Table Of ContentTHE UNIVERSITY OF HULL
Military Transformation on the Korean Peninsula:
Technology Versus Geography
Being a Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
At the University of Hull
By
Soon Ho Lee
BA, Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea, 2004
MA, The University of Birmingham, United Kingdom, 2005
MRes, King’s College London, United Kingdom, 2006
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Acknowledgement
I am the most grateful to my Supervisor Dr. David Lonsdale for his valuable academic advice
and support during the long PhD journey. To reach this stage, I have had invaluable support
from my family back in Korea and my dear wife Jin Heon. I would also like to thank my
family for being so patient while I was researching. During this journey, I have obtained a
precious jewel in my daughter, Da Hyeon. I will pray for you all my life. I would like to give
special thanks to my late grandfather who gave me the greatest love, and taught me the
importance of family.
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Thesis Summary
This thesis provides an explanation of one RMA issue: the effectiveness of contemporary
military technology against tough geography, based upon case studies in the Korean
peninsula. The originality of the thesis is that it will provide a sound insight for potential foes’
approach to the dominant US military power (superior technology and sustenance of war).
The North Korean defence strategy – using their edge in geography and skill – tried to protect
themselves from the dominant US power, but it may be impossible to deter or defeat them
with technological superiority alone. This research also provides a valuable example, through
Stephen Biddle’s technology and skill theory, which claims that, in the future of war, the
skills of the unit (tactical readiness) are as important as the technology involved.
By examining three case studies, the thesis aims to reveal that technological
superiority alone cannot guarantee military success against the foe that possesses the
geographic advantage and the capability to use its benefits. The first case study of the Imjin
Wars will examine the significance of geography and capability to using the geographic edge
in the Korean peninsula. The second case study of the Korean War will examine how
technology alone failed to overcome the skilled and geographically advantageous defenders
in modern warfare. Finally, by examining possible conflict scenarios of US-ROK alliance and
North Korea, this research will seek to prove that contemporary military technology alone
would not guarantee military success and deterrence against North Korea, which is both
geographically advantaged and highly skilled.
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Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
Part 1 The US-ROK Technology-centred Military Strategy and Posture, and the
North Korean Tactical Readiness, Focusing on Terrain and its use
Chapter 2 The Military Transformation of US-ROK Alliance
2-1 Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare, and its Implications on Korean
Peninsula Security
2-2 RMA
2-3 The US Military Transformation after 9/11 and its Impact upon the US-
ROK Alliance
Chapter 3 North Korean Geographic Edge and Tactical Preparedness
3-1 Geographic Dimension of War and the Traditional Korean Military
Strategy – The Significance of Tactical Preparedness using the
Characteristics of Korean Peninsula Topography
3-2 The Development of North Korean Military Strategy
Part 2 Case Studies – Does Contemporary Military Technology Bring Ultimate
Military Success against the Geographically Advantaged and Tactically Well-
prepared North Koreans ?
Chapter 4 Imjin Wars
Introduction
4-1 The Japanese Invasion Plan
4-2 Japan’s Initial Successes and Joseon’s Defence Systems
4-3 Shock and the Gradual Strategic, and Tactical Transformation of the
Joseon- Cholla Province Defence (occupation) Campaign
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4-4 The Second Invasion and the Transformed Joseon Strategies and Tactics
Conclusion
Chapter 5 Technological and Geographic Dimensions of the Korean War
Introduction
5-1 Outbreak of War and North Korea’s Initial Success
5-2 The US Engagement and the Naktong River Line Campaign
5-3 Chinese Engagement and the New Phase of War
5-4 Stalemate (Position Warfare) and Ceasefire
Conclusion
Chapter 6 The Future Prospect of Technology and Geography in the Korean
Peninsula Conflict
Introduction
6-1 The US Pre-emptive Strike Strategy and OPLAN 5027
6-2 North Korea and Deterrence
6-3 The US-ROK Stand-Off Precision Earth-penetrating Weapons and North
Korean HDBTs
Conclusion
Chapter 7 Conclusion
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACMs - Advanced Conventional Munitions
ATG - Advanced Tactical Group
AUP - Advanced Unitary Penetrator
BCT - Brigade Combat Team
C3 - Command, Control, and Communications
C4I - Command, Control, Communication, Computer, and Intelligence
CALM - Conventional Air Launched Missile
CAS - Close Air Support
CEC - Cooperative Engagement Capability
CEP - Circular Error Probable
CFC - Combined Force Command
DMZ - Demilitarized Zone
DOD - Department of Defence
DOE - Department of Energy
DPRK - Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
EEZ - Exclusive Economic Zone
EPW - Earth-penetrator weapon
FAS - Federation of American Scientists
FEAF - Far East Air Force
FEBA - Forward Edge of Battle Area
FECOM - Far East Command
FMS - Foreign Military Sales
FOFA - Follow-on-Forces Attack
GBU - Guided Bomb Unit
GPR - Global Posture Review
HDBTs - Hard and Deeply Buried Targets
IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM - Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
IMHC Institute for Military History Compilation
ISAF - Israeli Air Force
ISR - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
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JASSM - Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile
JCS - Joint Chiefs of Staff
JSOW - Joint Standoff Weapon
KIDA - Korea Institute for Defence Analysis
KRIS - Korea Research Institute for Strategy
KWP - Korean Worker’s Party
MAD - Mutual Assured Destruction
MAP - Military Assistance Program
MD - Missile Defence
MLRS - Multiple Launch Rocket System
MND - Ministry of National Defence
MOP - Massive Ordnance Penetrator
MRC - Major Regional Conflict
MTCR - Missile Technology Control Regime
MTR - Military Technical Revolution
NAS - National Academy of Sciences
NEP - Nuclear Earth Penetrator
NKPA - North Korean People’s Army
NNSA - National Nuclear Security Administration
NPR - Nuclear Posture Review
NRDC - Natural Resource Defence Council
OMG - Operational Manoeuvring Group
PC - Pacific Command
PDD - Presidential Decision Directive
QDR - Quadrennial Defence Review
PIP - Performance Improvement Plan
PLA - People’s Liberation Army
PRC - People’s Republic of China
PVA - People’s Volunteer Army
RDO - Rapid Decisive Operation
RMA - Revolution in Military Affair
ROK - Republic of Korea
RSC - Reconnaissance-Strike Complex
SBCT - Stryker Brigade Combat Team
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SDB - Small-Diameter Bomb
SLBM - Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles
SLOC - Sea Lane of Communication
SOS - System of Systems
SSM - Surface to Surface Missile
TACMS - Tactical Missile System
UA - Unit of Action
UNC - United Nations Command
USAF - US Air Force
USFK - United States Forces Korea
USJFCOM - Joint Force Command
US PACOM - United States Pacific Command
WMD - Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Chapter 1 Introduction
The initial idea for this project came from the transformed military strategy that both the
Koreans and the US implemented in response to the rapid change of the Korean peninsula’s
security circumstance at the end of the Cold War. After the Cold War, North Korea had to
acclimate itself to the less warm relationship with Russia1 and China. As a consequence, they
suffered an economic crisis and major setbacks in their warfare capability, since they were
not able to introduce new weaponry and train their forces properly for offensive purposes. On
the other hand, even though ROK (Republic of Korea) suffered an economic crisis in 1997, it
recovered quickly and enjoyed steady economic growth, which enabled it to produce more
modernized and technologically advanced armed forces. Along with the economic growth
that gave them a financial basis to improve their military forces, the ROK was prompted
towards modernized and technology-centred armed forces due to their contemporary security
circumstances.
Firstly, ROK will recuperate war time operation command in 2015.2 Secondly, they have
started to protect their national interest not only within the Korean peninsula but also along
its outside. Under these circumstances, military authorities were urged to update independent
and long-range operations capabilities. The ROK proposed two grand threats in the Defence
White Paper of 2004. It suggested “the direct military threat” which was conventional
weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and front-line troop disposition of North
Korea. In addition to the direct military threat, unspecified threats were added. Terrorism,
1 The Soviet Union and North Korea formed an alliance in July, 1961, which included The Mutual
Military Aid clause but this treaty ceased in September, 1985 after the Cold War ended, allowing
Russia and ROK to establish formal diplomatic relationship in 1990.
2 The ROK forces’ operation command was handed to the UNC (United Nation Command) during the
Korean War (14th of July, 1950). Even though the peace time operation command recuperated in
December, 1994, wartime command still belongs to the UNC. The significance of wartime command
recuperation was not just restricted to the recovery of operation command independence. The ROK
government will be required to improve their forces’ quality especially in the weaker areas to achieve
independent operation. Even though they possessed massive military power, there was a lack of
information on warfare capability due to heavy US reliance. The modernization of forces to operate
independently will be carried out for next few years.
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WMD expansion and regional instability were mentioned as unspecified threats; however,
due to their concern at friction with neighbouring countries, the ROK did not mention their
neighbouring countries as a future threat. However, in The Navy and Air Force Vision of
2025 which mentions the ROK’s future objectives, strategy, tactic and force improvement
plan, it was stated that protecting the national interest involved securing the Sea Lane Of
Communication (SLOC), the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the Fishing Protection Zone,
the Continental Shelf, and the disputed Dok-Do island, which are vital to national security.
This means their operations range will need to expand by at least 300-500km away from
coastlines and borders. Although they are hesitant to speak of such matters directly, the ROK
recognizes neighbouring countries as future threats to the pursuit of their national interests.
Therefore, the ROK military authorities are also preparing and building up military strategy
and capabilities against regional powers. Accordingly, their transformation to technology
centred forces has progressed significantly in recent years.
The USFK (United States Forces Korea) has also transformed their strategy according to the
GPR (Global Posture Review) and Flexibility agreement, which obviously aimed to
transform their strategy in this area to a more technologically-centred one.3 Consequently, the
Korean peninsula is experiencing the biggest disparity in military technology since the
Korean War. Much research is on-going regarding how the technological disparity itself may
affect possible Korean peninsula conflicts, but most of the research is focused on the area of a
possible North Korean invasion of the South and its defence. However, there is no guarantee
that this will be the only possible conflict; the strategist has to research the entire gamut of
possible situations and prepare solutions to meet the needs of whatever situation may arise.
During the First North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, the US prepared a surgical operation to
the suspicious North Korean nuclear site (Yongbyon) similar to an operation performed in
Libya (1986).4
3 See) Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture, September 2004
4 The former ROK president Kim Yongsam gave testimony to the SBS radio (Seoul, ROK) on 13th of
April, 2009 that there were 33 US battleships and 2 air craft carriers in the East Sea to bombard
Yongbyon during the first crisis, and he phoned the US president (Bill Clinton) to avoid all-out war
with North Korea which he believed led to the US decision not to bombard Yongbyon.
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