Morality Matters

185 Pages·2004·0.75 MB·English

by  Roger Trigg

morality matters
morality matters
roger trigg
#2005byRogerTrigg
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Contents
Preface viii
Introduction 1
‘That’s Your Opinion’ 1
A Just Society? 4
Should Law Enforce Morality? 7
1 What Is Natural? 11
Is Morality Natural? 11
What Does ‘Being Natural’ Mean? 12
How Free Are We? 16
The Roots of Morality 18
Moralityand Natural Law 21
2 Human Nature and Natural Law 26
What Is Natural Law? 26
Reason and Natural Law 29
Going against the ‘Grain of Nature’ 32
What Is Morality About? 34
vi 3 Human Rights 38
s The Political Context 38
t
n The Status of Rights 41
e
What Counts as a Right? 43
t
n
Who Gives Us Our Rights? 45
o
c Are ‘Rights’ Merelya Western Idea? 48
4 Natural Rights and Law 53
Can Laws Be Unjust? 53
The Moral Background 55
The Lawas Teacher 58
Liberalism and the Law 61
Should the Law Allow Torture? 63
5 The Rule of Law 68
What Is the Difference between Moral Rules and Laws? 68
Judicial Activism 71
The Role of Judges 73
Dissent and Democracy 76
Conscientious Objectors 78
6 The Public and the Private 82
Is a Political Pluralism Ethically Neutral? 82
The ‘Veil of Ignorance’ 85
The Moral Basis of Agreement 88
Trust 90
‘Fair Play’ 92
7 Groups and Individuals 96
Which Differences Matter Morally? 96
Discrimination and Multiculturalism 99
Politics and Race 102
ACase History: American Law 104
Sexual Orientation and Discrimination 108
8 Patriotism and Nationalism 111 vii
The Dangers of Patriotism 111 c
o
The Limits of Moral Concern 113 n
Particular and Universal Loyalties 116 t
e
Liberalism and Country 120 n
t
The Patriot and the Cosmopolitan 122 s
9 One World: a Global Ethic? 125
ACosmopolitan Law? 125
Global Responsibilities 129
Global Politics 132
Morality in International Relations 135
10 Character and Principle 140
The Importance of Character 140
‘Good Character’ 142
Liberalism and Character 145
‘Dirty Hands’ 148
Moral Conflict 150
11 Morality and Human Nature 154
Human Dignity 154
‘Playing God’ 157
Value Pluralism and Objectivity 159
Rationalityand Freedom 162
Conclusion 165
Glossary 168
Bibliography 173
Index 175
Preface
This volume continues a long series of books I have written, taking a
stand against various forms of relativism. My last book (Philosophy Matters,
Blackwell 2002) argued that relativism ultimately undermines philosophy
itself as an academic discipline. I now wish to look at alternatives to
relativism in the controversial field of morality. I am also continuing my
previous stress on the philosophical importance of the idea of a common
humannature,formingthebasisofsocietieswhichmayatfirstsightappear
verydifferent.
The book took shape while I was visiting the Center of Theological
Inquiry, a research institute in Princeton, New Jersey, for the latter part of
2002.TheCenter providedanidealbaseforhardworkandnewinspiration.
Iammost grateful for thekindlyhospitalityI received there.Ilearnt much
from colleagues visiting the Center from various parts of the world. I also
received much stimulus from discussions in Princeton University, particu-
larlyatitsCenterforHumanValues,andattheJamesMadisonProgramin
American Ideals and Institutions.
I was very grateful for a research grant covering the same period, from
theJohnTempletonFoundation.TheFoundationfurtherswork inthearea
of science and religion, and, although the grant helped me primarily with
other projects, it also indirectlyaided this one.
As always I have enormously benefited from the help, support and
encouragement of my family. My wife Julia, my daughter Dr Alison
Teplyand my son-in-law Robert Teply have all given invaluable advice and
criticism.
Roger Trigg,
Universityof Warwick
Introduction
‘That’s Your Opinion’
A moral argument is often stopped in its tracks when someone refuses
to consider a position by saying that ‘that is just your opinion’. The
implication is that anybody’s judgement is as good as anyone else’s, and
thatnoone has aright to tell otherswhat to do. The factthat Ido not like
bananas may be a fact about me, but it has no bearing on what you may
enjoy.Similarly,itisimplied,ifIdisapproveofsomething,thatmaytellyou
aboutme,but ithasnorelevancetowhatyou shoulddo. Theconfusionin
allthisisdisplayedbytheideathatwehaveno‘right’totellotherswhatto
do. We seem at the same moment to be denying that moral claims can
tie everyone down, and asserting that there is at least one moral claim that
we should all respect, namely that we ought not to impose our views on
others.
How have we come to this point? We respect individual freedom, and
consider that we are right to do so. Then, in the name of that freedom,
manydenythatmoralitycaneverbeother thanapersonal,evensubjective,
affair.Whatseemsrighttomeisrightforme,butnotnecessarilyforothers.
This seems very tolerant, and we all value toleration. Yet the ideas of
freedom and toleration are not morally neutral, but are only possible
given a certain kind of society, which inculcates a definite moral position.
Asocietyinwhichtoleration,andindividualfreedom,areonlyupheldinso
farastheyseemrighttoindividualsishardlyonemostof uswouldfeelsafe
living in. Too much would depend on the passing whims, and tastes, of
particular people. Wewould allwant the reassurance of a more substantial
moral framework, perhaps underpinned by the lawof the land.
2 The confusionendemic inall thisiswell illustratedbythosewhowant a
rightof individual‘privacy’tobepubliclyrecognized.Theythenextendthe
n
idea of such privacy to cover wide-ranging personal judgements about our
o
i own preferred lifestyle. Privacy becomes ‘autonomy’, and ‘autonomy’ be-
t
c comestherighttomakemyownchoiceswithoutinterferencefromothers.
u
d Yet a right to such autonomy, whether claimed morallyor enforced legally,
o involves a demand that others respect my own choices. Since very few
r
t choices fail to have public effects, this becomes a demand that I do what I
n
i like, regardless of its effect on others,and on the public good. In anysocial
setting,suchapositioncannotbesustained.Byclaimingrightstoprivacy,we
makeother people’sclaimstosimilarrightsunobtainable.Wecannotallget
what wewant without colliding with others.
Morality cannot just be a matter of individual taste. Yet it is not just
constituted by the customs and traditions of a particular society. We may
wanttocriticizewholesocieties,includingourown.Infactthesamepeople
whowantedtodecrytheideaofanyuniversalmorality,onthegroundthat
it was merely an imposition of Western values, were the first to condemn
apartheidinSouthAfrica.Ifwhatisrightisreducedtowhatisjudgedright
in a particular society, white South Africa could claim to be a society. A
commoncomplaintwasthat‘youdonotunderstandourcircumstances,and
would think differently if you lived here’. Yet if anything was objectively
wrong,theapartheidregime,withitssystematicracialdiscrimination,surely
was. Otherwise, no one could properlycondemn it. Yet condemnation had
to appeal to basic moral principles that go deeper than the particular
judgements of a particular society.
We have to be pulled back from a position that tolerates any and every
view, including those that preach intolerance and hatred. No one can
consistently use moral language, except in the most cynical way, without
recognizingthatitintrinsicallymakesjudgements,callsonreasonswhichare
applicabletoeveryone,andrulesoutsomepossibilities.Somephilosophers,
even so, have maintained that this truth-expressing function of moral lan-
guage is wholly illusory. Saying that something is good, they would hold,
only says something about ourselves, such as that we commend it. It is not
making anyclaim about theworld.
We see in these claims the long shadow cast by science. Its success in
moderntimeshasbeensuchthatitappearsthattruthhastoberestrictedto
what can be decided according to its meticulous experimental method. It
seemsthattruthcannotbeatstake,ifwehavenoagreedmeansofsettlinga
dispute.Thiswasthepositionofthe‘logicalpositivists’,whodefinedclaims
to truth in terms of our ability toverifyor falsify them by scientific means. 3
Thus claims, which cannot be checked, have no meaning. This view was
i
propagated between the two world wars by the ‘Vienna Circle’, and it n
t
echoed through universities long after the Second World War. One of its r
o
main exponents in the English-speaking world was A. J. Ayer, whose book d
Language, Truth and Logic tried to show that moral statements were merely u
c
expressing emotion, evincing one’s own feelings and perhaps calculated to
t
i
stir those of others. Moral statements were ‘emotive’, not saying anything. o
n
Ayer claimed that ‘it is impossible to find a criterion for determining the
validityofethicaljudgements, becausetheyhavenone’.1Sentencesexpress-
ingmoraljudgementsarenotabletoexpresstruthsorfalsehoods.Theydo
not sayanything at all.
This view resonated through society long after logical positivism was
discreditedasaphilosophicaltheory.Theidearemainsstrongthat‘facts’are
the province of science, while moral judgements are to be contrasted as
‘values’.Factsareobjective,and‘values’personal.Tosaythatsomethingisa
‘valuejudgement’thenbecomesaneffectivedeviceforstoppingaconversa-
tion. The idea is that no reason can be given for what appears an arbitrary
subjective choice. This is reinforced by the dominant idea that, as it is
fallacious to deduce a value judgement from any particular set of facts,
there is no rational way of passing from a particular circumstance to a
judgement of what ought to be done. It seems that our personal choices
must not be constrained by whatever happens in theworld.
The issue is whether moral judgements can be made rationally, and
should be influenced by anything outside our own arbitrary will. Can they
beopentodiscussionandargument?Otherwisemoralbeliefsbecomemere
facts about individuals or groups. Some have some preferences, or desires,
while others have different ones. The temptation in a democratic society
will be to count heads, or to conduct sociological surveys, to gauge what
people think. Morality becomes a matter of opinion polls. What becomes
importantissimplymeetingasmanypeople’swishes,orfailingtooffendas
many, as possible. The opinions are basic data, so that the question is no
longer who is right, but how many believe something. It is irrelevant why
they believe it. Morality then becomes politics. Moral issues become the
stuff of political negotiation. We are onlyconcerned with what can obtain
maximumagreement.Moralargumentissqueezedoutofthepublicsphere,
tobereplacedbypoliticalcompromises.Anyideaofprincipledreasoning is
abandonedinfavourof negotiations and accommodationsbetween interest
groups.