Table Of ContentPB 34-92-1 JANUARY-MARCH 1992
Volume 18 Number 1
2 Vantage Point
4 From the Editor
5 Letters
36 Proponent Notes
39 Total Force
40 Career Notes
43 Training Notes
45 Subscription Form
48 Professional Reading
FEATURES
6 Intelligence Analysis in the 21st Century
by Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall
According to this author, our analytical system is failing to support commanders
because we haven't learned to answer the all-important question of "So What?"
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in a Field Artillery Battalion
by Second Lieutenant David H. Dotson
Initiative and good intelligence work keep combat soldiers alive—to include in the
field artillery.
Countersurveillance Operations
by David Guaglianone
A former NTC chief of reconnaissance explains what every S2 should know about
preventing enemy reconnaissance—how to keep enemy eyes away.
Delusions of Grandeur: Ethnocentrism and Wehrmacht Intelligence
Analysis
by Captain Justin L. C. Eldridge
Preconceived personal or class bias can have devastating effects on analysis, as
this historical example shows.
The First Steps: Battalion S2s in World War |
by Captain Michael E. Bigelow
Starting with the American Expeditionary Force in World War |, the author recounts
how America’s first modern intelligence system came into being, and shows that
many of the precepts applied back then are still valid today.
The New Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course
by Colonel Robert B. Mangold
The Director of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine gives us a look at the new
MIOAC for the nineties and how the changes impact on the intelligence community.
Your Career...What’s Happening!
by Colonel Lanning M. Porter, Major Robert A. Smith, and
Captain Kelly A. Crosby
This article provides some invaluable tips on how to keep up with or get ahead of
the competition for the fewer career opportunites that will exist in tomorrow’s Army.
The Commander’s Weather Brief
by Captain Thomas M. MacJarrett
Captain MacJarrett discusses the importance of the weather brief, and details how
to graphically present it so the commander will remember it long after the briefing is
over.
STAFF:
Commandant: Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr.
Director of Training and Doctrine: Colonel Robert B. Mangold
Editor: Captain Linda A. Gorsuch
Associate Editor: Annette Castro
Art Director: Dutch Poggemeyer
Editorial Assistant: First Lieutenant Edward Riehle
Administration: Marie Valenti
Typesetting: Roger Johnson
Carolyn A. Korona
By Order of the
Secretary of the Army:
GORDON R. SULLIVAN
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official: MR. MILTON H. HAMILTON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
Military intelligence, an authorized publication of theD epartment of the Army, U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, AZi,s publishedq uarterly under provisions of AR 25-30
and the TRADOC Professional Bulletin Policy Letter. This publication presents professional information, but the views expressed herein are those of the authors, not the Department
of Defense or its elements. The content does not necessarily reflect the official U.S. Army position and does not change or supersede any information presented in other official Army
publications. Use of news items constitutes neither affirmation of their accuracy nor product endorsement. Use of the third person pronoun "he" and any of its forms is intended to
include both mascualnd ifenmienin e genders. Inquleitterrs itoe thse e,dit or, manuscripts, supporting grapahndi sucbscsrip,tio n requests should be sent toC ommander, U.S. Army
intelligence Center, ATTN: ATSI-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. For further information telephone AUTOVON 879-0674 or commercial (602) 538-0674. Personal subscriptions
are $6.50 per year (domestic) and $8.15 per year (foreign).
Major General Paul E. Menoher, Jr.
While this edition of our Military Intelligence approved four recommendations of the Relook
Professional Bulletin concentrates on predictive Team and deferred two others for additional study.
analysis, | want to use this space to continue to The GOSC approved the following recommenda-
keep you informed of major changes impacting our tions:
branch and our corps; and much has happened C) Fix intelligence dissemination by first field-
since our last MIPB issue. ing proven nondevelopmental item of com-
We have seen the retirement of one senior munications and automation, as the near
MI general officer and the reassignment of several term solution. Then integrate validated Ml
others. We have completed the Mi Relook Study communications requirements into the ob-
and have started to plan the implementation of jective Army communications architecture
those recommendations approved by its General over time, as the long range solution.
Officer Steering Committee (GOSC). We have Develop an implementable imagery process-
begun a new and significantly different MI Officer ing and dissemination architecture to sup-
Advanced Course (MIOAC), which will provide far port commanders across the force down to
better trained MI officers to the field and will cause maneuver brigade.
some changes to MI officer personnel manage- Correct the focus and balance of MI or-
ment. We have seen the launch of the Space ganizations across echelons and disciplines.
Shuttle which carried into orbit an Mi warrant Realign Army production responsibilities to
officer from the Intelligence Center staff, as part meet future requirements in the face of
of the first Military Man in Space (MMIS) experi- changes being dictated by Defense intel-
ment. And we are now seeing vertical construc- ligence in the nineties, for example, the for-
tion rising from the soil of Fort Huachuca, as the mation of Joint Intelligence Centers.
facilities to accommodate the consolidation of the The two recommendations the GOSC deferred
Intelligence School Devens at the home of MI begin for further study include:
to take shape. () Create a new linguist MOS for the Active
Component as well as the Reserve Com-
General Officer Changes
ponent; and establish a program with incen-
Starting with general officer changes, as men- tives to ensure we recruit, train, and retain
tioned in our last issue, Lieutenant General Charles sufficient linguists, fully qualified in the lan-
Eichelberger retired from the Army. In October, guages needed to support the Army’s con-
Lieutenant General Ira C. (Chuck) Owens replaced tingency responsibilities.
him. Major General Mike Pfister, formerly DCSINT of (1) Adopt a new strategy for creating a viable
USAREUR, replaced Lieutenant General Owens as Reserve Component MI structure at division,
ADCSINT, DA. Replacing Major General Pfister in corps, and EAC.
USAREUR is Brigadier General (Promotable) John We at the Intelligence Center are responsible for
F. Stewart, Jr. All other MI general officers will stay developing implementation plans for the four ap-
in place, at least for the time being. proved recommendations. | have appointed
Colonel Tom McLaulin, who was my senior repre-
Mi Relook Study
sentative on the Relook Task Force, to head a team
The MI Relook Task Force, under the leadership which will include full-time representatives from HQ
of Brigadier General Stewart, finished its work in INSCOM and DCSINT, DA. Together, they will seek
mid-September 91. The Task Force briefed its support from throughout our corps to develop im-
recommendations to a GOSC, co-chaired by the plementation plans which will bring the approved
ADCSOPS-FD (Major General Granrud) and Relook recommendations to fruition. In fact, some
ADCSINT, DA (Major General Owens). The GOSC (Continued on page 46)
Military Intelligence
Command Sergeant Major James A. (Art) Johnson
We can expect many changes as our Army tant that our NCOs stay on top of these changes.
reshapes itself. These next few years will see our The new changes will ensure only the very best are
Army draw down to a smaller, more highly trained allowed to stay in the Army.
force. Of course, the MI Corps will also feel the Again, the interim change to AR 601-280, Total
effects of the drawdown. These are going to be dif- Army Retention Program, is out. This interim
ficult times for those soldiers who have to transition change provides new policy for qualification for
to civilian life. With the help of our leadership, both discharge, immediate reenlistment, immediate
officer and NCO, this transition can be less painful. reenlistment eligibility, extension action, and length-
Our soldiers and their families deserve your sup- of-service requirements. It mandates bar to reenlist-
port. ment proceedings on some soldiers and makes
One area where we'll see several changes is the numerous administrative changes.
retention of soldiers. You must remember reeniist- We will have our Command Sergeants Major/G2
ment is a privilege and the Army will offer it only to Sergeants Major Training Conference from
those soldiers who demonstrate, through their per- February 16 to 21. February 21 is set aside for
formance and conduct, the potential for future Command Sergeant McKnight and the INSCOM
development. Soldiers must reenlist when they’re Sergeants Major. Hope to see as many attend as
within 4 to 8 months of ETS. Once they are 3 possible. It’s very important that you be kept in-
months from ETS, as of January 1, 1992, they are formed of the many changes taking place in MI.
ineligible for reenlistment without DA approval.
Recent changes also require a bar to reenlistment
for soldiers failing two consecutive APFTs, or
making no satisfactory progress in the overweight | ~]-A77Z See -
program, or being removed for cause from NCOES.
Bar reviews are now at 3 and 6 months.
Keep in mind the Army will reduce reenlistment
options as it downsizes. Once a soldier is within the
reenlistment window, current authorization will dic-
tate options available. In addition, the Army will not
authorize option F-3 (retrain for new MOS) for
shortage or balanced MOSs without prior approval
from DA.
These are just some of the policy changes that
are effective now or will be in the future. It’s impor- =
January-March 1992
Happy New Year!
A key lesson that we, as Military Intelligence professionals, learned in DESERT STORM was that we need to
do a better job at predictive analysis. Intelligence analysis needs to forecast future events, and not simply
reiterate past events. That is the feature topic of this issue.
Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall’s article tells us how to move from simple analysis to the more difficult
task of synthesis: Completing a picture by tying together information we already have, and making logical
predictions from that information. His ideas and suggestions are in line with the measures the MI community
is implementing to train our analysts to predict.
To successfully predict events, an analyst must take the initiative to taylor information to his needs. Cap-
tain Thomas M. MacJarrett shares with us a way he has structured weather information to make it a more
useful tool for decision making. Second Lieutenant David H. Dotson shows us how he modified the doctrinal
IPB process to make it useful in support of field artillery bat-
talions. Both articles are good examples of how an analyst, with
a little common sense and initiative, can ensure he provides his
commander with useful, predictive estimates.
Finally, articles by Captains Michael Bigelow and Justin L. C.
Eldridge provide historical examples of past lessons learned in
collection and analysis. While both relate to our feature topic,
they also stand alone as interesting, informative glimpses into
the history of intelligence.
In closing, congratulations to our Writer of the Year, Captain
Michael Bigelow; our Runner-up, USAR Captain Aaron Danis;
and Honorable Mention Winners Captains Rick Ugino and Gilles
Sea finthy,
Writer of the Year Award
The Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin is pleased to announce that Captain Michael E.
Bigelow is the winner of our Sixth Annual Writer of the Year Award. The time period of this award is
October 1990 through December 1991.
Captain Bigelow’s articles, “Van Deman* (October-December 1990), "Eisenhower and Intel-
ligence" (January-March 1991), and ‘The Faw Peninsula: A Battle Analysis" (April-June 1991) earn
him this award for 1991. MIPB has also published six book reviews by Captain Bigelow during the
juRdugninneg rp-eurpi odf.or this award is Captain (USAR) Aaron Danis. for hi. s arti. cles, “Afghanis. tan Revis. ted:
Soviet Lessons Learned" (October-December 1990) and "Iraqi Army: Operations and Doctrine"
(April-June 1991). Captain Dar.is is also a regular contributor to our Professional Reading section.
Honorable mentions go to Captains Rick Ugino and Gilles Van Nederveen for their prolific con-
tributions to our Professional Reading section.
Military Intelligence
Dear Editor: demand Cut in user countries. With- gency operations," as Captain Collins
The article, "Small Scale Agriculture: out this, local prices will rise again indicates. U.S. Army doctrine states
How the United States Can Win the when the price of a kilo of cocaine the first category is "support for insur-
Drug War," leaves a false impression rises in the U.S. and Europe in gency and counterinsurgency" (FM
to those not involved in counter-drug response to the reduced availability 100-20, p. 1-10).
operations. The fact is the premise of of cocaine. Captain Collins also says that U.S.
the article is wrong: Small scale agri- Besides politics, as noted in the arti- forces may prevent escalation, as in
culture will not win the drug war, nor cle, another factor that limits our the "peacekeeping role." Army doc-
will eradication programs, nor any ability to deal with the coca farmer is trine says that peacekeeping forces
other program focused on the coca the fact that coca can be grown in maintain a peace already achieved
farmer. The only place for any of other areas besides Peru and Bolivia. diplomatically, and are usually forbid-
these programs is as part of a larger, Already there is some coca growing den to use force at all, except in self-
more comprehensive strategy in Colombia and coca can also be defense (FM 100-20, p. 1-11).
focused on eliminating demand at all grown at Brazil’s lower elevations. Finally, Captain Collins lists the final
Stages of the cocaine production True, it takes more effort to process LIC imperative as “legitimacy of ef-
process. As long as there is a this coca, but if there is demand for fort." Legitimacy of effort implies
demand, and therefore profit, some- cocaine, there will be money to be something operational; but according
one will grow coca and produce made. to Army doctrine, the LIC imperative
cocaine. His recommendation for the devel- "legitimacy" has nothing at all to do
Captain Ligon presents a valid argu- opment of a realistic agriculture with operations, and everything to do
ment for using the Benson Institute’s program to help the farmer is good. with politics. The "legitimacy" referred
agriculture program to improve the Programs designed to persuade farm- to is the legitimacy of the government
small farmer's nutrition intake, and ers to stop growing coca have their in question in the eyes of its own
he’s correct in stating the positive ef- place and they do increase the traf- people (FM 100-20, p. 1-9).
fect it would have on campesino- ficker's difficulty in producing These three errors are minor in
government relations. cocaine. Like so many other elements and of themselves. I’m not trying to
But he overstates the value of the of the counter-drug war, it is often a dance with Captain Collins on the
small farmer in the process when he patch-work of many efforts that lead heads of pins. The problem is that
Calls him the "strategic center of to success. But it is wrong to believe these errors, in fact, reflect a preoccu-
gravity," and he ignores the basic that focusing on the farmer, as the ar- pation throughout the article with
reason the small farmer grows coca, ticle states, would have a significant military operations. Each error is a
which is money. impact on the drug trade. misunderstanding of doctrine slanted
Besides the fact the average coca And it’s not over yet. Consider the in- toward a military interpretation of what
farmer sees nothing inherently wrong creased use of heroin in the United remains at heart a political problem.
with growing coca (it’s been used in States and the increased production While Captain Collins pays homage
the Andean ridge countries for cen- of that drug in response to demand. to the idea that LIC is a political end
turies), the bottom line is he can Already, the Cali Cartel is growing that may end employing armed
make more money growing coca and processing poppies for this "new" means, virtually his entire discussion
than other food or cash crops. The cash crop. focuses on the means, ignoring the
drug trade is capitalistic to the core end. In order for MI to function effec-
and is gov-erned by the law of supply Major Raymond W. Levesque tively in a LIC environment, we
and de-man4d. It’s true if he can feed Chief, Counter-Drug Tactical have to internalize a number of hard
his family and make money growing Analysis Team realities:
food he'll be happy, but he'll be hap- Panama @ We can't “deter a guerrilla war like
pier if he can grow food and make P.S. | also was in charge of the we deterred Soviet aggression for 50
more money growing coca. The only counter-drug tactical analysis team in years. LICs occur because of
time we saw farmers in the Chapare Bolivia for a year. economic and social injustice. You
region of Bolivia stop growing coca can repress the desire for justice;
was when the price of the leaf fell Dear Editor: you can only eliminate unrest caused
below the cost to produce it. This led | have some disagreement with Cap- by it, by meeting the needs of the
many farmers to join the govern- tain David Collins’ (USAF) article in people.
ment’s eradication program and led July-September MIPB on "MI in Low- @ To do that, we need long-range
others to leave the valley. Intensity Conflict." Strategic vision and long-term
But even this local (tactical) suc- The first of the operational cate- HUMINT intelligence [sic] systems to
cess is transitory without a prolonged gories of LIC is not “counterinsur- (Continued on page 47)
January-March 1992
2Q
>
w
|
x
<
- aleL i O Lu — — — o >
N Y)
sige’
ee
6 Military Intelligence
end product should be synthesis, which is combin-
ing analyzed information into a coherent whole,
thereby drawing a conclusion. Analysis and syn-
thesis involve the highest and most difficult levels of
thinking.
Going from singularly focused traditional
analysis to synthesis as an end product creates
new possibilities. Using synthesis, analysts can
make intelligent predictions, gain insight, and dis-
cern complex relationships. The new process
recognizes inextricable, complex relationships:
Analysis and synthesis, analysis and collection
management, collection management and syn-
thesis, to name a few.
Analysts who follow this process use a dis-
ciplined approach to seeking and understanding
information. They use structured thinking and task-
ing to relate collected information to the com-
By Lieutenant Colonel Wayne M. Hall mander’s concept of the operation.
To achieve synthesis, the analyst must under-
The situation...An order of battle analyst is briefing stand and act upon fundamental concepts:
a division commanding general. The briefer is relat- (1) To be meaningful, intelligence collection has
ing findings from the interrogation of an enemy to focus on the commander’s information re-
prisoner. The analyst gives the general many one- quirements.
line sentences describing what the prisoner said. (1) The analyst must learn to ask specific ques-
The analyst then abruptly changes topics and tions which will provide specific information.
moves on to the enemy situation shown on the (1) The analyst must do some analysis before
briefirig map. The general, with a perplexed look on tasking, to understand the relative value of in-
his face, says with irritation, “Wait a minute. What formation as it arrives, before synthesizing it.
does ail that information from the prisoner mean?" Intelligence analysts cannot be dull, unin-
To a commander in a modern battle situation, quisitive purveyors of information, who simply
the question “what does it mean" frequently arises. provide it to the commander and expect him
He’s constantly bombarded with fragmentary infor- to find meaning. Instead, they have to
mation from a seemingly chaotic battlefield. How deduce the meaning, provide it to the com-
does he interpret information; what does it mean? mander, and make the difficult predictions
How does he assemble it into a coherent picture? themselves.
The commander has many information gathering (1) This entire approach must be holistic.
resources. He has endless opportunities to make A holistic approach is based on wholes, which
decisions and to understand the enemy, weather, nest within one another. Wholes aren't usually dis-
and terrain. But how does he use the information to crete entities; they relate to other entities. Analysts,
make sound battlefield decisions? How does he using mental energy, can discover these wholes
use his resources to the best advantage, to know and the links which bind them together.
what’s happening, and to determine how to direct
Theory
or redirect events to satisfy his intent?
The U.S. Army’s intelligence system worked ex- Even the most seemingly insignificant piece of
ceptionally well during DESERT SHIELD and information has potential power. To release this
DESERT STORM. It was a major contributor to vic- power, an analyst must relate the piece of informa-
tory and to the unbelievably low casualty count. tion to other pieces. The analyst must assess the
However, as well as it worked, we must improve on information for complicated relationships, then syn-
one area of the intelligence system: Its ability to thesize it into a whole. The seemingly insignificant
make information mean something. act of recognizing that each and every piece of in-
Battlefield experience shows that, to be of maxi- formation has potential power is critical: It is the
mum benefit, the end product of intelligence needed first step to understanding and implement-
analysis should not be analysis, which is studying ing synthesis.
something to understand its nature. Instead, the What are wholes? Wholes are mental and physi-
January-March 1992
cal constructs. Wholes represent things (physical) information. Analysis involves pulling something
and ideas or concepts (mental). Wholes are com- apart and examining each of the parts. It lets us
posed of smaller wholes and comprise larger thoroughly understand parts of wholes, and then
wholes. Related wholes are linked together and task correctly. This is the process we use when we
have overlapping boundaries. analyze indicators and SIRs to develop specific
Wholes are composed of bits and pieces of in- taskings. Using such analyses to focus tasking
formation. We can't find or develop complete links collection and analysis to the commander’s in-
wholes, only varying degrees of partial wholes. Par- formation requirements.
tially complete wholes, however, provide us with an Synthesis means putting pieces of information
explicit power: The power to predict. By determin- into a coherent, meaningful whole, the parts of
ing probabilities and predicting, we can use a par- which fit together. Synthesis results in under-
tial whole to form conclusions about a complete standing the whole and making predictions from
whole. When we understand these concepts, we that whole. Synthesis is the end product of the
gain an entirely new perspective of understanding. analytical effort. It enables us to conclude, predict,
We can easily apply the theory of wholes to intel- and understand. By-products in the march toward
ligence collection and analysis. The focus of most achieving synthesis include performing trend and
military endeavors is the enemy. Every organized pattern analyses, and identifying and under-
force has an order of battle. This appears as a standing relationships.
hierarchical series of connected wholes. Also, the Analysts study information to understand it.
functions of enemy battlefield operating systems Through understanding, analysts can synthesize
appear as wholes, reaching horizontally and verti- (combine) the analyzed information into a relevant
Cally. Additionally, an enemy’s C? nodes appear as and coherent whole. From the whole, analysts can
wholes, connecting below, above, and laterally. discern other wholes, develop them further, predict
Those wholes then become the focus of our intel- outcomes or intentions, and understand even more
ligence collection and analysis. complex phenomena.
Indicators and specific information requirements
Current State of Nature
(SIRs) analyses, discussed in Army intelligence
doctrine, are techniques we use to task collection In practice, Army intelligence analysts usually
systems for information. SIRs are detailed ques- don't synthesize well. There are several reasons for
tions whose answers identify specific types of ac- this shortfall. Many of our officer and enlisted
tivity, technical data (like frequencies and call analysts don’t know how to discipline their minds to
signs), and types of information we want the collec- achieve the higher-level thinking synthesis requires.
tion system to find. We analyze these by first view- Typically, they do well when they concentrate on
ing a series of wholes of the environment under what they know how to do: Analyze.
study.
“Another point is that
"Synthesis is the end
people rarely think about
product of the analytical
thinking—how they think,
effort. It enables us to
how their commanders
conclude, predict, and
think, and what the results
understand."
of thinking should be."
For example, take any of the above mentioned Synihesis, though, is a higher step in the
wholes (order of battle, battlefield operating sys- process of thinking. It’s difficult to do and difficult to
tems, nodes). Analyze your intelligence indicators learn. Additionally, our doctrine doesn’t explain how
and SIRs. Then concentrate collectors to find infor- to go through such a sophisticated mental process.
mation related to the whole. This produces In fact, our intelligence doctrine doesn’t discuss
focused, relevant, and disciplined collection. Once either synthesis or the effect of synthesizing infor-
the information returns, you must synthesize it into mation into wholes.
wholes, give understanding and coherency to Another point is that people rarely think about
otherwise confusing data, and predict, perhaps thinking—how they think, how their commanders
even shape, the future. think, and what the results of thinking should be.
Analysis is always important to understanding When a person neither knows how nor what the
Military Intelligence
