Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power

373 Pages·2012·4.19 MB·English

by  Jesse Ferris

Nasser’s Gamble
Nasser’s Gamble
HOW INTERVENTION IN YEMEN CAUSED THE SIX-DAY WAR
AND THE DECLINE OF EGYPTIAN POWER
J F
ESSE ERRIS
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON AND OXFORD
Copyright © 2013 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41
William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press,
6 Oxford Street, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1TW
press.princeton.edu
Jacket Photograph: Abdul Nasser Meets the Yemeni People. from al-Quwwat al-Musallahah, Egyptian
weekly journal, supplement to volume 412, May 1, 1964. Courtesy of The Arabic Press Archive,
Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University Israel.
All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ferris, Jesse, 1972–
Nasser’s gamble : how intervention in Yemen caused the Six-Day War and the decline of Egyptian
power / Jesse Ferris.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-691-15514-2 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Egypt—Foreign relations—1952–1970. 2.
Egypt—Military policy—History—20th century. 3. Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 1918–1970. 4. Yemen,
North—History—Revolution, 1962—Participation, Egyptian. 5. Yemen (Republic)—History—
1962–1972. 6. Israel-Arab War, 1967—Egypt. I. Title.
DT107.83.F47 2013
956.04’6—dc23 2012028784
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available This book has been composed in
Palatino Printed on acid-free paper. ∞
Printed in the United States of America 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2
Contents
Acknowledgments
INTRODUCTION
The Golden Age of Nasserism
Idealism and Pragmatism in Nasser’s Foreign Policy
The Nature of Middle Eastern Politics
The Place of the Intervention in Egyptian Memory
Structure of the Book
CHAPTER ONE
The Road to War
The Coup in Yemen
The Struggle for Power in Egypt
The Accidental Intervention?
The Denouement of the Crisis in Cairo
CHAPTER TWO
The Soviet-Egyptian Intervention in Yemen
The Nature of Soviet Relations with Egypt and Yemen
The Egyptian Appeal and the Soviet Response
Explaining Soviet Behavior
Forms of Early Soviet Involvement
CHAPTER THREE
Food for “Peace”: The Breakdown of US-Egyptian Relations, 1962–65
Recognition
Disengagement
The Suspension of US Aid
The Balance of Payments Crisis
CHAPTER FOUR
Guns for Cotton: The Unraveling of Soviet-Egyptian Relations, 1964–66
Guns for Cotton
The Soviet Quest for Base Rights in Egypt
From Jiddah to Moscow
In the Cracks of Cold War Geology
The Final Unraveling
CHAPTER FIVE
On the Battlefield in Yemen—and in Egypt
Counterinsurgency
Casualties
Cost
Corruption
The Spread of Popular Discontent
CHAPTER SIX
The Fruitless Quest for Peace: Saudi-Egyptian Negotiations, 1964–66
The First Arab Summit
The Second Arab Summit
The Jiddah Agreement
From the Islamic Pact to the Long Breath Strategy
The Kuwaiti Mediation and the Return of Sallāl
CHAPTER SEVEN
The Six-Day War and the End of the Intervention in Yemen
The Sinai Option
The Syrian Connection
The Soviet Spark
The Egyptian Initiative
The Impact of the Yemen War on Egyptian Military Performance in the
Six-Day War
The Khartoum Conference and the Withdrawal of the Egyptians from
Yemen
AFTERWORD
The Twilight of Egyptian Power
Bibliographical Note
Bibliography
Index
Map of Yemen ca. 1965.
Acknowledgments
THE OPENING LINES of a first book afford a singular opportunity to pay
tribute to those who have shaped one’s growth as a scholar. My
intellectual story begins with Donald Kagan, who taught me all about
foxes. The late Bill Odom then tried to get me into hedgehogs. Michael
Doran guided me into the labyrinth of Middle Eastern politics—and
suggested that I “look at Yemen” and “take Russian.” I went to Stephen
Kotkin seeking perspective on Russia and came away with a new
approach to history.
Many other distinguished colleagues and friends have helped shape
this book. Şükrü Hanioğlu, who has been unstinting in his support, read
several drafts and provided many helpful comments; so did Bernard
Haykel, who shared his private library with me. Elie Podeh contributed
expertise in Arab politics and valuable counsel along the way. Bernard
Lewis furnished invaluable references and encouragement. L. Carl Brown
read through the entire manuscript and provided many insightful
comments. Mark Kramer and the editorial staff at the Journal of Cold
War Studies helped refine the ideas contained in the second and fourth
chapters. Michael Oren provided helpful advice and support at key
junctures. Oscar Sanchez generously shared the results of his research.
David Freedel, the best language instructor I have ever known, taught
me Russian. The noble-hearted Musa Odeh transformed my Arabic. Gali
Dagan, a true friend, endured many hours of conversation about Yemen.
Vladimir Shubin, Alexei Vassiliev, Oleg Peresypkin, Constantine
Truevtsev, Zaid al-Wazir, Qassim al-Wazir, and many others shared their
reminiscences. Desmond Lachman and Yotam Margalit contributed
economic expertise. Rachel Green and Maayan Ravitz-Shalom jealously
guarded my time. Ira Bein, Frank Grelka, Shaul Levy, Rami Livni, and
Baker al-Majali assisted with research. Shane Kelley designed the maps.