Material Agency: Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Approach

268 Pages·2008·4.13 MB·English

by  Andy Clark (auth.)

Material Agency
Carl Knappett Lambros Malafouris
l
Editors
Material Agency
Towards a Non-Anthropocentric Approach
1 3
Editors
CarlKnappett LambrosMalafouris
UniversityofToronto,Toronto, UniversityofCambridge
Ontario,Canada Cambridge,UK
ISBN:978-0-387-74710-1 e-ISBN:978-0-387-74711-8
DOI:10.1007/978-0-387-74711-8
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2008930774
#2008SpringerScienceþBusinessMedia,LLC
‘‘WhereBrain,Body,andWorldCollide’’reprintedwithminorchangesbypermissionofDaedalus,
JournaloftheAmericanAcademyofArtsandSciences,fromtheissueentitled,‘‘TheBrain,’’Spring
1998,Vol.127,No.2
Allrightsreserved.Thisworkmaynotbetranslatedorcopiedinwholeorinpartwithoutthewritten
permissionofthepublisher(SpringerScienceþBusinessMedia,LLC,233SpringStreet,NewYork,
NY10013,USA),exceptforbriefexcerptsinconnectionwithreviewsorscholarlyanalysis.Usein
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Contents
1 WhereBrain,BodyandWorldCollide........................ 1
AndyClark
2 AtthePotter’sWheel:AnArgumentforMaterialAgency......... 19
LambrosMalafouris
3 MaterialAgency,SkillsandHistory:DistributedCognition
andtheArchaeologyofMemory ............................ 37
JohnSutton
4 TheActor-Enacted:CumbrianSheepin2001................... 57
JohnLawandAnnemarieMol
5 Non-HumanAgencies:TreesinPlaceandTime................. 79
OwainJonesandPaulCloke
6 IntelligentArtefactsatHomeinthe21stCentury ............... 97
RichardHarper,AlexTaylorandMichealMolloy
7 InContext:Meaning,MaterialityandAgencyintheProcess
ofArchaeologicalRecording ............................... 121
ThomasYarrow
8 TheNeglectedNetworksofMaterialAgency:Artefacts,Pictures
andTexts.............................................. 139
CarlKnappett
9 SomeStimulatingSolutions................................ 157
AndrewCochrane
10 OnMediationandMaterialAgencyinthePeirceanSemeiotic ..... 187
ChristopherM.Watts
v
vi Contents
11 WhenANTmeetsSPIDER:Socialtheoryforarthropods......... 209
TimIngold
12 Agency,Networks,PastandFuture.......................... 217
SanderE.vanderLeeuw
Index..................................................... 249
Contributors
AndyClark
DepartmentofPhilosophy,EdinburghUniversity,Edinburgh,UK
PaulCloke
DepartmentofGeography,UniversityofExeter,Exeter,UK
AndrewCochrane
SchoolofHistoryandArchaeology,UniversityofCardiff,Cardiff,Wales,UK
RichardHarper
MicrosoftResearchCambridge,Cambridge,UK
TimIngold
DepartmentofAnthropology,SchoolofSocialScience,UniversityofAberdeen,
Aberdeen,UK
OwainJones
Countryside and Community Research Institute, Dunholme Villa, The Park,
Cheltenham,UK
CarlKnappett
DepartmentofArt,UniversityofToronto,Toronto,Ontario,Canada
JohnLaw
CentreforScienceStudiesandDepartmentofSociology,LancasterUniversity,
Lancaster,UK
LambrosMalafouris
McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, Cambridge University,
Cambridge,UK
AnnemarieMol
CentreforScienceStudiesandDepartmentofSociology,LancasterUniversity,
LancasterLA1,4YN,UK
vii
viii Contributors
MichealMolloy
MicrosoftResearchCambridge,Cambridge,UK
JohnSutton
MacquarieCentreforCognitiveScience,MacquarieUniversity,Sydney,NSW
2109,Australia
AlexTaylor
MicrosoftResearchCambridge,Cambridge,UK
SandervanderLeeuw
School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University,
Tempe,Arizona,US
ChristopherWatts
Department of Anthropology, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S
2S2,Canada
TomYarrow
Department of Social Anthropology, School of Social Sciences, University of
Manchester,Manchester,UK
Material and Nonhuman Agency: An Introduction
C.KnappettandL.Malafouris
Materialandnonhumanagency–surelythisisamistake?Isnotagencyasolely
humanproperty?Howthencanwedevoteawholevolumetoatopicwithsuch
obviouslyshakyfoundations?Certainly,theoddsseemtobestackedagainstus
whenwethinkofagencyasnotonlythecapacitytoact,butalsothecapacityto
reflectonthiscapacity.Asubjectmayfeelhisorherarmmovingandrecognise
‘ownership’ofthatmovement,butthisisnotnecessarilythesameasbeingable
toreflectivelyunderstandthatheorsheisthecauseor‘agent’ofthatmovement
(Gallagher 2007, p. 2). When agency is linked strictly to consciousness and
intentionality, we have very little scope for extending its reach beyond the
human.
Eventhosenonhumanentitiesthatseemtothreatenthisneatequationmost–
let us say software agents or robotic agent-artefacts – do not get close to
fulfilling these criteria of agency, even though they are closely modelled after
the human (Suchman 2007; Sørensen and Ziemke 2007). In this view, then,
‘material agency’ is a secondary property, a mirage even, with agency (as
consciousnessandintentionality)stillverymuchinhumanhands.Nonetheless,
thereissomesense,evenananxietyinfolkpsychology,thattheautonomyand
interactivityofsuchartefactsisasteptowardsagency.Butachievingagencyis
fromthisperspectiveaquestion,essentially,ofbecominghuman.
This human-centred view of agents and artefacts is not limited to those
artefacts we design to be like agents. It extends to a much wider and more
prosaic world of artefacts and matter, an environment of things that is con-
ceivedonourownterms,underourcontrolanddesignedtoserve.Wedonot
giveasecondthought,onthewhole,tochairs,mugs,steps,litterbins,wooden,
ceramic, concrete or plastic: these objects are overlooked because we engage
withthemhabituallyandhapticallyeveryday.Theywouldnotserveourends
verywell,ifwecouldnotoverlookthem.Designedtobesecondary,theyhaveto
besecondary,formingthebackdroptoourlives,ofwhichweareofcoursethe
stars,thedecision-makers,theagents.Itiscommonsensethatagencyshouldbe
conceivedanthropocentrically–howcanitbeotherwise?Wearecentre-stagein
ourlives,nottheseartefacts,howevermundane,orindeedintelligent.
Althoughhereglossedrathersimplistically,thisanthropocentricworldview
meansthatthematerialorenvironmentalcounterpointstohumanagencyhave
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x MaterialandNonhumanAgency:AnIntroduction
generallybeengivenshortshriftinscholarlydiscussion.Indeed,whileagencyis
amuch-debatedthemeacrossthesocialsciences,thetermsofthedebatehave
remainedrathernarrow,focussingoverwhelminglyontherelationshipbetween
agencyandstructure(EmirbayerandMische1998,pp.962–963).Argumentsgo
backandforthoverthedegreetowhichagents,whichmaybe,thoughcertainly
need not be, human individuals, are free to act in the world. This degree of
freedom is socio-culturally mediated (Ahern 2001, p. 109), and thus varies
considerablyindifferentsettingsandsocieties.Itisafundamentalquestionin
howsocietyisconstituted,fromthetop-downorthebottom-up:doespowerlie
withindividuals,orwithsocialinstitutions?Thisdebate,oftencastintermsof
structure vs. agency, has seen attempts to bridge the divide, in the form of
practice theory and structurationist ideas (Archer 1988;Bourdieu 1977, 1990;
Giddens 1984). Such ideas are now familiar territory not only across much
socialscience,butalsoinarchaeology,withtheworkofBourdieuandGiddens
frequently cited (Barrett 2001; Dornan 2002; Gardner 2004; Johnson 2000;
Smith 2001). Agency has become something of a buzzword in archaeological
theory(DobresandRobb2000,p.3),particularlyinpost-processualthinking,
whereitisabywordforindividualratherthansystemicpowerinthepast.1
Yet while the conceptofagency ismuch contested,it isdone so within the
theoretical margins of a narrow anthropocentric perspective. This anthropo-
centric view of agency is based upon a general agreement about a single
undisputable fact: that agency, in the real sense of the word, is a property of
thehumanindividual–‘‘theonlytrueagentsinhistoryarehumanindividuals’’
(GiddensandPierson1998,p.89).Whetherthisindividualisconceivedthrough
a Cartesian or an existential lens makes no important difference. What is
important is that when we speak about agents proper, we are referring to
human individuals, and preferably of the modern Western-type. In short,
agencyisanattributeofthehumansubstance.
However,anemergentsuspicionofthehumanisticdeterminationsofagency
canactuallybetracedquitefarback,tothelikesofMauss(1954)andHeidegger
(1977). Mauss’s seminal study, The Gift, illustrated the fluidity of the bound-
ariesbetweenpersonsandthingsandthecapacityofthelattertoembodyand
objectify,aswellasproduce,socialconsequences.Thisisapointalsoreflected
in Munn’s observations on the Kula exchange system: ‘‘Men appear as the
agentsdefiningshellvalue,butwithoutshellsmencannotdefinetheirvalue.In
thisrespect,shellsandmenarereciprocallyagentsofeachother’svaluedefini-
tion’’, (Munn 1983, p. 284). Indeed, as modern anthropology has plainly illu-
strated ‘‘commodities, like persons, have social lives’’ (Appadurai 1986, p. 3).
The enframing that, according to Heidegger, characterises the attitude of the
1‘‘[A]gency has become the buzzword of contemporary archaeological theory ... a lingua
franca–anambiguousplatitudemeaningeverythingandnothing...thereislittleconsensus
aboutwhat‘‘agency’’actuallymeans...norhastherebeensustainedconsiderationofbasic
methodologicalandepistemologicalissuesastomakeitapplicableandappropriatetothe
premodernpast’’(DobresandRobb2000,p.3).