Logic of Life: Heidegger's Retrieval of Aristotle's Concept of Logos (Stockholm Studies in Philosophy, 24)

124 Pages·2002·60.91 MB·English

by  Charlotta Weigelt

ACTA UNIVERSITATIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS
STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 24
THE LOGIC OF LIFE
HEIDEGGER'S RETRIEVAL OF
ARISTOTLE'S CONCEPT OF LOGOS
CHARLOTTA WEIGELT
ACTA UNIVERSITA TIS STOCKHOLMIENSIS
STOCKHOLM STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY 24
THE LOGlC OF LIFE
Heidegger's Retrieval of
Aristotle' s Concept of Logos
CHARLOTTA WEIGELT
ALMQVIST & WIKSELL INTERNATIONAL
Doctoral dissertation
Department of Philosophy
Stockholm University
S-106 91 Stockholm
ABSTRACT
ln the work of Martin Heidegger, the quesl for the proper philosophical beginning is
motivated by an awareness of the "historicaI" nature of thought: ilS dependency upon
the beginning of philosophy in the historica! sense. This study explores the early
Heidegger's attempt to provide philosophy with a new beginning by explicitly
addressing the legacy of Aristotle, regarded as Ille philosophical origin, which
philosophy cannat avoid to confront without remaining naive with respect ta ilS own
foundation. Heidegger's projeci is here considered with respect to how it conceives
of the question of human reasan, and it is taken to be driven by the ambition ta corne
to grips with a traditional logical and theoretical ideal of cognition. Turning to
Aristotle as the alleged originatar of this ideal, Heidegger focuses on the concept of
logos, taking as his point of departure Aristotle's classica! detinition of man as zoioll
logon echoll, commonly rendered as "the rational animal". The study explores
Heidegger's retrieval of Aristotle's concept of logos. In this pursuit, Heidegger tS
guided by the assumption that this concept must be traced back ta Aristotle's
understanding of life and praxis, since it is based upon an experience of speech as the
basic trait of human cognition. 11 is shawn how Heidegger on the basis of his
interpretation of Aristotle tries ta develop a notion of a speaking or discursive reason.
Thereby, he hopes to overcome an idea also present in Aristotle: that the supreme
form of knowledge is cOlltained in the simple apprehension of nous. lt is argued (hat
the point in revealing the "practical" foundation of Aristotle's notion of logos is
essentia!ly to find out what it means for philosophy to be a fonn of praxis. Thereby,
the aim is to show that Heidegger affirms Aristotle's idea that philosophy as theory,
theoria, is the supreme mode of praxis. For this reason, the therne of logos is situated
within the comex! of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's teleology. A guiding
assumption is that Heidegger thinks that the concept of killesis, change, provides us
with the ontological background to Aristotle's inquiry inlo logos. lt is shawn how
Heidegger argues Ihat Aristotle conceives of logos as a kind of kinesis. Yet he also
shows that Aristotle was not able to fully affirm {his because of his assumption that.
being in the true sense is not kinesis but entelecheia, unchanging, complete activity,
which belongs not ta logos but to nOlis.
Key words: Heidegger, Aristotle, logos, kinesis, phenornenology, teleology,
assertion, sunthesîs, dihairesis, theory, praxis, everydayness.
© 2002 Charlotta Weigelt
ISBN 91-22-01996-0
ISSN 0491-0877
Printed by Akademitryck AB Edsbruk 2002
1I l.\ 11I'IIIIII/1'(lllIuIIOIi
1I l PllIlll1l'illlIl PldJu'iophy
NIUI k!lIlll1l 1J IIIVI.iI~dly
S 11111 'II Sl<\e,110ltll
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT
ln 1111.: work or Martin Ileidcgger, the quest for the proper philosophical beginning is ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS viii
1i1OIivntcd by un Hwarcness of the "historieal" Ilnture of Ihought: ils dependeney lIpon
Ihe bl.:gillning of philosophy in the historien! sense. This study explores the early
IIcideggcr's HtlCll1pt 10 provide philosophy with a new beginning by explicitly
oddrcssing the legacy of Aristotle, regarded as Ihe philosophical origin, which INTRODUCTION
philosophy cannot avoid to confront withoul rernaining naive with respect to ils own 1. 'l'Ile clnri ficalion of logos as a central philosophical task
ofUrl Il1dnlion. Hcidegger's project is here considered \Vith respect to how il coneeives 2. ;\ lm and structure of the present study 7
Ille question of human reason, and it is taken ta be driven by the ambition to come
10 HI'i[)S wilh a !raditional logical and theoretical ideal of cognition. Turning ta 1. ;\ survey of previous literature 12
AdKhlllc 11$ the alleged originator of this ideal, Heidegger focuses on the concept of
l''WI\, luk!lI~ liS his point of departure Aristotle's c1assical definition of man as zoioll CHAPTER ONE: HEIDEGGER'S PROJECT AND
l'';,fnll 1'1'1t01/, comJnonly rendered as "the rational animal". The study explores
ITS RELATION TO ARlSTOTLE
Iii Iih\~~N'H rctr'it!val of Aristotle's concept of logos. Tn this pursuit, Heidegger is
.!ld. Il lIy Ille IISSlunption that [his concept must be traced back ta Aristotle's 1. The philosop:ly of facticallife 20
uwh. IIIIHIIIIJ!\ of life and praxis, since il is based upon an experience of speech as the 2. The philosophy of logos: phenomenology, logic and hermeneutics 26
1111 Il lIull of' hutl1l.l1l cognition. It Îs shawn how Heidegger on the basis of his 1. Qnlology and teleology 32
IIlh 1 plI·tullol1 of' A rislotle tries Lo develop a notion of a speaking or discursive reason.
1111 11111), ho hopt.:s la overcome an idea also present in Aristotle: that the supreme 'I. The nolion of a firs! phi losophy 38
IlIlIn lit ~'Iowh.:dgè is contained in the simple appl'ehension of nOlis. Il is argued that ~, 1I cidegger's critique of ethics 44
1111 l'plilt 111 fr.:vcaling the "praclical" foundation of Aristotle's notion of logos is (J. Jlhilosophy as historical knowledge 49
l "~I\lldl1lly Il' lilld out what it means for philosophy to be a fonn of praxis. Thereby,
Ih~\ 11h11 ls 10 show that Heidegger affirms Aristotle's idea Ihat philosophy as theory, -" Ilistorical inlcrpretation and systematic philosophy 54
""'III'/fI, is Ihl! supreme mode of praxis. For Ihis reason, the the me of logos is situated
I\Illhl" Ille context of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's teleology. A guiding CI-IAPTER TWO: THE EPISTEMIC LOGOS
IIK~IIII)ption is that Heidegger thinks Ihat the concept of kinesis, change, provides us 1. o'n lhe task of questioning a Iraditional interpretation of logos 60
wllh 11lt.: onlological background to Aristotle's inquiry into logos. lt is shown how
1 hllduggcr argues Ihat Aristotle conceives of logos as a kind of kinesis. Yet he also 2.. Sl/IllI,esis and dihairesis as the basic constituents of the assertion 64
shows Ihat Aristotle was not able to fully affirm this becallse of bis assumption that 1. 'l'he linguistic and the olltologicallevel of sunthesis and dilwiresis 68
bcing in the truc sense is not kinesis but enteiecheia, unchanging, complete aclivity,
wllich be!ongs not ta logos but to nous. II. The as-structure 73
~, 'l'l'ulh and apopJ/tIl1sis 78
Key words: Heidegger, Aristotle, logos, kinesis, phenomenology, teleology, (,. 'l'ho l1ect.!ssity ofcontcxlualising the assertion 82
!1~scl'tion, slllllhesis, dihairesis, thcory, praxis, cverydayness. J. l'Il!,; uss~l'lioll as founded 011 a change in c:veryday cOlllportlllenl 89
@ 2002 Charlotta Wcigell K, 1h e problel11 \Vith Ihe l'Ccluclion in asscrloric speech 9'1
'l, 'Ille p,'oblcill \Vilh Ih" "piSIClllic idcal 98
ISIIN 91·22·0199 ·0
10, {'Otlcluding l'cillill'ks 101
ISSN 0491·0877
JlI'illlcd by Akrldclllill,Yt'k Alli Il,,111111 11101
CHAPTER THREE: THE EVERYDA y LOGOS
1. Everydayness as a philosophical themc 103
2. Heidegger's reading of the Nicomachean Ethics 106
3. Everyday speech as the basis of Aristotle's concept of logos 108
4. Techne and concern. The poietic perspective of everyday life 113
5. Phronesis and care Ils
6. The discursive nature of action 125
7. Truth as disclosedness and nous 130
8. Logos as kinesis 134
9. Logos as fall and empty speech 139
10. Concluding remarks 140
CHAPTER FOUR: TI-lE PI-IILOSOPHICAL LOGOS
1. Philosophy as an original possibility for logos 147
2. The raIe of interruption in the genesis of philosophy 150
3. Anxiety and reduction 155
4. The limited scope of dialectic 159
5. The theoreticallife 165
6. The moment oftruth in vision: nOlis and AlIgenblick 171
7. Philosophy as counter-movement and rctrieval 177
8. The formai indication 182
9. Concluding remarks 188
CHAPTER FIVE: LOGOS AND BEING
1. From logos to being 190
2. Being as manifold and unity. Aristotlc's critique'ofthe Eleatics 194
3. The principles of change and their teleological interpretation 199
4. Change analysed into poiesis and pathesis 202
5. The common foundation of logos and kinesis 206
6. The primacy of the assertion and the question ofbeing 210
7. The question of the meaning ofbeing. Logos as the unit y of being 215
8. Temporality as the unity of being 219
CONCLUSION 224
I.IST 01: WOI{KS CI1'I;I) 22')
I\CKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A Ilumber of people at the Departmellt of Philosophy ill Siockhoim
have been important for the genesis of this thesis. First of ail, 1 would
INTRODUCTION
like ta thank Staffan Carlshamre and Hans Ruill, \vho have supervised
it. r am particularly grateful to Staffan for his encouragement in times of
crisis, of which there have been quite a few. His broad philosophieal
outloak has also becn a source of inspiration. 1 am deepJy indebted to
Hans for the philosophieal guicbnce that he has granted to me for 1. The clarification oflogos as a central philosophiealtask
severnl years by now. No one cise has bcen 50 important for Illy "II might be that the beginning is the greatest part of everything",
intellectual development. Aristotle says, and he continues, "and therefore it is the most difficu[t
pari as weil; and the mightier it is in power, the tinier it is in magnitude,
Dag Pra witz and Gunnar Svensson have contributed to crenting a
still1ulating milieu at the department. 1 am also grateful to Anna and as such the beginning is also whal is Illûst di fficult ta see. ,,1 The
idca that Aristûtle himself reprcsents such a powerful but yet elusive
Ahlstrëll1S oeh Ellen Terseru, Stinelse for tillalleial support.
beginning, which is still waiting to be understood, was of fundall1ental
r woulcl like to thank the following persans for stil1lulating scminars
importance to the development of Heidegger's philosophieal projeet, in
on phenomcnology and ancienl philosophy: Gosta Gromoos, Jim
particular wh en it was still in its bcginning. In his early lecture courses,
Jakobsson, Per-Erik Malmnjs, Per Martin-Lof, Alexander Orlowski,
Heidegger returns time and again to Aristotle's works, seeking to reveal
Nicholas Smith and Karl Weigelt. Amollg these, 1 am indebted 10 Karl
what he takes to be their as yel hidden possibilities. In this pursuit,
in particular for intellectual as weil as emotioll.:J1 inspiration. Finally,
however, Heidegger is not out ta simply restore some kind of
cJuring ail this time, 1 have bellefited from Jim's cal'eful, often critical
Aristotelian doctrine, but his primary aim is to explore Arislotle's
reading of my tcxt, without which this thesis wou/cl probably Ilot klve
thought precisely as a philosophieal beginning and to understand the
rcached complction. What is more important, he aJso provided my work
with its guiding idea when he asked me whether l hac! p;'lid any attention nature of ils legacy. In this projeet, he is driven by the conviction that
ta Heidegger's statement that logos is a fOrln ofkinesis. cvery attempt to begin anew in philosophy must proeeed by way of a
1 dedieate this book to my mother. confrontation with the Aristotclian beginning, sinee it by and large has
circumscribed the scope and nalure of philosophieal work as a who le. In
this sense, then, Aristotle is to Heidegger Ilot just one innuential
philosopher among others but simply the Philosopher. However,
Ileidegger thinks that in spitc of the decisive influence that Aristotle has
exerted on the subsequent philosophieal tradition, he nevertheless
constitutes a lost or "unseen" origin. Accordingly, Heidegger
simultaneûusly wants ta use his interpretatiol1 of Al'istatle in arder to
lurn Aristotle against a tradition that assumes his philûsophy as a basis,
1 Sophistical Reillfa/ions, 183b22-25: "I-IÉylO'1:0V yàp 10'wç àpX~ lraVtOC;, ... 01(:' Kal
XCÛ.E7tOHatOV· 0(1<1) yàp KpatlO''tov 1:fj ouval-lEl, 'toO'o\mp 1l1Kpérrawv OV HP IlEYÉ6El
XClt.errw'W1'6v èan v 6$O~vw." Ail translations, also of Heidegger's works, are ru)'
Qwn. Dy \\Iuy of cnnvcniion, wllen rcfcrring ta the works of Aristotle, J u~e
IIbbrevitHCd l'nrlll'! orthe !,nlin titles for page refercnces. Sophistical Refutations Will
occonlillHly he ICllllll'd In"l( ".\'(l/Ilt M.".
IN IlW I)[Je liON
IN 11 «)llt l'l'ION
Hnd accuses il of nol rcally knowing what il is doing. In l!lb \\Illy. Ihe
Ihcorcticfllly biuscd ami Ihus reductive view On rationality, this ideal
reinterpretation ofAristotie eonlronts Heidegger with no less " t",k than
assumes tl dichotomy bctwecn theory and praxis, the consequence of
that of rethinking the philosophieal tradition as a whole.
which is that Ilot only theory but also human understanding in general is
According ta Heidegger's OWIl testimony, it was his early encounter
rcgardcd as something essentially different trom life and action. But
with Brentano's dissertation Von den mannigfàchen Bedeutung des
with the help of phenomenology, Heioegger hoped ta be able to uncover
Seienden nach Aristote/es that initiated his "first elumsy attempts to
the origin of this ideal, and this in such a way as ta get at the
penetra te into philosophy", eonfronting him for the first time \Vith the
cxperiences that once led ta those concepts of theOl'y and knowledge
question which was to become the focal point of his entire philosophical
which are now entrenched in the philosophical vocabulary.
endeavour: the question posed in the Metaphysics concerning being as
2 The search for this origin eventually led Heidegger ta Aristotle. One
being Eventually, Heidegger would get to the point where he could
might perhaps think that the beginning of Western rationality should be
launch his own Ihesis on "the mani fald meaning of being": the point
loeated in Parmenides or Plata rather than in Aristotle, but Heidegger
wh en he presented his project of fundamental ontology in his main early
puts emphasis on what he regards as a decisive breakthrough or
\York Sein und Zef!. By that lime, however, Heidegger had bccome
development in Aristotle. Heidegger thus approaches Aristotle as the
convinced that, when thus raising ane\\' the question of being, he \Vas
culmination of previous Greek thought, and of Plata in particular,
actually reawakening a question long forgotten, which had becn
claiming that Aristotle's achievements essentially consist in a "more
"reduced ta silence" after the time of Plato and Aristotle3
radical and scientific" elaboration of Plato's thought' Not oilly has
But even though the ontologieal perspective is present in Heidegger's
Aristotle inquired further into the nature of rationality th an his
1V0rk from the start, the lecture courses that precede the publication of
predecessors, but this inquiry might itself be said to be of a more
Sein und Zeit display a slightly st ronger focus on the tapie of reason or
"rational" kind than before. The camp Iain! made in the Sophist, that the
rationality. There Heidegger devotes himself ta the task of developing
an ontology of life, thereby trying ta modify the thematic field of carly philosophers "seem ta tell us a story, muthos, as if \\le were
children"', is aftirmed more strongly by Aristotle than what Plato
phenomenology and to steer the phenomenologieal projeet in another
himself could do, his suspicion of myth and poetry notwithstanding.
direction than what Husserl had done. Early on, Heidegger was
Aristotle takes the decisive step a\Vay from myths and speculative
eonvinced of the need 10 challenge the epistel11ologieal and tao
discourse, tOlVards a more "con crete" and scientific philosophy, in
Cartesian orientation of Husserlian phenomcnology, with its focus on
which it is no longer lIluthos that articulates the order of the world, but
consciousness and subjectivity. The ambition to come to grips with his
logos.
Qwn mast immediate philosophical background and heritage gave
Il is also precisely the concept of logos that stands at the centre of
Heidegger an impetus ta refleet upon the nature of philosophy as such
Ileidegger's interpretation of Aristotle as a thinker of rationality,
and to reconsider not only its basic questions and concepts, but also its
notably with respect ta Aristotle's definition of man as a being endowed
very aim and direction. In particular, Heidegger wanted to reconsider
with logos. This has become the classical definition of man as a rational
the notion of philosophy as theory, notably with respect to how it fits
bcing, not Jeast because of its Latin translation, animal rationale.
into a modern scientific and logical ideal concerning cognition as a
Ilowcvcr, in Heidegger's view, what this definition really says about the
whole. Nearly ail of Heidegger's early writings involve a critique ofthis
nature of ratiollality has actually been lost in the tradition aCter Aristotle,
idea!. This critique stems From his belicf that, apart from entailing a
t"ough il might weil be the case that Aristotle himself did not fully
2 "Mein Weg in die Phanomenologie", pp. 81·90 În Zur Sache des Denkens, p. 81. ~ "/(11011" Sophistes (110. 19 in Ille Gasomlollsgobe, which henceforlh is referred to as
) Sein I/nd Zeit ("SZ"), p. 2. "UA"), pp. 11-12.
, SrJ/IIIII", 242ct-:rr.
2
IN 1I {()I)LJ "liON INTR l)l) "l'ION
realise ail its implications. While he does not dispule IlilIt " dNtolle's
CIIHt:IIIlCIII. ln Ihe litcraLurc on Al'islotlc, however, Ihe concept oflogos
der.nition concerns man as a rational being, Heidegger wanls 10 siress is onen rcgardcd as a notion of discursive reason and interpreted as the
that this definition proposes as the basic characteristic of man not plain cupacity for reasolling or making inferences. Logos in this sense is
reason but rather speech. Speech is the key ta the question of reason, opposed ta nOliS, "intuition", which has access to those premises from
because, and this is the crucial point, speech is the basic constituent of
which an inferenee starts and which must be taken for granted by the
human action or activity as such. For in virtue of its power of
infercnce itself. But Heidegger emphasises another aspect of the
distinguishing between different things, speech lets man have a world
Âl'istotelian logos: that it is constituted by combination and separation,
and share it with olhers. Il is thus the experienee of speech, or sa at least .\'fll1lhesis and dihairesis. This structure, Heidegger argues, is what
Heidegger claims, that Illakes up the foundation of Aristotle's rnakes it possible for us ta understand something as something, in a
conception of rationality. As Aristotle hilllself puts il in the ramous particular regard or in a specifie sense. On account of this structure,
passage in the Politics:
logos to Heidegger displays the notion of a finite reason, in contras! ta
an ideal ofknowledge as simple, ullmediated "seeing", which he thinks
Why man is a social animal in <l higher degree than <.Iny bec or
any gregarious animal is clear. For, as wc say, nature does is exprcssed \Vith the concept OrnaI/s.
nothing in vain, and man a!one alllong animais possesses speech. ln retrieving Aristotle's concept of logos, Heidegger seeks ta
The Illcre sound or voice can 110 doubt indicale pain flild plcasure, preserve what he regards as Aristotle's most important insight in this
and therefore, il belongs 10 the other animaIs .:l.S weil ... , but
context, namely that the inquiry into reason or rationality must bc
speech is for the sake of revealing the advanlagcOLJS and Ihe
harmful, and Iherefore nlso the just and the unjusl; l'or this is situated within an analysis of human praxis or existence. However,
proper ta man as compared with the olhcr animais, namcly la Ilcidegger thinks, or at lenst suspects, that Aristotle was not really able
alone have perception of good and bad and jusI and unjust and
la do justice to this insight. For even though Heidegger is not willing ta
other such tbings, and it is joint participation in Ihese things thal
makes a household and a cornmunity.6 simply subscribe to the rather common view on Aristotle and on Greek
thought as a whole as essentially naive with respect ta language, he
The present study explores the way in which Heidegger seeks to suspects that there is a celiain conflict in Aristotle's thinking between a
retrieve and evaluate this definition of man, both as regards its
phenomenologieal mode of illquiry on the one hand, and his
implications for the nature of reason, and its idea concerning the right
Illetaphysical or ontological assumptions on the other. As a consequence
approach to this tapie. More precisely, it wi II be shown how Heidegger of Ihis, Aristotle \Vas not fully able to thematise or reflect upon his own
attempts to develop Aristotle's notion of a discursive, "speaking" discoveries. As wc will see in the course of this study, the idea of an
reason. Heidegger hil11self does not use the tenn "discursive"; as a rule ambiguity in Aristotle's thought makes Heidegger somewhat hesitant as
he simply talks about "speech" (Rede), since one of his major points is to how far he can follow Aristotle in his OWIl project, wavering between
that speech or articulation is nothing extenial to the act of ft critical and an approving stance, as it were. But it seems that
understanding, but on the contrary constitutes its realisation or Ileidegger at last becomes more or less certain that the metaphysical
tcndency in Aristotle's thought finally triurnphs, and that this triumph
6 Po/itics ("Pol."), 1253a7-18: "olon oÈ 1tO/.ltIKàv (, avepùJlTOS Ç00v ncLOllS Illakes up the foundatioll of the logieal and theoretical ideal of
!-U::/d"ttl1S KOl lTfNtàs àYEÀaÎ.ou sebou 110ÀÀov, O~Àov. ouStv yap, ms $OIlÉV. l-latl1V ~ rnlionality.
$UO"lS lTOtEt· ÀOyov oÈ !-lOVOV av9pwlToS Ëxel "HÔV Ç0wv· ~ )1ÈV ouv $wv~ wû
III the leclure course Platon: Sophistes, delivered in 1924/25,
Àurr'lPOÛ Kat ~ÔÉOS EOtl crll~lEiOV, OlO Kat wîs aÀ).olS urrclpXEI s00ls ... , 6 oÈ
À6yoç bü '!Cp OIlÀOÛV tan 1à aWI$Épov Kat 10 ~Àap€:pov, WOtE KCÛ TO ÔiKOiOV Kat Ilcidegger gives the following diagnosis of the fate of the Greek
Tà aÔlKOV· wûm yàp rrpàs tà QÀÀa s0a "toîS àvOpwlTolS Hhov, -rà ~16vov àyaOoû ulldcrstandillg of logos:
Kai 1<"CtKO\l KCÙ cnKoio"U KOt ciôiKOU Kai "tWV (i),J,wv oi:08llOiv ËXElV· ~ ÔÈ:. tO"lJtwv
KQL\iWvia rrûle.Î oil<iav I<ai ltÔÀIV."
4 5
INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
'l'he clnrilicnlioll of logos \Vas to the Greeks aflllulamelltal:ask, nrlh.:ulation. Phenomenology means, on Heidegger's definition,
/lild 1l1l1rCOVCr such a one, in which they only \Vith difficulty and "(JjJophaines/hai ta phainomena: to let that which shows itscl r be seen
slowly could ndvancc and where they to sorne extent remained
sluck, if one llwy designate as this point thaï wllich has been l'rom itself SllClt as it shows itself [rom itsel!'.'" Hence the nced to
handcd clown as the Aristotelian lagie, traditionally speaking. clucidate the nature of logos and in this lVay to make clear the
InilSlllu!.:h as the tcaching of logos among the Greeks finally \Vas
conditions of possibility of letting something be se en "as" somcthing.
dcvelopcd in a thcorctiçal sense, the pri1}/ary phenomenoll of
Ilut when analysing "phenomenology" in terrns of apopltaineslhai,
logos \Vas (he sentence, Ihe theore/Ical assertion about
sornething.7 Il 'idcgger has simultaneously established a connection with that notion
01' logos which constitutes the target of his critique, namely logos as
In his attcmpt to make the clari fication of logos into a task of his OWI1)
lop.os apophantikos, which rerers to a form of speech which in virtue or
Heidegger wants to challenge this "theoretical development" 01 logos,
Ils unpophantic" nature precisely lets something be seen. ]n this way,
insofar as it has led to the beliel that the assertion, or to use Aristotle's
Ih' Iflsk of conrronting Aristotle's understanding of logos is embedded
term, logos apopltantikos, can be regarded as the basic mode or speech,
in Ihe very term "phenomenology".
in the sense of being the mûst fundamental clement of truth and
knowlcdge. But even more important to Heidegger is to question the
l Ailll QI/d slnlc/ure of/he present study
logico-grammatical approach to language IVhich the foeus on the
1l i ' [lim 01 this study is to show how Heidegger pursues his critical
assertion eventually entailed. For the consequence of this is that
, 'Il'Îcvnl 01 Aristotle's notion of discursive reason by bestolVing upon it
language is expelled From the domain of human praxis, and so are
nn onlological interpretation, which seeks ta challenge the logico
theory and knowledge. Thus the aim is not to do away with theory or
HI'UIIl1r\uliçal perspective on speech and reason. On Heidegger's
logic, but to restore ta it its original and proper place as a form of Iife or
1It.'l'Otllll, Ihe ontological approach is already present in Aristolle. though
action. On Heidegger's view, this aim can only be fuIf i lied by means of
1" l' lulent or undeveloped way. More precisely, Heidegger believes that
an investigation of speech. For if the presently prevailing view on
Ihe lllliological basis of Aristotle's conception of logos can be made
rationality is based upon a certain interpretation of speech, th en the
VINlhlc iflhis conception is brought together with Aristotle's teleology,
attempt to challenge this view must apparently proceed by way of a
I1lId 111 parlicular with his notion of praxis, action. Thus wh en claiming
reinterpretation of speech. And if it is precisely Aristotle's interpretation
IIUII lIu.: Hll!:llysis of rationality or logos cannot do without an inquiry into
of speech that- albeit in a round about way - makes up the loundation
IIIOIIIHI/Jr"xis, Ileidegger's point is also that Aristotle 's conception of
of the modern view on rationality, then the ~cinterpretation of speech ,,,1 ,,,,,,Iii)' Illust be interpreted in the light of his understanding of
must equally involve a confrontation \Vith Aristotlc. 1"1/\ l", I\usiclllly, what Heidegger discovers in Aristotle's teleological
This reinterpretation should be of a phenomenological kind, but it !11h11 pl 'I/ltion Or li fe as a whole is an idea of the directedness of action
will also in its turn contributc to a clarilÏcation of the nature of "11,1 IIIIIlIght Ihat is less mcntalistic than Husserl's notion of
phenomenology itself, since it is the task of phenomenology ta present
11I1I·"III'lllIliIY. Ilowcver, Ileidegger is silllultaneously convinced that the
"the logos of the phenomena" and thus to give them their proper
""I,,II'~ "llOli which Arislotle's teleology is based is an ontology of
IIH 1 la \1, 1\ Cl)lI~cqllcncc of which is that Aristolle tends to regard
7 GA 19, p. 252: "Die Aufklarung des Àôyoç war fOr die Griechen eine Gnmdallfgabe 11111111111 II\, 11011 liS ~lIch. including the activity of logos, frol11 the point of
und dazu cine solche, bei der sic nur schwer und langsam voran karncn und
gewissermalJen stecken blieben, wenn man ais dicSCIl Punkt dos hC/cichl1cn k,~nn, 1 \1 ,01 Il,,lsh 'd, il 'rli,:cled bci"g. Bul j" his IIltempl 10 q"eslioll Ihis
wns aIs die aristotelische Logik, traditionell gespl'ol.:hcll, nbcl'lldclt 151. ~olt.:rn
n{lmlich dic Lehre vorn Myoç bei den Gricchcll ICII.:lich ill cinl"11l IlIl'lIl\\tlschcli Sinll\.: Il t t "PIlIiIIOlllt\IHllnHIr: !t11HI (lUllII; t'mO/lift! VI'OO(I1 rù QfUl V6p11\'lA: I)ns WO~, sich
ausgcbildct wurde, WOI' das prillic/fe f!I/âIlOIlIC'1I dc,~ À.ôY\li,f d"1 Srlf", dl/ Ihl'IlI'I"üdllJ r INL ,ri Will ,'<j ~kli VOII 111111 8111b~1 liN Id.!!. VOI1 111111 ~clh:lI IICI' selle Il 1f1~sCII, My
AII.\'.wgc: Obel' cIWflS." Ililllli
INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
ideal, Heidegger nonetheless draws on Aristotle's teleology, ta the bcing. Throughout this study, 1 will toueh upon the temporal
extent that he argues that logos must be eonceived of as a form of implications of Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle, but 1 will not
kinesis, a kind of movement which involves differcnce and therefore is address temporality as a theme in its oIVn right until in the last chapter.
open ta change. With this c\aim, Heidegger th us wants ta retrieve an This is not a comparative slUdy, whieh is not to say that eomparisons
idea already present in Aristotle, while at the same time transforming it, will be wholly absent, but as my primary aim is ta explore I-Ieidegger's
in that he does not subsume kinesis under the model of complete and thought, Aristotle is [rom the beginlling situated within the context of
terminated movernent. Ileidegger's philosophy. The scope of the study is more or less
1t is a major thesis of this work that this ontological or tcleological rcstricted to Heidegger's \Yorks lroH! the twenties, since al11105t ail of
interpretation of logos not only lets Heidegger inquire further into the his lectures on Aristotle as a whole belong ta this decade. Praetieally ail
constitution of understanding and articulation as compared with a or I-lcidegger's lecture courses du ring this period to a greater or 1esser
traditional logical and theoretical perspective, but that it in fact also cxtent involve a con frontation with Aristotle, and the presence of
gives bim the possibility of re-establishing the primaey of theoretical Aristotle can be felt even in those works where he is no1 explicitly
knowledge. This might perhaps seem like a somewhat paradoxieal Inentioned. For this reason, the study covers nearly ail Heidegger's
claim, but the point is 1hal the meaning of "theory" will be substantially writ ings from tbis period. But of particular importance are the two
modified, once it is realised that its origin and foundation must be extensive courses Platon: Sophistes from 1924/25 and the reeently
loeated in life or action. Thus Heidegger's elaboration of the published Grundbegriffe der oris/oteUsehen Philosophie from the
Aristotelian logos is equally an attempt at questioning the traditional prcvious semester,9 Whereas the former work puts focus on the
distinction between theory and praxis, and a1so, as wc will sec, the idea discussion in the Nicomacheal1 Ethics of the intetlectual virtues and
that Aristotle is the originator of this distinction. Aeeordingly, when their relation ta action and production, the latter brings together
trying to retrieve a genuine sense of theory, Heidegger in a sense " l'istotle's understanding of logos with his teleologyW The overall
rehabilitates the traditional view on Aristotle as a proponent of the IlI'lCtltlltion of bath these courses is to explore Aristotlc's works as
primaey oftheory. Heidegger's point is thus not that this view is plainly phellomenological investigations into different aspects of life, but also
false but that it is based upon a misguided interpretation of Aristotle's to draw out their ontological presuppositions. The same strategy ean be
notion of theoey; therefore, one has not been able ta understand what 1,\1111(\ in what is known as the Aristotle Introduction written in 1922,
this primaey of the theoretical really amounts ta. "1'llfll1omcnologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der
Heidegger's preoccupation with the question of logos could be il '1l1lcncutischen Situation)"I1, whieh is the first text Heidegger devoted
described as a prelude ta the project of fundamental ontology, inquiring "xpliclt Iy to Aristotle. The interpretation of the concept of logos is also
into how we speak about being, in order ta tinally get at the meaning of 111(' cClltl'nl issue of Logik: die Frage naeh der Wahrheit (1925/26), and
being as such. This more far-reaehing ontologieal perspeetive will Il ,Idegger retuills ta it in Sein und Zeit (1 n7), Grundprobleme der
however only be briefly explored in this study, though the relation
between Heidegger's inquiry into logos and his ontological project is Il 1; j 18, 1 also mnke use of a texi that has not yel bcen published,
l'//lI/lf11111'I/Olo}llsche III/e1ï)/'era/ionell ZII Aris/olde,\', Oll/ologie II/Id Logik, which was
discussed at the end. When treating the problem of logos as intimately
Ih IIVtllNI 111 1922, This lecture course prcscnts the saille bflsic tcndency as
conneeted with ontologieal and teleologieal issues, one incvitably III Idt\l!f-1t'l ',II otlter CC1urscs 011 Aristollc durillg this pcriod, sinec it 100. trics 10 make
eomes aeross the question of time or temporality in Ileidegger and • h'lu IIpw Arltlh)IIC'S 0111010UY is rCh\lCd 10 his undcrSlllnding or lire, This course is
j11t+1"cll'd Il~ 110, 62 orthe (/IJSl1I11WU.W//)tr Iwd il will he l'cfcl'l'cd 10 Wilh ;]11 uSlerisk
Aristotle, not least when eonsidering Heidegger's suspicion lhal ,dtl r llc(' VOllltllC lIlullbcr,
Aristotle's conception ofratiOl1[1lity as Cl wholc IIllly uitilillli 'Iy he trnccd lU Ic\lt'ldo~\y 1." nll1l) lhe l'Clltr,tI lhl'Il\cof ArI,\/f//I'/('S, A'I(,/ofJh)',dk I.j, VOII lVe'scn
11111' Il li Atll'!tkclr r/4'" Al'f/fi ( 1( ) t l , (lA 11),
bock 10 thl,: as~urnptioll thal bl:ÎlIg in nu.; truc N~\II!1t.' IN PI\"WIII, nldsll 'd 1 111111"'1' .I11/whl/ch (, (191N), nI', 217·2/IK, Ill'llu'lllt lh rdllrr l.'d 10 1111 ""A",