Logic, language and reality

465 Pages·1990·27.115 MB·English

by  Matilal Bimal Krishna

LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND REALITY
Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues

LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND
REALITY
Indian Philosophy and Contemporary Issues
BIMAL KRISHNA MATILAL
MOTILAt BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS
PRIVATE LIMITEDtDELHI
First Edition: Delhi, 1985
Second Edition: Delhi, 1990
© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PVT. LTD.
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
ISBN: 81-208-0008-7 (Cloth)
ISBN: 81-208-0717-0 (Paper)
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CONTENTS
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION ix
INTRODUCTION X1^
CHAPTER ONE: LOGIC AND DIALECTIC IN ANCIENT AND
MEDIEVAL INDIA 1
1.1 Ancient Indian Logic and the Question of
Greek Influence 1
1.2 Rules of Dialectic and Debate 9
1.3 Argument and Pseudo-Argument
(Nyäya and Nyäyäbhäsä) 23
1.4 The Early Nyäya Theory of Inference
(Nyäyasütra 1.1.5) 29
1.5 Pseudo-Reason {Hetväbhäsä) 42
1.6 What Do We Infer? 58
1.7 The Triple-Character'of Reason 68
CHAPTER Two: PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC IN
NAVYANYÄYA 76
2.1 Empty Terms 76
2.2 Reference and Existence 85
2.3 The Navyanyäya Logic of Property and
Location 112
2.4 The Problem of 'Universal Properties'
(kevalänvayiri) 128
2.5 Inference and Concomitance (vyäpti) 140
2.6 Double Negation in Navyanyäya 145
2.7 The'Difference'of Difference 155
2.8 Definition and Classification 164
2.9 Definition, Differentiation and Essence 176
CHAPTER THREE: PROBLEMS OF KNOWLEDGE AND
PERCEPTION 203
3.1 Awareness and Knowledge 203
3.2 Perceiving and Misperceiving 215
3.3 Knowing the External World 228
3.4 Memory 262
vijj Contents
CHAPTER FOUR: ONÏOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 268
4.1 Three Rival Ontologies: Nyâya, Buddhism and
Jainism 268
4.2 Causality 284
4.3 Substance (Jainism and Vaisesika) 294
4.4 Seven Ways of Non-Absolutism (Saptabhaiigi) 301
4.5 'Emptiness' and 'Many-sidedness' 314
4.6 Avidyä in Buddhism, Yoga and Nyäya 319
4.7 The Enigmas of Buddhism: Alayavijnana Duhkha
y
and Nirvana 333
4.8 Transmigration and the Moral Enigma of
Karma 35]
CHAPTER FIVE: INTERACTION OI GRAMMAR AND
PHILOSOPHY 372
5.1 The Doctrine of Karana 372
5.2 Substance and Quality in Sanskrit Grammatical
Theory 378
5.3 Grammatical Categories: A Navyanyâya
Appraisal 389
5.4 The Notion of the Sentence (vclkya) 398
5.5 Grammaticality and Meaningfulness 416
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 431
INDEX 439
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
Ï take this opportunity to note the important issues raised by
some of my reviewers and try to answer very briefly a few
constructive criticisms made by them.
The new sub-title underlines the fact that I have attempted to
reassess the problems of traditional and classical Indian
philosophy in contemporary setting. Hence it neither is a book
on history of philosophy nor a mere philological research on
texts of Indian philosophy. In the introduction to the first
edition, I emphasized upon philological issues. But that is
because it has been my firm belief that without sound philologi-
cal grounding original research in Indian philosophy is next to
impossible. I have studied the texts, however, as a philosopher.
It is true, as Professor Pranab Sen in his review in Mind
January 1989 has noted, that in Chapters Two, Three and Five, I
have dealt with what is 'particularly germane to contemporary
philosophic concerns'. However, in Chapter One, I deal with the
history of Indian logic, for history of logic in any tradition, I
believe, has, unlike the history of ideas, a separate philosophical
interest of its own. Jjn Chapter Four, I have been concerned with
certain broader question of Indian philosophy—the goal of
human life, the idea of freedom, moksa and samsara and the
notion of the self and non-self. Although these problems are
typically Indian, I still believe they ought to be of interest to
some modern philosophers (if, however, 'philosophy' is narrowly
defined to mean simply analytical philosophy or the so-called!
'naturalism' in modern philosophy then this would not be thd
case).
In view of certain critical remarks in the reviews, I have
reformulated some sentences in a couple of places. For example,
on page 211 my reformulation answers the objection raised by
Professor S. Bhättacharya in his 'Critical Notes' in J.I.C.P.R. in
1987, and others. I had said that a non-judgmental cognitive
state is not known to us. It has been pointed out that this goes
against the Nyàya view for it is said in Nyäya that such a state
is 'known' by inference. I still insist that such a state is not known