Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: An Attempt at a Critical Rationalist Appraisal

307 Pages·2018·3.76 MB·English

by  Joseph Agassi

Synthese Library 401
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,
and Philosophy of Science
Joseph Agassi
Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical
Investigations
An Attempt at a Critical Rationalist
Appraisal
Synthese Library
Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology,
and Philosophy of Science
Volume 401
Editor-in-Chief
OtávioBueno,UniversityofMiami,DepartmentofPhilosophy,USA
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BeritBrogaard,UniversityofMiami,USA
AnjanChakravartty,UniversityofNotreDame,USA
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Joseph Agassi
’
Ludwig Wittgenstein s
Philosophical Investigations
An Attempt at a Critical Rationalist Appraisal
JosephAgassi
DepartmentofPhilosophy
TelAvivUniversity
TelAviv,Israel
SyntheseLibrary
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As for modern methods of philosophizing
... Substantial forms, Occult Qualities, are
exploded; ... they are only empty sounds.
William Wotton, Reflections upon Ancients
and Moderns, 1694, Ch. 27
The questions that we forbid you to
investigate ... are not only insoluble; they
are illusory and devoid of meaning.
Henri Poincaré, Science and Hypothesis,
Ch. X
And everything descriptive of a language-
game is part of logic.
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, §56
GettingtoknowWittgensteinwasoneofthe
most exciting intellectual adventures in
my life.
Russell, obituary for Wittgenstein, Mind,
1951
I regarded him from the start as a mystic
andmetaphysicianoftherefinedtype,asan
antiscientific person through and through
and I dared to say so as the admiration of
Wittgenstein was the fashion... Schlick
enjoyed ... attacks on ... my violent
remarks on this fellow Wittgenstein.
Neurath to Carnap, June 16, 1945
I have not found in Wittgenstein’s
Philosophical Investigations anything that
seemed to me interesting and I do not
understand why a whole school finds
important wisdom in its pages.
Russell, My Philosophical Development,
230
“To say that metaphysics is nonsense is
nonsense.”
Friedrich Waismann, “How I see
Philosophy”
“the cult of the piecemeal approach”
Ernest Gellner, Words and Things, Ch. 16
Whatistheuseofstudyingphilosophy...if
it does not improve your thinking of
everyday life, if it does not make you ...
more conscientious ... in the use of ...
dangerous phrases...?
Wittgenstein to Malcolm, 16 Nov. 1944
Bach wrote on the title page of his
Orgelbüchlein, “To the glory of the most
high God, and that my neighbor may be
benefited thereby”. That is what I would
have liked to say about my work.
RushRhees,LudwigWittgenstein,Personal
Recollections, 181
I have carefully endeavored not to deride,
or deplore, or detest but to understand.
Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, 1 §4
}
Preface
Thisbookisarewrite(plusannotations)ofthelecturenotesofacoursedeliveredin
1992 at the Department of Philosophy of York University, Toronto, on
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Of these 13 lectures, 7 are on the
background tothephilosophy ofWittgenstein and5areonit: 1onthe philosophy
ofyoungWittgenstein,1onhistransitionalperiod,andthefinal3onthephilosophy
of mature Wittgenstein, chiefly on his Philosophical Investigations. The last and
concluding lecture concerns the analytical school of philosophy that grew chiefly
underitsinfluence.
IfirstheardofWittgensteinin1953,whenIwasagraduatestudentattheLondon
SchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience.Thephilosophicalliteraturethenhardly
mentioned Wittgenstein.1 Iwas then ignorantof him, aswell as ofKarlPopper. A
paper of his (Popper 1952) on the value of metaphysics for science caught my
attention,andIbecamehisstudent(Agassi2008,72).HearingPopperonWittgen-
stein made me read his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP). Trained as a phys-
icist,Imisread2it,viewingitaspositivistoldstyle.AsitreferredtoNewtonandnot
1The case of Carnap is typical. As his views diverged from those of Wittgenstein, he found it
increasinglydifficulttoexpresshisdebttohim(Schilpp1963,25);Wittgensteinconsideredhima
plagiarist(Hintikka1991).Carnap(1937)tacitlyendorsesRussell’sdeadlycritiqueofWittgenstein,
withnomentionofit,muchlessasdeadly.HefinallydeemedWittgensteinanirrationalist(Schilpp
1963,26;Witherspoon2000).
2ThesubtitleofCook’s2005bookisTheTwentiethCentury’sMostMisunderstoodPhilosopher.
Black 1971, 1 says, “No philosophical classic is harder to master. According to Wittgenstein
himself, it was misunderstood by Russell, Moore and Frege; and even Ramsey...”; see also
Engelmann1967,94;Cavell,1976,151;SlugaandStern1996,Preface;Biletzki2003,Introduc-
tion: “Rarely has a philosopher been so widely interpreted”; “a deluge”; a “massive corpus of
interpretations.”Landini2007,1–2:“wefinddiametricoppositionamongeventhemostprominent
philosophical interpretations”; “It is difficult to avoid the pessimistic ... conclusion that no
satisfactoryaccount...willbefound.”Hintikka(2006,43)goesfurthest:“nobodyIknow(with
the exception of von Wright and perhaps a couple of other philosophers) has anything like a
firm overall grasp of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, including its development.” They all dodge
vii
viii Preface
to, it looked to me obsolete.3 When Wittgenstein’s first posthumous book, his
Philosophical Investigations (PI), appeared, I tried to read it. I failed. Most of the
leading commentaries on it I found rather unpleasant: they are hagiographic and
obscureandthus,perhapsalsounawares,metaphysical.Evenhisleadingbiographer,
Ray Monk (1990, 2012), who made efforts to be open, has omitted too many
unpleasantdetailsfromhistremendouslydetailedlifeofWittgenstein.Fewscholarly
commentatorslikePaulHorwich(2012,Preface)showthatitispossibletowritean
appreciative, informed, and balanced commentary on Wittgenstein’s philosophy
without concealingtheinadequacyofhis anti-metaphysics (op. cit.,xiii&note 7);
Horwich judged Wittgenstein’s view erroneous but still valuable. I try here to
supportthis.
Nowhere in Wittgenstein’s works did I find any restatement of the traditional
characterization of metaphysics, reflected in G. E. Moore’s description of it as “a
general description of the whole universe” and the view of it of Moritz Schlick
(1979, 215) as a “synoptic view,” 4 both true to tradition. They naturally viewed
realismasapartofthetruemetaphysics.BothascribedittoWittgenstein;Moore,but
not Schlick, considered this stance a rejection of Wittgenstein’s anti-metaphysical
stance.Perhaps thisreflectsnomore than Schlick’sfamousvenerationofWittgen-
stein as a sort of demigod.5 It is hard to judge, as already then the literature on
Wittgensteinsufferedexcessivelyfromhagiography.6Itstilldoes.BertrandRussell
dismissed it whole, together with the whole output of mature Wittgenstein.7 In
disdainful response to it, he said ([1959] 1993, 217–218), Wittgenstein “threw
away his talent and debased himself” because he had “grown tired of serious
thinking.” Still, he appreciated Wittgenstein’s sincerity, comparing him to Blaise
thefirstruleofinterpretation:firstdiscussthequestionwhydoesthetextathanddeserveattention
inthefirstplace.ParticularlyHintikkaispuzzling.Hespokeofhiminadmiration,neverexplaining
why, while rejecting his sole claim (PI, §133) that clarification will oust all metaphysics and
criticizing him severely. The ideas that he advocated, he admitted, Wittgenstein “would in all
likelihoodhaverejected”(2006,41).
3TLP,§6.53-7;theviewofmetaphysicsasmeaninglesswasfashionablethen.Eddington(1928,91)
founditimpossibletoavoidallmetaphysics, buthedeclaredhisprivate.(SodidPopper(1935,
§29).) Schrödinger declared it unavoidable: one cannot open one’s mouth and speak, he said,
withoutmetaphysicspouringoutofit.
4Diverse,oftenvague,definitionsofmetaphysicsappearinRorty1967classiccollection.Noneof
themistraditional,andnoneofthemisWittgenstein’s,althoughmost(notall)oftheiroriginators
arehisfans.
5The expression is of Schlick’swife (Blanch Guy), recorded byPopper (Hahn 1995, 17); Stern
(2007,312)citeshertorefertoSchlick’s“reverentialattitudeofthepilgrim.”
6The first public reaction to the Wittgenstein cult was Geoffrey Warnock’s 1972 book that
presentedEnglishPhilosophysince1900asindebtedtoG.E.Moore,nottoWittgenstein.
7Russell[1959]1995,159.HerespectedTolstoyasawriterandasamoralist;“histheoriesareof
courseworthless”(lettertoGoldieDickinson,July20,1904).Wittgenstein’sTolstoyanmysticism
marred his close friendship with Russell. Monk (1990, 211) blames Russell for this. He notes
Russell’sviewofWittgenstein’sreligiosityastiresomebutdismissesitasduetoRussell’satheism.
ThisforceshimtoignoreWittgenstein’satheism(TLP,§5.4733)putgrammatically(“God”hasno
reference).SeeMcCutcheon2001,Preface.
Preface ix
Pascal and to Leo Tolstoy. Wittgenstein’s antics did not impress him, but he
indulgedhim,indeepempathywithWittgenstein’sanguishifwithnothingelse.8
Current analytic literature is largely commentaries, largely on texts of Wittgen-
stein.Allhistextsrepeatthetraditional9positivisttotaldismissalofmetaphysicsas
meaningless10,andmostifnotallofhiscurrentfollowersrejectthistotaldismissal.
This requires reflection.11 His admirers value his demand to write unpretentiously.
Possibly, they hope to restore the precritical naïveté that Pascal, Tolstoy, and
Wittgenstein yearned for. This suggests that his endorsement of the hackneyed
mystic idea of the ineffability of the true metaphysics is a corollary of sorts to his
demand for unpretentiousness. Mystics of all sorts say, initiates cannot teach; they
canonlypointtheway.PerhapsthisexplainsWittgenstein’sstraightforwardandyet
undeniablycrypticstyle.12Yet,whereaslittledisagreementsexistwithintraditional
mystic traditions, for example, the Zen canon, disagreement about Wittgenstein’s
texts abounds and varies. This disagreement is reducible by the adoption of some
commonsenserulesofinterpretation(Agassi&Meidan2016,8,91).First,explain
the need for hermeneutics: try to read a text as interesting, i.e., as suggesting
discussion of a problem or as assessing an interesting answer to it. Second, avoid
8Excesssinceritycanserveasatoolfordogmatism.(Sartreidentifiedseriousnesswithcommitment
andcommitmentwithunreserveddogmatism.)Notoriously,Wittgensteineitherdismissedcriticism
withcontemptoradmittedit,invariablyaddingtotheadmissionthatheshouldcommitsuicide.
That his disposition to commit suicide was sincere only worsened the situation. Talented as he
assuredlywas,henevertriedtoavoidcausingmisunderstanding,hisdeclaredpassionforclarity
notwithstanding.Generally,anyrepeatedunexplaineddismissalofcriticismofanytextrendersit
increasinglyopaqueandsobetterignored.
9Gomperz(1941,173)followedtraditionandlistedsomefamiliartermsthathedeemedmeaning-
less(terms,notstatements).
10Ignoringthehabitualambiguityintheanalyticliteratureaboutthedistinctnessofthetwoanalytic
schools, Dummett (1960, 76) dismisses Gellner’s 1959 critique of analytic philosophy: “As a
seriouspieceofphilosophicalcriticism,Gellner’sbookistotallyvitiatedbyhisfailuretodistin-
guishbetweenthetargetsofhisattack.”Dummettcouldillustratethisbycitingsomecriticismof
Gellnerthatappliestoonlyoneschool.Hedidnottroublehimselftodothat.
11TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy,Art.MetaphysicsdoesnotmentionWittgenstein!
12Russell rejected the philosophy of young Wittgenstein as mystical yet as saying much that is
allegedlyunsayable.Anscombe(1995,conclusion)explainsWittgenstein’svaguenessasduetohis
continuousinquisitiveness.Thisexcuseisalwaysvalidandraisesthequestionregardingthecriteria
fordistinguishingthestillvaguefromthehopelesslymuddled.NowthedifficultiesthatWittgen-
steinfacedrelatenottoproblemsbuttohistaskoffreeingpeoplefrommetaphysics(Monk1991,
291).AmbroseandLazerowitz([1972]2014,16)saythisclearly:(astheaspirationofmetaphysics
is“togetageneralcomprehensivepictureoftheuniverse”)hisaspirationwasto“notsatisfythe
cravingbutmakeyouceasetohaveit.”Hedenounced“ourcravingforgenerality”asitrestson
“certaincravingofthemetaphysicianwhichourordinarylanguagedoesnotfulfil”(BlueBook17;
Monk1991,527).True,metaphysicalreflectionsdidpainhim;tootherstheybroughtjoy.Arethey
addicts? If so, then Wittgenstein is a therapist who imposes his services. His therapy is thus
unusable:theuseofgeneraltermsisunavoidableandsoisthecuriositythatpropelsthelearning
thatexpands“ourordinarylanguage.”ThisshowshowpenetratingwasPole’s1958characteriza-
tionofWittgensteinasaconservative.ThehostilitythatPolemetatthetimewasextraordinary.