Methods of legal reasoning

237 Pages·2006·2.56 MB·English

by  Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brozek (auth.)

Law and Philosophy Library
J
e
r
z
y

S
te Jerzy Stelmach and
l
m
a
c Bartosz Broz˙ek
h

a
n
d

Methods of Legal
M
e
t
h
o
Reasoning
d
s

o
f

L
e
g
a
l

R
e
a
s
o
n
i
n
g
Managing Editors:
Francisco Laporta, Autonomous University of Madrid, Spain
Aleksander Peczenik†, University of Lund, Sweden
Frederick Schauer, Harvard University, U.S.A.
METHODS OF LEGAL REASONING
Law and Philosophy Library
VOLUME 78
Managing Editor
FRANCISCO J.LAPORTA,Department of Law,
Autonomous University of Madrid,Spain
ALEKSANDER PECZENIK,Department of Law,University of Lund,Sweden
FREDERICK SCHAUER,John F.Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University,Cambridge,Mass.,U.S.A.
Former Managing Editors
AULIS AARNIO,MICHAEL D.BAYLES†,CONRAD D.JOHNSON†,
ALAN MABE
Editorial Advisory Board
AULIS AARNIO,Research Institute for Social Sciences,
University of Tampere,Finland
ZENON BANKOWSKI,Centre for Law and Society,University of Edinburgh
PAOLO COMANDUCCI,University of Genua,Italy
ERNESTO GARZÓN VALDÉS,Institut für Politikwissenschaft,
Johannes Gutenberg Universität Mainz
JOHN KLEINIG,Department of Law,Police Science and Criminal
Justice Administration,John Jay College of Criminal Justice,
City University of New York
NEIL MacCORMICK,European Parliament,Brussels,Belgium
WOJCIECH SADURSKI,European University Institute,
Department of Law,Florence,Italy
ROBERT S.SUMMERS,School of Law,Cornell University
CARL WELLMAN,Department of Philosophy,Washington University
METHODS OF
LEGAL REASONING
JERZY STELMACH
.
BARTOSZ BROZEK
A C.I.P.Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.
ISBN-10 1-4020-4936-6 (HB)
ISBN-13 978-1-4020-4936-1 (HB)
ISBN-10 1-4020-4939-0 (e-book)
ISBN-13 978-1-4020-4939-2 (e-book)
Published by Springer,
P.O.Box 17,3300 AA Dordrecht,The Netherlands.
www.springer.com
Printed on acid-free paper
All Rights Reserved
© 2006 Springer
No part ofthis work may be reproduced,stored in a retrieval system,or transmitted in any form
or by any means,electronic,mechanical,photocopying,microfilming,recording or otherwise,
without written permission from the Publisher,with the exception ofany material supplied
specifically for the purpose ofbeing entered and executed on a computer system,for exclusive
useby the purchaser ofthe work.
PREFACE
Anyone reflecting on the methodology of legal reasoning faces a difficult
task. The number of methodological theories in jurisprudence and the
vast literature on the subject are not the only problems that have to be
taken into account. Perhaps the most striking difficulty concerning the
methodology of legal argument is the heated debate between jurists,legal
theorists and philosophers of law that has been recurring since at least
nineteenth century.
Therefore a justification is needed for writing yet another book con-
cerning the methods of legal reasoning; a book that aims to cover a lot
of what has already been proposed in legal theory. We believe that there
is such a justification. First, the perspective that we adopt in the present
book is unique, at least in some respects. We venture to look at the
methodology of legal reasoning “from the outside”,i.e.from a more gen-
eral,philosophical perspective,while taking into account the “hard real-
ity” of law. This perspective enables us to ask questions about the
justification for the methods of legal argument presented.
Second, we do not want to defend one, paradigmatic conception of
legal reasoning. On the contrary, we put forward the thesis that there is
a plurality of argumentative methods. The plurality, however, does not
lead to relativism in legal decision-making.
Third, we reject any hierarchy of the methods of legal reasoning, and
take the view that one can speak only of the precision and flexibility of
different methodologies.
Finally,we would like to show that the methodological conceptions of
jurisprudence constitute a coherent element of the humanistic method-
ology. The important aspect here is that the methodology of legal argu-
ment is much more precise and much better developed than the
“general” humanistic methodology. However, this does not mean that
there are no peculiarities of legal methodology, as we try to highlight in
the course of our presentation.
v
vi FOREWORD
This is a substantial revision of our book that appeared in Polish
under the title “Metody Prawnicze” (Zakamycze Publishing House,
Kraków 2004).Chapters 1 and 3 have undergone the biggest revision and
a new chapter 6 has been added.
.
Jerzy Stelmach, Bartosz Brozek
Kraków – Kiel, September 2005
CONTENTS
1 Controversy over Legal Method in the Nineteenth 1
and Twentieth Centuries
1.1 Three Stances 1
1.1.1 The Rejection of Method 1
1.1.2 Methodological Heteronomy 2
1.1.3 Methodological Autonomy 6
1.2 Methods of Legal Reasoning 9
1.3 Logic – Analysis – Argumentation – Hermeneutics 12
2 Logic 17
2.1 Introduction 17
2.2 Classical Logic: Propositional Logic and First
Order Predicate Logic 20
2.2.1 Presentation of Calculi 20
2.2.2 Paradoxes of Material Implication 23
2.2.3 Examples 24
2.3 Deontic Logic 29
2.3.1 Possible World Semantics 29
2.3.2 Deontic Logic 30
2.3.3 Paradoxes of Deontic Logic 33
2.3.4 Examples 35
2.4 Logic of Action and Logic of Norms 40
2.4.1 Two Types of Obligation 40
2.4.2 Logic of Action 41
2.4.3 Jørgensen Dilemma 46
2.5 Defeasible Logic 49
2.5.1 The Concept of Defeasibility 49
2.5.2 Defeasible Logic 51
2.5.3 Objections Against Nonmonotonic Logic 53
2.5.4 Examples 54
2.5.5 Two Remarks 63
2.6 Summary 63
vii
viii CONTENTS
3 Analysis 69
3.1 Introduction 69
3.1.1 The Notion of Analysis 69
3.1.2 History of the Concept 70
3.1.3 Analytic Philosophy 72
3.2 Linguistic Analysis 75
3.2.1 History and Basic Assumptions of Linguistic Analysis 75
3.2.2 Legal Conceptual Scheme 78
3.2.3 Speech Acts Theory 82
3.2.4 The Method and Its Limits 89
3.3 Economic Analysis of Law 92
3.3.1 Law and Economics 92
3.3.2 Idea of Economization 94
3.3.3 Limits of the Method 97
3.3.4 Conclusions 104
3.4 Summary 105
3.4.1 Features of Analysis 105
3.4.2 Analysis in Law 105
4 Argumentation 111
4.1 Introduction 111
4.1.1 Philosophies of Argumentation 112
4.1.2 Criteria of a Practical Discourse 123
4.2 Two Conceptions of a Legal Discourse 130
4.2.1 The Topical–Rhetorical Conception
of Legal Discourse 132
4.2.2 Procedural Conception of Legal Discourse 139
4.3 Legal Argumentation 145
4.3.1 Claim to Universality 146
4.3.2 Structure of Legal Discourse 147
4.3.3 Applications 163
5 Hermeneutics 167
5.1 Introduction 167
5.1.1 The Beginnings of Hermeneutics 167
5.1.2 What Do We Not Know About Hermeneutics? 173
5.2 Hermeneutics as Epistemology 175
5.2.1 Methodological Current in Philosophical
Hermeneutics 176
5.2.2 Legal Receptions 183
5.3 Hermeneutics as Ontology 187
CONTENTS ix
5.3.1 Ontology of Understanding 188
5.3.2 Legal Receptions 193
5.4 The Understanding of the Law 198
5.4.1 Claim to Universality 199
5.4.2 The Nature of Hermeneutic Cognition 200
5.4.3 Applications 205
6 Methods of Legal Reasoning from a Postmodern Perspective 211
6.1 A Summary 211
6.2 Dilemmas of the Contemporary Philosophy of Law 214
6.3 The Epistemological Approach 216
6.4 Unfinished Projects 219
Index of Names 223
Subject Index 227