Moral Relativism and Pluralism

82 Pages·2023·1.935 MB·English

by  David B. Wong

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The argument for metaethical relativism, the view that there is
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no single true or most justified morality, is that it is part of the g
best explanation of the most difficult moral disagreements. The
argument for this view features a comparison between traditions
that highly value relationship and community and traditions that
highly value personal autonomy of the individual and rights. It is held Ethics
that moralities are best understood as emerging from human culture
in response to the need to promote and regulate interpersonal
cooperation and internal motivational coherence in the individual.
The argument ends in the conclusion that there is a bounded
plurality of true and most justified moralities that accomplish these
functions. The normative implications of this form of metaethical
relativism are explored, with specific focus on female genital cutting M Moral Relativism
o
and abortion. ra
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About the Series Series Editors m
This Elements series provides an extensive Ben Eggleston
overview of major figures, theories, and University of
concepts in the field of ethics. Each entry Kansas David B. Wong
in the series acquaints students with the
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manner that will interest researchers. University, Virginia ytisre
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ElementsinEthics
editedby
BenEggleston
UniversityofKansas
DaleE.Miller
OldDominionUniversity,Virginia
MORAL RELATIVISM
AND PLURALISM
David B. Wong
Duke University
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DOI:10.1017/9781009043496
©DavidB.Wong2023
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ISSN2516-4031(online)
sse ISSN2516-4023(print)
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Moral Relativism and Pluralism
ElementsinEthics
DOI:10.1017/9781009043496
Firstpublishedonline:January2023
DavidB.Wong
DukeUniversity
Authorforcorrespondence:DavidB.Wong,[email protected]
Abstract:Theargumentformetaethicalrelativism,theviewthatthereisno
singletrueormostjustifiedmorality,isthatitispartofthebest
explanationofthemostdifficultmoraldisagreements.Theargument
forthisviewfeaturesacomparisonbetweentraditionsthathighlyvalue
relationshipandcommunityandtraditionsthathighlyvaluepersonal
autonomyoftheindividualandrights.Itisheldthatmoralitiesarebest
understoodasemergingfromhumancultureinresponsetotheneed
topromoteandregulateinterpersonalcooperationandinternal
motivationalcoherenceintheindividual.Theargumentendsinthe
conclusionthatthereisaboundedpluralityoftrueandmostjustified
moralitiesthataccomplishthesefunctions.Thenormativeimplications
ofthisformofmetaethicalrelativismareexplored,withspecificfocus
onfemalegenitalcuttingandabortion.
Keywords:moralrelativism,ethicaltheory,comparativephilosophy,
normativeethics,naturalisticethics
©DavidB.Wong2023
sse
rP ISBNs:9781009044301(PB),9781009043496(OC)
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tisre ISSNs:2516-4031(online),2516-4023(print)
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Contents
1 WhyArePeopleSoExercisedaboutMoralRelativism? 1
2 HowShouldThesesaboutMoralRelativismBeFramed? 2
3 RelationshipandCommunity,AutonomyandRights 3
4 EpistemicReasonstoDelveFurtherintotheConflict
betweenRelationship-Centered andRights-Centered
Moralities 6
5 AnEthicalArgumentforExtendedInquiryintoRivalsto
One’sOwnEthicalViews 9
6 OvercomingStereotypesofRelationship-Centered
Moralities 13
7 ComplicatingtheContrastbetweenRelationship-and
Autonomy-CenteredMoralities 18
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ytisre 8 TheUnderdiscussedQuestionofWhatMoralityIs 22
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e 9 ANaturalisticApproachtoUnderstandingWhyHuman
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irb BeingsHaveMoralities 24
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b e 10 PuttingTogetherMoralAmbivalenceandaNaturalistic
n
iln ConceptionofMorality 27
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34 12 TheSocialConstructionofMorality:BytheIndividualor
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Contents v
14 WhyWeHaveDifferentBeliefsinMetaethics 40
15 HowMoralReasonsEnterintotheTruthConditionsof
MoralJudgmentsandHelpShapeOurMoralMotivations 42
16 SummaryoftheArgumentforaPluralisticFormof
MetaethicalMoralRelativism 45
17 ConfusedReasoningThatIsSometimesAttributedto
ThoseWhoBelieveinNormativeMoralRelativism 46
18 AnArgumentforNormativeMoralRelativismThatIs
ContingentupontheAcceptanceofCertainValuesand
theAdoptionofMetaethicalMoralRelativism 47
19 WhyNormativeMoralRelativismCannotBeaSimple
MatterofLettingOthersBe 48
20 WhatIsFemaleGenitalCutting? 49
21 AccommodationandtheFraughtIssueofAbortion 53
22 UnderminingStereotypesoftheOtherSide 57
23 FosteringPluralisticEncounters 59
sse 24 SummaryofNormativeMoralRelativism 61
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MoralRelativismandPluralism 1
1WhyArePeopleSoExercisedaboutMoralRelativism?
GrowingupChineseAmericanintheAmericanMidwest,thewaysofmyfamily,
includingwhatwasexpectedofmeasason,seemedpainfullydifferentfromthe
waysofthefamiliesofmyEuropeanAmericanfriends.Familyseemedsomuch
more important in my home. This did not mean that my European American
friendshadnoresponsibilitiestotheirfamilies,butingeneral,theirdutiesrested
upon their shoulders more lightly. My mother once said to me that she simply
didn’tunderstand(maybeshemeantdidn’tapproveof)theAmericanobsession
withhappiness.Shethoughtthemostimportantthingwastofulfillone’srespon-
sibilitiestoothers,andofcoursetheweightiestoneswereowedtofamily.Idon’t
think she meant to deny the importance of a subjective sense of contentment
(what I think she meant by “happiness”), but her point was that the subjective
sensehadtobeearnedthroughtheperformanceofresponsibilities,asbestasone
could.Irespectedhersentiments,andhalfofmeagreedwithher,buttheother
halfwantedtobefreetopursuehappiness.
The question was about how I should live my life, and so it took on the
greatest personal importance for me. When I began to take moral relativism
seriously, some of those closest to me wondered whether I should find some
other philosophical subject to write about. Many people think that moral
relativismlicensesanyanswerapersonwouldbeinclinedtogive,oranyanswer
theirsociety’sculturegives.Thatiswhy“moralrelativism”isoftenusedasan
epithet,atermofderisionbypeoplewhoassumethatmoralityisamatterfor
reasoned judgment. I agree with this assumption, but depart from the oft-
associated,butverydifferentonethatforanymoralquestionthereisasingle
sserP correct answer to be found and that conflicting answers are incorrect. Others,
ytisre andIamamongthem,havecometoquestionthelatterassumptionbyreflecting
vin on the nature of moral disagreement. The kinds of disagreement that can be
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eg mosteffectivelyadducedinsupportofmoralrelativismtypicallyinvolvevalues
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C y (consider liberty versus equality). The experience of moral conflict can be
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en interpersonal, in which different sides have different views as to which value
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silb Thatis,onecanbeinternallydividedbetweentwomoralviewpoints,aswasthe
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43 Themerefactthatpeopledisagree,intrapersonallyorinterpersonally,isnot
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90 in itself a reason to think that there isn’t a single correct answer to be found.
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87 Insufficientevidencetoresolveadisagreementiscompatiblewiththerebeing
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2 Ethics
thistooiscompatiblewiththerebeingasinglecorrectanswer.Themotivation
thatpeoplehaveforadoptingbeliefs,moralandotherwise,andwhethertheyare
aware of their motivation or not, is often that these beliefs are held by others
with whom they identify or align themselves. Beliefs can help people protect
their self-esteem, and this can lead to motivations to overlook evidence that
undermines these beliefs and focus on evidence that supports them. Take the
belief that people are solely responsible for what they have achieved in life,
whichplaysakeyroleincertainconservativeviewsaboutdistributivejustice.If
onehasenjoyedreasonablesuccess,onemaystronglybelievethatonedidsoon
one’sown,focusingonthegenuinelydifficultsituationsonehadtoworkone’s
waythrough,butnotsomuchkeepinginmindthehelpothersprovidedalong
the way. This is a very familiar way of coming to an ill-founded belief, and
philosopherspointtosuchepistemicpitfallstoarguethatmoraldisagreement
provideslittleornoevidenceagainstmetaethicaluniversalism(e.g.,seeBrink
1989).Butonecanagreethatsuchpitfallsexist,andstillrejecttheideathatthey
“explainaway”allimportantmoraldisagreement.
In what follows, I make a case for this rejection and for accepting some
versionsofmoralrelativism.Thepathbeginswithadiscussionofhowtoframe
the issue of moral relativism. What exactly are the views being debated for
whichcertainkindsofmoraldisagreementsareadducedasevidence?
2HowShouldThesesaboutMoralRelativismBeFramed?
Inphilosophy,somuchdependsonhowyouframethequestion.Thebestwayof
framing the question enables interlocutors to fully consider the main consider-
sse ationsthathavemotivatedthecontendingsides,andtoevaluatethefullarrayof
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U e possibleconclusionsthatcouldbereached.Withthisinmind,“metaethicalmoral
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irb relativism”isdefinedhereasthethesisthatthereisnosingletrueormostjustified
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aC morality (with some adaptation, this formulation is from Harman 2000, 77).
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e Moralityhereistakenasaguidetowhatsortofactionsandattitudesarerequired,
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o prohibited,andpermissible,andmuchofitssubjectmatterconcernshowoneisto
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hsilb relatetoandaffectothers,thoughitcanalsospecifyfortheindividualwhatitisto
uP liveaworthwhilelife.Thedisjunction,“trueormostjustified,”ismeanttoallow
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9 an order or admonition might not be true or false), but nevertheless can be
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187 justified, perhaps in greater or lesser degree (as an order or admonition might
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/71 bemoreorlesswelltaken).Relativism,thusdefined,isopposedtowhatIshall
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.01 call“universalism”:theviewthatthereisasingletrueormostjustifiedmorality.
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