Modeling and Verification of Parallel Processes: 4th Summer School, MOVEP 2000 Nantes, France, June 19–23, 2000 Revised Tutorial Lectures

227 Pages·2001·2.749 MB·English

by  Stephan Merz (auth.), Franck Cassez, Claude Jard, Brigitte Rozoy, Mark Dermot Ryan (eds.)

Lecture Notes in Computer Science 2067
EditedbyG.Goos,J.Hartmanis,andJ.vanLeeuwen
3
Berlin
Heidelberg
NewYork
Barcelona
HongKong
London
Milan
Paris
Tokyo
Franck Cassez Claude Jard
Brigitte Rozoy Mark Dermot Ryan (Eds.)
Modeling andVerification
of Parallel Processes
4th Summer School, MOVEP 2000
Nantes, France, June 19-23, 2000
Revised Tutorial Lectures
1 3
SeriesEditors
GerhardGoos,KarlsruheUniversity,Germany
JurisHartmanis,CornellUniversity,NY,USA
JanvanLeeuwen,UtrechtUniversity,TheNetherlands
VolumeEditors
FranckCassez
CNRS,IRCCyN
1ruedelaNoe,44321NantesCedex3,France
E-mail:[email protected]
ClaudeJard
CNRS,IRISA
CampusdeBeaulieu,35042Rennes,France
E-mail:[email protected]
BrigitteRozoy
UniversitédeParisXI,LaboratoiredeRechercheenInformatique
Bâtiment490,91405OrsayCedex,France
E-mail:[email protected]
MarkDermotRyan
UniversityofBirmingham,SchoolofComputerScience
Edgbaston,BirminghamB152TT,UK
E-mail:[email protected]
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Berlin;Heidelberg;NewYork;Barcelona;HongKong;London;Milan;
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Foreword
MOVEP 2000 was the fourth summer school in the series of MOVEP summer
schools (MOdeling and VErification of Parallel processes), and was organized
jointly by IRCCyN, IRISA, LRI (France), and the University of Birmingham
(UK). It was held in Nantes, France on 19–23 June 2000 and continued the
success of the first three MOVEP summer schools held in 1994, 1996, and 1998.
MOVEPwasoriginallyaFrench-speakingschoolandwasinitiatedbyA.Arnold
(LaBRI,Bordeaux),J.Beauquier(LRI,Orsay),andO.Roux(IRCCyN,Nantes)
in 1994. MOVEP adopted English as its working language in 2000.
MOVEP is a school devoted to the wide area of modeling and verifying soft-
ware or hardware systems. The goal of MOVEP is to gather students, academic
researchers, and industrial researchers interested in the development of safety
critical systems and to provide a forum for discussion among people from com-
puter science and automatic control. More than 100 people from Europe, North
America, North Africa, and India attended MOVEP 2000.
This volume contains tutorials and annotated bibliographies covering the
main subjects adressed at MOVEP 2000. It gives a snapshot of the recent de-
velopments in the domain as well as a useful introduction to many subjects.
ThevolumecontainsfourtutorialscomprisingintroductorymaterialtoModel-
Checking,TheoremProving,CompositionandAbstractionTechniques,andTimed
Systems (with UPPAAL).
Three research papers give some more detailed views of High-Level Message
Sequence Charts, Industrial Applications of Model-Checking, and the use of
Formal Methods in Security.
Finally,fourannotatedbibliographiesgiveanoverviewofInfiniteState-Space
Systems, Testing Transition Systems, Fault-Model-Driven Test Derivation, and
Mobile Processes.
The organizers of MOVEP 2000 would like to thank all the contributors for
their commitment during the school and for their papers in this volume.
It is a great pleasure for us to be the editors of this LNCS Tutorials volume
and we hope to meet for the next MOVEP in June 2002.
April 2001 F. Cassez, C. Jard, B. Rozoy and M. Ryan
Program Committee
H. Alla LAG, Grenoble, F
A. Arnold LaBRI, Bordeaux, F
E. Brinksma U. of Twente, NL
A. Cimatti IRST, Trento, I
J. Esparza TU. of Munich, D
C. Jard IRISA, Rennes, F
K. G. Larsen BRICS-Aalborg, DK
F. Maraninchi UJF & Verimag, Grenoble, F
S. Merz U. of Munich, D
A. Petit LSV, Cachan, F
A. Petrenko CRIM, Montr´eal, CA
O. Roux IRCCyN, Nantes, F
B. Rozoy LRI, Orsay, F
J. Rushby SRI, USA
M. Ryan U. of Birmingham, UK
D. Sangiorgi INRIA, Sophia-Antipolis, F
P.-Y. Schobbens U. of Namur, B
R. Valette LAAS-CNRS, Toulouse, F
M. Wonham U. of Toronto, CA
Organizing Committee
Franck Cassez IRCCyN/CNRS, Nantes
Claude Jard IRISA/CNRS, Rennes
Brigitte Rozoy LRI, Orsay
Mark Ryan U. of Birmingham
Local Arrangements
Patricia Galloyer IRCCyN, Nantes
Marie-No¨elle Georgeault IRISA, Rennes
Nicole Labaronne IRCCyN, Nantes
MOVEP 2000 Sponsors
CNRS, INRIA, France Telecom, Ville de Nantes, Conseil R´egional des Pays de
la Loire, Conseil G´en´eral de Loire Atlantique, Universit´e de Nantes, Universit´e
de Rennes 1, Ecole Centrale de Nantes, EEC.
Contents
Tutorials and Papers......................................... 1
Model Checking: A Tutorial Overview ................................ 3
Stephan Merz (Universita¨t Mu¨nchen, Germany)
Theorem Proving for Verification..................................... 39
John Rushby (Computer Science Laboratory, SRI International, Menlo
Park, USA)
Composition and Abstraction........................................ 58
Antti Valmari (Tampere University of Technology, Finland)
Uppaal – Now, Next, and Future.................................... 99
TobiasAmnell(UppsalaUniversity,Sweden),GerdBehrmann(Aalborg
University,Denmark),JohanBengtsson(UppsalaUniversity,Sweden),
Pedro R. D’Argenio (University of Twente, The Netherlands),
Alexandre David (Uppsala University, Sweden), Ansgar Fehnker
(University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands), Thomas Hune (Aarhus
University, Denmark), Bertrand Jeannet, Kim G. Larsen (Aalborg
University,Denmark),M.OliverMo¨ller(AarhusUniversity,Denmark),
Paul Pettersson (Uppsala University, Sweden), Carsten Weise
(Ericsson Eurolab Deutschland GmbH, Germany), Wang Yi (Uppsala
University, Sweden)
HMSCs as Partial Specifications ... with PNs as Completions ............ 125
BenoitCaillaud,PhilippeDarondeau,Lo¨ıcH´elou¨et,andGillesLesventes
(IRISA, Rennes, France)
Industrial Applications of Model Checking ............................ 153
Alessandro Cimatti (ITC-IRST, Trento, Italy)
Formal Methods in Practice: The Missing Links. A Perspective from the
Security Area...................................................... 169
Dominique Bolignano, Daniel Le M´etayer, Claire Loiseaux (Trusted
Logic)
Annotated Bibliographies ................................... 181
Verification of Systems with an Infinite State Space .................... 183
Javier Esparza (Technische Universita¨t Mu¨nchen, Germany)
Testing Transition Systems: An Annotated Bibliography ................ 187
Ed Brinksma, Jan Tretmans (University of Twente, The Netherlands)
X Table of Contents
Fault Model-Driven Test Derivation from Finite State Models: Annotated
Bibliography ...................................................... 196
Alexandre Petrenko (CRIM, Montreal, Canada)
Mobile Processes: A Commented Bibliography ......................... 206
Silvano Dal Zilio (Microsoft Research, Cambridge, U.K.)
Author Index................................................... 223
Model Checking: A Tutorial Overview
Stephan Merz
Institut fu¨r Informatik, Universit¨at Mu¨nchen
[email protected]
Abstract. We survey principles of model checking techniques for the
automatic analysis of reactive systems. The use of model checking is
exemplifiedbyananalysisoftheNeedham-Schroederpublickeyprotocol.
Wethenformallydefinetransitionsystems,temporallogic,ω-automata,
and their relationship. Basic model checking algorithms for linear- and
branching-time temporal logics are defined, followed by an introduction
tosymbolicmodelcheckingandpartial-orderreductiontechniques.The
paper ends with a list of references to some more advanced topics.
1 Introduction
Computerized systems pervade more and more our everyday lives. We rely on
digital controllers to supervise critical functions of cars, airplanes, and indus-
trialplants.Digitalswitchingtechnologyhasreplacedanalogcomponentsinthe
telecommunication industry, and security protocols enable e-commerce applica-
tionsandprivacy.Whereimportantinvestmentsorevenhumanlivesareatrisk,
qualityassurancefortheunderlyinghardwareandsoftwarecomponentsbecomes
paramount, and this requires formal models that describe the relevant part of
the systems at an adequate level of abstraction. The systems we are focussing
onareassumedtomaintainanongoinginteractionwiththeirenvironment(e.g.,
the controlled system or other components of a communication network) and
are therefore called reactive systems [60,94]. Traditional models that describe
computer programs as computing some result from given input values are inad-
equate for the description of reactive systems. Instead, the behavior of reactive
systems is usually modelled by transition systems.
The term model checking designates a collection of techniques for the auto-
matic analysis of reactive systems. Subtle errors in the design of safety-critical
systems that often elude conventional simulation and testing techniques can be
(and have been) found in this way. Because it has been proven cost-effective
and integrates well with conventional design methods, model checking is being
adopted as a standard procedure for the quality assurance of reactive systems.
The inputs to a model checker are a (usually finite-state) description of the
system to be analysed and a number of properties, often expressed as formulas
of temporal logic, that are expected to hold of the system. The model checker
either confirms that the properties hold or reports that they are violated. In the
lattercase,itprovidesacounter-example:arunthatviolatestheproperty.Such
aruncanprovidevaluablefeedbackandpointstodesignerrors.Inpractice,this
view turns out to be somewhat idealized: quite frequently, available resources
F. Cassez et al. (Eds.): MOVEP 2000, LNCS 2067, pp. 3−38, 2001.
 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001
4 S. Merz
only permit to analyse a rather coarse model of the system. A positive verdict
fromthemodelcheckeristhenoflimitedvaluebecausebugsmaywellbehidden
by the simplifications that had to be applied to the model. On the other hand,
counter-examples may be due to modelling artefacts and no longer correspond
to actual system runs. In any case, one should keep in mind that the object of
analysis is always an abstract model of the system. Standard procedures such as
codereviewsarenecessarytoensurethattheabstractmodeladequatelyreflects
the behavior of the concrete system in order for the properties of interest to be
established or falsified. Model checkers can be of some help in this validation
task because it is possible to perform “sanity checks”, for example to ensure
that certain runs are indeed possible or that the model is free of deadlocks.
This paper is intended as a tutorial overview of some of the fundamental
principles of model checking, based on a necessarily subjective selection of the
large body of model checking literature. We begin with a case study in sec-
tion 2 where the application of model checking is considered from a user’s point
of view. Section 3 reviews transition systems, temporal logics, and automata-
theoretic techniques that underly some approaches to model checking. Section 4
introduces basic model checking algorithms for linear-time and branching-time
logics.Finally,section5collectssomerathersketchyreferencestomoreadvanced
topics. Much more material can be found in other contributions to this volume
and in the textbooks and survey papers [27,28,69,97,124] on the subject. The
paper contains many references to the relevant literature, in the hope that this
survey can also serve as an annotated bibliography.
2 Analysis of a Cryptographic Protocol
2.1 Description of the Protocol
Let us first consider, by way of example, the analysis of a public-key authen-
tication protocol suggested by Needham and Schroeder [104] using the model
checker Spin [65]. Two agents A(lice) and B(ob) try to establish a common se-
cret over an insecure channel in such a way that both are convinced of each
other’s presence and no intruder can get hold of the secret without breaking the
underlying encryption algorithm. This is one of the fundamental problems in
cryptography: for example, a shared secret could be used to generate a session
key for subsequent communication between the agents.
The protocol is pictorially represented in Fig. 1.1 It requires the exchange
of three messages between the participating agents. Notation such as (cid:1)M(cid:2)C
denotes that message M is encrypted using agent C’s public key. Throughout,
weassumetheunderlyingencryptionalgorithmtobesecureandtheprivatekeys
ofthehonestagentstobeuncompromised.Therefore,onlyagentC candecrypt
(cid:1)M(cid:2)C to learn M.
1 The original protocol includes communication between the agents and a central
key server to distribute the public keys of the agents. We concentrate on the core
authentication protocol, assuming all public keys to be known to all agents.