Lithuania 1940: Revolution from Above. (On the Boundary of Two Worlds: Identity, Freedom, and Moral Imagination in the Baltics)

297 Pages·2007·1.79 MB·English

by  Alfred Erich Senn

LITHUANIA 1940
RevoLUTIoN fRom Above
on the boundary of Two Worlds:
Identity, freedom, and moral Imagination
in the baltics
9
Editor
Leonidas Donskis, Professor of Political Science and Philosophy, and
Director of the Political Science and Diplomacy School at vytautas
magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania
Editorial and Advisory Board
Timo Airaksinen, University of Helsinki, finland
Egidijus Aleksandravicius, Lithuanian emigration Institute;
vytautas magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania
Stefano Bianchini, University of bologna, forlì Campus, Italy
Endre Bojtar, Central european University; budapest, Hungary
Kristian Gerner, University of Uppsala, Sweden
John Hiden, University of Glasgow, UK
Mikko Lagerspetz, estonian Institute of Humanities, estonia
Andreas Lawaty, Nordost-Institut; Lüneburg, Germany
Olli Loukola, University of Helsinki, finland
Hannu Niemi, University of Helsinki, finland
Alvydas Nikzentaitis, Lithuanian History Institute, Lithuania
Yves Plasseraud, Paris, france
Rein Raud, University of Helsinki, finland, and estonian Institute
of Humanities, estonia
Alfred Erich Senn, University of Wisconsin-madison, USA, and
vytautas magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania
David Smith, University of Glasgow, UK
Saulius Suziedelis, millersville University, USA
Joachim Tauber, Nordost-Institut; Lüneburg, Germany
Tomas Venclova, Yale University, USA
LITHUANIA 1940
RevoLUTIoN fRom Above
Alfred erich Senn
Amsterdam - New York, NY 2007
Cover photo: “Hill of Crosses” (Lithuania).
The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of
“ISo 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for
documents - Requirements for permanence”.
ISbN-13: 978-90-420-2225-6
©editions Rodopi b.v., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2007
Printed in the Netherlands
Contents
Introduction 1
I. TheMolotov-RibbentropPact 7
II. TheVilniusComplex 27
III. ATrojanHorse? 49
IV. AnUncertainWinter 65
V. TheSovietInvasion 85
VI. TheRefugee 103
VII. Moscow’sProconsul 119
VIII. ThePeople’sGovernment 135
IX. FromUnderground 151
X. “TheMoorCanGo” 169
XI. TheClassStruggle 185
XII. TheElections 205
XIII. Sovietization 225
XIV. TheBalanceSheet 243
Notes 255
Index 287

Introduction
Thepurposeof thisstudy is twofold. Itsmainfocus isontheway in
which Soviet officials arranged Lithuania’s incorporation into the Soviet
Union in 1940. Its second purpose is to examine the collapse of the
authoritarian regime that ruled Lithuania from December 1926 until the
SovietinvasionofJune1940.Thetimeperiodcoveredrunsfromthesigning
of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, also known as the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact, on August 23, 1939, until Lithuania’s formal incorporation
intotheSoviet Union in August 1940. Thestudyfocuses mainlyon political
developments and not so much on the economic and social changes
introduced by Soviet rule; the “sovietization” of Lithuania after its
incorporation into the Soviet Union is a much larger subject that demands a
broader examination than this study can offer. Similarly the question of
Stalin’s general motives in his foreign policy of 1939–1940, while certainly
relevant to this subject, lies basically beyond its purview; the study focuses
first of all on the process of the Soviet Union’s formal incorporation of
Lithuania.
In a secret protocol attached to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union divided East Central Europe between
themselves; by this agreement, Lithuania fell into the German “sphere of
interest.” Germany subsequently traded Lithuania to the Soviet Union in
exchange for a part of Poland that had first been designated for Soviet
occupation. After Moscowhadforced the Lithuanianstoaccept thepresence
of Soviet troops within their borders, Lithuania eventually underwent a
radical social/political revolution and became a part of the Soviet Union.
Soviet scholars long called the very idea that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact
includedasecretprotocolawesternfabrication,afalsificationofhistory, and
when they finally admitted the protocol’s existence, they dismissed the
thoughtthat Soviet troops stationedin Lithuaniahadanythingtodowith the
events leading up to Lithuania’s incorporation into the USSR. Lithuanians,
they insisted, had carried out a social revolution and of their own free will
hadrequestedincorporationintotheSovietUnion.FewLithuanianhistorians
today acceptsuch interpretations.
The speed with which the old order in Lithuania collapsed and the
newonedeveloped isstriking. In August1940,theSovietUnion swallowed
all three Baltic states—Latvia and Estonia in addition to Lithuania. Some
authors have suggested that the job of sovietizing Lithuania was easier than
Moscow had expected, and contemporary German observers remarked that
during June and July 1940 the Lithuanians showed more enthusiasm in
popular demonstrations than did the Latvians or Estonians. It is not the
purpose of this study, however, to compare the Lithuanian experience with
the Latvian or Estonian experience; the purpose here is to examine the
2 AlfredErichSenn
process of the collapse of the old regime in Lithuania and the country’s
transitiontobecomingaunionrepublicof theSovietUnion.
Historianshavemoreor less established themajor landmarks in the
process of the Soviet Union’s incorporation of Lithuania, and to recount
enormous detail here would probably be unnecessary effort—there is,
moreover,an ocean ofdetails yet topour out ofthearchives. Theinteresting
problem, at least to me, lies more in the way that interpretations of those
events clash than in the account of the events themselves. Therefore I have
spread commentary on specific documents, specific events, the actions of
specific persons, and generally the major lines of interpretation throughout
thetext. Acriticalreader maydecidethatI“maywell”haveusedthephrase
“may well” too much, but I have allowed myself some freedom for
speculating on questions for which I have no clear answer, so to speak
jumpingthegapsbetween documents. Myhopehereistostimulateothersto
investigate thesequestionsmore thoroughly.
A Lithuanian reader today might object that I have spent too much
time discussing Soviet interpretations of processes and events, but Soviet
historiography produced a considerable library of works describing the
events of 1940. Western historians have used them, and these works have
influenced western views in one way or another. Soviet historiography
grosslymisrepresentedthespiritand actionsofthetime,usuallyomittingthe
regime’s use of physical and psychological terror and also thenewregime’s
glorification of Stalin. The exhibitions of popular enthusiasm that Soviet
historians stressed only represented the surface of the “revolution.” Striking
fear into the hearts of opponents, whether real or only potential, was an
important tactic in the Soviet program for action, just as praise for the
Stalinist system and its master was also a vital part of the program.
SeparatingStalin fromthereal,dailyimageoftheSoviet Unionin the1930s
falsifiedhistoricalmemory. ThepracticeofignoringMoscow’s pro-German
propaganda in1939–1940falsifiedhistoricalmemory. Theeffortsofsome to
argue that “everything would have been fineif not for Stalin” also distorted
therealityoftheday;Stalinwasan overwhelmingfigureintheSovietorder;
serious historiography of this period cannot just omit mention of his name.
In turn, such manipulation of the historical evidence produced books and
interpretations that still sit in libraries throughout the world, and I feel the
need torespond.1
ComplicatingthisefforttoevaluateSoviethistoriographyisthefact
that someLithuanianhistorians, trained in Soviet times, object tobeingheld
responsibleforwhatwaspublishedundertheirnamesinthosedays. Thereis
no clear way out of this situation. When Mikhail Gorbachev’s advisor,
Aleksandr Iakovlev, cametoLithuaniainAugust1988andheardcomplaints
about thedistortions ofSoviet historiography, hedeclared thatthehistorians
themselves had written all that material. The historians had of course been
working under strict rules of censorship, but even when the rules had been
Lithuania1940:Revolution fromAbove 3
relaxed, there were established historians whose first post-Soviet writings
indicated that they had in fact believed much of what they had written in
Soviet times—as, indeed there are still people who believe what those
historians wrote. Now some would prefer that those works be forgotten.
Insofar as thematerialspublished in Soviet times arestill in libraries and on
bookshelves, thisstudy mustrespond tothem.
Theissuesconsideredinthisstudy,althoughnowover 65yearsold,
haveechoes evenin the twenty-firstcentury. In thewinterof2004–2005,the
presidents of Latvia, Lithuania, andEstoniaagonized over whether toattend
a summit gathering of world leaders in Moscow to celebrate the sixtieth
anniversaryoftheendofWorldWarIIThedefeat ofNaziGermanyin 1945
hadonlyreinforced theSoviethold on thethreestates, andnowvoices in all
threewereinsistingthattheirpresidentsshouldattendthiscelebrationonly if
the Russian government apologized for the action of its Soviet predecessor.
The president of Russia, however, had no intention of apologizing. The
presidents therefore had to choose between participating in a major world
gathering or boycotting it in the name of historical grievances—or, as this
study considers the events of 1940, in the name of historical
“interpretations.”
“Interpretation” includes historiography, opinions, memories, and
presumptions, together with clichés, self-delusion,and mystification,in short
almostanythingthat mightinfluenceandcolor theunderstandingofaperson
studying or simply discussing the events of 1940 in Lithuania. The term
“collective memory” is now popular, and this study experiments with this
idea. But a major problemarisesin definingthe“collective”whosememory
is being plumbed. Under Soviet rule the residents of Lithuania as a whole
lost much of their sense of community; the society fractionalized into
antagonistic sections. And conflicting memories now keep that
fractionalizationalive,insomewaysevenintensifying it. Contradictionsand
unconvincing arguments abound together with controversy. The polemical
literature is enormous: Some works read like legal indictments, others tell
heroic tales. Too much happened too quickly; “memories” could not absorb
all the details; and then the surviving and conflicting “memories” nurtured
feelingsofpersecution andsuffering.
There is no way to reconcile the polar interpretations of events in
Lithuania between August 1939 and August1940. Soviet historianspictured
the events of 1940 as a mass revolution in which the Communist Party
provided theeliteleadership thatthesituation demanded. Thefirst step was
theformationofa“people’sgovernment,”“atransitionalformontheroadto
a socialist state,” a “popular front” made up of the “non-communist anti-
fascistLeft”andsupportedbythe“pettybourgeoisie.” AsSovietLithuanian
historians put it, “The theory of people’s democracy, the anti-fascist
revolution,atthattimeconstitutedthebasisfor anewstrategicorientation of
thecommunistmovement.”2