Table Of ContentManipulative Fallacies
in Early America
Studies on Selected
Congressional Debates
1789 to 1799
Juhani Rudanko
Paul Rickman
Manipulative Fallacies in Early America
Juhani Rudanko • Paul Rickman
Manipulative Fallacies
in Early America
Studies on Selected Congressional Debates
1789 to 1799
Juhani Rudanko Paul Rickman
English Department English Department
Tampere University Tampere University
Tampere, Finland Tampere, Finland
ISBN 978-3-030-99932-2 ISBN 978-3-030-99933-9 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99933-9
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A
cknowledgments
We take pleasure in thanking Palgrave Macmillan for including this vol-
ume in their Palgrave Pivot series. We are also grateful to the anonymous
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shortcomings that remain in the book.
v
c
ontents
1 Introduction 1
References 11
2 Opposition to Amending the Constitution in a
Congressional Debate in 1789 13
2.1 Introduction and Background 13
2.2 Opposition to Madison’s Motion on June 8, 1789 18
2.3 Comparing the Argumentation of Madison’s Opponents 41
2.4 Defining the Fallacy of ad socordiam 43
2.5 Concluding Observations 45
References 47
3 Edward Livingston’s Resolution for Negotiating with
France in July 1798 51
3.1 Background 51
3.2 Edward Livingston’s Resolution and Kittera’s Amendment 53
3.3 Concluding Observations 60
References 62
4 Arguing for the Sedition Act in the Debate of July 5, 1798 65
4.1 Background 65
4.2 The Debate of July 5, 1798: Allen and Harper on the
Offensive 68
vii
viii CoNTENTS
4.3 Conclusion 90
References 91
5 Debating the Expulsion of Matthew Lyon in February 1799 95
5.1 Introduction 95
5.2 The Debates of February 20 and February 22, 1799 to Expel
Matthew Lyon 98
5.3 Concluding Observations 111
References 113
6 Conclusion 115
References 123
Index 125
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
The present book has the general objective to contribute to the under-
standing of the language of politics and of the means—especially such
means as involve manipulation—that politicians use in their attempt to
prevail over their opponents in political debates and controversies. Four
concrete controversies are drawn on for data and they are all from the early
period of the American Republic, from the period from 1789 to 1799.
Achieving an understanding of manipulative tactics used by politicians
during this decade is valuable because the tactics in question shed light on
the nature and practice of political argumentation during a formative
period of American political culture. Further, it is reasonable to assume
that an understanding of manipulative tactics during a formative period of
American political culture can help us identify tactics of manipulation in
other periods of history.
From a more general perspective, the study of the language of politics
is important in those countries where the laws and accepted legal practices
make it possible for speakers to debate issues publicly and express dissent
from current orthodoxies without fear of criminal prosecution. It is also
important to study the language of politics in countries where dissenters
are threatened or suppressed with criminal prosecution.
In more specific terms, the present book investigates three debates in
the United States House of Representatives relating to freedom of speech,
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1
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J. Rudanko, P. Rickman, Manipulative Fallacies in Early America,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99933-9_1
2 J. RUDANKO AND P. RICKMAN
the first in 1789, the second in 1798, and the third in 1799. Sandwiched
between these three is a chapter relating to the foreign policy of the United
States in 1798. In each case the focus is on fallacious arguments. A falla-
cious argument, as the term is used here, is an argument involving an
informal fallacy. A textbook definition of an informal fallacy is given in (1).
(1) It is customary in the study of logic to reserve the term “fallacy”
for arguments that are psychologically persuasive but logically incor-
rect, that do as a matter of fact persuade but, given certain argu-
mentative standards, shouldn’t. We therefore define “fallacy” as a
type of argument that seems to be correct, but proves, on examina-
tion, not to be so. (Copi and Burgess-Jackson 1996: 97; origi-
nal emphasis)
In other words, the point of departure for the study of fallacies here is
a normative notion of the concept, explicit in the use of the modal shouldn’t
in the definition. The important question is then to inquire into the ways
in which a particular argument may fall short of a standard of adequacy. As
a preliminary step to answering the question from the perspective adopted
in this book, we begin by introducing some basic notions from Grice’s
(1975) framework of analysis. The first of these is Grice’s Cooperative
Principle, given in (2).
(2) Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the
talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice 1975: 45)
Grice then distinguishes several maxims and submaxims, the “following
of which will, in general, yield results in accordance with the Cooperative
Principle” (Grice 1975: 45). One of these maxims is Quantity, which has
two submaxims, given in (3).
(3) 1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is
required. (Grice 1975: 45)
1 INTRODUCTION 3
Another maxim is that of Quality, “Try to make your contribution one
that is true” (Grice 1975: 46), which has the two submaxims given
in (4a-b).
(4) a. Do not say what you believe to be false.
b .Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
(Grice 1975: 46)
Grice goes on to note that a speaker “may fail to fulfill a maxim in vari-
ous ways” (Grice 1975: 49). He or she may “flout a maxim,” that is, he
or she “may blatantly fail to fulfill it” (Grice 1975: 49). By this means, a
speaker may generate a conversational implicature. A conversational impli-
cature may also be generated by a speaker observing the Cooperative
Principle and the maxims, as in the well-known “out of petrol” example,
where the first speaker says “I am out of petrol”, and a hearer replies
“There is a garage round the corner,” implicating “that the garage is, or at
least may be open” and has, or may have, petrol to sell, among other
implicatures (Grice 1975: 51).
A further way in which a speaker may fail to fulfill a maxim is that the
speaker “may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim.” The speaker
will then “in some cases … be liable to mislead” (Grice 1975: 49). This
remark by Grice on how a speaker may mislead a hearer is highly pertinent
to the concern with fallacies involving deceptiveness in the case studies in
this book. Regarding deceptiveness, it has been pointed out that it needs
“only be viewed from the point of view of the intent to deceive” (Vincent
and Castelfranchi 1981: 750). That is, if a person makes a deceptive state-
ment, the statement is still deceptive even if the addressee does not believe
it and is not deceived (cf. Vincent and Castelfranchi 1981: 750).
To prepare the ground for the examination of the arguments to be
presented, it is also appropriate here to quote McCornack’s comment on
deceptive messages, developed as part of what has been called information
manipulation theory. The comment is given in (5).
(5) The production and presentation of messages that are deceptive
can be considered a phenomenon in which speakers exploit the
belief on the part of listeners that they (i.e., speakers) are adhering
to the principles governing conversational exchanges. Deceptive
messages are “deceptive” in that, while they constitute deviations
from the principles underlying conversational understanding, they
