MAILED FIST Developments in modern armour

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MAILED FIST
Developments in modern armour
edited by Jakkie Cilliers and Bill Sass
Monograph No 2
February 1996

Notes on the authors
List of abbreviations
Armour in the SANDF: a strategic and practical perspective
Maj-Gen W G Lombard
Latest international developments in armour
Christoper Foss
Armour and the attack helicopter in Africa
Maj-Gen W H Thackwray
The present and future of armour
Prof Richard M Ogorkiewicz
The Gulf War: British interpretations of the armoured lessons learnt
Maj-Gen Patrick Cordingley
Armour in the African environment
Maj-Gen J M Dippenaar
This publication is sponsored by the Hanns Seidel Foundation

NOTES ON AUTHORS
Maj-Gen W G Lombard is Chief of Army Staff Intelligence of the South African Army. He
previously commanded Northern Transvaal Command, Army Battle School and 81 Armoured
Brigade. He has held numerous staff and training posts, and also held numerous operational
posts during the former South West Africa/Namibia campaign.
Christopher F Foss wrote his first book Armoured Fighting Vehicles of the World in 1970,
and since then has written more than 30 books on armoured vehicles and artillery. He is
presently military editor of Jane's Defence Weekly, editor of Jane's Armour and Artillery, and
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is closely associated with all the other Jane's publications.
Maj-Gen W Thackwray advises the Chief of the South African Air Force on operational
requirements. He previously served as Chief of Air Staff Operations and Director of Operations
of the SAAF, and commanded its Western Air Command during the South West Africa
campaign. He has been closely involved in developing the Rooivalk attack helicopter.
Prof Richard Ogorkiewicz is an internationally recognised expert on the design and
development of armoured vehicles, and has advised the British Ministry of Defence and various
international companies on this subject. After lecturing at various universities and colleges on
vehicle engineering and design, he has since 1988 been a professor at the Royal Military
College of Science.
Maj-Gen P A J Cordingley, DSO, is General Officer Commanding 2nd Division/Eastern District
of the British Army. He commanded 7th Armoured Brigade (the Desert Rats) during the Gulf
War, and previously commanded his regiment, the 5th Royal Inniskilling Dragoon Guards. He
has held numerous training posts, including one at the Staff College Camberley.
Maj-Gen J M Dippenaar is Chief of Army Staff Personnel of the South African Army. He
previously commanded the Army Battle School, and the renowned 61 Mechanised Battle Group
during the South West Africa/Namibia campaign. He has also held numerous staff and training
posts, and has served as a military attaché.
Brig W P (Bill) Sass (ret) is the deputy director of the IDP.
Dr Jakkie Cilliers is the executive director of the IDP.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AFV Armoured fighting vehicle
AH Attack helicopter
APC Armoured personnel carrier
APFSDS Armour-piercing fin-stabilised discarding sabot
APFSD Armour-piercing fin-stabilised dart
AT Anti-tank
CAS Close air support
CATTB Component advanced technology test bed
CFE Conventional Forces in Europe
CVR Combat vehicle reconnaisance
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DEXA Defence Exhibition of South Africa
DSO Distinguished Service Order
ERA Explosive reactive armour
FIFV Future infantry fighting vehicle
FMC Ford Motor Corporation
FN Fabrique Nationale
GOCO Government-owned, contractor-operated
GPS Global Positioning System
IFV Infantry fighting vehicle
IVIS Inter-vehicular information system
LIO Low-intensity operation
MBT Main battle tanks
MK1 Mark 1
MRL Multiple rocket launcher
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBC Nuclear, bacteriological and chemical
R&D Research and development
RO Royal ordnance
RPG Rocket-propelled grenade
RSA Republic of South Africa
SAAF South African Air Force
SANDF South African National Defence Force
SWA South West Africa
TAMS Tank anti-missile system
TOGS Thermal observation gunsight
TTD Tank technology demonstrator
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US SLID United States small low-cost intercepting device
VERDI Vehicle electronics research defence initiative
ARMOUR IN THE SANDF: A STRATEGIC AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE
Maj-Gen W G Lombard, Chief of Army Staff Intelligence
INTRODUCTION
The notion of armour, as I believe in it, is encapsulated in the following statement which is often
quoted in armour magazines: "Armour is a concept it is not a tank or a specific weapons system
but rather a state of mind, an approach to combat that stresses firepower, mobility and shock
effect."
I believe one could also add `versatility' to this definition, even if this were to supplant the
traditional shock effect; our experience in deploying armoured cars has reinforced our belief in
their practicality and versatility.
I believe in Clausewitz's dictum that "war is the continuation of state policies by other means".
Among other things, this places the armed forces of a nation safely in the hands of the
politicians! If the political view or perception of the threat changes, so will the relative role and
stature of the military. The army is part and parcel of the military, and the armoured corps is part
of the army. We must be under no illusion that to be employed or not employed is above all else
a political decision and that the defence budget in a democracy in peacetime is nearly always
under pressure.
We now find ourselves in what is commonly described as a `post-Cold-War phase', and this
affects the RSA as well. For the first time this century there is a marked absence of `isms'
nobody will admit to imperialism, nazism and fascism, and communism is dead or dying. Talks
abound about the new world order "the world yells peace, but there is no peace"; the new world
order appears to be the new world disorder.
The `peace dividend', as it is called, translates into cuts in defence budgets on a worldwide
scale, all clad in new phrases such as `downsizing', `right-sizing' and `resizing'. Armament
production has been affected; development has been affected. If one reads overseas
magazines, one gains the impression that some armed forces are seeking new enemies or new
roles, or are at least taking a serious new look at their priorities.
The main shift in this post-Cold-War phase is away from the bipolar confrontation towards
operations called `peacekeeping', `wider peacekeeping' and `peace enforcing', to help keep the
lid on the new world disorder. Whatever it is called, it remains military intervention but this type
of intervention appears to be more acceptable at the international level.
THE SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
On a lower level, the RSA was also involved in the bipolar confrontation during our years of
deployment in Namibia/Angola. In Angola we viewed the Cubans as Soviet surrogates. The
USSR saw them as their allies, their brothers in the revolutionary struggle. Our perception was
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that we were resisting communist aggression; their perception was that we were supporting the
rebels and counter-revolutionaries. The bottom line was that we were drawn into the global
confrontation, but at the lower end of the scale. It was typical military intervention a limited war
with limited objectives but we had a fairly clear idea of what we wanted to achieve.
Our conflict in Namibia/Angola was a protracted one, a typical African bush war, interspersed
with more intense conventional battles. Flowing from our experiences, we adapted our
weaponry and weapon systems as best as we could. Because of our isolation and sanctions, we
had to develop our own armaments industry which had to cater for both protracted low-intensity
conflict and the higher-intensity mobile conventional operations. These experiences have
ingrained not only the belief in the value of certain weaponry, but also the belief in certain
doctrines. We still believe in:
the value of taking the offensive;
the value of carrying the battle over the `cutline' the border into enemy territory;
the value of mobile, balanced and hard-hitting battle groups and combat teams;
the need to maintain mobility over long distances; and
flexibility the same battle groups that carried out conventional attacks also went over into
`area operations' (counterterrorist/guerrilla patrolling and area sweeps).
We had to adopt a practical approach, and had to be flexible we could not be dogmatic. On the
other hand, we did realise the value of a high/low mix. As regards armour, wheels could do the
job in 90 percent of cases, but the real hard cases called for tanks. This was especially true
during the latter phases of operations Hooper, Modular and Packer (1988/9) in southern Angola.
1994 AND BEYOND
The year 1994 will be remembered not only for the advent of democracy; in the case of the SA
Army, it also meant the end of national service, the start of the integration process and our
return to the international arena, with all its ramifications and implications. We had to take a new
look at our strategy, and decided on a threat-independent approach. What came to the fore was
the concept of a `core force', a `war force' and an `affordable force'.
There is no conventional threat on the horizon, but we are a regional power and there are no
indications that we will step down from this position. The implication, from a military point of
view, is an increasing possibility of being drawn into military intervention operations, especially
in sub-Saharan Africa. On the other hand, the primary function of the army is still to defend the
RSA against foreign aggression to safeguard the borders against a military threat.
Peacekeeping operations are seen as part of the army's collateral value, a collateral capability it
must have to move towards. This will become a reality. The question is how this will affect the
army and the armoured corps.
Broadly speaking, it will require specialist and dedicated forces. These forces must be easily
transportable by air or sea, and once deployed they must be very mobile. Besides being
maintainable, they must have sufficient weapons and weaponry to make an impact, or to force a
local decision if necessary. Besides the command structure, this will require specialist advisers,
an engineering capability, and medical and other types of support, from the political to the
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practical one cannot see, from a South African perspective, the employment of heavy armour.
Operations in a Rwanda-type situation call not only for sufficient infantry and other specialists,
but also for deployable light armoured forces. A suitable armoured personnel carrier (APC) for
the infantry is important. Inter alia, one can expect that a force in this situation will have to deal
with:
a bad transport and road network;
a decaying infrastructure, or one that has virtually ceased to exist; and
guerrilla-type opposition, but one that is still able to sabotage what is left of the usable
military infrastructure, plant mines, lay ambushes and fire at you with anything from rifles to
RPGs, mortars, mobile rocket launchers and the odd lumbering T55. This can and
probably will take place while 80 percent of the peace force's attention is directed towards
humanitarian and political/diplomatic efforts.
A force thus employed must be a true rapid deployment force, a force in being especially the
initial contingents. I believe it must be designed and built around what can be airlifted in a C130
aircraft; if larger aircraft (non-SAAF) were made available, this would be no more than a bonus.
Equipment-wise, on the armour side it will be appropriate to take a new look at the Eland
especially the Springbok variation. These cars will be backed by Mamba-borne infantry, or will
back the Mamba-borne infantry. Additional firepower could be added to this force in the form of
portable anti-tank missiles, mortars or MRLs.
I would say the main indication now is in the direction of light deployable and maintainable
forces, including light deployable armour. I also believe it would be senseless, given our time
and financial restrictions, to develop vehicles right from the beginning. Use what is available
now, and develop (or adapt) from the existing baseline of vehicles. Although I stressed the
deployability and maintainability of forces employed in Africa, one cannot rule out further
reinforcement by heavier weaponry, should this become necessary. In the immediate region of
the RSA's borders this should not pose a problem one would simply move the Rooikats/Ratels
by road.
THE ARMY'S PRIMARY FUNCTION
International peacekeeping is not the SA Army's primary function even if this becomes a regular
and prominent pattern of operations in the future, the army's primary function will still be to
counter any landward threat against the RSA. The factors that were considered when the army
(and armour) was redesigned in the 1960s and 1970s still hold true.
These factors are, inter alia:
a large space-to-troop ratio;
the near-impossibility of holding fixed lines of defence;
the terrain, which is suitable for (mechanised) manoeuvre; and
the possibility of having to fight while outnumbered.
The answer to these constants was to invest in firepower and mobility, and I cannot see that
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these tenets will change in the foreseeable future. One can perhaps argue about being
strategically on the defensive, but being allowed tactically to go on the offensive if the threat
justifies it and the government allows it.
I believe this is still the best option, and that the means to carry it out will and must rest squarely
on the shoulders of the mobile formations. It was with these concepts in mind that the Rooikat
was designed and developed. If the constant factors stay the same, the need stays the same.
We will still need a vehicle that can deliver superior operational mobility for the manoeuvring
phase of the war (be it offensive or defensive), while at the same time providing adequate to
good tactical mobility and still carrying an adequate main weapon.
The Rooikat, with its 76mm gun, was never meant to be a tank destroyer its purpose is to exploit
the indirect approach, to use the open flank, to get to the rear areas and to use space to
manoeuvre effectively. Seeing that the topography of South and southern Africa is not going to
change, we will need the Rooikat type of armoured vehicle.
Mobile operations are not always a matter of quick and decisive operational and tactical
manoeuvring. On the future battlefield one will still find reinforced positions, covered by heavy
direct and indirect fires. These positions will call for a deliberate assault the traditional tank
attack, supported by mechanised infantry and concentrated artillery fire.
The capacity to attack reinforced positions or to stage a decisive destruction battle is necessary
if one believes in having a balanced army and, in the regional context, adding to the concept of
a credible deterrent. The tank is still needed; a proper main battle tank (MBT) that can do a
tank's job when the going gets tough.
Seeing that there is no immediate threat on the horizon, one could argue that perhaps more
effort should be directed towards the tank technology demonstrator (TTD) either to develop it
further (even into another concept), or to go into limited production with the present concept so
that troop trials can be carried out.
If this option is accepted, it will imply that the Olifant Mk1a will form the mainstay of the tank
fleet until the decision is taken to start producing the new-generation tank. To me it is not a
question of Rooikat versus tank rather, it is the question of the right mix. There is a need for
both.
It is beyond the scope of this presentation to delve deeply into aspects such as local production
and research and development. A local industry gives the RSA the capacity, when needed, not
only to supply but to upgrade, modify and maintain. It provides the capacity to stay in tune with
the rest of the world. Despite the cutbacks we are still, and must remain, active in research and
development.
The Deputy Minister of Defence stated a short while ago that we must never allow a post-World-
War-1 and a pre- and post-World-War-2 situation to develop again we must maintain a credible
force. And local industry as well as R&D are part and parcel of that.

LATEST INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMOUR
Christoper Foss, Military editor, Jane's Defence Weekly
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INTRODUCTION
Most armed forces around the world, except those in the Middle East and in some countries in
the Far East, are going through a period of very painful adjustment owing to changes in the
world situation. For more than 45 years NATO trained to fight the numerically stronger Warsaw
Pact. The latter has now ceased to exist; there are no longer any Russian troops in any of the
satellite countries, and Russia is beset by numerous internal problems. For many countries
there is now no clearly perceived threat to help justify the large defence expenditures of the
past; for this reason, some western countries are now emphasising `out of area' operations for
their armed forces, with the thrust on lighter forces that can be quickly transported by tactical
aircraft to where they are required.
The end of the Cold War has not only impacted dramatically on the actual armed forces
themselves, but also on the large industrial base that supported them. In the past many western
defence equipment manufacturers, especially those in the US, were used to very high
production runs on a multi-year basis. For example, the former FMC Corporation's Ground
Systems Division produced 600 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) a year, while General
Dynamics Land Systems Division manufactured almost 800 M1 series main battle tanks (MBTs)
a year. For the US manufacturers, those days are over for the time being, and may well be gone
forever.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE US DEFENCE INDUSTRY
In the US a restructuring of the whole defence industry has been under way for several years,
with some companies pulling out of the defence business altogether and others merging in
order to survive.
In January 1994 the FMC Corporation and the Harsco Corporation (which owns BMY Combat
Systems) announced that they had completed plans, first announced in December 1992, to
combine FMC's Defence Systems Group and BMY's Combat Systems Division. This new
partnership began on 1 January 1994; FMC holds 60 percent of the joint venture and Harsco 40
percent, with the former acting as manager.
General Dynamics has already sold its Fort Worth company, which makes the F16, to
Lockheed, but still retains its Land Systems Division, which makes the M1A2 Abrams MBT for
export only.
At the lighter end of the market, Cadillac Gage Textron has moved its combat vehicle production
operations from Coco, Florida, and integrated them with its marine division in New Orleans to
form Textron Marine & Land Systems.
DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE
In Europe, the rush to merge key land systems manufacturers has still to start in earnest,
although there have been moves in some countries, especially France and the UK. Giat
Industries of France has taken over a number of companies, including FN and PRB of Belgium
and Mecanique Creusot-Loire, Luchaire, Manurhin and Cime Bocuze of France, and is now the
largest land systems manufacturer in France. But Giat is still state-owned, which in the eyes of
some European defence equipment manufacturers does not make for real competition.
In the UK there are still five major land systems manufacturers, with little duplication of effort:
Vickers Defence Systems (MBTs), Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering Limited (artillery), Alvis
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Vehicles (light tracked and wheeled vehicles), GKN Defence (wheeled and tracked vehicles) and
Royal Ordnance (artillery and ammunition).
The Royal Ordnance Division of British Aerospace Defence Limited has also been in acquisition
mode and has purchased the British Manufacture and Research Company, Heckler & Koch of
Germany, and Muiden Chemie International of the Netherlands. Royal Ordnance was originally
owned by the British government, but was privatised some years ago and is now owned by
British Aerospace. Its sites have been rationalised; it is now much more competitive than
previously, and is well placed to compete in the international marketplace.
GKN Defence has acquired the small company of Glover Webb in southern England, which has
enabled it to offer a complete family of tracked and wheeled vehicles ranging from three to 30
tonnes. GKN Defence is well suited to larger production runs, while Glover Webb is more suited
to smaller production runs and customised vehicles.
While the rationalisation of the western defence industries is set to continue, for the customer it
can lead to less competition and therefore to higher prices, especially in the area of ammunition.
For example, in the US there are just two manufacturers of 120mm tank ammunition for
M1A1/M1A2 MBTs: Alliant Techsystems, and Olin. In the UK, there were two suppliers of 30mm
ammunition: the British Manufacture and Research Company, and Royal Ordnance; now there
is just one, Royal Ordnance. In most major industrialised countries there is insufficient volume to
keep two ammunition manufacturers in business.
While competition does drive prices down, the government must provide some financial
incentive to industry in order to keep the production base alive. In the US, for example, many of
the ammunition production facilities are Gocos (government-owned, contractor-operated), so
even if the contractors change the actual production facility remains in existence.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION AND BRAZIL
While the end of the Cold War has had a dramatic effect on western defence equipment
manufacturers, its impact on those in the East, especially the former Soviet Union, has been
catastrophic. Many facilities have either stopped working or are running at very low levels, and
in some cases production is for export only. Production of the T-80 and T-72 MBTs continues,
as does production of the BMP-3 infantry combat vehicle, which has been bought by Kuwait and
the United Arab Emirates.
Some of the Brazilian defence equipment manufacturers have also had a very hard time in
recent years, and one of the largest manufacturers of wheeled armoured vehicles in the world,
Engesa, has ceased to exist.
In the past, many manufacturers invested large amounts of their own capital in developing new
armour systems, primarily meant for export. These projects include the Engesa Osorio MBT, the
French Creusot Loire Mars 15 family of light tracked vehicles, the Royal Ordnance RO 2000
family, the Alvis Storm light tank, the Vickers Defence Systems Mk 7 MBT, and numerous
teaming arrangements with Norinco of China, all of which came to nothing. While exports can
and do make a major difference to many defence equipment manufacturers, a strong home
market is essential, as it builds a firm base for the future of the company.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
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Today, defence equipment manufacturers have to keep two key parts of their business alive:
first, research and development, and second, production capability; the two are intertwined and
cannot be separated. In some western countries, research and development is often carried out
by the government as well as defence equipment manufacturers. In the age of substantial
defence cutbacks, government and industry most co-operate far more closely on research and
development, so that scarce resources are not wasted.
A good example of co-operation between government-backed research and development
organisations and private industry is that in the UK in respect of the VERDI-2 (Vehicle
Electronics Research Defence Initiative-2) and the Advanced Composite Armoured Vehicle
Platform.
In the past, research and development in the west was driven by the perceived threat from the
east, and this has led to development programmed for new armours and larger-calibre guns for
example, the 140mm smooth-bore gun now under development by France, Germany, the UK
and the US.
Industrial teaming is becoming much more common. For example, Mowag of Switzerland has
teamed up with Giat Industries on the Mowag 10x10 armoured combat vehicle, while Giat
Industries has teamed up with Hagglunds Vehicles on the CV 90105 TML. Both these vehicles
feature the private venture Giat Industries 105 TML modular turret system, armed with a 105mm
rifled tank gun. In some respects European armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) manufacturers are
better placed than their US counterparts, as in some cases they have a broader product range
and are better suited to lower production runs. For the future, it is likely that there will be more
collaborative AFV programmes, although past experience in Europe has shown this to be full of
problems.
REARMING NATO
In NATO, downsizing has meant that some countries, for example Denmark, Greece, Portugal,
Spain and Turkey, have taken delivery of surplus modern AFVs at virtually no cost, as other
countries rationalise their forces, especially large numbers of M60A1/M60A3 MBTs from the US
and Leopard 1 MBTs from Germany and the Netherlands. While this free transfer of vehicles has
benefited the countries concerned, it hardly helps the manufacturers of complete new vehicles.
but it will mean much work for the subcontractors supplying new engines, transmissions, fire
control systems and, in some cases, armour systems.
In recent years the established western manufacturers have also had to contend with new
countries entering the international marketplace from a much lower cost base. The customer is
also becoming more demanding, and today the contractor must accept more responsibility.
Reliability is written into the contract which is often a fixed-price one and a complete package is
required that not only covers the vehicle but also spare parts and training. The contractor must
also be more flexible in providing what the customer wants.
CONCLUSION
In the future there are likely to be more upgrade programmes than new starts, and industry will
try to take over some of the functions often carried out by the armies themselves, such as base
overhauls. Above all, systems must become more reliable. Research and development, not only
of technical but also of operating aspects, must have real meaning. In the past, many countries
paid little attention to this.
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