Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz

223 Pages·2011·1.67 MB·English

by  Justin E.H. Smith

Machines of Nature and Corporeal Substances
in Leibniz
The New Synthese Historical Library
TextsandStudiesintheHistoryofPhilosophy
VOLUME67
ManagingEditor:
SIMOKNUUTTILA,UniversityofHelsinki
AssociateEditors:
DANIELELLIOTGARBER,PrincetonUniversity
RICHARDSORABJI,UniversityofLondon
EditorialConsultants:
JANA.AERTSEN,Thomas-Institut,UniversitätzuKöln
ROGERARIEW,UniversityofSouthFlorida
E.JENNIFERASHWORTH,UniversityofWaterloo
MICHAELAYERS,WadhamCollege,Oxford
GAILFINE,CornellUniversity
R.J.HANKINSON,UniversityofTexas
JAAKKOHINTIKKA,BostonUniversity
PAULHOFFMAN,UniversityofCalifornia,Riverside
DAVIDKONSTAN,BrownUniversity
RICHARDH.KRAUT,NorthwesternUniversity,Evanston
ALAINDELIBERA,UniversitédeGenève
JOHNE.MURDOCH,HarvardUniversity
DAVIDFATENORTON,McGillUniversity
LUCAOBERTELLO,UniversitàdegliStudidigenova
ELEONORESTUMP,St.LouisUniversity
ALLENWOOD,StanfordUniversity
Forothertitlespublishedinthisseries,goto
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Justin E.H. Smith Ohad Nachtomy
Editors
Machines of Nature
and Corporeal Substances
in Leibniz
123
Editors
Prof.JustinE.H.Smith Dr.OhadNachtomy
ConcordiaUniversity Bar-IlanUniversity
DepartmentofPhilosophy RamatGan
2100Mackay,PR204 Israel
deMaissoneuveBlvd.1455 [email protected]
MontrealQCH3G1M8 and
Canada
FordhamUniversity
[email protected]
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USA
ISBN978-94-007-0040-6 e-ISBN978-94-007-0041-3
DOI10.1007/978-94-007-0041-3
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Foreword
Afewyearsago,ayoungercolleaguereportedtomethathehadsubmittedanarticle
onLeibnizandthelifesciencestoarespectedjournalinthehistoryofphilosophy.It
wasrejected.Theexplanationgivenwasthatsinceatroot,Leibnizrecognizesonly
monads and their perceptions and appetitions, Leibniz could not have been gen-
uinelyinterestedinanythinglikebiology.Studiesliketheonesinthisvolumeshould
causeustoreevaluatesuchapriorijudgmentsaboutthehistoryofphilosophy.
Our understanding of Leibniz’s thought has come a long way in the last few
years. The prodigious work of the editors of the Akademie edition have made
available hundreds of new texts, in addition to making available better and more
reliable editions of older texts. There is still a great deal to be done before we
have a complete edition of Leibniz’s papers, but even so, it is safe to say that the
scholar working today has a variety of texts that no contemporary of Leibniz’s
had access toand thatwereunavailable toalmosteveryone interestedinLeibniz’s
thoughtthroughouttheeighteenth,nineteenth,andmostofthetwentiethcenturies.
Furthermore,recentscholarshavecometoappreciatemoreandmoretheintercon-
nections between the history of philosophy and the history of science. Standard
figuresfromthehistoryofphilosophysuchasLeibnizwereasmuchinvolvedinthe
scientific life of their age as they were in the philosophical. Indeed, for Leibniz
and his contemporaries, there was no real boundary between the two. To focus
exclusively on Leibniz’s philosophical writings, understood in the way in which
our contemporaries in departments of philosophy understand that term is to have
onlyaverypartialanddistortedpictureofhisthought.
Muchoftheworkthathasbeendoneinthehistoryofphilosophyinrelationto
the history of science has concentrated on philosophical conceptions of the physi-
cal world, and the ways in which natural philosophy is linked with questions and
doctrines that later thinkers would recognize as philosophical. But recent schol-
ars have moved into an interesting new domain, that of life. The scholars who
have contributed essays to this volume are very much a part of that new trend.1
The aspect of Leibniz’s thought that they focus on concerns living things and
1SomeexcellentexamplesofthisnewapproachcanbefoundinDuchesneau(1998)andtheessays
collectedinSmith(2006).
v
vi Foreword
Leibniz’srelationtothesciencethatwouldcometobecalledbiologyinlateryears.
Traditional approaches to Leibniz’s thought have hidden the extent to which life
and living things are central to Leibniz’s thought. Monads are certainly impor-
tant to understanding Leibniz’s view of the world, at least in his later years. But
ifyoufocusontheidealisticmetaphysicssuggestedbyanarrowreadingofcertain
later texts, such as the Monadology, then you miss a great deal of Leibniz’s rich
viewofthephysicalworld,aviewteamingwithlife,soul,andanimatedcorporeal
substances.
ToappreciateLeibniz’sviews,though,wemustunderstandtheirhistoricalcon-
text.Theyare,inaway,extensionsofviewsfoundearlierintheseventeenthcentury,
mostprominentlyinDescartesandHobbes,whileatthesametimetheyconstitute
aprofoundcritiqueofthosesameviews.
Descartes and Hobbes were certainly not the first to think of living things as
complexbodieswhosebehaviorcanbeexplainedentirelyintermsofthesize,shape
andmotionoftheirmaterialparts;viewslikethosecan,inonewayoranother,be
tracedbacktotheancientEpicureansandStoics,ifnotfartherstill.Norwerethey
theonlyonesamongtheircontemporariestodoso.Butintheseventeenthcentury,
itwasDescartesandHobbes,perhaps,whogavethesedoctrinestheirmoststriking
andinfluentialarticulation.
Descartes’Traitédel’hommewasprobablywrittensometimebetween1630and
1633, when he withdrew it and the companion Traité de lumière from publication
uponhearingofthecondemnationofGalileo.Butitwasn’tpublisheduntil1662in
Latin translation, and 1664 in the original French. The book begins, apparently in
mediasres:
Thesemenwillbecomposed,asweare,ofasoulandabody.FirstImustdescribethebody
onitsown;thenthesoul,againonitsown;andfinallyImustshowhowthesetwonatures
wouldhavetobejoinedandunitedinordertoconstitutemenwhoresembleus.(CSMI.99,
ATXI.119–120)
Butinthetextasithascomedowntous,Descartesisconcernedexclusivelywith
thebodyof“thesemen”whomheposits:
Isupposethebodytobenothingbutastatueormachinemadeofearth,whichGodforms
withtheexplicitintentionofmakingitasmuchaspossiblelikeus.ThusGodnotonlygives
it externally the colours and shapes of all the parts of our bodies, but also places inside
it all the parts required to make it walk, eat, breathe, and indeed to imitate all those of
ourfunctionswhichcanbeimaginedtoproceedfrommatterandtodependsolelyonthe
dispositionofourorgans.Weseeclocks,artificialfountains,mills,andothersuchmachines
which, although only man-made, have the power to move of their own accord in many
differentways.ButIamsupposingthismachinetobemadebythehandsofGod,andso
IthinkyoumayreasonablythinkitcapableofagreatervarietyofmovementsthanIcould
possiblyimagineinit,andofexhibitingmoreartistrythanIcouldpossiblyascribetoit.
(CSMI99,ATXI120)
AndsoDescartesproceedstosetout,insomedetail,thewheelsandspringsthat
canaccountforthebehaviorofthismaninentirelymechanicalterms,asifthebody
Foreword vii
were one of those clocks, fountains, or mills which can do apparently remarkable
thingsallontheirown,buttowhichnoonewouldthinktoattributeasoul.
WhatDescartesisopposinghereisthestandardviewoflife,humanlifeinpar-
ticular,thatwastaughttoeveryschoolboy.BasictoAristoteliannaturalphilosophy
wastheexplanationofthecharacteristicbehaviorofbodiesintermsofsubstantial
forms.Becauseoftheformfirehas,ittendstobehotandrise;becauseoftheform
thatearthhas,ittendstobecoldandtofall.Inlivingthings,formsarecalledsouls,
andthesesoulsaretheprinciplesoflife.Now,thesesoulswereofthreesorts:vege-
tative,sensitive,andrational.Thevegetativesoulexplainedsuchthingsasnutrition,
growth, and reproduction, the sensitive soul such things as sensation and locomo-
tion,andthe rationalsoul,reason.Descartes,of course,recognized arationalsoul
inhumans,theprincipleofthought.Butthatwastheonlyfunctionthatheattributed
tothesoul.ThemanoftheTraitédel’hommewasjusta“statueormachinemadeof
earth,” a material thing whose physical organization explains all of the vital func-
tions that had previously been explained in terms of the vegetative and sensitive
souls.2
ThereisanevenmoreradicalstoryinHobbes.BeginningwiththeElementsof
Law in 1640 (first published in 1650), but continuing in the De cive (1642), the
Leviathan(1651),theDecorpore(1655)andtheDehomine(1658),Hobbesdevel-
opedaconceptionoftheworldwhichexcludedformandsoulaltogether,evenfor
thought. In particular, all living things, including humans, were explained entirely
intermsoftheirmaterialcomposition,thecomplexityoftheirpartsandtheirrela-
tions to one another. And this applies to thought and volition as well. At the root
of Hobbes’ political theory is a view of thought, grounded in motion, transmitted
tothebrainbythesensoryorgans,andtransmittedfromthebraintotheheart,and
from the heart to the muscles either to seek what gives us pleasure or to flee what
givesuspain.3
TherearemanyfeaturesofbothDescartes’andHobbes’viewthattroubledcon-
temporaries.ForHobbes,therewastheproblemoftheimmortalityofthesoul:ifthe
mindisjustmatterorganizedinaparticularway,thenthereisnothingthatsurvives
thedeathofthebody.AsHobbeswascertainlyaware,thisviewwasnotnecessarily
inconsistentwithrevealedreligion;onecould,andsomedidholdthatallChristian
orthodoxyrequiresistheultimateresurrectionofthebody,thoughotherswerenot
convinced. But there is another disturbing feature of these views. For Descartes
thereisaclearboundarybetweenhumansandtheanimalworld:eventhoughani-
malbodiesandhumanbodiesmaysharetheirmechanicalstructures,humanshave
souls that animal bodies don’t have. For Hobbes, though, the difference between
animalbodies andhumans can onlybeamatter ofcomplexity: wearemorecom-
plicatedthananimalbodies,andforthatreason,ourbodiesarecapableofvarious
2ForsomerecentstudiesofDescartes’biologyandmedicine,seeDesChene(2001)andAucante
(2006).
3AlthoughmanycommentatorsnoteaspectsofHobbes’materialisticviewsonlifeinpassingon
theirwaytohispoliticalphilosophy,itisstrangethatthereisnoextendedandsystematicdiscussion
ofhisthoughtonlife,sofarasIknow.
viii Foreword
tricks (reason, for example) that (most) other animal bodies aren’t. But for both
Descartes and Hobbes, outside of complexity there seems to be no real boundary
betweenthelivingandthenon-living.Livingbodiesarecertainlycapableofmuch
morethanthemachinesthatwebuildcando.Buttheyareverymuchthesamekinds
ofthings.ThenewviewoflifethatthinkerslikeDescartesandHobbesintroduced
wouldseemtounderminetheverycategoryoflifeitself.
AnditisinthiscontextthatwecanappreciateLeibniz’sview.AswithDescartes
andHobbes,Leibnizbelievesthateverythinginthematerialworldisexplicablein
termsofsize,shapeandmotion,includinglife.Inthisway,livingthingsarenatural
machines,machinesdelanature.Butevenso,theyarenotlikeartificialmachines,
the kinds of machines that we can build. Artificial machines are made up of finite
components,andareoffinitecomplexity,astheywouldhavetobeiftheyaresuch
thatwecouldbuildthem.Butnaturalmachinesarenot:theyareinfinitelycomplex,
individuals nested in other individuals. All of these individuals which compose a
livingthingarethemselveslivingthings,whichare,inturn,composedofaninfin-
ity of other living things, bugs in bugs to infinity. In this way, Leibniz is able to
preservetheideathateverythingismechanical,includinglife,butthatlivingthings
are fundamentally different from non-living machines. There is another difference
between the living and the non-living for Leibniz. An important part of Leibniz’s
idiosyncratic version of the mechanical world view was the reintroduction of sub-
stantial forms into physics. For a variety of reasons, Leibniz believed that forms
wereneeded:formsweretobethegroundofactiveforce,andthatwhichmakesan
individualsubstanceagenuineindividual.Furthermore,Leibnizconceivedofthese
forms as souls, the souls of corporeal substances that are the ultimate constituents
ofbodiesintheworld.Thesesoulsaren’tjoinedtojustanybodies,though,butonly
to the organized bodies that constitute natural machines. And together with them,
theyconstitutelivingthings.Inthisway,forLeibniz,biologycanbesaidtoground
thephysicalworld.LeibnizagreeswithDescartesandHobbesthateverythinginthe
world,includinglivingthings,canbeexplainedintermsofsize,shape,andmotion:
butlifeintheformoftheseensoulednaturalmachinesisattherootofeverything.
At some stage in Leibniz’s philosophical development, monads come to underlie
the whole structure in some way. But, it seems, this view of life and its centrality
issomethingthatrunsthroughmuchofLeibniz’sviewofthephysicalworld.4 The
livingthingisnotjustintheworld,butinabasicway,constitutiveoftheworld:itis
themetaphysicalgroundoftheworld.ForLeibniz,thelivingbodygoesfrombeing
theoutlier,theexceptiontobeexplained,tobeingatthecenterofhisconception.
Butthedevilisinthedetails.Thisfascinatingcollectionofessaysisconcerned
withunderstandingtheinfinitedepthofLeibniz’sconception.
PrincetonUniversity DanielGarber
4TheviewofLeibnizIassumehereis,admittedly,somewhatcontroversial,particularlyinregard
totheplaceofthemonadologicalmetaphysicsinhisthought.Forafullerdevelopmentanddefense,
seeGarber(2009).
Foreword ix
References
Aucante,V.2006.LaphilosophiemédicaledeDescartes.Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance.
DesChene,D.2001.SpiritsandClocks:MachineandOrganisminDescartes.Ithaca,NY:Cornell
UniversityPress.
Duchesneau,F.1998.ModèlesduvivantdeDescartesàLeibniz.Paris:J.Vrin.
Garber,D.2009.Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Smith, J. E. H. (ed.). 2006. The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy.
Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.