Latin America as an Arena for Iran and Hezbollah's Terrorist

47 Pages·2012·0.89 MB·English

The Meir Amit Intelligence and
Terrorism Information Center

Latin America as an Arena for Iran and
Hezbollah's Terrorist, Subversive and Criminal
Activities1

Ahmadinejad visits Venezuela in January 2012, seen here with Venezuelan President
Hugo Chávez (Photo from the almanar.com.lb website)

1Follow-up of the ITIC April 19, 2009 study "Iran increases its political and economic presence in Latin America, defying the
United States and attempting to undermine American hegemony" at http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/iran_e006.pdf.
Overview
Background Information
1. Since Ahmadinejad was elected president in August 2005, Iran has extended and solidified its
relations with several Latin American countries, especially Venezuela and Bolivia, and increased
its efforts to obtain a political foothold in the others. According to findings brought before the
American Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Iran has significantly increased its diplomatic
representation in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina and Brazil. It was also reported
that since 2005 Iran has increased the number of its embassies in Latin America from five
to 11 and set up 17 "cultural centers."2
2. The common factors in the increasingly close relations between Iran and certain Latin American
countries are their anti-American ideologies and policies, and their desire to present a
revolutionary alternative to what they perceive as American imperialism. Iran (also
employing Hezbollah) exploits the relations to strengthen its foothold in Latin America to establish a
presence and gain political, economic, cultural and religious influence. As in other areas of the world,
in Latin America Iran employs terrorism and subversion, and works to instill radical Shi'ite
Islamic ideology into the local Muslim communities.

Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Iranian President
Ahmadinejad meet in Caracas (Press TV, January 9, 2012)
3. Iran's increased activity in Latin America is part of its global strategy, whose objectives go far
beyond the desire for hegemony in the Middle East. Iran, regarding itself as hemmed in by the United
States and its allies, stubbornly pursues the nuclear crisis with the West and seeks to present the
United States with a revolutionary challenge in its own backyard by exploiting its relative
advantages with countries and populaces in Latin American: Iran's anti-American ideology
and rhetoric, which fall on receptive ears; Iranian petrodollars, which can be used for political and
propaganda purposes; and a large Muslim population, some of it Lebanese, living in key Latin
American countries.

2According to Ambassador Roger F. Noriega before the US Senate, February 16, 2012. See below.
4. Iran's interests and objectives in Latin America are the following:
1) Politics and strategy: Iran has found ideological and political sympathy in a number
of Latin American countries, which may enable it to escape from its increasing political
isolation and strengthen the so-called "resistance camp" it leads (including Syria,
Hezbollah, and Palestinian terrorist organizations). Iran also regards Latin America as a good
area for defiance and for challenging the United States through increased political and
military collaboration, economic infiltration and extensive activities to disseminate
Shi'ite Islam and eventually export the Islamic Revolution to Latin America.
2) Economics: Iran focuses on economic relations with Latin American countries in energy
and oil, and strives to increase those relations to help it circumvent the sanctions which
have been imposed on it. Thus Iran's relations with Venezuela enable it to coordinate
prices with a large oil exporter like itself (Iran and Venezuela are respectively the fourth and
fifth largest oil exporters in the world). In addition, Iran wants to exploit uranium deposits
in Venezuela and other Latin American countries (in 2009 Venezuela publicly stated that
Iran was helping it explore for uranium.) However, Iranian-Latin American economic
collaboration is still limited and a relatively small factor in Iran's overall trade.
3) Harming Israel's political relations with Latin America countries: One example was
the terminating of Israeli-Venezuelan and Israeli-Bolivian relations during Operation Cast Lead.
In addition, Iran's close relations with Venezuela and other countries create an internal political
atmosphere and even infrastructure (encouraged by Iranian propaganda) to harm the Jewish
communities in those countries (where, as in other parts of the world, often no distinction
is made between anti-Israel policy and harming Jewish communities).

"Get out," graffiti on the wall of a synagogue in Caracas, Venezuela's
capital (Photo by Carlos Garcia Rawlins for Reuters, January 31,
2009).

4) Constructing secret intelligence and terrorist networks: Those networks give Iran
operational-terrorist options, using the Quds Force and other bodies, to launch terrorist
activities against Israel and the United States, both routinely and as the order of the
day. Iran exploits the subversive and terrorist capabilities of Hezbollah, which conducts
extensive activity in Latin America and has increased its presence there while engaging in
drug-trafficking and other crimes.
Limitations of Iran's Political Power in Latin America
5. Ahmadinejad's last visit to Venezuela (January 9, 2012) and other Latin American
countries (Nicaragua, Cuba and Ecuador) illustrated that regardless of Iranian aspirations in
Latin America there were limitations to its political power. His visit was prompted by the
increasing tension between Tehran and the West and Iran's growing international isolation. One of his
objectives in visiting Latin America was to demonstrate Tehran's ability to advance its relations with
countries beyond the borders of the Middle East and in a region considered America's backyard, and
show it could defy, and perhaps even threaten, the United States. However, in reality,
Ahmadinejad and the Latin American countries did not sign new agreements, and his visit was
accompanied by broad criticism from local media for Iran's not having honored previous
economic commitments.
6. The considerable efforts made by Iran to strengthen its ties with other important Latin
American countries, beyond those where it has already gained a foothold thanks to its relations
with Venezuela, were unsuccessful. For example, Iran's relations with Argentina, virtually
destroyed after the two terrorist attacks on the Israeli embassy and the AMIA Jewish community
center in the early 1990s, have never been repaired (the attacks are still a cause of tension in the
Argentinean arena). In May 2011, Bolivia forced Vahidi, Iran's minister of defense, to cut short a
state visit following political pressure from Argentina. Brazil has distanced itself from Iran since Dilma
Rousseff was elected president, and Iran's relations with Colombia and Mexico are strained (both of
which accuse Iran of promoting drug-trafficking and terrorism within their borders). In addition, Iran's
broad activity in Latin America has so far not significantly damaged Israeli-Latin American
relations (with the exception of Venezuela).
Iranian-Venezuelan Relations
7. Since Ahmadinejad was elected president in August 2005, Iran had strengthened its
relations with revolutionary Latin American countries which defy the United States and
object to its regional influence. Ahmadinejad's vision, ambitious as it is, to lead the world camp
opposing American hegemony and create a new (Islamic) world order, and his determination to
export the ideology of the Islamic Revolution, found a willing disciple in the form of Hugo
Chávez, Venezuela's president. Iranian strategy was also integrated into political, societal and
economic changes both in Venezuela and in other countries. Chávez, whose policies are defiantly
anti-American, succeeded in marketing Iran to other Latin American countries, among them
Nicaragua, Ecuador and Cuba.
8. In recent years political and economic cooperation between Venezuela and Iran has
increased significantly. They signed many agreements regarding their economies, banks, oil and
natural gas. Military relations were strengthened after a military delegation headed by Iran's
minister of defense, Mostafa Muhammad Najjar visited Caracas (April 30, 2009). The two countries
signed a memorandum of understanding intended to strengthen joint military collaboration.
9. Political and economic collaboration between the two countries were manifested in two
specific fields:
1) Exploring for and mining uranium: The Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace issued a report in December 2008 on possible Iranian-Venezuelan collaboration in
mining Venezuelan uranium. According to the report, Venezuela is estimated to have
50,000 tons of unmined uranium and might mine it for Iran.3 According to an article in The
Guardian, Iran was helping Venezuela look for uranium using geophysical flights and
geochemical deposit analysis. The article stated that uranium had been found in western
Venezuela and the southeastern Bolivar state.4
2) Banking and financial services: In 2009 it was reported that Iranians had opened an
international development bank in Venezuela called the Banco Internacional de Desarrollo. It is
an independent subsidiary of Iran's Export Development Bank. In 2008 the United
States Treasury Department imposed sanctions on both banks for having provided or
attempted to provide financial services to the Iranian ministry of defense and Armed Force
Logistics, both Iranian entities which promote Iran's nuclear program.5
10. Ambassador Roger Noriega, formerly a diplomat with the American State Department and today a
fellow of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), said in testimony before the American Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in February 2012 that Iran had provided Venezuela with weapons
systems. He said the systems gave Hugo Chávez, Venezuela's president, unprecedented
capabilities to threaten Venezuela's neighbors, and indirectly to threaten the United
States6 (See below for further details about Noriega's testimony).
The Iranian Battle for Hearts and Minds
11. Several million Arabs and Muslims live in Latin America, most of them Sunnis (with a
Lebanese Shi'ite minority), and are the principle target of Iran's propaganda activities. There are two
main communities: one whose roots are in India, Indonesia and Pakistan, and the other, made up
mainly of Arabs from Syria and Lebanon, descendents of immigrants who moved to Latin America in

3http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/12/18/venezuela-nuclear-profile/2xwc
4http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8725168
5Online.wsj.com, September 8, 2009
6In November 2010 and May 2011 the German daily newspaper Die Welt reported that Venezuela and Iran had signed an
agreement for the joint operation of a missile base in Venezuela. In response the American State Department said that
it had not evidence to support Die Welt's report.
the 19th and 20th centuries. While the percentages of the Arab-Muslim populations in each country
are not statistically significant, their socio-economic status is relatively high.
12. The two largest Arab-Muslim communities in Latin America are in Brazil and Argentina.
There are about a million to a million and a half Muslims in Brazil, including about 10,000 Brazilians
who converted to Islam (less than 1% of the entire population). About 700,000 Muslims live in
Argentina (about 2% of the population), most of them descendents of immigrants from Syria and
Lebanon.7 Large concentrations of Muslims can also be found in Chile, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela,
Mexico and the Caribbean Islands.
13. The Muslims spread throughout Latin America, especially Shi'ite Muslims originating in
Lebanon, provide a convenient environment for Iran and Hezbollah for establishing
subversive, terrorist and occasionally criminal networks. Iran also conducts extensive
ideological, religious, cultural and social activities within the Muslim communities to
disseminate Khomeini's radical Shi'ite Islam. The activities are often interrelated (See below).
14. Iran's intensive efforts to export the Islamic Revolution to Latin America take many
forms: financing the construction of mosques and cultural and religious centers;
translating books and ideological and religious material into Spanish and distributing
them throughout Latin America; providing local residents with religious and political
training in Iran (who then return to their own countries imbued with radical Islam and
anti-American, anti-Israeli ideology); sending Iranian clerics to preach Khomeini's
ideology in Latin America; and establishing a Spanish TV station which broadcasts 24/7
(HispanTV, which began broadcasting on February 1, 2012);8 and providing assistance in
establishing Spanish-language Internet sites.

HispanTV, Iran's Spanish-language TV station: "strengthening
relations with Latin America is currently Iran's number one priority."

7Based on Lieutenant-Colonel Curtis C. Connell, [US Air Force] Air University, Cadre Paper No. 21, "Understanding Islam and Its
Impact on Latin America," Air University Press, March 2005.
8Mohammad Hosseini, Iran's minister of culture and Islamic guidance, referred to the establishing of HispanTV as a step
meant to fill Iran's needs in Latin America. He said that "strengthening relations with Latin America is currently
Iran's number one priority...Iran wants to increase its presence in that area of the world" (ilna.ir website).
Subversion and Terrorism
15. In the overall Iranian view, Latin America is a secondary arena. Its principle venues for
widespread subversion and terrorism are Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinian arena, Central and
Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf and Sudan. Nevertheless, Iran and Hezbollah find Latin America
attractive for purposes of terrorism, subversion and crime. As elsewhere, in Latin America
their activities are led by the Quds Force in collaboration with various other bodies and
entities within the Iranian regime.
16. Iranian activity in Latin America, as in other arenas, combines exporting the Islamic Revolution
with terrorism and crime, worries Washington and is often represented as a threat – or at
least a potential threat – to American interests. However, specialists, officials in the
administration and Congressmen who monitor Iranian and Hezbollah activity in Latin America
sometimes differ as to how serious they think the threat and its significance are.
17. In our opinion, there is a methodological difficulty in assessing the nature and seriousness of
the Iranian threat because it is not easy to distinguish between Iran's vast subversive activities
and those undertaken to export the Islamic Revolution, on the one hand, and its terrorist
activities on the other: On the one hand, experience has taught that subversive and
propaganda activity (with the addition of criminal activity) prepare the ground for a network of
people who are liable, given the right circumstances, to participate in terrorist activity. On
the other, Iran's preoccupation with disseminating Shi'ite Islam and exporting the Islamic Revolution
to Latin America may not necessarily be translated only into terrorist activity, but has the
potential to endanger other American interests in Latin America (such as fostering hatred for
the United States and the radicalization of the Latin American Muslim population).
18. On January 5, 2012, the American Congressional Research Service (CRS) issued a study called
"Latin America: Terrorism Issues," written by Mark Sullivan, a specialist in Latin American affairs.9 It
quoted the State Department's Country Report on Terrorism (published in August 2011), which stated
that "There are no known operational cells of either Al-Qaeda or Hezbollah-related groups in the
[western] hemisphere." However, according to the Report, "ideological sympathizers in South
America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and moral support to these and
other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia." (ITIC emphasis)
19. Other Latin American experts in the United States, however, give greater importance to the
threats to American interests, including the threat of terrorism, resulting from Iran and
Hezbollah's extensive activities in Latin America. One of them is Ambassador Roger F.
Noriega, who testified many times before Congressional committees. Familiar with Latin American
affairs, between 2003 and 2005 he was the American ambassador to the Organization of American

9http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf.
States and today is a fellow of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and one of a team of experts
monitoring Iranian activity in Latin America.
20. On February 16, 2012 a hearing was held by the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee to
discuss Iran's influence and activity in Latin America. Ambassador Noriega presented the
subcommittee with the results of his team's research, which dealt with threats to the United
States caused by Iranian activity in Latin America. "Our exhaustive work," he said, "leads to
the following conclusions:"10
 "Venezuelan strongman Hugo Chaves and Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad are conspiring to
wage an asymmetrical struggle against U.S. security and to abet Iran's illicit nuclear
program. Their clandestine activities pose a clear and present danger to regional peace and security.
 Iran has provided Venezuela conventional weapon systems capable of attacking the United
States and our allies in the region.
 Iran has used 30$ billion in economic ventures in Venezuela as means to launder money and
evade international financial sanctions.
 Since 2005, Iran has found uranium in Venezuela, Ecuador and other countries in the
region and is conducting suspicious mining operations in some uranium-rich areas.
 Two terrorist networks one home-grown Venezuelan clan and another cultivated by Mohsen
Rabbani, a notorious agent of the Qods Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps, proselytize,
fund-raise, recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah in many countries in the
Americas.
 Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networks in South America as a means of raising
resources and sharing tactics.
 The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates regular service from Caracas to Damascus
and Teheran - providing Iran, Hezbollah, and associated narco-traffickers a surreptitious means to
move personnel, weapons, contraband and other materiel.
21. Iran's activities in Latin America and its readiness to carry out terrorist attacks on American
soil (manifested by the attempted assassination in Washington of the Saudi Arabian ambassador) led
Ambassador Noriega to the conclusion that "Tehran's activities near our homeland constitute a
very real threat that can no longer be ignored." (ITIC emphasis) Despite with the grave
assessments of the Iranian threat as expressed in a number of expert testimonies before Congress,
certain members of the American administration are of the opinion that Iran's influence in Latin
America is limited and that the United States can minimize it.

10http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Roger_Noriega_Testimony1.pdf
Investigating How Iran and Hezbollah Operate in Latin America
22. The following study deals with Iranian and Hezbollah activities in Latin America in three inter-
related areas:
1) Section I – Terrorism: Latin America as an arena for Iranian-Hezbollah terrorism
2) Section II – Criminal activities: Iranian and Hezbollah involvement in criminal activities
which serve as a source of revenue and and also serve their subversive and terrorist activities in
Latin America.
3) Section III – Subversion and exporting the Islamic Revolution: Exporting radical
Islam and Shi'a, and fostering hatred for the United States and its allies (including Israel) in
Latin America as part of Iran's global strategy.
Section I: Latin America as an Arena for Iranian-Hezbollah
terrorism
Overview
23. Iran regards Latin America as an arena for terrorist activity, which the Iranian regime
considers an instrument for promoting its strategic objectives. The designated Iranian bodies active in
those areas are the Quds Force and the ministry of intelligence and security. They support
Hezbollah and use it as Iran's most important proxy in its efforts to launch terrorist
activities. According to the American media, in recent years the Quds Force extended its
activities throughout Latin America, especially in Venezuela.11
24. In April 2010 a non-classified US Defense Department report was presented to Congress dealing
with Iranian military strength. It stated that the Quds Force (which engages in terrorism and
subversion around the world) had increased its presence in Latin America, particularly in
Venezuela. At the end of 2011 former American intelligence officials told the Washington Post that
the presence of Quds Force officers and other military personnel in diplomatic missions
enhanced "Iran's ability to carry out covert activities, sometimes in conjunction with members of the
Iran-backed Hezbollah militant group that operates extensive networks in Latin America and maintains
ties with drug cartels."12 However, the commander of the US Southern Command, General Douglas
Frazer, said that Iranian activity in Latin America focused on diplomacy and commerce, adding that he
had not seen a growth of Iran's military presence in the region.13
Evaluation of Iranian-Hezbollah Terrorist Capabilities in Latin America
25. During the 1990s both Iran and Hezbollah demonstrated formidable capabilities to carry
out showcase terrorist attacks against Jewish targets. In 1992 they used a car bomb driven by
a suicide bomber to attack the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, killing 29 civilians. Two years later
they used the same method to blow up the Jewish community center (the AMIA building) in Buenos
Aires, killing 85. Since then, Iran and Hezbollah have not carried out terrorist attacks in Latin America
against Israeli targets, and almost none against the United States (in several instances, local criminal
and terrorist networks have been involved in planning terrorist attacks on American soil, which,
however, were prevented.) In our assessment, since the two attacks in Argentina, Iran and Hezbollah
have focused on constructing covert terrorist networks in Latin America which will be
activated when the Iranian regime considers it appropriate.

11Google.com/hostednews/afp/article; Washingtonpost.com; also see the April 2, 2007 ITIC bulletin "Using the Quds Force of
the Revolutionary Guards as the main tool to export the revolution beyond the borders of Iran" http://www.terrorism-
info.org.il/site/html/search.asp?sid=13&pid=108&numResults=37&isSearch=yes&isT8=yes.
12http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/iran-seeking-to-expand-influence-in-latin-
america/2011/12/30/gIQArfpcUP_story_1.html
13CRS report, January 2012