Table Of ContentLiberalislll
and the
Lin1its ofJustice
SECOND EDITION
MICHAELJ. SANDEL
r.A
~ MRUTnc;.p
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l!:l Cambridge University Press 1982, 1998
This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception
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the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First edition published 1982
Second edition first published 1998
Reprinted 1998
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To my parents
Contents
Preface to the Second Edition: The Limits
of Communitarirmism pageix
AcknmLJh!rlg?nrmts xvii
Introduction: Liberalism and the P1·imacy ofj ustice
l
The Foundations of Liberalism: Kant versus Mill
2
The Transcendental Subject 7
The Sociological Ol~jection ll
Deontolof:,ry with a Humean Face 13
Justice and the Moral Su~ject 15
The Primacy of.Justice and the Priority of the Self 15
Liberalism without Metaphysics: The Original Position 24
The Circumstances of.Justice: Empiricist Objections 28
The Circumstances of.Justice: Deontological Rejoinder 40
In Search of the Moral Sul~ject 4 7
The Self and the Other: The Priority of Plurality 50
The Self and I L<; Ends: The Su l~jcct of Possession 54
Individualism and the Claims of Community 6o
2 Possession, Desert, and Distrilmtivc.Justicc 66
Libertarianism to Egalitarianism 66
Meritocracy versus the Difference Principle 72
Defending Common Assets 77
The Basis of Desert 82
Individual and Social Claims: Who Owns \Vhat? g. :-)
3 Contract Theory imd.Justilication 104
The Morality ofComract 105
Contracts versus Contractarian Arg-uments 1 og
Libera Ii sm and the Priority of Procedure 1 1 3
What Really ( ~oes on behind the Vci I of Ig-norance 1 2 2
C'rm/m/.1·
4 Justice and the Good
I ;~;~
The Unity of the Self
I;~;~
The Case of Affirmative Action
I;~!)
Three Conceptions of Community 147
Agency and the Role of Reflection
I ~)4
Agency and the Role of' Choice I() I
The Status of the Good <1r.,
1
The Moral Epistemoll>)..,')' of'.Justice !()8
Justice and Community I ,1_ '-)
Conclusion: Liberalism and the Limits o!Justin· 7
1 ~}
Deontology's Liberating Pndect
1 7~1
Character, Self~Knowlcdge, and Friendship 17R
A Response to Rawls' Political Liberalism 1 fLt
Contesting the Priority of the Right over the Com! 1R5
Defending the Priority of the Right over the Good 1fl9
Assessing Political Liberalism
195
BibliograjJh)'
Index
Preface to the Second Edition
The Limits of Communitarianism
Much has changed in the landscape of political philosophy since this
book first appeared. The 198os and 1990s brought an avalanche of
books and articles devoted to what now goes by the name of the
'liberal-communitarian' debate. Meanwhile, John Rawls, whose de
servedly celebrated work A Them)' r!f.fustir:e was the primary focus of
my critique, has recast his theory in important ways. In the new final
chapter for this second edition, I examine the revised version of lib
eralism that Rawls presents in his recent work. In this preface, I wish
to register some unease with the 'communitarian' label that has been
applied to the view advanced in Liberalism and the Limits ofjuslir:e (LL]).
WJ-IEIU: COMMUNlTARIANISl\1 GOES WRONG
Along with the works of other contemporary critics of liberal political
theory, notably Alasdair Macintyre, 1 Charles Taylor,2 and Michael
Walzer,'1 IJ~f has come to be identified with the 'communitarian'
critique or rights-oriented liberalism. Since part of my argument is
that contemporary liberalism offers an inadequate account of com
munity, the term fits to some extent. In many respects, however, the
)abel is misleading. The 'liberal-communitarian' debate that has
raged among political philosophers in recent years describes a range
of issues, and I do not always find myself on the communitarian side.
The debate is sometimes cast as an argument between those who
prize individual liberty ancl those who think the values of the com
munity or the will or the m<~jority should always prevail, or between
those who believe in universal human rights and those who insist
1 See Alasdair Maciiii)'IT, Afln Vir/Ill' (No1n· Danlt': Unil'ersityorNotrc Dame Press. 1981) .
~ Sec· Ch:uks 'I:iylor, l'iri!!J.Iof•hi('((/ l'nJwn, TII/I. 1: llumou :\grul)· nut! I.IIII,S;IIn,l.'l'; TJo/. II: l'iri/11.1·
oJiiry nlllllhr /lrwu//1 Srirnrr.1 (<:am hridg~·: <:am hridgc \Jnil'nsity Press. 1! JH;,): and 'E1ylor.
Smrrrl'.l of !Ill' Sdj: '1'/rr Maldrrg ofi\lotlrm ltlrntily (Cambridge. Mass.: llarl'ard Unil'crsit)'
Press, I !l!l!)) ·
:I Sc•c· Michac·l Walle-r. SJ•Iwn'.\ '!f./11.1/irr: A l>c:fi·n.\1· of 1'/rna/i.llll mull;qflfliity (New \'nrk: Basic
!looks, 1 !JH:I).
l'rrfarr to thr Srrmul Edition
there is no way to criticize orjud~e the valut's that inf(mn difl<.:rent
cultures and traditions. lnsoEu· as 'commtmitarianism' is another
name for m;~joritarianism, or for the idea that rights should rest on
the values that predominate in any given community at any given
time, it is not a view I would defend.
\Vhat is at stake in the debate between Raw lsi an liberalism and the
view I advance in Ll)is not whether ri~hts are important hut whether
rights can be idcntif1ed and justified in a way that docs not presup
pose any particular conception of the good life. At issue is not
whether individual or communal claims should carry greater weight
but whether the principles ofjusticc that govcm the basic structure
of society can be neutral with respect to the competing moral and
religious convictions iL~ citizens espouse. The fundamental question,
in other words, is whether the right is prior to the good.
For Rawls, as for ~1.nt, the priority of the 1·ight over the good stands
for two claims, and it is important to clistin~uish them. The first is the
claim that certain individual rights arc so important that even the
general welfare cannot override them. The second is the claim that
the principles ofjustice that specify our ri~hts do not depend for their
justification on any particular conception of the good life or, as Rawls
has put it more recently, on any 'comprehensive' moral or religious
conception. It is the second claim for the priority of ri~ht, not the
first, that Ll} seeks to challenge.
The notion that justice is relative to the good, not independent of
it, connects LIJ to writings by others commonly identified as the
'communitarian critics' of liberalism. Bill there arc two versions of
lhe claim thatjustice is relative to good, and only one of them is 'com
ln.unitarian' in the usual sense. Much of the confusion that has beset
lh.e liberal-communitarian debate arises from failing to distinguish
lite two versions.
One way oflinkingjustice with conceptions of the good holds that
~tinciples ofjustice derive their moral force from values commonly
~~>paused or widely shared in a particular community or tradition.
his way of linking justice and the good is communitarian in the
~~nse that the values of the community dcf1ne what counts as just or
\~ust. On this view, the case for recognizing a right depends on
~~owing that such a right is implicit in the shared understandings that
\\form the tradition or community in question. There can be dis
\-reement, of course, about what rights the shared umkrstandings of
X
Preface to the Second Edition
a particular tradition actually support; social cnt1cs and political
reformers can interpret tradit.ions in ways that challenge prevailing
prt~ctices. But these arguments always take the form of recalling a
community to itself, of appealing to ideals implicit but unrealized in
a common project or tradition.
A second way oriinkingjustice with conceptions of the good holds
that principles ofjustice depend for their justification on the moral
worth or intrinsic good of the ends they serve. On this view, the case
for recognizing a right depends on showing that it honors or
advances some important human good. vVhether this good happens
to be widely prized or implicit in the traditions of the community
would not be decisive. The second way of tying justice to conceptions
of the good is thet·efore not, stTictly speaking, communitarian. Since
it resL~ the case for righL~ on the moral importance of the purposes or
ends rights promote, it is better described as teleological, or (in the
jargon of contemporary philosophy) perfectionist. Aristotle's politi
cal theory is an example: Before we can define people's rights or
investigate 'the nature of the ideal constitution', he writes, 'it is nec
essary for us first to determine the nature of the most desirable way of
life. As long as that remains obscure, the nature of the ideal constitu
tion must also remain obscure. '4
or the two ways of linking justice to conceptions of the good, the
first is insurtlcient. The mere fact that certain practices arc sanc
tioned by the tradit.ions of a particular community is not enough to
make them just. To make justice the creature of convention is to
deprive it of it.~ critical character, even if allowance is made for com
peting interpretations of what the relevant tradition requires. Argu
menL~ about justice and rights have an unavoidably judgmental
aspect. Liberals who think the case for rights should be neutral
toward substantive moral and religious docu·ines and communitari
ans who think rights should rest on prevailing social values make a
similar mistake; both try to avoid passingjudgment on the content of
the ends that rights promote. But these arc not the only alternatives.
A third possibility, more plausible in my view, is that rights depend for
their justification on the moral importance of the ends they serve.
,1 '/11P l'o/itirJ of'Aii.l/ollt•, 1:1~:1a 1.1, t:fl. and trans. by Ernest Barker (London: Oxford Uni·
versity Press, I !)!iH), p. 27!1·
XI
