Table Of ContentLOGIC AND THE NATURE OF REALITY
LOGIC
and the
NATURE OF REALITY
by
LOUIS O. KATTSOFF
lin!vera!ty of North Carolina
I I
MARTINUS NIJHOFF -- THE HAGUE
1956
ISBN 978-94-011-8533-2 ISBN 978-94-011-9282-8 (eBook)
DOl 10.1 007/978-94-011-9282-8
CoPY'Yight I9j6 by Ma'Ytinus Nijhofl. The Hague. Nethe'Ylands
All 'Yights 'Yese'YVed. including the right to translate 0'1' to
'Yeproduce this book Of' pa'Yts thereof in any fO'Ym
To begin with, then, it seems to me that the most
important and interesting thing which philosophers
have tried to do is no less than this; namely: To give
a general description of the whole of the Universe,
mentioning all the most important kinds of things
which we know to be in it, considering how far it is
likely that there are in it important kinds of things
which we do not absolutely know to be in it, and also
considering the most important ways in which these
various kinds of things are related to one another.
G. E.MoORE
Some Main Problems in Philosophy
PREFACE
This book is not merely about metaphysics; it is an essay in
metaphysics. Furthermore, it is written in the firm conviction
that metaphysics is possible and meaningful metaphysical
statements can and should be made. However, I felt it necessary
to approach the perennial problems of metaphysics through the
avenues of linguistic analysis. I have tried not only to infiltrate
the position of the linguists but to show that a fifth column
already existed there. Yet the objections to metaphysics needed
to be met or at least some indication of how they could be met
had to be shown.
It is never enough to demonstrate that objections are un
founded - some positive indications of a possible metaphysics
had to be offered. This book, as a consequence, tries also to
draw at least in broad outline, a metaphysical position that
seems to me to be well-founded. In the present state of philoso
phy in the United States especially, this is sufficient reason for
publishing another book in philosophy.
I want to express my appreciation to a number of people. To
my colleagues at North Carolina I am grateful for stimulating
criticisms that often helped me see my way through to solutions.
To Professors B. Blanshard (Yale University), and Ledger Wood
(Princeton University), I am grateful for reading the manuscript.
To Professor Paul Weiss (Yale University), I am obligated not
merely for reading the manuscript but also for suggesting the
title. Needless to say, none of these gentlemen are responsible
for what I hold to be the case, nor should it be inferred that
they agree with me in all matters.
Thanks are due to the Research Council of the University of
North Carolina for a grant -:-in-aid,as well as to the Administration
for a sabbatical leave that enabled me to find the time to complete
the book.
CONTENTS
1. The Necessity of Metaphysical Solutions 1
2. Language and Metaphysics. . . . . . 15
3. What Metaphysics Can Be . . . . . . 30
4. Properties of the Metaphysical Language . 47
5. On What There Is .......... 60
6. How We Know the Essence of What There Is . 75
7. Modes of Knowledge and Intuition . . . . 90
8. The Verification of Metaphysical Statements 102
9. The Veridicality of Eidetic Intuition 115
10. Functions and Events . . . . . . 127
11. Negation, Conjunction, and Events 138
12. Implication and What There Is 150
13. Functions and Facts .... 162
14. Functions and Meaning . . . 174
15. Functions and Categories and Universals 185
16. Events and Actual Occasions 195
17. Actual Occasions . . . . . 207
18. Cosmology. . . . . . . . 219
19. Commitments and Language 234
Name Index . 245
Subject Index 246
CHAPTER I
THE NECESSITY OF METAPHYSICAL SOLUTIONS
Not the least interesting thing about the beginnings of a
revival of metaphysical interest is the source of that renewed
interest. When Camap developed the distinction between the
formal and material modes of speech and with that his various
formulations of syntactics, it was felt by him and his disciples
that the confusions of the metaphysicians had at long last been
definitively dispelled by being shown for what they really were
- a confusion based on the use of pseudo-object statements
because of an unjustified and uncritical application of the
material mode of speech. So Camap said at one time:
"The supposititious sentences of metaphysics, of the philosophy
of values, of ethics (in so far as it is treated as a normative
discipline and not as a psycho-sociological investigation of facts)
are pseudo-sentences; they have no logical content, but are only
expressions of feeling which in their tum stimulate feelings and
volitional tendencies on the part of the hearer." 1 But more
recently Camap has been driven to reconsider the questions of
ontology in connection with the very possibility of the con
struction of languages. Quine too, disturbed already in his
Mathematical Logic by the problem of "what there is" in the light
of language, reconsidered the situation in a paper of that title.
The result was an exchange of views between Camap and Quine
which at the time of this writing still promises to continue.2
In a sense the ontolo~cal problem had never been avoided.
It had been fought on such grounds as the existence of classes,
the existence of the null-class, and the very concept of existence
itself in connection with the problem of the "existential import of
1 R. Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language (New York: Harcourt, Brace &
Company), 1937, p. 278.
• W. V. Quine, "What There Is," Review of Metaphysics, II, 5, September, 1948,
pp.21ff.
2 The Necessity 01 Metaphysical Solutions
particular propositions." On a wider scale, the development of
the notion of semantics which deals with the rules for the "in
terpretation" of "formal" systems, it appears in retrospect at
least, made inevitable the revival of these ancient problems not
merely of what there is but of the nature of what there is. The
virtual elimination of the "class" in favor of "functions" seemed
to end that discussion in favor of nominalism. But it was not
clear to what, if anything, a "function" referred. What were
the types of objects whose names could be used to replace the
symbol that intended to refer to a "function"?
Like so many problems concerned with the construction of
techniques, the overwhelming fruitfulness of technical develop
ments pushed such problems into the background where they
lurked like the monsters they were, ready to appear whenever
the opportune moment arrived. And they did reappear in the
theory of descriptions and the attempted reduction of proper
names to descriptions in order, as Quine points out in his various
logics, to eliminate certain types of metaphysical problems that
have traditionally been associated with the problem of the
meanings of singular terms. Frege's distinction between 'sense'
and 'meaning' as well as Russell's theory of descriptions, and
Quine's distinction between "naming" and "meaning" are all
attempts to put a rational basis behind an assumed or implicit
dogma - the principles of nominalism and some form of empiric
ism. All of these assume that if a term in one language (e.g.,
'class') can be translated into terms in another language (e.g.,
'class' into 'function' or 'proper names' into 'descriptions' or
'abstract terms' into 'sense data terms') the ability to speak in
another way eliminates the referrents intended by the first mode
of speech. As a consequence, metaphysical terms are held to be
eliminated when they are translated into empirical ones, and it is
assumed that when they cannot be so translated from a meta
physical language to a non-metaphysical one, they are cognitively
meaningless.
Two things can be said here. There is the obvious remark that
such a translation elevates one language or one type of language
to a preferred position. Secondly, what is sauce for the goose
ought to be sauce for the gander. The metaphysician could have
insisted, but has not had the temerity to do so, that the argument
The Necessity of Metaphysical Solutions 3
could be made in reverse. If a language containing "descriptions"
can be translated into a language containing only "proper
names," etc., then this indicates the basic superfluity of de
scriptions, and what cannot be translated from an empirical
language into a conceptual one is cognitively meaningless. Viewed
in this way, the question reduces to a choice of languages and this
cannot be made within a given language but if it is at all a
possible choice other conditions would be demanded for its
execution. To describe those conditions would necessitate a
language, at least an informal one. It appears to me that no formal
ized language can be used to describe the reasons for the choice of
a language, since it would itself be subject to the request for a
reason for choosing it.
Unless, then, we are to assert, and there seems to be some
inclination on the part of some to take this drastic step, that the
choice of a language is purely a psychological matter, we are
driven to approach the problem from a new metaphysical
standpoint. If we do not, then we end in a complete sterility and
virtually a form of insanity. Those who would urge that the
choice of a language is psychological and/or cultural would be
confronted with the self-refuting position that what they have
said about the choice of languages is itself so determined and has
therefore no real significance. "Why should the choice of a
language be so determined?" becomes from this point of view a
meaningless question.
It is in principle not capable of being answered because to
reply to this question would necessitate a language not so
determined. To attempt an answer to the question in a language
determined by psychological and/or cultural factors would be
circular since no sentence could be framed in it except in terms
psychologically and/or culturally determined. It is possible to
say the question is meaningless in every language so determined,
but this too begs the question if it assumes that every language
is so determined. It is not very clear in what sense a language is
determined by psychological and/or cultural factors. Neither is it
clear what can be meant by saying that the choice of a language is
so determined. But even if it is assumed that we do know what we
mean by saying that the choice of a language is determined by psy
chological and/or sociological factors, the retention of a language
4 The Necessity 01 Metaphysical Solutions
is dependent on these only in an extended sense of the two terms.
The physicist quickly gives up English as the language of his
scientific work. The change from what might be called the
Newtonian language to the language of quantum physics
occurred because certain things could not be said about physical
events in the former which could be said in the latter, and many
things that could be said in the Newtonian language turned out to
be unverifiable at the sub-atomic leveL For example, a precise
determination of position could be described in the Newtonian
language but not verified, where statistical statements could be
said and approximately confirmed in the quantum language. If
it is urged that this is a semantic problem, I would agree. But the
choice of a language is precisely a matter of semantics.
It is easy enough to write down '(3:x).xis M'. We can interpret
this to mean 'there are mortals'. Furthermore "mortals" can be
indicated ostensively. Here it is easy to interpret '3:' as indicating
concrete existents. But the language may also contain '(3:f)'
where 'f' indicates a predicate variable. What then? Should we
say that 'there are predicates' must be meaningless or false
because we cannot ostensively indicate a predicate, nor even
experience one by means of our senses because they can give us
only particular objects with properties? How metaphysics
creeps into this is clear. Suppose we assert '(3:x)Mx'; unless we
were to insist that this, when interpreted, always is an analytic
statement, we must be able to separate "M" and the "x". If that
is the case then we can legitimately ask: "What is the nature 01
that whose name may be substituted for 'x' and that whose name
can be substituted for 'M'?" Of course, if '(3:x)Mx' were viewed
as an analytic form, it could hardly have been interpreted as an
existential for I presume no one would argue that an existential
assertion is verified by definition.
I am not concerned here with discussing the question of the
meaning of 'existence' in existential assertions. It is possible, of
course, that the term is highly ambiguous and the use of the
word 'existence' in interpreting '(3:x)' should be prohibited. But
then we should not feel that the substitution of 'there are ... ' for
'there exists .. .' is less ambiguous or answers any problems. 3 My
• L. o. Kattsoff, "Reichenbach's Treatment of 'Existence· ... Methodos. III, 12.
1951, pp. 275 ff.
