Table Of Content’
Locke s Moral Man
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Locke s Moral Man
Antonia LoLordo
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Acknowledgments
Thisisashortbook,butI’vehadalotofhelpwritingit.Theinitialidea
camefromaseminardiscussingsomeconnectionsbetweentheEssayand
TwoTreatises.I’dliketothankthestudents,especiallyJesseNewton.
Ipresented aversionofChapter1,withavery different conclusion,at
SPAWN 2009. Lisa Downing’s comments led me to revise the paper
radically and to see the importance of Locke’s discussions of animal
minds. Without her comments, I would have written a very different
book. I’d also like to thank Melissa Frankel and Kara Richardson, who
organized the conference, and the other participants. A version of
Chapter2 was presented at the 2008 Atlantic Canada Seminar in Early
Modern Philosophy. I owe thanks to the organizer, Tom Vinci, and the
audience. It was presented again at the 4th Biennial Margaret Wilson
memorial conference at Cornell, later that summer. At the 5th Biennial
MargaretWilsonconference,inBoulderin2010,Ipresentedaversionof
Chapter3. It’s a pleasant coincidence that both conferences were
organized by Ruth Mattern, whose work on Locke I’ve learned a great
dealfrom.I’mgratefultoherandallthepeopleshebroughttogetherfor
these events. I presented an overview of the whole project at UNC-
ChapelHillinthesummerof2011.IthankAlanNelsonfortheopportu-
nityandeveryonethereforadiscussionthathelpedmefigureoutthefinal
shapeoftheproject.
The Canadian Journal of Philosophy published an earlier version of
Chapter2, as “Locke on substance, mode, person and ‘the moral Man.’”
Ithanktheeditorsforpermissiontoreusethatmaterial.
Manypeoplehavereadallorpartofthemanuscriptatdifferentstages.
MarthaBolton,StewartDuncan,BrieGertler,PaulLodge,AnikWaldow,
Shelley Weinberg, and Ken Winkler gave helpful feedback on drafts of
individualchapters.MikeJacovidesreadthewholemanuscriptandhelped
mesolveamajorproblem.HealsoofferedencouragementwhenIreally
neededit.Iowehim.WalterOttgavemealongandvery helpful setof
comments,arecordsixdaysafterIsenthimthemanuscript.Mycolleagues
Trenton Merricks,JorgeSecada, and John Simmonsread alate draft and
saved me from some embarrassing mistakes. Trenton deserves special
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
thanksforhisrareattentiontostyle.TwoanonymousreviewersforOUP
gavemedetailedcomments.Thebookismuchbetterforthem,although
Idoubtthateitherwillbecompletelysatisfied.
Finally, I’d like to thank my partner, Missy, for things that have very
littletodowiththisbook.It’sdedicatedtoher.
Contents
Introduction 1
1. Liberty 25
2. Personality 64
3. Rationality 103
Conclusion 133
Bibliography 136
Index 143
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Introduction
I
Lockefacesaproblemfewphilosophersbeforehimfaced.Ononehand,
he denies that species boundaries exist independently of human conven-
tion,holdsthatthehumanmindmaybeeitheranimmaterialsubstanceor
a material one to which God has superadded the power of thought, and
insists that animals possess the abilityto perceive, will and even reason—
indeed, in some cases to reason better than humans. Thus, he eliminates
anysharpdistinctionbetweenhumansandtherestoftheanimalkingdom:
“inallthevisiblecorporealWorld,weseenoChasms,orGaps”(3.6.12).1
On the other hand, in his ethical and political work Locke assumes that
thereisasharpdistinctionbetweenmoralagentsandotherbeings.There
arenovaguecases,nobeingswithonlysomeoftherightsanddutiesthat
natural lawaccords tofull-fledged moralagents.2Lockethus needs tobe
abletodelineatethesetofmoralagentsprecisely,withoutrelyingonthe
sortofmetaphysicalandphysicalfactshispredecessorsappealedto.Moral
agencycannotbeamatterofbelongingtoacertainspecies,possessingan
immaterialsoul,orevenpossessingthecapacitytoreason.Whatthendoes
itconsistin?3
1 AllreferenceswithoutfurtheridentificationaretotheEssay,whichiscitedbybook,
chapter,andsectionnumber.
2 Tobeprecise,nobeingsstartoutwithonlysomeoftherightsanddutiesthatnaturallaw
accordstofull-fledgedmoralagents.Oncewestartinteractingwithothers,wecanloseor
gainparticularrightsanddutiesthroughfreealienationandforfeiture.
3 Lockeisnot,ofcourse,thefirstphilosophertofacequestionsaboutthebasisofmoral
agency.Writersinthenaturallawtraditionhaveoftenwantedtogivesomeaccountofthe
relevantfeaturesofhumannature.ButLockefacesthequestioninasomewhatstarkerform.
Previousphilosophersfeltconfidentthattheclassofmoralagentsincludedhumanbeingsbut
nootheranimals.Whattheyneededtodowastoexplainwhichfeaturesofhumanbeingsare
relevanttomoralagency.Incontrast,Lockefacesnotonlythequestionofwhatproperties
