Military Crisis Management Operations by NATO and the EU: The Decision-Making Process

337 Pages·2019·2.051 MB·English

by  Claudia Fahron-Hussey

Claudia Fahron-Hussey
Military Crisis
Management Operations
by NATO and the EU
The Decision-Making Process
Military Crisis Management Operations
by NATO and the EU
Claudia Fahron-Hussey
Military Crisis
Management Operations
by NATO and the EU
The Decision-Making Process
Claudia Fahron-Hussey
Institut für Politikwissenschaft
Professur für Internationale Politik
Technische Universität Dresden
Dresden, Germany
ISBN 978-3-658-23517-8 ISBN 978-3-658-23518-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-23518-5
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018954838
Springer VS
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Acknowledgements

This book is the updated and slightly changed version of my dissertation. In the
years of working on this dissertation, many people have supported me. I would
like to take this opportunity to thank them all very much.
I would first and foremost like to thank my adviser and first reviewer Eugé-
nia da Conceição-Heldt for her constant support and inspiration. Throughout the
process of designing and writing my dissertation, she was always there to give
me advice. She commented on numerous drafts of my research design and the
individual chapters, which greatly improved the manuscript. I am very grateful
that she helped me focus on a clear argument and present my findings in a con-
vincing way. I also want to thank Hans Vorländer for kindly agreeing to be my
second reviewer. Thanks are also due to Mark Arenhövel for chairing the com-
mittee for the defense of my dissertation as well as Anja Besand and Sabine
Müller-Mall for also serving on my dissertation committee. In addition, I owe
many thanks to Prof. Conceição-Heldt, Prof. Vorländer, and Prof. Arenhövel in
their roles as my superiors at the Institute of Political Science at Technische Uni-
versität Dresden, since they always gave me enough time to focus on my disser-
tation alongside my teaching and student advising duties.
The Institute of Political Science at Technische Universität Dresden was a
very pleasant social and intellectual environment for me while I was working on
my dissertation. I want to thank all my colleagues, especially those who worked
with me at the Chair of International Politics, for all the enriching discussions
about my dissertation. Special thanks go to the following research fellows, who
were my colleagues at the Chair of International Politics during at least part of
my dissertation process, for giving me extensive comments on my research de-
sign when I presented my book project in our research colloquium and for
providing me with important help and support particularly in the earlier stages of
writing my dissertation: Patrick Mello, Markus Gastinger, Erik Fritzsche, André
Isidro, Laura Mahrenbach, Sebastian Knecht, Roman Goldbach, and Sebastian
VI Acknowledgements
Lange. For their help in the final stages of my dissertation, I am grateful to my
colleagues Anselm Vogler, Julia Hammelehle, and Felix Flamme.
Since I had the opportunity to present my research design in the research
colloquium of Frank Schimmelfennig at Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule
(ETH) Zürich in March 2015, I wish to thank Prof. Schimmelfennig and his
research fellows, especially Thomas Winzen, Jørgen Bølstad, Asya Zhelyazkova,
and Jofre Rocabert, for their interesting comments. I also want to express my
gratitude to Ingo Peters at Freie Universität Berlin and Ina Wiesner currently at
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin for their useful advice at the beginning of my
dissertation project. Throughout my dissertation process, I had fruitful discus-
sions with my mother Katrin Fahron, who helped me clarify my thoughts, and
my husband Caleb Hussey, who proofread endless versions of my manuscript.
Furthermore, I want to thank the highly motivated students who attended my
class on EU Foreign and Security Policy, which I have regularly offered at Tech-
nische Universität Dresden since October 2012. The very committed students of
the Bachelor’s program in Political Science, the Bachelor’s program in Interna-
tional Relations, and the Master’s program in International Relations helped me
get a fresh perspective on my dissertation every time I taught the class.
I am much indebted to the officials from NATO, the EU, the US, Germany,
and France who granted me interviews for my dissertation in the first half of
2016. All my interview partners gave me important insights into my dissertation
topic and enabled me to gain a better understanding of the two international
organizations and their member states. Since I promised my interviewees ano-
nymity, I cannot thank them by name, but I would like to express my deep grati-
tude to all the officials who agreed to talk to me and shared their time, knowl-
edge, and experience with me. I also want to thank the officials from NATO and
the EU who helped me arrange some of my interview appointments.
I owe many thanks to my family and friends on both sides of the Atlantic. I
thank especially my parents Katrin and Lutz Fahron for their love and encour-
agement. Most importantly, I want to thank my husband Caleb Hussey for all his
love, help, and support. Thanks for everything!

Berlin, July 2018 Claudia Fahron-Hussey
Contents

List of Tables ...................................................................................................... XI

List of Figures ...................................................................................................XIII

List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................... XV

1 Introduction ................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Puzzle ................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Research Question and Argument........................................................ 6
1.3 Political and Academic Relevance ....................................................... 9
1.4 State of Research ............................................................................... 11
1.4.1 NATO and Its Operations ................................................. 12
1.4.2 EU, CFSP/CSDP, and Its Operations ................................ 14
1.4.3 NATO-EU Relations ......................................................... 17
1.4.4 NATO-EU Relations with a Special Emphasis on
Operations ......................................................................... 18
1.4.5 Research Gap .................................................................... 24
1.5 Methods ............................................................................................. 25
1.5.1 Data Collection ................................................................. 25
1.5.2 Data Analysis .................................................................... 29
1.6 Overview............................................................................................ 34

2 The Conduct of Military Crisis Management Operations by NATO
and the EU ................................................................................................... 39
2.1 Operationalization of the Dependent Variable ................................... 39
2.2 NATO and the EU as International Organizations ............................ 40
2.2.1 NATO ............................................................................... 40
2.2.2 The EU and Its CFSP/CSDP ............................................. 43
VIII Contents
2.2.3 The Relationship between NATO and the EU .................. 47
2.3 The Member States of NATO and the EU ......................................... 48
2.4 The Operations of NATO and the EU ............................................... 52
2.4.1 NATO Operations 1990 – 2017 ........................................ 53
2.4.2 EU Operations 2003 – 2017 .............................................. 61
2.5 Universe of Cases Based on the Military Crisis Management
Operations of NATO and the EU 2004 – 2016 .................................. 68
2.6 Case Selection on the Dependent Variable ........................................ 70

3 The Principal-Agent Explanation for Agent Selection ............................. 73
3.1 Theory Selection ................................................................................ 73
3.2 The Principal-Agent Explanation....................................................... 78
3.2.1 Literature Review of the Principal-Agent Approach ........ 78
3.2.2 Agent Selection Based on Agent Characteristics .............. 89
3.2.3 Operationalization of the Independent Variable ............... 93
3.2.4 The Causal Mechanism between the Independent
Variable and the Dependent Variable ............................... 96
3.3 Alternative Explanations .................................................................. 103
3.3.1 The State-Centric Institutionalist Explanation ................ 103
3.3.2 The Neorealist Explanation ............................................. 105

4 The Decision for a NATO Operation in Libya in Early 2011 ................ 109
4.1 Armed Conflict in Libya .................................................................. 109
4.2 The Principal-Agent Explanation in the Case of Libya ................... 110
4.2.1 The Value of the Independent Variable .......................... 110
4.2.2 Process Tracing Concerning the Causal Mechanism ...... 115
4.3 Alternative Explanations in the Case of Libya ................................ 142
4.3.1 The State-Centric Institutionalist Explanation ................ 143
4.3.2 The Neorealist Explanation ............................................. 144
4.4 Operation Unified Protector in Libya .............................................. 147
4.5 Interim Conclusion .......................................................................... 150

5 The Decision for an EU Operation in Chad/CAR in Late 2007 ............ 153
5.1 Armed Conflict in Chad/CAR ......................................................... 153
5.2 The Principal-Agent Explanation in the Case of Chad/CAR ........... 154
Contents IX

5.2.1 The Value of the Independent Variable .......................... 155
5.2.2 Process Tracing Concerning the Causal Mechanism ...... 160
5.3 Alternative Explanations in the Case of Chad/CAR ........................ 184
5.3.1 The State-Centric Institutionalist Explanation ................ 184
5.3.2 The Neorealist Explanation ............................................. 186
5.4 EUFOR Tchad/RCA in Chad/CAR ................................................. 189
5.5 Interim Conclusion .......................................................................... 193

6 The Decision for NATO Operations and an EU Operation off the
Horn of Africa in Late 2008 ..................................................................... 195
6.1 Piracy off the Horn of Africa ........................................................... 195
6.2 The Principal-Agent Explanation in the Case of the Horn of
Africa ............................................................................................... 197
6.2.1 The Value of the Independent Variable .......................... 197
6.2.2 Process Tracing Concerning the Causal Mechanism ...... 202
6.3 Alternative Explanations in the Case of the Horn of Africa ............ 228
6.3.1 The State-Centric Institutionalist Explanation ................ 228
6.3.2 The Neorealist Explanation ............................................. 230
6.4 Operation Allied Provider, Operation Allied Protector,
Operation Ocean Shield, and EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the
Horn of Africa .................................................................................. 233
6.5 Interim Conclusion .......................................................................... 237

7 Conclusion.................................................................................................. 239
7.1 Summary of the Findings ................................................................. 239
7.2 Avenues for Further Research ......................................................... 252
7.3 Policy Recommendations................................................................. 257

References ........................................................................................................ 265

Interviews ........................................................................................................ 325
List of Tables

Table 1 The Member States of NATO and the EU (2017) ............................. 49
Table 2 NATO’s Military Deterrence and Defense Operations
(1990 – 2017) ..................................................................................... 55
Table 3 NATO’s Military Crisis Management Operations
(1990 – 2017) ..................................................................................... 60
Table 4 The EU’s Civilian Crisis Management Operations
(2003 – 2017) ..................................................................................... 64
Table 5 The EU’s Military Crisis Management Operations
(2003 – 2017) ..................................................................................... 67
Table 6 Universe of Cases .............................................................................. 70
Table 7 Summary of Results ......................................................................... 250