Table Of ContentLosing an Empire and Finding a Role
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Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945
Series Editor: Professor John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies,
University of Southampton, UK
During the second half of the last century, the practical aspects of national nuclear
weapon policies remained shrouded in state secrecy laws. This was an area where politi-
cal and technical issues were intertwined, and understanding required knowledge and
expertise of both. Archival material was sparse and most writings on the subject were
based on information provided to well-placed journalists and confidential interviews
with some of those involved. The result was that for the academic analyst, separat-
ing truth from fiction was a very difficult task, especially in the case in the United
Kingdom. With the end of the Cold War, archival material became available from all
of the five declared nuclear-weapon states on their activities and scholars were able
to discuss the previous century’s nuclear reality. A small community of scholars and
former practitioners in the UK therefore started to rethink this history by producing
a new series of volumes on the evolution of the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapon
policies from 1952 onwards, the date of the explosion of its first nuclear device.
Thanks to a grant from the UK Arts and Humanities Research Board to the Mountbatten
Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton, Professor John
Simpson and his colleagues were able to start a systematic study of the post-1952
period, and to engage with those directly involved in its many aspects. What soon
became clear was that in the period between 1958 and 1964 the course was set for UK
nuclear policy in the next half-century. It is thus appropriate that Richard Moore’s
volume Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons,
1958–1964 should be the first of the planned chronological volumes arising from this
systematic process. This is reinforced by the current salience of debates over the future
of the UK’s nuclear deterrent force, and the role of the volume as the lead publication
in Palgrave Macmillan’s wider series of studies on nuclear history.
Titles include:
Kristan Stoddart
LOSING AN EMPIRE AND FINDING A ROLE
Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear Weapons, 1964–70
Richard Moore
NUCLEAR ILLUSION, NUCLEAR REALITY
Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64
Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945
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Losing an Empire and
Finding a Role
Britain, the USA, NATO and Nuclear
Weapons, 1964–70
Kristan Stoddart
Research Assistant, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, UK
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© Kristan Stoddart 2012
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Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication
may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
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in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
First published 2012 by
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Contents
List of Illustrations vi
Series Editor’s Introduction vii
Acknowledgements ix
List of Abbreviations xii
Introduction 3
1 T he Labour Government: The Inheritance of Polaris
and Anglo–US Nuclear Relations, 1964–1966 18
2 T he Labour Government and UK/US Responses to
Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missiles, 1964–1966 37
3 B ritain, the United States and the Reform of NATO Strategy,
1964–1966 55
4 B ritain, America and Allied Tactical Nuclear Weapons
Planning, 1964–1966 79
5 T he Second Wilson Government and the Maintenance
of Polaris, 1966–1970 118
6 A BM Systems and Arms Control, 1966–1970 153
7 N ATO and Flexible Response, 1966–1970 166
8 B ritain, America and Allied Tactical Nuclear Operations,
1966–1970 199
Conclusion 227
Notes 243
Bibliography 299
Appendix 313
Index 315
v
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List of Illustrations
4.1 B omber routes from dispersals with position
at R-Hour +60 95
4.2 H MS Repulse, the second of the Resolution Class of Polaris
Submarines to be commissioned, in the Gareloch on the Clyde 116
4.3 HMS Repulse Officer’s Wardroom 117
vi
Series Editor’s Introduction
The end of the Cold War permitted the UK to start releasing into the public
domain detailed material relating to its nuclear weapon production and war
planning. This revealed that it progressed through a number of phases in
its handling of these issues. Until 1958 the focus was on developing first
generation nuclear and thermonuclear warheads and their delivery systems.
From 1958 to 1964, as chronicled in Richard Moore’s companion volume
Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality, the focus was the weaponisation of second-
generation nuclear devices to create a technically credible strategic deterrent
force. This was assisted by US decisions to start nuclear exchanges with the
UK and export advanced strategic delivery systems, including Polaris sub-
marine based missiles.
The current volume moves the story forward from 1964 to 1970. It
describes the successive challenges during this period to the UK remaining
a nuclear weapon state, including economic crises, political opposition and
technical uncertainty and risks. The incoming Labour government led by
Harold Wilson was constrained by national economic weakness. Difficult
decisions had to be taken over the UK’s future global and regional security
commitments and capabilities. Also, some of Labour’s ministers were known
to oppose the UK’s continued possession of nuclear weapons. Wilson halted
nuclear weapons testing and the development of new warhead designs, but
a major programme to manufacture replacement third-generation strategic
and tactical nuclear warheads moved ahead quietly. The UK’s conventional
capabilities were overstretched in fulfilling new and existing European and
extra-European defence commitments: conflicting calls on national defence
resources reached crisis point in 1967. A number of drastic options were
examined to reduce defence spending, including abandoning national
nuclear weapon capabilities and terminating extra-European force deploy-
ments, defence agreements and bases, including their stockpiles of nuclear
weapons. The outcome was a decision to close all UK bases East of Suez by
the early 1970s and withdraw all stockpiled nuclear weapons from them.
In parallel, the UK was involved in debates over NATO strategy. The
French withdrawal from NATO in 1966 facilitated a change in NATO
doctrine from one of responding with ‘massive nuclear retaliation’ to an
incursion by Warsaw Treaty forces to one of using a range of conventional
or nuclear forces in a ‘flexible response’. One result was deployment of UK
nuclear weapons to West Germany, giving the UK both a strategic and tacti-
cal ‘second centre for nuclear decision’ capability in this event. Another was
an apparent attempt by Wilson to facilitate entry into the EEC by offering
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viii Series Editor’s Introduction
to discuss nuclear issues with France. The ‘Mildenhall Agreement’ between
the UK and US, where each agreed to inform the other of such exchanges,
may have resulted from this activity.
The period 1964–70 was therefore spent grappling with the long-term
consequences of the UK decision to acquire and deploy a national nuclear
weapon capability. Sustaining its technical capabilities, and thus its nuclear
relationship with the US, threatened open ended financial and resource
commitments. The assignment of Polaris to NATO for strategic targeting
purposes was a condition for this transfer, though orders for use continued
to be routed through the UK national command structure. This also meant
that the UK retained the capability for independent targeting and deploy-
ment. Yet while the Polaris force appeared to offer the UK a relatively invul-
nerable and cost-effective ‘minimum deterrent’, doubts were soon emerging
about its ability to penetrate USSR missile defences. Thus although the UK
nuclear deterrent stockpile was being renewed and the nuclear relationship
with the US had been revived, their future survival was still not assured.
John Simpson
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Acknowledgements
This book has taken many years to complete, but has been an area of con-
stant fascination and interest. Nuclear history is a difficult subject area to
work in, due in no small measure to the sensitive nature of the material
under consideration; although, given its centrality to defence and foreign
policy, it deserves significant attention. This work does not seek to explore
the morality of nuclear weapons; in this I am entirely in accord with
Lawrence Freedman who stated in the introduction to Britain and Nuclear
Weapons, ‘The agnosticism of this study is partly a reflection of a determina-
tion to provide a book of description and analysis rather than advocacy.’
It seeks to provide a holistic investigation into British nuclear weapons
policy in all its aspects. It examines areas of policy ranging from the acquisi-
tion and manufacture of fissile material to nuclear warhead design, weapons
deployment, means of nuclear delivery as well as operational strategy and
tactics at national, bilateral and multilateral levels. Such wide areas of policy
depict the size and scale of the effort involved.
My family deserve my thanks for supporting me throughout. My mother
Anne Stoddart, my uncle John Stoddart, who, in recounting his experiences
as a Royal Navy sailor in the late sixties and early seventies enthused me
in his distinctive and humble way. Jennifer Stoddart too has been a source
of strength to me, as have family members past and present. Two former
teachers of mine, John Llewellyn Jones and Ian Rees, also deserve mention
for enthusing me from an early age with their love of learning. Support
and friendship was also forthcoming from Leigh Bennett, Lee and Sian
Williams (and family), Jeremy Thomas, Dr James Lee, Dr Peter Fleming,
Dr’s Mark and Huw Boulton, Linda, Philip and Simon Dyton and my aunt
Phylis Ward.
No endeavour of this nature could have been attempted alone. I must
extend my thanks to all those who have contributed directly and indirectly
to this research project, including the late and much missed Sir Michael
Quinlan, Kate Pyne, the Atomic Weapons Establishment’s Technical
Historian, the staff at The National Archives at Kew, Dr John Walker of
the Foreign Office, Dave and Lesley Wright of the British Rocketry Oral
History Project (BROHP) and participants at the BROHP/UK Space confer-
ences and to John Coker (RN retd.) and the staff of the Museum of Naval
Firepower, Gosport. Thanks are also due to Dr Bill Burr at the National
Security Archives, based at George Washington University in Washington
DC, who provided valuable documentary evidence from the US archives
which allowed for a greater appreciation of the ‘special nuclear relationship’
between the United States and Great Britain. In addition the photographs
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