Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control

153 Pages·2014·1.03 MB·English

by  Rear Adm. J. C. USN Wylie

CLASSICS
OF
SEA POWER
The Classics of Sea Power series makes key works of professional naval thought
readily available in uniform, authoritative editions. Each book is chosen for its
eloquence, incisiveness, and pertinence to the great ideas of naval theory,
strategy, tactics, operations, and logistics. The series is a companion to histories,
anthologies, and other interpretative writings, providing a depth of
understanding that cannot be had from reading secondary sources alone.
Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie was the first serving naval officer since Mahan and
Luce to become known for his writings on strategy and theory. Military Strategy
is a reaction to questions raised in the 1950s during the debate on unification of
the U.S. armed forces. In it Wylie attempts to break down deep-seated service
parochialism with a comprehensive approach to strategy.
Another of his purposes was to ensure that sea power and maritime strategy
were thoroughly appreciated. But Wylie also knew the limits of navies, and was
quick to say that sea power is always applied with an eye on events ashore.
Similarly, he was both appreciative and critical of air-power and land-power
advocates. He was ahead of his time in seeing that guerrilla warfare was a fourth
major element of strategic theory. Now, in a personal postscript for this edition,
he adds a fifth component, the strategy of terrorism.
Wylie’s general theory of power, centered on the sturdy concept of control as
its end and developed with an original exposition of cumulative and sequential
strategies, is as useful today as when he wrote.
SERIES EDITORS
Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.
John B. Hattendorf
Naval War College Naval Postgraduate
School
Newport, Rhode Island Monterey, California
Military Strategy
Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie
Courtesy U.S. Naval Institute Photo Archive

This book has been brought to publication with the generous assistance of Marguerite and Gerry
Lenfest.
Naval Institute Press
291 Wood Road
Annapolis, MD 21402
This book was originally published in 1967 by Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey.
Military Strategy © 1967 by Rutgers, The State University Introduction and postscript © 1989 by the
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland “Reflections on the War in the Pacific” © 1952 by the
United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland “On Maritime Strategy” © 1953 by the United States
Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland “Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor” © 1957 by the United States
Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or
by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
First Naval Institute Press paperback edition published in 2014.
ISBN: 978-1-61251-515-1 (eBook) Grateful acknowledgment is made for permission to quote from the
following material: The Command of the Air by Giulio Douhet, translated by Dino Ferrari, © 1942 by
Coward-McCann, Inc.
On War by Karl von Clausewitz, translated by O. J. Matthijs Jolles, © 1943 by Random House, Inc.
The Library of Congress has cataloged the hardcover edition as follows:
Wylie, J. C. (Joseph Caldwell) Military strategy : a general theory of power control / J. C. Wylie ; with an
introduction by John B. Hattendorf and a postscript by J. C. Wylie.
p. cm.—(Classics of sea power) Reprint with a new introd. and postscript. Originally published: New
Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1967.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Strategy. 2. Naval strategy. I. Title. II. Series.
U162.W9 1989
355’02.—dc20 89-12140
CIP
Print editions meet the requirements of ANSI/NISO z39.48-1992 (Permanence of Paper).
22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
First printing
CONTENTS
Introduction
Military Strategy
Postscript: Twenty Years Later
Appendix A: Excerpt from “Reflections on the War in the Pacific”
Appendix B: “On Maritime Strategy”
Appendix C: “Why a Sailor Thinks Like a Sailor”
Index
INTRODUCTION
R
EAR ADMIRAL J. C. WYLIE is a rarity among American naval officers.
He was the first serving officer since Luce and Mahan, half a century
before him, to become known for writing about military and naval theory. First
and foremost Wylie was a sailor, a sea officer, and an accomplished ship-
handler, but at the same time he became a careful thinker about strategy.
Wylie came to be interested in abstract theory gradually, through experience
1
and observation during his naval career. Wylie’s book, Military Strategy: A
General Theory of Power Control, was clearly a product of his experience and
his professional development as a naval officer. Looking back over his career,
one can find in it the ideas and thought processes that led him to write the book.
The key influences on his thought came first through an appreciation of cultural
differences, which he obtained in his early years with the Asiatic Fleet. This was
followed by his combat experience in the Second World War, his role in the
development of the Combat Information Center, and his postwar experience with
ergonomics. The stimulation and the time for reflection that he had at the Naval
War College during the period when the U.S. Navy was struggling through the
bureaucratic battles of service unification were also important elements of his
development. All of the separate influences combined to bear fruit through his
work with the strategy and sea power study group at the Naval War College in
the 1950s. These were Wylie’s intellectual steps that led to Military Strategy.
Wylie’s father, Joseph Caldwell Wylie, Sr., had been graduated from
Clemson College in his home state of South Carolina. He went to the New York
City area to engage in business, rising to become vice president, secretary, and a
director of the Lovell-Dressel Company, manufacturers of marine lighting and