Table Of ContentLOCAL COMMONS AND
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE
LOCAL COMMONS
AND GLOBAL
INTERDEPENDENCE
Heterogeneity and Cooperation in
Two Domains
edited by
Robert O. Keohane
and Elinor Ostrom
Published under the auspices of the
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
® SAGE Publications
London • Thousand Oaks • New Delhi
© Sage Publications 1995
This edition first published 1995
Previously published as a Special Issue of the Journal of
Theoretical Politics; Volume 6 (1994), no. 4.
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CONTENTS
Notes on Contributors vii
1 Introduction
Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom 1
Part I: Theoretical Puzzles
2 The Problem of Scale in Human/Environment Relationships
Or an R. Young 27
3 The Politics of Scope: Endogenous Actors, Heterogeneity and
Institutions
Duncan Snidal 47
4 Heterogeneity, Linkage and Commons Problems
Lisa L. Martin 71
Part II: Evidence from the Laboratory
5 Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution:
Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts
Steven Hackett, Dean Dudley and James Walker 93
Part III: Evidence from the Field
6 Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action
Elinor Ostrom 125
7 The Conditions for Successful Collective Action
Gary D. Libecap 161
8 Self-interest and Environmental Management
Kenneth A. Oye and James H. Maxwell 191
9 Heterogeneities at Two Levels: States, Non-state Actors and
Intentional Oil Pollution
Ronald B. Mitchell 223
Index 253
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
DEAN DUDLEY is Assistant Professor of Economics in the Department of Social Sciences at
the United States Military Academy. Current working papers include individual Choice in
Common Pool Resource Environments: An Experimental Approach', 'Forecasting Behavior in
Experimental Common Pool Resource Appropriation and Public Good Provision Environ-
ments' and individual Provision Choice in Voluntary Contribution Public Good Environ-
ments: An Experimental Approach'. Current research focuses on strategies for downsizing large
organizations. ADDRESS: Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy,
West Point, NY 10996, USA; [email protected]
STEVEN HACKETT is Assistant Professor, School of Business and Economics, Humboldt
State University and Research Associate of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy
Analysis at Indiana University. His principal research focus is on contracting and the activities
of firms, with recent attention to problems of ex-post contractual negotiations. Recent public-
ations include 'A Comparative Analysis of Merchant and Broker Intermediation', Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization; incomplete Contracting: A Laboratory Experimental
Analysis', Economic Inquiry; and 'Bottlenecks and Governance Structures: Open Access and
Long-Term Contracting in Natural Gas' (with T. Lyon), Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization. ADDRESS: School of Business and Economics, Humboldt State University,
Arcata, CA 95521-8299, USA; [email protected]
ROBERT O. KEOHANE is Stanfield Professor of International Peace, Harvard Univer-
sity. He is the author of After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy; co-author of Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research
and co-editor of Institutions for the Earth: Sources of International Environmental Protection.
ADDRESS: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138,
USA; [email protected]
GARY D. LIBECAP is Professor of Economics and Director of the Karl Eller Center at the
University of Arizona, Tucson, and Research Associate with the National Bureau of Economic
Research, Cambridge, MA. He received his PhD in economics from the University of Penn-
sylvania in 1976. His research areas involve investigations of property rights and regulatory
arrangements, as well as bureaucratic behavior. ADDRESS: Karl Eller Center, University
of Arizona, McClelland Hall, Tucson, AZ 85721, USA; [email protected]
LISA L. MARTIN is John L. Loeb Associate Professor of the Social Sciences in the Govern-
ment Department at Harvard University. She received her PhD in Government from Harvard
in 1989. She studies international cooperation and international institutions, and is the author
of Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. ADDRESS: Center for
International Affairs, 1737 Cambridge Street, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138,
USA; [email protected]
JAMES H. MAXWELL is a visiting scholar at MIT's Center for International Studies and has
served as Co-Director of MIT's Technology, Business, and Environment Program. He received
his PhD in the field of Public Policy from MIT. He has written numerous articles on environ-
mental policy, including recent articles on the political economy of the CFC phase-out, corpo-
rate environmental practices among the Japanese automobile transplants and on the policy
Vlll NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
issues surrounding recycling. ADDRESS: Center for International Studies, MIT, E38-648, 292
Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA.
RONALD B. MITCHELL holds a PhD in Public Policy from Harvard University and is cur-
rently an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Oregon. His book, Inten-
tional Oil Pollution at Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance» will be published by
MIT Press in 1994. ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, 1284 University of Oregon,
Eugene, OR 97403-1284, USA; [email protected]
ELINOR OSTROM is Co-director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis
and the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Bloomington.
She is the author of Governing the Commons and Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing
Irrigation Systems; co-author with Larry Schroeder and Susan Wynne of Institutional Incen-
tives and Sustainable Development and co-author with Roy Gardner and James Walker of
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. ADDRESS: Workshop in Political Theory and
Policy Analysis, Indiana University, 513 North Park, Bloomington, IN 47408-3895, USA;
[email protected]
KENNETH A. OYE is Director of the Center for International Studies and Associate Professor
of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is author of Economic
Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s and 1980s; co-
editor of Eagle in a New World: American Grand Strategy in the Post-Cold War Era.
ADDRESS: Center for International Studies, MIT, E38-648, 292 Main Street, Cambridge, MA
02139, USA; [email protected]
DUNCAN SNIDAL is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and the
Harris Graduate School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. His research focuses on
issues of international cooperation and the role of international institutions. ADDRESS:
Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, 5828 South University Avenue,
Chicago, IL 60737, USA; [email protected]
JAMES WALKER is Professor of Economics and Associate Director of the Workshop in
Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. His principal research focus is the
use of experimental methods in the investigation of behavior related to the voluntary provi-
sion of public goods and the use of common-pool resources. Recent publications include
'Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible' (with Elinor Ostrom
and Roy Gardner), American Political Science Review, 'Probabilistic Destruction of Common-
Pool Resources: Experimental Evidence' (with Roy Gardner), Economic Journal; and 'Group
Size and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence Utilizing Large
Groups* (with R. Mark Isaac and Arlington Williams), Journal of Public Economics.
ADDRESS: Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA;
[email protected]
ORAN R. YOUNG is Director of both the Institute of Arctic Studies and the Institute on
International Environmental Governance at Dartmouth College. He is the author of Resource
Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Institutions; International Cooperation: Building
Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment; and International Governance: Protec-
ting the Environment in a Stateless Society. ADDRESS: Institute of Arctic Studies, Dartmouth
College, 6193 Murdough Center, Hanover, NH 03755-3560, USA;oran.r.young@dartmouth.
edu
1. INTRODUCTI ON
Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom
Neither modern states nor small farmers in remote areas of poor countries
can appeal to authoritative hierarchies to enforce rules governing their rela-
tions with one another. In world politics, the lack of a world government
means that states must find ways to cooperate with one another and to reach
agreements that can be maintained through the use of reciprocity rather than
through hierarchy. For small farmers in Asia, as well as many other people
seeking to appropriate resources from a common pool, national govern-
ments are too remote or uncomprehending to be helpful in encouraging
productive cooperation - whether such cooperation involves maintaining
irrigation systems or other ways of sustaining common-pool resources
(CPRs).
It is popularly believed that the actors involved in common-pool resource
problems, whether individuals or governments, are trapped in an inexorable
tragedy of the commons' from which they cannot extract themselves
(G. Hardin, 1968). Empirical and theoretical work on multi-period CPR
situations, however, has shown that the Inexorable' nature of the problem
results more from the assumptions used by theorists than from constraints
that are universally present in all CPR situations. Indeed, research on local
CPR problems has demonstrated that under some circumstances solutions
worked out by those individuals directly affected prove more successful and
enduring than resource regimes imposed by central political authorities.1
Many successfully governed CPRs have survived for centuries relying on
self-monitoring and self-enforcing patterns of human interaction. It is
encouraging to realize that reliance on self-help schemes can be a positive
advantage in small-scale CPR regimes.
Students of international politics have often made similar claims to those
of observers who believe that the tragedy of the commons can only be over-
Support of the National Science Foundation in the form of grant number NSF SBR-9308633
is deeply appreciated. The authors wish to thank Nazli Choucri, Steve Hackett, Lisa Martin,
Ron Mitchell, Duncan Snidal, Jimmy Walker and Oran Young for comments on an earlier draft
and all participants in the October 1993 conference for their stimulating discussion leading to
this introductory paper. We are particularly indebted to Patty Dalecki for her editing and pro-
duction skills and to Stanra King and Brenda Bushouse for assisting us in putting this collection
together.
1. See Berkes, 1989; Blomquist, 1992; Bromley et al., 1992; Feeny et al., 1990; Matthews,
1993; McCay and Acheson, 1987; McKean, 1992; Netting, 1981; E. Ostrom, 1990; V. Ostrom
et al., 1993; Pinkerton, 1989; Tang, 1992.
