandhavetobeconsidered
amongtheprimarycausesofthefamine. Iarguethatcapitalandlabordifficultieswere
significantbutwerenotasimportantastheseenvironmentalfactors,andwereinpart
aresultofthem. IalsodemonstratethattheSovietleadershipdidnotfullyunderstand
thecrisisandoutofignoranceactedinconsistentlyinresponsetoit Iconcludethatit
isthusinaccuratetodescribetheSovietfamineof1932-1933assimplyanartificialor
man-madefamine,orotherwisetoreduceittoasinglecause. Overall,thelowharvest,
andhencethefamine,resultedfromacomplexofhumanandenvironmentalfactors,
aninteractionofmanandnature,muchasmostpreviousfaminesinhistory.
6
The Global Context
Natural disasters leadingtofaminesboth at home and abroadform the
background tothe 1932-1933 famine. Internally,theperiod 1917to 1930saw
faminesinlargeareasoftheSovietUnion,insomecasesonanationalscale. The
regimecametopowerin1917inthemidstofseriousandgrowingfoodshortages,
causedmainlybythedemandsofWorldWarI,intownsthroughoutthecountryandin
mralareasinthenorthem"consumingprovinces";thetsaristregimeandtheProvisional
Governmenthadestablishedstatecontroloverfoodsuppliesandinstitutedrequisitioning
policies,modeledonthoseofthewesternpowers. DuringtheCivilWar,theBolshevik
13
government,theWhiteregimes,andeventheGreensrequisitionedfoodfrompeasants
inregionsthattheycontrolled; thetownsinBolshevikandWhiteregionsgenerally
experiencedfamines. The"famineof1921"infactencompassedtheyears1920
14
1923,duetoseverecropfailuresin1920and1921andlowharvestsin1922and
1923,andaffectednotonlyruralareasbutalsocities,includingMoscowandPetrograd.
DuringtheseyearstheSovietregimereceivedaidfromabroad,butcontinuedthe
requisitionsofwarcommunisminsomeregionswhileapplying"methodsofrequisition"
tocollectthenewtaxinkindimposedin1921inordertosupplementofteninsufficient
aidsupplies.
IS
SeriousdroughtsledtofaminesduringtheperiodoftheNewEconomicPolicy
(NEP)in 1924--1925inEuropeanRussiaandUkraine,andin1928-1929,which
wasmostsevereinUkraine.Inbothcases,theregimeacknowledgedthecrisesand
fannedextraordinaryagenciestomanagerelief. The1928--1929Ukrainianfamine,
16
whichhasnotbeenrecognizedintheWesternliteraturebutisdocumentedinUkrainian
sources,wasamajorcauseofthe"graincrisis"becauseitsubstantiallyreducedgrain
suppliesfortheurbanpopulationaswellasforpeasantsinthedroughtregions. The
graincrisisandfamineof1928-1929wereamongthemainfactorsthatledSoviet
leadersandofficialstoresorttothe"extraordinarymeasures"toprocurefoodfrom
peasantsinotherregions,toimportfoodfromabroad,torationfoodintownsandin
ruralfaminedistricts,andultimatelytoundertakethecollectivizationofagriculture.
17
Evenin1930manyregionshadunfavorableweatherandcropfailures: inpartsofthe
NorthCaucasus,cropfailuresforcedlocalauthoritiestoappealtocentralauthorities
forseedaid,whichtheyreceived,andcropfailuresalsoreducedharvestsinKazakstan
andtheMiddleVolga
18
Thedomesticcontextofthe1931-1933famine,therefore,wasoneofchronic
foodinsecurity. Naturaldisasters,especiallydroughtaloneorincombinationwith
otherenvironmentalfactors(tobediscussedbelow),repeatedlycausedcropfailures
duringtheearlyyearsoftheSovietUnionandthreatenedtorevivethefoodcrisesand
famineoftheCivilWarperiod. NEP,despiteonescholar'sassertions,wasnota
7
periodof''well-being''freefromfamine.
19
TheSovietregimewasnotuniqueinthisexperience: othermajoragricultural
countriesintheworldalsoencounteredmajornaturaldisastersandfoodcrisesinthe
early1930s.TheUnitedStatesin1930-1931enduredwhatwastermed''thegreat
southerndrought,"whichaffectedtwenty-threestatesfromTexastoWestVIrginia,
broughtimmensesufferingandincreasedmortality,andcausedamajorpoliticalscandal
whenHerbertHooverrefusedtoallocatefoodrelieffromfederalgovemmentresources.
Chinaenduredacatastrophicfloodalongthreemajorriversin1931-1932thatledto
famineandcausedsome2milliondeaths. FrenchcoloniesinwesternAfricain1931
1932enduredadrought,locustinfestation,andtheworstfamineeverrecordedthere,
thoughtheFrenchauthoritiescontinuedtodemandtaxes." Bothdomestic and
internationalcontextssuggestthatenvironmentalfactorsdeservecarefulconsideration
inevaluatingthecausesofthe1932-1933famineintheSovietUnion.
Natural disasters, 1931-1932
Drought
Historically,themostimportantenvironmentalfactorinharvestfailuresandfamines
inRussiahasbeendrought Amainthemeinthehistoriographyofthe1933famine,
21
however,hasbeenthatdroughtdidnotoccurin 1932,atleastnotonascalethat
couldhavecausedafamine. Stalin,forexample,inaspeechtotheJanuary1933
CentralCommitteeplenum,acknowledgedthat"unfavorableclimaticconditions"
causedlossesintheNorthCaucasusandUkrainein1932,butinsistedthatthesedid
notequalhalfthelossesduetothe1931droughtintheVolgaregion.Macecitesa
tablefromastandardSovietstudyofdroughttoarguethatnomajordroughttook
placein1932.Penner'srecentstudyofthe1932-1933famine,whichfocusesmostly
ontheNorthCaucasus,arguesthatalthoughsomeregionsexperienceddroughts,
suchlocalunfavorableweatherconditionswerenotunusualandoverall,droughtwas
notafactorinreducingthe1932harvest.
22
Ontheotherhand,DaviesandWheatcroftarguethatdroughtwasanimportant
factorinreducingthe1932harvest. Theyrefertothedroughtof1931(whichIshall
discussbelow)andstatethat"droughtconditionscontinuedin1932."Theycitean
unpublishedpaperbyWheatcroftinwhichheprojectedsteadilyincreasingharvests
fromthelatenineteenthcentury,comparedthistocertainestimatesofharvestsinthe
Sovietperiod,whichwerealwayslower,andthenemployedrainfallstatisticsto
detenninetherelativesignificanceofweatherinthosefluctuations.vHiscalculations
indicatedthatdroughtwasanimportantfactorinlowerharvestsintheSovietperiod,
8