Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era

302 Pages·2000·1.504 MB·English

by  Michael E. Latham

Modernization as Ideology
The New Cold War History
John Lewis Gaddis, editor
michael e. latham
Modernization
as Ideology
American
Social
Science
and
‘‘Nation
Building’’
in the
Kennedy
The
Era
University
of North
Carolina
Press
Chapel Hill
and London
∫ 2000 The University of North Carolina Press
All rights reserved
Designed by April Leidig-Higgins
Set in Minion by Keystone Typesetting, Inc.
Manufactured in the United States of America
The paper in this book meets the guidelines for
permanence and durability of the Committee on
Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the
Council on Library Resources.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Latham, Michael E. Modernization as ideology:
American social science and ‘‘nation building’’ in the
Kennedy era / Michael E. Latham.
p. cm.—(New Cold War history)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
isbn 0-8078-2533-6 (cloth: alk. paper)
isbn 0-8078-4844-1 (pbk.: alk. paper)
1. United States—Foreign relations—1961–1963.
2. Social sciences— Political aspects—United
States—History—20th century. 3. Nationalism
—United States—History—20th century.
4. Economic development—Developing countries
—History—20th century. 5. Social change—
Developing countries— History—20th century.
6. Alliance for Progress. 7. Peace Corps (U.S.)
8. Economic development projects—Vietnam—
History—20th century. I. Title. II. Series.
e841.l34 2000 327.73—dc21 99-35517 cip
04 03 02 01 00 5 4 3 2 1
For Peter Richard Latham
and Nancy Wagner Latham

CONTENTS
Foreword by John Lewis Gaddis ix
Acknowledgments xi
∞ Modernization as Ideology:
Approaching the Problem 1
≤ American Social Science,
Modernization Theory, and
the Cold War 21
≥ Modernity, Anticommunism,
and the Alliance for Progress 69
∂ Modernization for Peace:
The Peace Corps, Community
Development, and America’s Mission 109
∑ Modernization at War:
Counterinsurgency and the Strategic
Hamlet Program in Vietnam 151
Conclusion 209
Notes 217
Bibliography 243
Index 269

FOREWORD
Ideologies make it easier than it might otherwise be to cope with reality.
They provide simple models of complex phenomena. They suggest direc-
tions in which history is moving. They generate rhetorical justifications for
action. And because ideologies perform these tasks, they tempt the leaders of
states into relying upon them as guides to action.
Historians of the Cold War have been reassessing the role of ideology in
the former Soviet Union, its Eastern European satellites, and the People’s
Republic of China. New archival sources suggest that within these states
ideology played all of these roles: that Marxism-Leninism frequently deter-
mined foreign policy priorities.
But what about the United States? Was there a comparable American ide-
ology during the Cold War? Michael Latham’s careful study of three Ken-
nedy administration initiatives—the Alliance for Progress, the Peace Corps,
and the Strategic Hamlet Program in Vietnam—shows that theories of mod-
ernization indeed became an ideology during the early 1960s. Based upon a
remarkable injection of social science into the realm of policy, these ideas
claimed to provide an objective basis for diagnosing and acting to alleviate
conditions that might make for Communist revolutions in the Third World.
They became, for a time, extraordinarily influential.
Latham also demonstrates, though, that what purported to be a new and
dispassionate analytical instrument in fact reflected an old and passionately
held set of cultural assumptions, extending all the way back to the days of
Manifest Destiny. The resulting confusion of science with a sense of national
mission made it di≈cult for American o≈cials to distinguish successes from
failures, for if ideology facilitates action, it can also cloak the e√ects of one’s
actions. It obscures reality’s irritating tendency not to fit models constructed
for it.
Most historians now acknowledge that the Soviet Union’s collapse re-
sulted in large part from the gap between its ideological aspirations and the
realities it confronted. Latham’s contribution is to show that the United
States also su√ered from ideological illusions in the years leading up to its
greatest foreign policy failure: the Vietnam War. The consequences were not
as devastating as they were for the ussr and its allies; but they were bad
enough. This important new study provides the clearest explanation yet of
how Americans fell victim to them.
Modernization as Ideology reveals, as few other books have, the power of
ideas in international history. It is a most welcome addition to the New Cold
War History series.
john lewis gaddis
x foreword