Table Of ContentStudies in Applied Philosophy,
Epistemology and Rational Ethics
Brian D. Haig
Method
Matters in
Psychology
Essays in Applied Philosophy of Science
Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology
and Rational Ethics
Volume 45
Series editor
Lorenzo Magnani, University of Pavia, Pavia, Italy
e-mail: [email protected]
Editorial Board
Atocha Aliseda
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM), Coyoacan, Mexico
Giuseppe Longo
Centre Cavaillès, CNRS—Ecole Normale Supérieure, Paris, France
Chris Sinha
School of Foreign Languages, Hunan University, Changsha, P.R. China
Paul Thagard
Waterloo University, Waterloo, ON, Canada
John Woods
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, Canada
StudiesinAppliedPhilosophy,EpistemologyandRationalEthics(SAPERE)publishes
new developments and advances in all the fields of philosophy, epistemology, and
ethics,bringingthemtogetherwithaclusterofscientificdisciplinesandtechnological
outcomes:fromcomputersciencetolifesciences,fromeconomics,law,andeducation
toengineering,logic,andmathematics,frommedicinetophysics,humansciences,and
politics. It aims at covering all the challenging philosophical and ethical themes of
contemporary society, making them appropriately applicable to contemporary
theoretical, methodological, and practical problems, impasses, controversies, and
conflicts.Theseriesincludesmonographs,lecturenotes,selectedcontributionsfrom
specializedconferencesandworkshopsaswellasselectedPh.D.theses.
Advisory Board
A. Abe, Chiba, Japan A. Pereira, São Paulo, Brazil
H. Andersen, Copenhagen, Denmark L. M. Pereira, Caparica, Portugal
O. Bueno, Coral Gables, USA A.-V. Pietarinen, Helsinki, Finland
S. Chandrasekharan, Mumbai, India D. Portides, Nicosia, Cyprus
M. Dascal, Tel Aviv, Israel D. Provijn, Ghent, Belgium
G. D. Crnkovic, Göteborg, Sweden J. Queiroz, Juiz de Fora, Brazil
M. Ghins, Lovain-la-Neuve, Belgium A. Raftopoulos, Nicosia, Cyprus
M. Guarini, Windsor, Canada C. Sakama, Wakayama, Japan
R. Gudwin, Campinas, Brazil C. Schmidt, Le Mans, France
A. Heeffer, Ghent, Belgium G. Schurz, Dusseldorf, Germany
M. Hildebrandt, Rotterdam, N. Schwartz, Buenos Aires, Argentina
The Netherlands C. Shelley, Waterloo, Canada
K. E. Himma, Seattle, USA F. Stjernfelt, Aarhus, Denmark
M. Hoffmann, Atlanta, USA M. Suarez, Madrid, Spain
P. Li, Guangzhou, P.R. China J. van den Hoven, Delft,
G. Minnameier, Frankfurt, Germany The Netherlands
M. Morrison, Toronto, Canada P.-P. Verbeek, Enschede,
Y. Ohsawa, Tokyo, Japan The Netherlands
S. Paavola, Helsinki, Finland R. Viale, Milan, Italy
W. Park, Daejeon, South Korea M. Vorms, Paris, France
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10087
Brian D. Haig
Method Matters
in Psychology
Essays in Applied Philosophy of Science
123
BrianD.Haig
Department ofPsychology
University of Canterbury
Christchurch, NewZealand
ISSN 2192-6255 ISSN 2192-6263 (electronic)
Studies in AppliedPhilosophy,Epistemology and Rational Ethics
ISBN978-3-030-01050-8 ISBN978-3-030-01051-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01051-5
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2018956277
©SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2018
Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpart
of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations,
recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission
orinformationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilar
methodologynowknownorhereafterdeveloped.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publicationdoesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfrom
therelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authorsortheeditorsgiveawarranty,expressorimplied,withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinor
for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to
jurisdictionalclaimsinpublishedmapsandinstitutionalaffiliations.
ThisSpringerimprintispublishedbytheregisteredcompanySpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG
Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland
To my coauthors—
Denny Borsboom
Russil Durrant
Fran Vertue
Preface
Book Overview
In this preface, I briefly explain the book’s title and then offer some orienting
remarks about the nature of scientific method and its importance for science more
generally. I begin by emphasizing the significance of method for science, and
express the belief that the various sciences, including psychology, do not take
methods seriously enough. I then speak to the importance of the interdisciplinary
field of methodology for understanding scientific method. I emphasize the con-
structiverole that philosophy of science canplay ininformingmethodology.After
identifying three major theories of scientific method, I provide an outline of one
of these accounts of method, the abductive theory, which features heavily in the
book. In the second part of the preface, I provide a summary of the chapters that
follow.
The main title of this book, Method Matters in Psychology, is intended to
suggest that the focus is on the important topic of scientific method as it relates to
psychology. The subtitle of the book, Essays in Applied Philosophy of Science,
referstothefactthatthedisciplineofphilosophyofscienceisemployedasamajor
resource in examining the methodological ideas in the book’s various chapters.
Modern science is a complex human endeavour comprising many parts. It
pursues aims that it seeks to realize; it employs methods in order to facilitate its
investigations;itproducesfactsandtheoriesinitsquesttoobtainanunderstanding
of the world; and it is shaped by the institutions within which it is embedded.
Although all of these dimensions are essential to a full-bodied characterization of
science,amethodisarguablyitsmostimportantfeature.Thisisbecauseeverything
weknowinscienceisacquiredingoodpartthroughtheapplicationofitsmethods,
whether it be our knowledge of substantive matters, values, or the methods
themselves.
Despite its undoubted importance to science, scientific method receives less
consideredattentionthanitdeserves,frombothscientistsandeducators.Ofcourse,
scientists take method seriously, but I believe that they do not take it seriously
vii
viii Preface
enough. Scientists themselves, including psychologists, learn about research
methods,andhowtousethemtoconducttheirresearch.However,thenatureofthis
learning, and the instruction they receive about how to employ these methods, is
betterdescribedasamixoftrainingandindoctrinationthanasagenuineeducation
designed to provide a critical, in-depth understanding of the methods.
Psychology, which makes extensive provision in its curriculum for teaching
research methods, uses textbooks that make little or no effort to inform students in
depthaboutthenatureofscientificmethod.Nordoesitscurriculumfosteracritical
appreciation of the various research methods that its textbooks deal with.
Consequently,bothpsychologicalscientistsandpsychologystudentstendtohavea
limitedunderstandingofscientificmethod,whichinturncontributestoamisuseof
research methods and a sub-optimal level of scientific literacy.
ThetermmethodderivesfromacombinationoftheGreekwordsmeta,meaning
followingafter,andhodos,meaningtheway,togivefollowingtheway,suggesting
the idea of order. Applied to science, method suggests the efficient, systematic
ordering of inquiry. It describes an ordered sequence of actions that constitutes a
strategytoachieveoneormoreresearchgoalsthathavetodowiththeconstruction
of knowledge (Nickles 1987, Haig 2014). For example, and simply put, the
sequence of actions for the traditional hypothetico-deductive method of theory
testing is: Identify the test hypothesis, derive one or more test predictions, gather
data in accord with the test predictions, check the data against the test predictions,
andconfirm,ordisconfirm,theoriginaltesthypothesis.Regardingscience,theterm
methodologydenotesthegeneralstudyofscientificmethodsandformsthebasisfor
a proper understanding of those methods. It is not a synonym for method.
Methodology is the interdisciplinary domain that studies methods. It comprises
statistics,philosophyofscience,andcognitivesciencemoregenerally,amongother
disciplines. Methodology has descriptive, critical, and advisory dimensions: It
describes relevant methods and explains how they reach their goals, it critically
evaluatesmethodsagainsttheirrivals,anditrecommendswhatmethodsweshould
adopt to pursue our chosen goals.
As an important part of methodology, the philosophy of science has been
seriouslyunderutilized.Thisisunfortunatebecause,inrecentyears,philosophersof
science have increasingly sought to understand science as it is practiced. Their
discipline now boasts an array of important methodological insights that can sig-
nificantly increase our understanding of research methods. I endeavour to utilize
someoftheseinsightsbyemployingaconceptionofmethodologythatisconsistent
with a contemporary version of the philosophy of scientific realism.
In this book, Iconcentrate on discussing theconceptual foundations ofa varied
selection of important behavioural science methodological concepts and research
methods,someofwhichareconsideredinrelationtosubstantivedomains.Idothis
by giving greater attention to the philosophy of science than is normally the case.
Thisstanceisjustifiedonthegroundsthatmodernphilosophyofsciencehasmade
importantgainsinunderstandinghowsuccessfulscienceispracticed.Asjustnoted,
this is especially so with respect to scientific methodology. I believe that the
Preface ix
philosophyofsciencecanbeofmajorhelpinprovidingin-depth,coherentaccounts
of the structure of behavioural science inquiry.
Itshouldbenotedthat,despitecasualtalkofthescientificmethod,claimsforthe
existence ofone,canonicalaccount ofscientificmethodareuntenable.Instead,we
have a number of different theories of scientific method that are employed for
different research purposes. Arguably, the “big three” theories are inductive
method, hypothetico-deductive method, and abductive method. Inductive method
can take different forms but it often said to involve reasoning by inductive enu-
meration from secure observation statements about singular events to laws or
theories. The hypothetico-deductive method structures hypothesis testing and, for
better or worse, has often provided the larger methodological framework for
empirical research in psychology. The abductive theory of method is less well
known, and emphasizes explanatory reasoning, while assigning statistical methods
a limited, although important, role.
According to the abductive theory of method (Haig, 2014), scientific inquiry
proceedsasfollows:Guidedbyevolvingresearchproblemsthatcomprisepackages
of empirical, conceptual, and methodological constraints, sets of data are analyzed
inordertodetectrobustempiricalregularities,orphenomena.Oncedetected,these
phenomena are explained by abductively inferring the existence of underlying
causes responsible for their production. Upon positive judgments of the initial
plausibility of the explanatory theories about these causes, attempts are made to
elaborate on the nature of the causal mechanisms in question. This is done by
constructingplausiblemodelsofthosemechanismsbyanalogytorelevantideasin
domains that are already well understood. When the theories are well developed,
they are assessed against their rivals with respect to their explanatory goodness.
Thisassessmentinvolvesmakingjudgmentsofthebestofcompetingexplanations.
Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1 discusses of the nature of philosophical naturalism and its relation to
scientific method. The discussion takes its cue from an interdisciplinary examina-
tion of the naturalization of the philosophy of mind by Kievit et al. (2011), who
employ statistical methods to construct psychometric models of both the identity
andsuperveniencetheoriesofthemind–bodyrelation. Forthemostpart,thefocus
of the chapter is on methods of inquiry. After a brief discussion of two different
attitudes to naturalized philosophy, two well-known views of naturalism in the
philosophy of mind are presented and considered in relation to the naturalism of
Kievitetal.Thereafter,somelimitationsofstructuralequationmodelling,whichis
the authors’ method of choice, are noted, as is the useful but neglected method of
inferencetothebestexplanation.Philosophersandpsychologistsareencouragedto
use one another’s methods, to the benefit of both.
Chapter 2 adopts the correspondence theory as a plausible theory of truth and
discussesitinrelationtoscience.Thecorrespondencetheoryispresentedinaform
x Preface
that enables one to show that it uniquely fulfils a crucial function in psychological
research, because the interpretation of truth claims as suppositions that concern
statesofaffairsintheworldclearlyexplicateswhatitmeansforatheorytobetrue,
andwhatitmeansforatheorytobefalse.Forthisreason,correspondencetruthhas
the advantage of allowing researchers to properly understand the assumptions of
scientific research as claims about the factual state of the world, as well as scru-
tinizing these assumptions. It is concluded that correspondence truth plays an
important part in our understanding of science, including psychology.
Chapter 3, a broad abductive theory of scientific method is described that has
particular relevance for thebehavioural sciences. This theory of method assembles
a complex of specific strategies and methods that are used in the detection of
empirical phenomena and the subsequent construction of explanatory theories.
A characterization of the nature of phenomena is given, and the process of their
detection is briefly described in terms of a multistage model of data analysis. The
construction of explanatory theories is shown to involve their generation through
abductive, or explanatory, reasoning, their development through analogical mod-
elling, and their fuller appraisal in terms of judgments of the best of competing
explanations. The nature and limits of this theory of method are discussed in the
light of relevant developments in scientific methodology.
Chapter 4 examines the methodological foundations of exploratory factor
analysis(EFA)andsuggeststhatitisproperlyconstruedasamethodforgenerating
explanatorytheories.Inthefirsthalfofthechapter,itisarguedthatEFAshouldbe
understood as anabductive method oftheory generation that exploits animportant
precept of scientific inference known as the principle of the common cause. This
characterizationoftheinferentialnatureofEFAcohereswellwithitsinterpretation
as a latent variable method. The second half of the chapter outlines a broad theory
of scientific method in which abductive reasoning figures prominently. It then
discussesanumberofmethodologicalfeaturesofEFAinthelightofthatmethod.It
is concluded that EFA, as a useful method of theory generation that can be prof-
itably employed in tandem with confirmatory factor analysis and other methods
of theory evaluation.
Chapter 5 examines the well-known, and widely used, approach to qualitative
researchknownasgroundedtheory.Intheirinitialformulationofthemethodology,
Glaser and Strauss (1967) adopted an empiricist outlook on inquiry, although one
leavenedmore bypragmatismthanpositivism.Thischapterpresentsanalternative
conceptionofgroundedtheorymethodthatisconsistentwitharealistphilosophyof
scienceandanabductiveconceptionofscientificmethod.Amongotherthings,the
proposed reconstruction of grounded theory method adopts a problems-oriented
conceptionofresearch,suggeststhattheoriesaregroundedinphenomena,notdata,
arguesfor anabductive rather thananinductiveconceptionoftheoryconstruction,
and makes good on the claim that grounded theory method accommodates both
qualitative and quantitative methods.
Chapter6presentsaframeworkforclinical reasoningandcase formulationthat
is largely based on the abductive theory of scientific method presented in Chap. 3.
Clinical reasoning has traditionally been understood in terms of the
