Levinas, Ethical Subjectivity and the Infinite Demands of Education Anna Harriet Block Strhan

269 Pages·2012·24.35 MB·English

'Bringing Me More Than I Contain':
Levinas, Ethical Subjectivity and the
Infinite Demands of Education
Anna Harriet Block Strhan
Institute of Education, University of London
Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD
Abstract
Emmanuel Levinas's reorientation of ethics as preceding ontology and his radical
presentation of responsibility, justice, consciousness and knowledge are of clear
relevance for education. It is therefore not surprising that in the last decade we have
seenanumber ofstudiesofLevinas by educationaltheorists.
Much of this work has focused on Levinas's relevance for issues of ethics, social
justice, multiculturalism and moral education. This thesis draws on this previous
research, but aims to take educational readings of Levinas in another direction
through considering how his presentation ofdiscourse, language and subjectivity, as
dependent on an infinite ethical demand, troubles several dominant orientations
within educational discourse that treat education in ways that can become totalising
and instrumentalist.
I begin by offering a philosophical analysis of how Levinas describes the scene of
teaching andthe nature ofsubjectivity. I then interrogate how this reading ofLevinas
disturbs some current understandings of education: first, the way that, within
liberalism, education can be conceived instrumentally as the site for the development
ofacertainkind ofindividual (arationally autonomouschooser,etc.), and second,the
way that neoliberal educational ideologies have privileged managerialism,
performance and the market, with Religious Education providing a case study ofthe
implications of Levinas's interruption. I then consider how this leads to new
understandings ofcommunity andpolitical subjectivitywithin education.
In this way, I explore how responding to Levinas, and reading his work together with
criticisms addressed by Badiou and others, leads us not just to a richer vision ofthe
meaning of education, but also to a more motivating understanding of the ethical
subjectivity ofboth studentsand teachers, which is dependent on a deepeningand an
archic responsibility, and which invites us to work for a better education extending
beyondthe straight lineofthe law.
2
I hereby declare that, exceptwhere explicitattributionis made, the workpresented in
this thesis is entirely my own.
Anna Strhan
3/9/09
Word count(exclusive ofappendixand bibliography):
99,732 words
3
Contents
Acknowledgements 5
List ofabbreviations 6
Introduction 7
1 'Bringing MeMoreThanI Contain': Discourse,Subjectivityandthe 29
SceneofTeachingin TotalityandInfinity
2 The DemandofInfinite Responsibilityin Otherwisethan Being 60
3 The VerySubjectionofthe Subject:Heteronomy,Autonomyandthe 93
Aims ofEducation
4 The ObliterationofTruthbyManagement:Badiou,Levinasand 123
EconomiesofEducation
5 AReligiousEducationOtherwise? 152
6 And WhoismyNeighbour? Community,Dialogueandthe 175
Commandmentto Love
7 PoliticalDisappointment,Educationandthe AnarchicEthical Subject 220
Coda 251
Appendix: List ofpublications 258
Bibliography 259
4
Acknowledgements
Paul Standishhas contributedincalculablyto the completionofthis thesis. I thank
him for his unfailing support, patience and encouragement, and the attentionand care
he has shown towardsthe detail ofmy writing, consistently helping me to articulate
and re-articulate my readings ofLevinas withineducation.
The developmentofthis thesis has also been dependent on those who have asked
aboutmy project, listened and respondedto my explanations, asked questions and
offeredinterpretations. Many ofthese have been students and members ofthe
Philosophy Sectionatthe Institute ofEducation,who have providedawelcoming and
supportive environmentto pursue this research. Particularmentionshouldbe made of
Graham Haydon and Terence McLaughlinwho first encouraged me to embarkon
research in this area. Most ofthe chaptershere have beenread at conferences,
seminars and colloquia, andI am grateful for the opportunitiesthis has allowedfor
discussionofthe ideas presentedhere with members ofthe Philosophy ofEducation
Society ofGreat Britain, the University ofKyoto, and KU Leuven.
Finally, I need to thank Martinfor the support, enthusiasm and encouragementhe has
providedme withthroughout.
Material in various chapters has beenpublished elsewhere, and a list ofthese
publications is provided inthe appendix.
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List ofAbbreviations
Works by Levinas
BV Beyondthe Verse
BW BasicPhilosophicalWritings
CP CollectedPhilosophicalPapers
DF DifficultFreedom
DEH DiscoveringExistencewithHusserl
EE ExistenceandExistents
GDT God, Death,andTime
GM OfGod WhoComesToMind
LR TheLevinasReader
OE OnEscape
OB Otherwise thanBeingorBeyondEssence
OS OutsidetheSubject
RB IsItRighteousToBe?
RPH 'Reflectionson thePhilosophyofHitlerism,
THP TheTheoryofIntuitioninHusserl's Phenomenology
TI TotalityandInfinity
TN In the Time ofNations
TR Nine TalmudicReadings
Works by Badiou
BE BeingandEvent
E Ethics:An Essayonthe Understanding ofEvil
HI HandbookofInaesthetics
M Metapolitics
SP SaintPaul: TheFoundationofUniversalism
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Introduction
Why Levinas? Why Subjectivity?
On 6th January 2006, the French newspaper Le Monde, responding to the centennial
celebrations ofEmmanuel Levinas's birth, published an article entitled, 'Generation
Levinas?' (Levy, 2006). This question could be seen, as Sean Hand notes in a recent
introduction to Levinas, as 'in itselfconfirm[ing] Levinas's rapid rise from respected
footnote of phenomenology to key representative of a decisive shift in Western
philosophy's history' (Hand, 2009, p. 109). Sincehis death in 1995,the influence of
the Lithuanian-born philosopher has moved far beyond post-war philosophical
reflection, permeating critical theory, theology, aesthetics, sociology, psychoanalysis,
human rights theory, war studies, literary and legal theory. That influence is still
extending, so that it might reasonably be claimed that Jacques Derrida was right to
state, in the speech he gave at Levinas's funeral, subsequently published in Adieu to
EmmanuelLevinas, that thework ofLevinas is 'so large one canno longer glimpse its
edges' (Derrida, 1999,p. 3):
One can predict with confidence that centuries ofreadings will setthis as
their task. We already see innumerable signs, wen beyond France and
Europe ... that the reverberations ofthis thought will have changed the
course of philosophical reflection in our time, and of our reflection on
philosophy, on what orders it according to ethics, according to another
thought of ethics, responsibility, justice, the State, etc., according to
another thought of the other, a thought that is newer than so many
novelties because it is ordered according to the absolute anteriority ofthe
face ofthe Other.
Yes, ethicsbefore andbeyondontology (pp. 3-4).
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In lightofthis, it is not surprisingthat over the last decade, we have seen a number of
studies of Levinas in relation to education.1 It is fair to say, however, that among
many educational theorists, there is suspicion that recent interest in Levinas is
attributable purely to his currently being in vogue, and that the presentprominence of
his work may be a passing trend. The obsessive quality of his uncompromising
writing remains opaque, or at least counter-intuitive, to many working within
education. Yet the concerns ofLevinas's philosophy are ofobvious significance for
how we think about education on all levels. In her introduction to Levinas and
Education, Denise Egea-Kuehne emphasisesthis:
His concepts of ethics, justice, consciousness, and moral conscience are
deeply relevant to education, as they were developed through the face-to
face encounter with the other, through intersubjective relation, and
through the responsibility and respect one must develop for the Other as
Other - notions which rest at the very heart ofeducation (Egea-Kuehne,
2008, p. 1).
This thesis will be concerned with taking up and thinking further through the ways in
which Levinas's theory of subjectivity and his conceptualisation of the scene of
teaching lead us to think again about the very nature ofeducation and teaching, what
and who educationis 'for', and some challengesthat follow from the way his thinking
disturbs the intellectual closure represented by some instrumentalist frameworks of
education. However, before explainingthe contextand purposes ofmy own analysis,
let me say something briefly about the context ofLevinas's philosophy and how this
relatedto his own workwithineducation.
Levinas; Philosopher, Teacher, Prophet
It was as if, to use the language oftourists, I went to see Husserl and I
found Heidegger. Of course, I will never forget Heidegger's relation to
Hitler. Even ifthis relation was only ofa very short duration, it will be
forever. But the works of Heidegger, the way in which he practised
phenomenology in Being and Time - I knew immediately that this was
one ofthe greatestphilosophers in history (RE,p. 32).
Itwas while studying at Strasbourgthat Levinasread Husserl'sLogical Investigations
for the first time, an experience that gave him the sense of'gaining access not to yet
1For example Todd, 2003a, Biesta, 2006, Egea-Kuehne,2008
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another speculative construction, but to a new possibility of thinking, to a new
possibility ofmoving from one idea to another, different from deduction, induction,
and dialectic, a new way ofunfolding "concepts'" (p. 31).2 Inspired by this sense ofa
new direction in philosophy, Levinas went to Freiburg to study with Husserl himself
in 1928-29, writing his thesis on Husserl's theory ofintuition. Yet the approach he
had discovered in Husserl was, ashe put it, 'continuedand transfigured by Heidegger'
(p. 32). While Levinas was credited with introducing Husserlian phenomenology into
France through his doctoral thesis and translation of Cartesian Meditations, his
criticisms ofHusserl were informed by his engagement with Heidegger, and he came
to critique his former teacher from a 'historical' perspective, for excessive
theoreticism and 'overlooking the existential density and historical embeddedness of
lived experience' (Critchley, 2002, p. 7). Clearly much inspired by Heidegger,
Levinas describes his approach, towards the end of Theory ofIntuition in Husserl's
Phenomenology, as 'post-Husserlian' (THP, p. 130). We seealso here the beginnings
ofthe distinctiveness ofLevinas's own later position in his reservations on Husserl,
when he states that the reduction to an ego 'can only be a first step towards
phenomenology. We must also discover "others" and the intersubjective world' (p.
150). Yet in Otherwise than Being, Levinas will still describe his work as 'in the
spirit ofHusserlian philosophy', an approach he explains asfollows:
Our presentation of notions proceeds neither by their logical
decomposition, nor by their dialectical description. It remains faithful to
intentional analysis, insofar as it signifies the locating of notions in the
horizon oftheir appearing, a horizon unrecognized, forgotten or displaced
in the exhibition of an object, in its notion, in the look absorbed by the
notion alone. (OB,p. 183)
Thus while he departs from Husserl, influenced by the Heideggerian emphasis'that
phenomenological analysis should begin in the facticity ofthe human in the situation
ofthe everyday, he nevertheless retained a sense that his work is indebted to Husserl,
though moving away from his former teacher to the extent that it is open to question
whether Levinas's own work can really be seen as remaining within phenomenology.
Ifthe intentionality thesis, which sees every mental phenomenon as directed towards
2 Byplacingthisterm inquotation marks,Levinasmightbe seenasalludingtothe senseinwhich the
place ofconceptualthinking was particularlycontested atthis time, for example inBergson's critique
of conceptual thinking, against which Levinas defends Husserl's theory of the relation between
conceptsandintuitioninTheoryofIntuitioninHusserl'sPhenomenology(THP,p. 119).
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its object, is axiomatic within phenomenology, then, as Simon Critchley suggests,
'Levinas's big idea about the relation to the other person is not phenomenological,
because the other is not given as a matter for thought or reflection ... Levinas
maintains a methodological but not a substantive commitment to Husserlian
phenomenology.' (Critchley, 2002, p. 8)
Husserl's phenomenological method was, Levinas argued, transformed by Heidegger.
It was, he later stated, the brilliance of Heidegger's application of the
phenomenological approach, rather than 'the last speculative consequences of his
project' that remained with him (RB, p. 33). Levinas followed Heidegger in rejecting
Husserl as too theoretical, removed from the everyday:
Husserl conceivesphilosophy as a universally valid science in the manner
of geometry and the sciences ofnature, as a science which is developed
through the efforts ofgenerations ofscientists, each continuing the work
ofthe others... In this conception philosophyseems as independent ofthe
historical situation ofman as any theory that tries to consider everything
sub specie aeternitatis... [The historical] structure of consciousness,
which occupies a very important place in the thought of someone like
Heidegger ... has not been studied by Husserl, at least in the works
published so far. He never discusses the relation between the historicity
ofconsciousness and its intentionality, its personality, its social character
(THP, pp. 155-56).
In the concluding section of Theory ofIntuition, we can see how far his critique of
Husserl followed from his engagement with Heidegger: he describes Heidegger's
phenomenological method as following Husserl, 'although in a profoundly original
manner, and we feeljustifiedin being inspired byhim' (p. 155).
Levinas admired the way in which Heidegger's phenomenological ontology disrupted
the primacy ofconsciousness in Husserl's approach. While Husserl's transcendental
Ego analyses life from a transcendent, ahistorical position, Heidegger's analysis saw
Being and beings as always already engaged in time and history, without, as Colin
Davis suggests, 'recourse to the absolute self-liberation promised by
phenomenological reduction' (Davis, 1996, p. 15). It was from this engagement
always already within time and history that meaning takes place. Thus Levinas
contraststheirpositions:
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