Table Of ContentMade by the USA
Made by the USA
The International System
Alex Roberto Hybel
madebytheusa
©AlexRobertoHybel,2001
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Hybel,AlexRoberto.
MadebytheUSA:theinternationalsystem/byAlexRobertoHybel.
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ISBN978-1-349-38668-0
1.UnitedStates—Foreignrelations.2.UnitedStates—Foreigneconomic
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10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To
Susan Eckert Lynch
Contents
Preface ix
Introduction:
TheUnitedStatesandtheChanging 1
NatureoftheInternationalSystem
1. TheRiseofaNewInternationalGiant 7
2. TheNewGiant’sFirstMajorBlunder 45
3. TheHumblingofDemocracy 77
4. ANewKindofWar 109
5. ExuberanceHindered 155
6. AudaciousTitan 193
7. MadebytheU.S.A. 237
Appendix:
TheColdWarWasNota 279
MatterofCulpability
Notes 281
Bibliography 321
Index 333
Preface
T
he political analyst is part storyteller, part conjecturer. He or she
triestocaptureasliceofpoliticallifebyimposingonthestoryhis
or her own theoretical perspective. Since the United States’s con-
ceptionasastate,analystshavesoughttoexplainthedevelopmentofits
foreign policies by highlighting different “causes.” Some analysts have
identified its strategic and/or economic interests as the dominant causal
forces, others have focused on its predominant values, a third group has
underscored the political struggles between the domestic organizations
responsiblefordesigningforeignpolicies,andafourthgrouphasconcen-
trated on the psychological nature or the information-processing attrib-
utes of its leaders. Although my objectives in this book are similar to
those of my predecessors, the conceptual framework I designed does not
fitneatlyintoanyoftheirtheoreticalconstructs.
My argument is built on the premise that the global system is con-
stantly undergoing change, which is spawned by tensions generated by
contradictory forces originating from different international and domes-
ticsources.Despitethefactthateverystateintheglobalarenawouldpre-
fertocreateaninternationalsystemthatcaterstoitsowninterests,only
ahandfulcanpartiallyfulfillthisgoal.Successinthiskindofendeavoris
dictatedbytheextenttowhichanentity’spoweranddomesticstructure
makeitpossibleforitsleadersbothtounderstandthenatureofthecon-
tradictory forces that dominate the international system and its own
domesticenvironmentatdifferenttimes,andtodealeffectivelywiththe
tensions these forces induce. Based on this theoretical device, I delineate
thestepstakenbytheUnitedStatesduringthenineteenthandtwentieth
centuriesto,first,becomeaworldpowerand,subsequently,forgethetype
ofinternationalsystemthatwouldhelpaddressitsneedsandinterests.I
use the same conceptual framework to posit a series of predictions about
x • Preface
the foreign policies the United States is likely to pursue during the first
25 years of the new millennium, the tensions that are likely to erupt in
the global system, the effects the tensions are likely to have on the sta-
bility of the international system and the interests of the United States,
and the likelihood that the United States will retain its standing as the
internationalsystem’schiefentity.
Inlightoftheaboveremarks,thereadermightbeinclinedtoassume
thatIwrotethisbookwithaverysmallaudienceinmind.Suchwasnot
myhope.Asonewhohasspentmuchofhisprofessionallifeintheacad-
emic world, I have always placed equal value on my roles as scholar and
professor.Likewise,Ihavealwaystriedtouseoneroletocomplementthe
other. I wrote this book hoping to stimulate interest among both inter-
national politics/foreign policy theorists and practitioners, and under-
graduateandgraduatestudents.Amongthosewhoarewellversedinthe
foreignpoliciesoftheUnitedStates,therewillbesomewhowillcontend
thatIcouldhaveusedlessinformationtobackmytheoreticalarguments.
Inasense,theyareright.MostoftheinformationIpresentinthisbook
was derived from a wide range of published sources and is common
knowledge among U.S. foreign policy analysts. From them, I ask their
indulgence, and their concentration on the nature and content of my
arguments. I hope that those with inquisitive minds, but who are rela-
tively new to the field of study, will use this book to acquire a better
understanding of an important aspect of U.S. history, and to learn about
anewtheoreticalperspective.
Mylastcontentioncallsforaminorproviso.Ididnotwritethisbook
with the intent of covering the entire spectrum of the United States’s
international activities during the past two centuries. For instance, the
reader will notice that I discuss the foreign policies of the United States
towardEuropeinmuchgreaterdetailthanthosetowardAfricaandLatin
America. By placing different emphases on different regions, I do not
mean to suggest that some areas are more important than others. My
decisiontodiscusscertainregionsatgreatlengthandtocoverothersspo-
radicallywasdictatedbytheintensityofthetensionsthatemanatedfrom
them. In the future, some of the areas I touched upon only briefly could
become the primary instigators of severe international tensions; in that
case, analysts would be forced to gauge their effect on the international
systemandtodepictthewayitsmostpowerfulentitiesattempttodefuse
them.
The idea for the book was born in 1994. In that year, and in 1995, I
helped direct two conferences at Connecticut College. The conferences
were designed to identify and evaluate the various effects, both positive
andnegative,thattheglobalizationofthemarketeconomyhadgenerated
sincetheend ofthe ColdWar. Iamgratefultomanyoftheconferences’
participants, especially William Smith, Richard Falk, Mwesiga Baregu,
Preface • xi
Claire Gaudiani, Marion Doro, Maria Cruz-Saco, Julie Fischer, Mary
McGinn, James K. Onoh, Julia Kushigian, Ann Elizabeth Harrison,
AnthoniaC.Kalu,NirvanaA.E.Khadr,StevenLamy,HernanMartinez,
AzimA.Nanji,andFrancisFoxPiven,fortheirinsightfulcontributions.
The conferences could have not been held without the generous support
from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Andrew W. Mellon
Foundation, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. I received additional
financialsupport,intheformoftravelgrants,fromConnecticutCollege’s
R.F.JohnsonFunds.
I am indebted to John Odell, Sidney Drell, Robert Peurifoy, William
Rose,DavidPatton,RonaldSteel,andtheanonymousreviewers,fortheir
constructivecritiquesofthemanuscript.Manyofmyformerstudentsalso
playedimportantroles.AlexanderThompson,whoservedasmyresearch
assistant before leaving for his graduate education at the University of
Chicago, contributed extensively to the writing of chapter 7. Hagen
Maroney,likewise,helpedmedevelopabetterunderstandingofthenew
economic and financial challenges faced by Latin American states. In
addition,Iamthankfultothestudentsinmyinternationalrelationsthe-
oriesandforeignpolicyseminarsfortheirwillingnesstoreadincomplete
versionsofthemanuscriptandforprovidinghelpfulcomments.Asinthe
past,BarbaraPeurifoy,mymother-in-law,helpedmeeditthemanuscript.
Iwouldhaveneverbeenabletocompletethisworkwithouttheunwa-
veringloveandsupportfrommywifeJan,andourtwodaughtersSabrina
andGabriela.AsIsatinfrontofmycomputereverymorningfornearly
two years, always wondering whether I would have a productive day, I
knew that ten hours later I would be returning to an environment filled
withjoyandlaughter.Thisknowledgemademyworkastonishinglyeasy.
IextendmyfinalexpressionofgratitudetoSusanEckertLynch.Susan
has been a major constructive force at Connecticut College for many
years. As an alum and a member of the Board of Trustees, she played a
leadingroleduringConnecticutCollege’slastfund-raisingcampaign.She
helped set the tone by creating the endowed chair that I now hold. Her
function, however, has transcended that of an important trustee and
financial contributor. Her warmth, friendship, and commitment to my
academicdevelopmenthasmademeappreciatethevalueofbeingassoci-
atedwithasmall,reputable,liberalartsinstitution.Idedicatethisbook
toher.
AlexRobertoHybel
Stonington,Connecticut
INTRODUCTION
The United States and the Changing
Nature of the International System
TheIntellectualChallenge
Theendofaneraisordinarilysupervenedbyuncertainty.AstheUnited
StatesandtheSovietUnionclosedthedoorsontheColdWarinthelate
1980s, some U.S. foreign policy analysts claimed that American hege-
monywasathingofthepast.Harddataseemedtobacktheirdeclaration.
By the end of the Reagan administration, the United States’s gross
national debt had jumped from $995 billion to $2.9 trillion, and its
annual deficit stood at $152 billion. Conditions did not improve during
the next three years. Under George Bush’s leadership, the United States
economy endured a recession, and by 1992 the federal government’s
cumulativedebthadsurpassed$4trillionandtheannualdeficithadrisen
to$290billion.1Basedonanalysesofthepotentialcapabilitiesofentities
suchasChina,Japan,theEuropeanUnion,Russia,India,andIndonesia,
some observers also predicted that by the year 2020 the structure of the
international system would be multipolar and that the rivalry between
thedominantpowerswouldinduceinstability.2
By the start of the second half of the 1990s, a new group of experts
wonderedwhethersomeofthedoubtsvoicedearlieraboutthefateofthe
United States might have been premature. The United States still pos-
sessed the most powerful and most advanced military in the world, and
its economy had again become the envy of its most ardent international
competitors.Andyet,ittookonlytwonewinternationalcrisesinthelate
1990s, one financial and the other military, to once more persuade some
criticsthattheUnitedStateswasdestinedtoloseitseconomicandstrate-
gicdominance,andthattheinternationaleconomicandsecuritysystems
were about to undergo radical transformations. Not surprisingly, by the
end of the first half of 1999, as the economies of many Asian countries
