Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens

206 Pages·2003·0.86 MB·English

by  Julian Le Grand

MOTIVATION, AGENCY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
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Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy
Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens
Julian Le Grand
GreatClarendonStreet,OxfordOX26DP
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vii
In contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every
man ought to be supposed a knave and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest. By this
interest, we must govern him and, by means of it, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambition,
co-operate to the public good.
(David Hume, ‘On the Independency of Parliament’)
I wouldn't mind being a Pawn, if only I might join—though of course I should like to be a Queen best.
(Lewis Carroll, Alice Through the Looking Glass)
Fancy what a game of chess would be if all the chessmen had passions and intellects, more or less small and
cunning;ifyouwerenotonlyuncertainaboutyouradversary'smen,butalittleuncertainaboutyourown;ifyour
Knight could shuffle himself on to a new square on the sly; if your bishop in disgust at your Castling, could
wheedleyour pawnsoutoftheirplaces;andifyourpawns,hating youbecausetheyarePawns,couldmakeaway
from their appointed posts that you might get checkmate on a sudden. You might be the longest-headed of
deductive reasoners, and yet you might be beaten by your own Pawns. You would be especially likely to be
beaten,ifyoudepended arrogantlyonyour mathematicalimagination,and regarded your passionate pieces with
contempt.
(George Eliot, Felix Holt: The Radical)
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Preface
I first encountered the quotation from David Hume with which this book opens when preparing for my inaugural
lectureas a newlyappointedprofessorattheLondonSchoolofEconomics.University‘inaugurals’ arerather daunting
events when new professors deliver a formal lecture to an audience that includes not only their own department's
colleagues and students but also staff and students from other parts of the university together with friends and
relatives. Most of these know nothing about the area in which the lecturer is working or indeed his or her specialist
discipline. So lecturers are supposed to lay out their wares in a non-specialised fashion that both informs and
entertains—and that convinces the listeners that the university has made an excellentappointment.
Thelecturewassomewhatanaemicallytitled ‘NewVisions ofWelfare’, and mypreparationsforitwerenotgoingwell.
Itwassupposedtoreflectuponthedramaticchangesthatatthetime(themid-1990s)hadjusttransformedthewelfare
state. These included the break-up of the old state monopolies providing public services such as health care and
education,andtheirreplacementbyso-called‘internal’or‘quasi’markets.Inthosepartsofthewelfarestateconcerned
withcash benefits, such as socialsecurityand incomesupport,there seemed alsotobea desiretolook outsidetheold
ways of doing things, to question the usefulness of cash benefits as a means of achieving redistribution, and to find
different ways of reducing poverty and inequality. It was apparent that all these changes represented some kind of
cosmicshiftinthinkingaboutpublicservicesandthewelfarestate.Butitwas far from clear exactlywhatthenatureof
this shift was and where it had come from. The welfare state had been in existence for fifty years or so, and, despite
numerous political and economic crises during that time, its basic form and structure had remained virtually intact
during all that time. What was it that had led to these dramatic changes? Why were policy-makers now engaging in
radical reforms? Was there a consistent pattern here, one that might give some insight into what really was going on?
The passage from Hume gave me a clue to part of the puzzle. In it, Hume appears to be recommending that public
policy-makers ought to assume that all those involved with governmental organisations were fundamentally self-
interested—knaves—and to design policies accordingly. Yet it was apparent from looking at the history of that prime
example of a governmental organisation, the welfare state, that the architects who originally designed it had not
followedHume'sdictumatall.Sofarfromassumingthateveryonewasaknave,theyseemtohavebelievedthatpublic
service professionals and other