Metaphysics and Scientific Realism: Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong

270 Pages·2016·1 MB·English

by  Francesco F. Calemi (ed.)

Metaphysics and Scientific Realism
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Eide
Foundations of Ontology
Edited by
Otávio Bueno, Javier Cumpa, John Heil, Peter Simons,
Erwin Tegtmeier, Amie Thomasson
Volume 9
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Francesco F. Calemi (Ed.)
Metaphysics and
Scientific Realism
Essays in Honour of David Malet Armstrong
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ISBN 978-3-11-045461-1
e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-045591-5
e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-045500-7
ISSN 2198-1841
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A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.
Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.
© 2016 Walter de Gruyter Inc., Boston/Berlin
Printing: CPI books GmbH, Leck
♾ Printed on acid-free paper
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Contents
FrancescoF.Calemi
Introduction|1
MatthewTugby
MirageRealismRevisited|13
1 Introduction|13
2 Theoneovermanyproblem|14
3 Devitt’schargeofmiragerealism|15
4 TheoneovermanyproblemandArmstrong’sworldofstatesof
affairs|17
5 Instantiationaspartialidentity|22
6 TheoneovermanyproblemandthePlatonicviewof
universals|24
FrancescoF.Calemi
OstrichNominalismorOstrichPlatonism?|31
1 Whatisitliketobeanostrich?|31
2 Theargumentfromgrossfacts|31
3 Theharlotargument|36
4 Thetruthmakerargument|39
5 SketchforaPlatonictheoryofpredication|42
6 Concludingremarks|47
PetervanInwagen
InDefenseofTranscendentUniversals|51
1 Armstrong’sontologicalmethod|51
2 Armstrong’sprimarycritiqueoftranscendentrealism|56
3 Areplytotheprimarycritique|60
4 “Howcandistinctparticularshavethesameproperties?”|64
5 Arguments,notexplanations|68
PeterSimons
ArmstrongandTropes|71
1 Universalsandtropes|72
2 Tropesandsubstances|73
3 Armstrong’sobjectionstotropenominalism|74
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VI | Contents
4 Answerstotheobjections|76
5 Someadvantagesoftropenominalism|78
6 Remainingproblemsforthetropenominalist|80
7 Conclusion|82
Anna-SofiaMaurin
Tropes:ForandAgainst|85
1 Introduction|85
2 Tropesandtheoneovermany|86
3 Armstrongonwhatisthe‘best’versionofthetropeview|88
4 Armstrongonwhytherearenotropes|92
5 Piling,swapping,and‘Hochberg’sargument’|93
6 Lawsofnatureandresemblance|96
WilliamF.Vallicella
Facts:AnEssayinAporetics|105
1 Introduction|105
2 Factsascontingentlyexistingconcreta|106
3 Thetruth-makerargumentforfacts|108
4 Butchvarov’sobjectionstorealismaboutfacts|110
4.1 Anargumentfromimperceivability|110
4.2 Anargumentfromimpossibilityofreference|112
4.3 TheParadoxoftheHorseandtheParadoxofSnow|113
5 Problemswiththeconcretistconceptionoffacts|115
5.1 Thecollisionofthecompositionalandnecessitarianmodels|115
5.2 Problemswiththecompositionalistmodel|118
5.3 NecessitarianismandthecollapseofArmstrong’sfact
ontology|120
6 Factsasabstractobjects:ReinhardtGrossmann|126
6.1 Thelocalizationargumentagainstconcretefacts|127
6.2 The‘bareparticular’objectiontoabstractfacts|128
7 Concludingaporeticpostscript|129
JavierCumpa
Armstrong’sHiddenSubstantialism|133
1 Introduction:IsFactualismaTruthofArmstrong’sOntology?|133
2 Statesofaffairsandtheproblemofuniversals|134
3 Statesofaffairsandtheproblemoftruth|135
4 Thecategorialclashbetweenfactualismandthevictoryof
particularity|136
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Contents | VII
5 Concludingremarks:theontologicalconsequencesofthe
clash|138
KristieMiller
PersistingParticularsandtheirProperties|139
1 Introduction|139
2 Transdurantism|141
3 Objectsaspropertybundles|142
4 Objectsassubstratawithproperties|149
5 Locationrelations|153
6 Explanationandidentity|157
StephenMumford
ArmstrongonDispositionsandLawsofNature|161
1 Dispositions,ontologicallyspeaking|161
2 WasArmstrong’saccountsufficientlyrealist?|162
3 Powers,actualismanddegreesofbeing|164
4 Potencyandact|167
5 Lawstotherescue?|168
6 Tendencies|170
7 Conclusion|173
AndreaBorghini
RecombinationforCombinatorialists|177
1 Introduction|177
2 Constituentsofstatesofaffairs|179
3 Recombinationforcombinatorialists|182
4 Rebuttingthetrickle-downobjection|186
5 Rebuttingtheobjectionfromalienpossibilities |188
6 Conclusions|190
MichelePaoliniPaoletti
Who’sAfraidofNon-ExistentManifestations?|193
1 Introduction|193
2 Theargument|194
3 Armstrongvs.powers|197
4 Gettingridofnon-existentmanifestations|200
5 SomemiscellaneousconcernsaboutMeinongianism|204
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VIII | Contents
Tuomas E. Tahko
ArmstrongonTruthmakingandRealism|207
1 Introduction|207
2 Truthmakingandrealism|209
3 Truthmakingasontologicallyneutral|211
4 Realismcanstandonitsown|214
D.H.Mellor
FromTranslationstoTruthmakers|219
1 Translations|219
2 Truthconditions|220
3 Dispositions|222
4 Truthmakers|223
5 Functionalism|225
6 Physicalism|227
7 Beliefsanddesires|228
FrancescoOrilia
Armstrong’sSupervenienceandOntologicalDependence|233
1 Introduction|233
2 ThebasicsofArmstrong’sontology|235
3 Thenodistinctnessproposal|236
4 Supervenienceandontologicaldependence|238
5 Supervenienceasneithersufficientnornecessaryforontological
dependence|239
6 Casesofasymmetricsupervenience|241
7 Casesofsymmetricsupervenience|244
8 InstantiationandBradley’sregress|247
PaoloValore
NaturalismasaBackgroundMetaphysics|253
1 UnderstandingArmstrong’snaturalisticposition|254
2 Theunder-determinationofthethesis|255
3 Thenegativecontent |255
4 Thepositivecontent|256
5 Istheaprioriback?|257
Index|261
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FrancescoF.Calemi
Introduction
David Malet Armstrong (8 July 1926 – 13 May 2014) has been one of the most
influential contemporary metaphysician working in the analytic tradition and
surelythegreatest20thcenturyAustralianphilosopher.Hismainmeritistohave
reestablishedmetaphysicsasarespectablebranchofphilosophyplacingitatthe
centre of the philosophical debate, and giving it the status of an authoritative
andcompetentinterlocutorofbothrationalandempiricalsciences.Bymeansof
a rigorously argumentative approach and a sharp prose, Armstrong has built a
whole metaphysical system, that is, a comprehensive and unified picture of the
fundamentalstructureoftheworld.Oneofthemoststrikingfeaturesofhismeta-
physicsisthesimplicityofitscorethesisthatcouldberecappedbyArmstrong’s
followingmotto:“Statesofaffairsrule!”(Armstrong1989a,43).Inordertograsp
themeaningofArmstrong’smottofirstofalloneshouldaskwhatkindofentity
isastateofaffairs,andinwhatsensearestatesofaffairssupposedto“rule”ina
metaphysicalsystem.
TogetananswertosuchquestionsweshouldfirstnotethatwhileArmstrong’s
theoryofstatesofaffairsliesattheheartofhismetaphysicalsystem,atthecenter
ofArmstrong’stheoryofstatesofaffairsthereishistheoryofpropertiesasuniver-
sals.Armstrong’stheoryofuniversalsisconcernedwiththeso-called“problem
ofuniversals”.Despitewhatseemstobeimpliedbythistime-honoredlabel,there
isawideconsensusamongmetaphysiciansonthefactthat,strictlyspeaking,the
problemofuniversalsisnotasingleproblem,ratheritisafamilyofwovenandpar-
tiallyoverlappingquestionsthattraditionallyhasbeenclusteredunderthesame
heading.Broadlyspeaking,onecanclaimthattheso-calledproblemofuniversals
involvestheexistenceandthenatureofproperties,thatis,suchentitiesasbeing
tall,beingred,havingamass,havinganelectriccharge,orhavingaspin.Thelist
thatfollowsisrepresentative,butnotexhaustive,oftheontological,metaphysi-
cal,epistemological,linguistics,andmeta-ontologicalissuesthatfallunderthe
umbrella-term“problemofuniversals”:
– Howcantwoormorenumericallydistinctparticularstobeidenticalinnature
ortobeofthesametype?
– Invirtueofwhatapredicatecanbetrueofsomeparticularentities?
– What accounts for the fact that a single predicate can be truly applied to a
multitudeofnumericallydifferentparticulars?
– Howcanweexplainobjectiveresemblancesoccurringbetweenparticularsif
notintermsofsharedproperties?
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2 | FrancescoF.Calemi
– Whatarethereferentsoftheso-calledabstractsingularterms(e.g.“redness”,
“triangularity”,etc.)?
– Ifthereareproperties,whatarethey?Arepropertiesnon-recurrent,viz.par-
ticularentities?Arepropertiesrecurrent,viz.universals?
– Arepropertiesnecessarybeingsorcontingentbeings?
– Doespropertydeservethestatusofafundamentalandirreducibleontological
categoryorshoulditbeanalyzedintermsofothermostfundamentalonto-
logicalcategories?
Since the so-called problem of universals includes all those (and many other)
questions, and properties, if admitted, can be construed not only as universals
butalsoasparticulars,i.e.tropes,itisnotquiterighttotalkabouttheproblemof
universals:oneshouldinsteadusetheexpression“problemsofproperties”.Arm-
strong’sanswertotheintenselydebatedproblemsofpropertiesiscalled“apos-
terioriRealism”,or“ScientificRealism”,or“ImmanentRealism”anditentailsthe
thesesthatfollow:
(T1) There are genuine properties (contra extreme Nominalism, which denies
the very existence of properties, and contra radical Nominalism, which
aims to reduce properties to classes, or to mereological fusions, or to re-
semblancesoccurringbetweenparticulars,ortoanyothernominalistically
acceptableentities).
Roughly speaking, Armstrong holds that there are some phenomena (such as
sameness of type, abstract reference, objective resemblance between particu-
lars,lawsofnature,amongothers)thatmustbeaccountedfor,andthatthebest
explanation we can give to them involves, besides particulars, also properties
construedasprimitiveentities.
(T2) Propertiesareuniversals(contraTropeNominalism,namelythedoctrine
thattakespropertiestobeparticulars,namelytropes).
Armstrongisratherskepticalinidentifyingpropertieswithtropes,thatis,inhold-
ing that properties are non-recurrent and particularized properties. Even if he
showsagreatappreciationtowardsTropeNominalism(hewritesthatTropeNom-
inalism“canbedevelopedasanimportantandquiteplausiblerivaltoamoderate
Realismaboutuniversals”¹),nonethelessArmstrongclaimsthathisaposteriori
RealismismorepalatablethanTropeNominalism,inthat(i)theformerexplains
1 Armstrong1989b,xi.
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