Table Of ContentJournal of Ethnobiology 129-158 Winter 2000
20(2):
MAYA KNOWLEDGE AND WARS
"SCIENCE
//
ANDERSON
N.
E.
Department Anthropology
of
University Riverside
California,
of
CA
92521-0418
Riverside,
—
ABSTRACT. Knowledge humans knowing
succeed
socially constructed, yet in
is
//
a great deal about their environments. Recent debates over the nature of "science
involve extreme positions, from claims that science arbitrary to claims that
all is
science somehow a privileged body of truth. Something may be learned by
is
considering the biological knowledge of a very different culture with a long record
Maya
of high civilization. Yucatec ethnobiology agrees with contemporary
many
them
almost highly
international biological science in respects, all of specific,
many
pragmatic and observational. differs in other respects, most of them highly
It
One may common
inferential and cosmological. tentatively conclude that
observation of everyday matters more directly affected by interaction with the
is
nonhuman
environment than abstract deductive reasoning, but that social factors
is
operate
at levels.
all
Key words: Yucatec Maya, ethnoornithology, science wars, philosophy of science,
Yucatan Peninsula
—
+
RESUMEN. humanos
El El conocimiento es una construccion social, pero los
pueden mucho
aprender ce sus alrededores. Discursos recientes sobre "ciencia"
incluyen posiciones extremes; algunos proponen que "ciencia" es arbitrario, otros
m
mucho
proponen que "ciencia" es verdad absoluto. Seria posible conocer
si
muy
investiguemos conocimiento biologico de una cultura, diferente, con una
el
historia larga de alta civilizacion. El conocimiento etnobiologico de los Yucatecos
conforme, mas o menos, con sciencia contempordnea intemacional, especialmente
la
en detallas derivadas de la experiencia pragmatica. Pero, el es deferente en otros
—
respectos los que derivan de cosmovision o de inferencia logical. Se puede concluir
tentativamente que observacion de fenomenos concretas es mas afectada por
la la
interaccion con el medio ambiente que por el razon deductive, pero que factores
pensamiento en
sociales influyen el todos niveles.
RESUME. hommes
-La connaissance construee socialement, mais,
est aussi, les
En
apprendrent beaucoup de leurs environs. debats reciens sous nature de
les la
"science" y a positions extremes. Les uns propose que "science" est des chose
il
propose que
arbitraires; les autres "science" est la verite absolue. C'est possible a
savoir plus de ces choses, en considerant la connaissance biologique d'un culture
—
un que une "longue duree" Maya
different culture tient Les yucateque
civilisee.
possedent un systeme biologique que ressemble de
a celui science
la
contemporaine. La plupart des ressemblances existent en domaines d'observation
pragmatique et quotidienne. Les differences (ou, selon Derrida, "differances") sont
On
ou
des choses logicales cosmologiques. peut concluir, tentativement, que la
phenomenes
observation de concretes est plus afectee par I'interaction avec
I'environment que le raison logical, mais les influences sociales existent en touts
niveaux.
—
ANDERSON
No. 2
Vol. 20,
130
WARS
SCIENCE
and
value
Anthropology has recently seen debates concerning the nature of
"science." These debates are part of a wider challenge to canons of truth, of liter-
ary quality, and indeed of all those matters that anthropologists regard as part of
culture.
As frequent in academic conflicts, the debate over "science" has quickly
is
who
most
escalated, with the most famous participants being those take the ex-
treme positions. This has led to the term "science wars" (see the excellent account
Hacking However, there are serious questions under the rhetoric. Lead-
in 1999).
—
ing philosophers of science disagree profoundly though, of course, less
—
media and
profoundly than the extremists of the semi-popular over the nature
practice of science.
summarize even
obviously impossible to this debate here, at a superficial
It is
makes knowledge
the present merely a small contribution to the base
level; article
how much
on
that underlies one aspect of the controversy, the debate of science
—
more
in this article, specifically the classification of living things is social
how much
construction, and based on a reality out there in the world.
is
Thomas
Loosely arrayed on one side are those such as Imre Lakatos
(1976),
Kuhn who
Ian Hacking and Paul Feyerabend hold various
(1962), (1999), (1987),
They
positions that give social construction a large role in scientific practice. are
Kuhn
not a uniform group. sees the social organization of science as structuring
the quest for truth, but not ready to write off either the search or the goal as
is
Kuhn
hopeless. (In spite of certain claims to the contrary, clearly states that he
regards some paradigms as more correct than others, and he sees progress in
sci-
who
ence over time.) Hacking, also, explicitly distances himself from those see
"science" as the construction of arbitrary nonsense, though he sees social con-
important and sometimes
struction as overriding the Feyerabend seems
truth. to
more
hold a radical position, at least for debating purposes; he appears to see
no more
science as a social belief system, believable on the face of than witch-
it
or flying-saucer
craft lore.
—
who
There are those think following Foucault but going
1971) be-
(e.g. far
yond anything Foucault said— we know
actually that, since cannot external truth,
of the claims of science must be and must be made simply keep
all false, to in
elites
was
power,
as "truth" constructed in Orwell's 1984 (Orwell 1948). This the "vul-
is
gar Marxist" version of Marx' claims about expanded
religion, to cover the field
many
"new
people "20^^
that see as the religion" of century" people
(on these
Hacking
matters
see
1999).
This position depends on an
inconsistency: people are seen to be living in a
completely world
solipsistic in relation to the natural environment, yet have a
to
grasp
perfect of the realities of interpersonal power. Thus,
this position, like other
and
radically "culturological"
culture-essentializing positions anthropology,
in
is
deeply
incoherent. People are hypothesized have
to a mystical, virtually perfect
grasp of their culture, such
that insiders participate in a perfect unity that un-
is
fathomable outsiders—yet somehow
to
this perfect learning does not extend
to
any phenomena
other than and somehow
social or cultural ones,
the visiting eth-
way
nographer has no
of contacting that mystic participation. The natural world.
JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY
Winter 2000
131
apprehended
in particular, only via this mystically absorbed cultural percep-
is
who
tion. The individual humans are so superbly good at learning from their elders
are incapable of learning from their observations.
Arrayed on number who
the other side are a of philosophers see science as a
—
way
of getting at real truth about the environment an enterprise that can be sub-
when
verted or mistaken, but, done right, gives us pragmatically consistent and
useful data. Leaders of this general view include Philip Kitcher (1985, 1993), Larry
Laudan many
Alexander Rosenberg Lewis Wolpert and more,
(1996), (1992), (1993),
These too are a diverse lot, but they all agree that science is a search that produces
more and game
ever accurate data theories, not just a social that produces ever
more complex
arbitrary representations.
However, and have abandoned
notably, all these writers the naive positivist
No
positions so popular in the early 20*^ century. current philosopher of science
am
(so far as aware) continues to defend the near-religious regard for ''covering
I
and dominated and
laws," "falsification," "objectivity" that science, confined in
it
much
narrow through midcentury Hacking and
channels, of the Ian Philip Kitcher
provide especially sober and thoughtful critiques of this position (rather unfairly
who
blamed on Karl Popper, advocated such procedures but was not so naive
as
Hacking Laudan
to think they defined science; see 1999; 1996).
all
may
remembered
be that Francis Bacon, in his original definitions of the
It
scientific enterprise, was not only aware of these problems but was more sensi-
all
them some modern He
tive to than are philosophers. defined the
—
observation-experiment method and warned his readers of the "Four Idols" the
—
we now
would
biases "social construction" or "cultural baggage" that can
call
unwary and unaware
blind the (Bacon 1901, orig. 16*^^ cent.).
As noted above. Hacking, in the most recent salvo in the long and confusing
somewhat
"science wars," concludes that science socially constructed, some-
is
me
what seems be an
factual (1999:99). This to to rather evasion.
The present paper obviously cannot even begin to summarize the literature
on merely makes 100%
science wars." a single point: science socially con-
It is
structed, but usually an accurate representation of the world in spite of that.
Maya
Evidence supplied from a comparison of and biological classifications of
is
Maya taxonomy maps
birds. ornithological fairly well onto biological taxonomy,
Maya
but there are major differences. This disproves both simple realism (the see
the natural distinctions just as the biologists do) and extreme social construction-
Maya
ism system must be from
(the totally different the biologists', since the
societies are so different).
What
has been missed, in the "science wars," the fact that society does not
is
wrong. To say something
necessarily get things socially constructed not say
is to
is
inaccurate. After people have to learn their social constructions from each
it is all,
why
through
other. If they can learn their culture interaction, can they (and, thus,
their culture) not learn about the envirorunent from interaction, and then teach
each other in further interpersonal interactions?
Anthropologists have turned their ethnographic gazes onto the actual prac-
tice of science in dozens of societies. Beginning with traditional small-scale societies,
they have expanded gaze encompass modern
their to laboratories. Particularly
noteworthy impact on work Laura Nader and
for the intellectual field the of
its is
ANDERSON
No.
2
Vol. 20,
132
movers
on
(Nader Nader has long encouraged research the
her associates 1996).
Her group has thus stud-
and contemporary including
shapers of society, scientists.
ied modern laboratories and university halls, often comparing them with her
own
alternative study area, the highland Zapotec world, which has its science
Nader
(Gonzalez
1998; 1996).
some
has provided very thoughtful insights
Roberto Gonzalez, in particular,
He
into Zapotec traditional agricultural science. sees as definitely a science (tak-
it
—
He
"assumptions"
ing "science" in sense #1, below). analyzes in terms of folk
it
—
He
shows
theories that hold together a body of empirical, pragmatic knowledge.
modem
work
that these like the theories of international science: they are basic,
from and used generate
largely counterintuitive ideas, extracted experience, to
new and and Some them highly ques-
practices to explain justify old ones. of are
modem
some
but assumptions
tionable, so are of science.
nonwestem dawn
Serious studies of science go back to the of anthropology.
One Frank Cushing's researches on Zuni agriculture and food, not pub-
recalls
lished in book form until 1920 (Gushing 1920) but carried out in the early 1870s.
Malinowski produced (Malinowski did
also classic studies in this area 1935), as
A
Raymond
his students such as Firth and Audrey Richards
(1957) (1948). self-
movement among
conscious to study "ethnoscience" arose in the 1940s, largely
late
Murdock
students of George working Oceania (Goodenough
at Yale, in 1953;
Many
ConJdin Frake seem
1962; 1980). of the earlier ethnoscience studies to the
contemporary anthropologist rather naively and paying
positivistic formalistic,
such
rather little attention to ideas as did not well into a "Western" scientific
fit
framework. was somewhat
Ironically, this not true of Cushing's to a lesser
(or,
extent, Malinowski's) work, which should have served examples.
as
Maya
Closer to the area of this paper, Scott Atran (1999) has analyzed Itza
from
"folkbiology" a similar point of view, analyzing knowledge and
linguistic
its
recognition.
any body
In case, this large of research established "ethnoscience" or "folk
science" as something to study. Ethnographers came knowledge
to see traditional
worthy
as of serious, detailed attention. They were exhorted understand in
to
its
it
own
terms
("emically"), rather than merely comparing unfavorably)
(usually
it
with "Western"
science. In spite of rearguard action by opposing scholars like
Marvin
Harris
(1968), studies of traditional knowledge grew and flourished apace.
seems only natural— coming—
It in fact, surprisingly long in that ethnographers
should turn on
their attention contemporary
university
laboratories.
SCIENCE
This Much
igainst the question of defining "science."
recent writing
conflates several under The
different things that label. following
me
seem
be
to to quite separate phenomena:
Science as search truth—
1. for for accurate data about the world, and for theo-
d world ways
that in that guide further searching
Wolpert
most
the
JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY
Winter 2000 133
understood
intuitive of proposals. that the search for truth often takes
It is
wrong Kuhn
famous and
"phlogiston"
turns, as in the cases of (see 1962) static
The
continents (Oreskes 1999), but that is in the nature of a search. search is
body
seen as resulting in a of facts, or at least pragmatically useful data, held
together by a framework of higher-level representations that can be called
and "axioms," with Gonzalez "assumptions." To extreme
"theories"
or, (1998),
framework might be seen merely "worldview"
social constructionists, this as
"cosmo
or vision."
Science as a repository of True Facts or of Absolute Truth. Although mili-
2. still
tantly upheld by some champions Sokal 1997), this position no longer
(e.g. is
Contemporary can about
really tenable. scientific practice get us to the truth
many when make
things ordinary observation will not, but that does not Sci-
ence a God-given repository of infallible wisdom. In fact, philosophers of
now
wrong
science hold that a genuine search for truth must take turns. Oth-
—
Humoral
erwise not a search merely a repetition of the obvious. medicine,
is
it
many
and were good
alchemy, phlogiston, other theories ideas in their time,
probably the best that could have been done with the data at hand. The
methods and
disproofs of these theories signalled advances in the techniques
improvement
of scientific practice, and, following those, the of theory. Science
advances not by learning ex cathedra truth but by providing better and better
now
Kuhn and most
theories, as pointed out as scientists agree. Possi-
(1962)
bly a subvariant of the old science-as-God's-truth view the popular
is
we
mass
conception of "science": Flashy technology. This the concept find in
is
media and overmakes between
Wars. (Wolpert the distinction
Star [1993] sci-
ence and technology, but has some valuable comments on the issue.)
—
—
modern
Science as one specific form the Western form of the search for
3.
accurate knowledge. There are two major contenders for the form. there
First,
14*
began perhaps century and was
the self-conscious "science" that in the
is
17* work
formulated in the 16*^ and centuries in the writings and of Francis
men
Bacon, Galileo Rene Descartes, and, Robert Boyle and
Galilei, later, like
Isaac Newton. This a science defined (ultimately) as working from observa-
is
tion to inductive and then hypothetico-deductive theories, and testing these
by
(and the observations also) experiment. It contrasts this search with re-
ceived wisdom, bias, and popular belief. This science did indeed break radically
with earlier ways of knowing. If it is not the only "science," it at least deserves
some marking; Randall
sort of terminological Collins' "rapid discovery
sci-
good The second by
ence" (Collins 1998) a choice. "science" as defined
is is
mid-20* with
the logical positivists in the century, formal operations, cov-
its
emphasis on and/ and
ering laws, verification or falsification, formally
(=mathematically) stated theoretical models. (This is so restrictive that has
it
abandoned by most
been current authorities.) This type of definition has the
advantage of cutting off one specific type of truth-search, but has the disad-
it
vantage making comparison impossible between contemporary
of international
and knowledge
science other traditions.
"what
Science as scientists do." This allows us to include the faked data, char-
4.
latanry, and vendettas that sometimes characterize scientific practice. also
It
ANDERSON
No. 2
Vol. 20,
134
—
own
whole people with eating habits,
directs us to look at scientists as their
and
daily paranoias, so forth.
lives,
most
5.
—
even China, with unquestionably great scientific tradition,
tional societies its
mod-
did not have a concept of "science" or a "science establishment" (until
have term ''knowledge" but not
ern times). Traditional societies usually a for
opposed knowledge. Chinese Arabic
one for "science" as to other types of xue,
Greek/Latin included
scientia
Bv
humanities. contrast, in
:r t]
now
modern countries, "Big Science" has a of own, institutional-
life its
ized in such organizations as the National Science Foundation.
Evidently, the three of these approaches characterize science as a special
first
kind of truth-seeking activity. The second pair treat science as a part of social ac-
—
somewhat
The approach above
tion in general as a social construction. third
is
—
intermediate, in that regards science as a social construction ^but a superior
it
one, one that inevitably leads to truer and better knowledge.
Champions and faked
of science see science as a truth-seeking see
activity,
—
and "bad
data, vendettas the like as science" alien contamination of the enter-
The and and
prise. attackers critics of science see as a part of social action, thus
it
many
and
see in terms of 4 5 above. For of them, the "bad science" just as
it is
scientific as the "good," and phlogiston just as real as any other scientific con-
is
demonstrated
rmodynamics
the
—
There are thoughtful reasons to see science in the above ways so long as
all
kept
are analytically
distinct.
I
one looks modern American
If at institutions, "Big Science" a totally differ-
is
thing from the tiny and scattered band of experimenters, often working in
modern
science" in
They
are linked
but they are not linked by
similarities in institutional or forms.
political
Conversely, one looking
if is at the accumulation of accurate data, one can
reasonably look at Assyrian medicine, Chinese agricultural experiments, and Maya
bird lore along with Nobel Prize experiments. One however, be
will not, terribly
concerned about
the personal
lives of the Assyrian or Chinese scholars.
—
one
If sees science in a broader and more
sociological sense science as the
know
somethin
and wisdom
intuition received
an
tell therr,
Maya
and become more
scholars
interesting. This the position of most
is
ans of science. has the major advantage human
It of allowing
all societies
than defining //
"science
cultural
Given
the high word
prestige of the "science" in
political ramifications
to these alternate courses of action.
Certainly most
the reasonable
of the restrictive definii
term
"science" to Dost-lfSnn Rarnni;in-r:Ainp
This
footnote Mayas
the Assyrians, Chinese,
human
^^ff
JC 't^^i
1
If "science" limited
is
JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY
Winter 2000
135
methodology and
institutionalized rules of that the positivists scientific philoso-
20^
phers of the early 17^^ century (let alone the century) invoked, then by definition
was no
there science before 1600 (or 1900 in the case of the positivists). Moreover,
much modern
of science does not count. Astronomy, astrophysics, paleontology,
most and most
historical geology, of ecology, of behavior biology are basically
observational than being based on Not
sciences, rather controlled experiments.
Maya
only bird lore, but even professional ornithological research, rarely conforms
Popperian Hempelian canon
to the full or (see Kitcher 1993 for the best discussion
Above and most
of these issues). directly relevant to the present paper, tax-
all,
onomy
modern
not a hypothesis-and-lab-experiment though
science,
is cladistics
beginning change
is to that.
Much
of the rhetoric in the "science wars" of the 20^^ century has been
late
associated with a disregard for the above distinctions. Sometimes the disregard
appears be but simply any what
to willful, often careless. In case, has often
it is
happened has been an all-out attack on the entire search for knowledge and un-
derstanding, justified by the failings of some scientists (some do fake their data,
many way
some
are biased in one or another). Conversely, champions of science
make
have failed to the necessary distinctions, and have talked as an attack on
if
was
the current social institutionalization of science in the United States an attack
know
on attempts anything. Sokal seems be
all to (1997), in particular, to peril-
ously close to taking such a view.
Of
have
course, in the real world, impossible to a search for truth that
it is is
completely wholly and uninfluenced by
disinterested, objective, social attitudes
We
known
and have day David Hume. Even
institutions. this since at least the of
after half a century of critical theory, C. Wright Mills' book The Sociological Imagi-
nation (1950) remains probably the best statement on the subject in social science.
The can hope understand them moral
best the scientist for to biases, adjust in a
is
direction, and compensate for them by seeking verification or disproof of findings
from other investigators from other schools or laboratories (Bacon 1901; Kitcher
1993).
may
At this point, it be interesting to turn to a different tradition. If two ut-
with come
terly different societies, utterly different scientific traditions, to similar
from perhaps
conclusions similar data, there objective truth lurking behind
the
is
and when two such way
cultural screen. societies differ totally in the they con-
If
may
and
struct the world, then science not exist at the social construction of
all,
may
knowledge be be an and some
truly said to arbitrary To
solipsistic activity.
extent, the degree of "social construction" in science an empirical question.
is
THE MAYA OF QUINTANA ROO
For the last ten years, in collaboration with Mexican (including Maya) and
United States colleagues, have been carrying out research on knowledge of plants
I
and animals among the Yucatec Maya of the "Maya Zone" of Quintana Roo. This,
was
the central part of the state, is the area that never truly reconquered after the
Maya known Dumond
War"
rebellion of 1846-48 as the "Caste (Bricker 1981; 1998).
Maya now
The in the present Yucatan state were crushed in 1848, but in what
is
ANDERSON
Vol No,
2
20,
136
Quintana Roo they remained independent until 1901, and in the remote v
was
were never subdued. There fighting as
they really re(
interior
tral
my
own Chunhuhub. Cv
1934 in Dzula, the community next to base in
Dzula do admit Alfonso ethnograph
habitants of not defeat. Villa Rojas,
much and some
area eastward in the mid-1930s, encountered hostiUty
The Maya, unsubdued, have continued preserve a cultural
danger. to
m
undly changed over time
much
knowledee
retains
ty-
mi
millennia
of
from
documents, which,
16^^ century onward (Landa 1937; Alvarez 1997; Arzapalo Marin 1987, 1996; analy-
ses in Anderson and Medina in prep.), record biological and medical lore close to
The Maya, everyone knows, one most
today's. as created of the greatest^ brilliant,
most innovative, and most original civilizations the world has ever seen (Sharer
The modern Yucatec of Quintana Roo are one of the several successor groups
1994).
much
Maya. probably assume
of the Classic safe to that of their biological
It is
Maya
knowledge derived from a Classic base, given the consistency in usage
is
since the very earliest dictionaries (Alvarez 1997; Anderson and Medina in prep.).
This base has been greatly supplemented in more recent centuries by Spanish
(in-
and modern Maya
cluding Moorish) lore international biological science. The are
some
Maya;
not sort of living fossil, preserving for us the mysteries of the Classic
nor are they a tiny isolated group. They are bearers of the elaborate and expert
science of a long-lived, populous, brilliantly successful, constantly evolving
civili-
zation.
Maya
languages have
a written tradition going back 1600 years, at first in
and
hieroglyphic syllabic scripts, later in Spanish letters. V^ritten transmission has
been but
a small significant part of cultural transmission for a very long time. In
we
Yucatan, for instance, have such examples as the Rituals of the Bacabs
(orig. ca.
1600; see Roys 1965, Arzapalo Marin 1987), which records magical and medical
from
lore the earliest part of the Colonial period.
Such huge
from homogeneous
a tradition far or uniform Hervik
is (see
e.g.
own
and
has
1999), its self-reflexive turn (Sullivan 1989). This article focuses on
knowledge recorded and around Chunhuhub,
in Quintana
Roo.
Chunhuhub
a large farming town some
is of 5,000 people, occupying an
ejido
(communal
landholding) Maya
of 14,330 ha. All are Yucatec except a few ad-
for
ministrators and and number
technicians, a small of in-migrants from
central
Almost
Mexico. everyone Most
is bilingual. families raise maize, beans, squash.
still
and by
other crops slash-and-burn
cultivation of raneine from
tracts
more. Every
family
medi
commonly
cine Some game
is practiced. obtained, but overhunting
is still
Medina
rowth from
Some
logging is carried out, but valuable woods were depleted
in the
JOURNAL OF ETHNOBIOLOGY
Winter 2000 137
early 1990s. Stockrearing and beekeeping are important. The vast majority of the
population highly knowledgeable about wild and tame animals,
is forests, fields,
medicinal herbs, insects, and indeed aspects of the environment. Given the
all
solidly agricultural nature of the community, this knowledge of a pragmatic,
is
wider model
experiential type, fitting well into the of "ecology of practice" devel-
oped by Nyerges
(1997).
Chunhuhub months and more
Research in lasted for six in 1991 six in 1996,
was by
with almost annual visits during intervening years. joined in the field
I
Hunn me
Eugene during a month in 1991; he introduced to Felix Medina Tzuc,
my
who Hurm
became and
collaborator field assistant. Dr. also recorded bird voices
Maya (Hunn and worked Don
with
in the field for experts to identify 1992) Felix
how Maya
and myself on seeing far could go in identifying birds from pictures in
Peterson and Chalif guide Mexican birds (Peterson and Chalif Other-
to 1989).
's
Chunhuhub
and
wise, research consisted primarily of walking through neighboring
Maya
ejido and ranch lands, observing birds in the field and obtaining identifica-
Maya
tions. also listened to a great deal of conversation about birds and other
I
and argument what
biota, including a great deal of discussion over just to call a
was (Hanks
particular bird. Since studying "referential practice" 1990), rather
I
than in the psychology of classification, found expedient to spend a great deal
I it
made
of time in the field listening to actual practice, and minimal use of formal
techniques beyond the frame interviewing described by Frake Thus,
eliciting (1980).
name
the following data refer strictly to usage in ordinary conversation. did not
I
carry out experiments of the sort done by Atran (1999) and others, since was
I
Hanks
interested, at this stage of research, in different questions (see 1990 for dis-
and approach studying Maya;
cussion justification of the referential-practice in
however, experimentation will be carried out in future research, opportunity per-
mitting).
modem
Maya
The do not have a concept of "science" in the international sense.
They do, however, have a reasonable equivalent. based on the core term k'aj
It is
"to know." Connected to this the complex word ool, which means "heart," and
is
by extension "knowledge, condition" (and sometimes also "lungs" and other
will,
we know
internal items near the heart). Uniting these, get k'ajool, "to something,
noun
and "knowledge."
to recognize," thus the verbal k'ajoolal This as near as
is
we
can get to "science." not a far reach; k'ajoolal focally signifies practical
It is
working knowledge.
on and some
This article focuses classification uses of birds, with comparisons
contemporary
to bird representation in international biological science.
MAYA
BIRD CLASSIFICATION
Classification often described as "carving nature at the joints." This, of course,
is
How
Maya
assumes that nature has joints. similar are bird taxa to those of con-
temporary biological science?
In ethnoornithology, as in science wars, there a range from social-construc-
is
No
tionist to realist positions. one is as extreme as Feyerabend (1987), but Ellen
and Bulmer and
Forth degree Ellen
(1993), (1996), to a (1967) stress social factors,
ANDERSON
No.
2
Vol. 20,
138
has been sharply of narrowly realist models. Conversely Boster (1987; Boster,
critical
Hunn
seem more
and
and d'Andrade
Berlin and O'Neill 1986; Boster 1988) (1977)
prone assume people recognize categories that are real in the sense of evolu-
to
Atran and Berlin take a relatively strong position:
tionary biology. (1990) (1992)
people are mentally programmed to recognize the multistranded similarities that
provide, and thus do carve nature at the joints. Atran's
evolutionary relationships
due
seems considerably more qualified and nuanced, to his pro-
position
later
with
longed study (including use of psychological experiments, in collaboration
Maya
(Atran
psychologists) of classification 1999).
Itzaj
Maya
Maya
The Yucatec data are consistent with the position that the recog-
However, use
nize groupings that are natural in the sense of evolutionary biology.
and other cultural and social factors enter into and shape the classification system.
by and
The system can be understood only taking both culture nature into ac-
count.
Maya names
bird are mostly at a level that Brent Berlin (1992) calls "folk ge-
These are usually one-word names. They contrast with each other; to
nerics/'^
place bird in one folk generic means not in any of the others. They are some-
a it is
down
broken which normally formed by adding an
times into "folk specifics," are
adjective to the generic. Thus ch'om means "vulture"; chakpool ch'om, "red-headed
Turkey Maya, and most
vulture," the Vulture (Cathartes aura), English, Latin, like
is
languages (Berlin 1992; his usage followed here, rather than that of Atran 1999,
is
more for convenience than because of any deep theoretical reason), use the classic
name
pattern in which a folk-generic modified by an adjective to produce a
is
name who
(The Greco-Latin genus roughly "one up,"
specific. Cathartes, cleans
name
covers one or two other vulture species; aura comes from a Native American
—
many
for this bird.) Latin terminology has higher categories the familiar phyla,
and Maya
orders, families of Linnaean taxonomy. terminology has only
classes,
Maya
one: the unique beginner ch'ich' "bird." also has very few folk specifics.
Almost all classifying of animals and plants is done at the folk-generic level. (This
most Native American
true in systems.)
is
named
Of
the 89 terminal taxa (folk genera not broken down, or folk species)
Appendix
listed in the below, 63 have a one-to-one correspondence with the spe-
by
cies recognized international omithology. Ten are focus-and-extension names:
whose name
more
a focal species is extended, or less often, to other birds that are
seen as distinct but are not named. In 9 cases, a terminal taxon a Linnaean genus
is
genus
(4 cases), part of a (2 cases), or a group of closely related genera cases). In
(5
names
3 cases, a terminal taxon a whole family, and in one case a name covers two
unrelated but very similar families {kusuun: and One name
swifts swallows).
—
only one a broad, vague category without Linnaean
is
counterpart.
two down
In cases, a folk generic broken which
is into folk specifics, all of
have
a one-to-one correspondence with One
the international ones. of these folk
generics corresponds Linnaean
to a one
family, to a pair of closely related Lin-
naean
genera.
In addition, I identify 13 groups, loosely named or named by extension of the
name
one
of of their species (see below). Of these 13 larger groups fami-
("folk
one corresponds two
lies"), to (Lirmaean) orders, two an
to order, six to a family,
two
and two
to part of a family, to a genus.
