Knowing the enemy :naval intelligence in Southeast Asia /Richard A. Mobley and Edward J. Marolda

2015·8.1 MB·English

by  Washington, DC :Department of the Navy, Naval History & Heritage Command

D
221.2:V 67/6
Naval Intelligence in Southeast Asia
Richard A. Mobley and Edward Marolda
J.

THE U.S. NAVY AND THE VIETNAM WAR
Edward Marolda and Sandra Doyle, Series Editors
}. J.
Knowing
the
Enemy
Naval Intelligence in Southeast Asia
Richard A. Mobley and Edward Marolda
J.
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON, DC
2015
.
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Title:Knowingtheenemy:navalintelligenceinSoutheastAsia/RichardA.MobleyandEdwardJ.Marolda.
Description:U.S.governmentofficialedition. | Washington,DC:DepartmentoftheNavy,2015. | Series:TheU.S.Navyand
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Introduction
InterpretationoftheThreattoSoutheastAsia 5
TheQuestionofSeaborneInfiltration 9
IntelligenceGatheringinLaos 13
CollectingIntelligenceontheEnemy'sDoorstep 17
IntelligenceSupportduringtheTonkinGulfIncidents 21
W-t PreparationsforWarinSoutheastAsia
NavyTacticalReconnaissance
AHelpingHandtoHanoi: Sino-SovietBloc
MilitaryAssistance
TheDefenseofNorthVietnam
ThePost-1968AirWarinNorthVietnamandLaos
IntelligenceandtheWaronthe Coast
Cambodia’sOpenDoor: Sihanoukville
TheNavalWarinSouthVietnam 73
NavalIntelligenceandthe FightforSouthVietnam 77
NILOsinAction 83
Intelligence intheLinebackerCampaign 91
Conclusion
TheShort, DangerousLifeoftheGhostSquadron
CTDutyat“RocketCity”
SculpinandtheSinkingofanInfiltratingTrawler
Zumwalt’sEyesandEars
JackGraf: ANavalIntelligenceHero
TheAuthors
Acknowledgments
SuggestedReading
Collection
Vietnam
NHHC
INTRODUCTION
—
ntelligence figured prominently in the causes, failedto understand theirprimaryopponent the
evolution, and results ofthe Vietnam War. Democratic Republic ofVietnam (DRV). Presidents
I
At the national level the National Security John F. Kennedyand Lyndon B. Johnson andtheir
Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence principal political and militaryadvisors developed a
Agency (CIA), the National SecurityAgency (NSA), strategybased ontheassumptionsthat U.S. military
the Defense IntelligenceAgency (DIA), the State powerwould infairlyshortordercompelNorth
and Defense departments, government-contracted Vietnamto ceaseits supportoftheCommunist
“think tanks,” and a host ofother organizations insurgencyin SouthVietnam; thatHanoiwould
gathered and analyzed intelligence. The Office of relent under acascadeofU.S. NavyandAir Force
Naval Intelligence (ONI), while directlyserving bombs; andthatU.S. forces in SouthVietnamwould
the Navy, also provided the national security prevent a Communistvictorythere. Incontrast,
establishmentwith comprehensive analyses of America’s enemies demonstratedthattheyintended
—
broad international developments. The dedicated to fight despitethe heavycostin resourcesand
—
professionals inthese agencies labored to identify their citizens’ lives untiltheyhad united all of
the nature ofthe threat faced bythe United States Vietnam underthe Communistflag.
in SoutheastAsia. Theydebated whether North AsWashington’s initialstrategicassumptions
Vietnamese leaders tooktheir orders from Moscow provedfalse, and despite the national intelligence
and Beijingor charted an independent course, and community’s accurate appraisalofthe enemy’s
theyargued over the extentofexternal support determinationto fightontovictory, Johnson and his
forthe insurgency in South Vietnam. There were successor, Richard M. Nixon, redoubled the military
heated disagreements over how much control effortin hopesofcompelling Hanoi to negotiatean
—
Hanoi exercised overthe National Liberation Front endtothewar atanadvantage to theUnited States.
(NLF) in South Vietnam (the Viet Cong [VC]). This goal also proved illusorybecausethe enemy
NSA, for instance, weighed in on this issue in 1961 heldthe strategic initiativethroughoutthewarand
when itdiscovered through communications inter- moreoftenthan notbeatthe forces ofAmerica’s
cepts that NorthVietnam employed a clandestine Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodianallies on
radio networkthatlinked Hanoiwith 114Viet thebattlefield. Nonetheless, devastatingU.S. air
Congreceiving stations in South Vietnam. Other strikes, the miningofHaiphongin 1972, and North
agencies also drew conclusions aboutthe enemy’s Vietnam’sgrowingisolation from the international
capabilities and intentions. Analysts attempted to Communistmovement persuaded Hanoito signthe
discernwhich ofthe leaders in Hanoi had the most ParisAgreementonEndingtheWarand Restoring
clout in guidingthe strategyto be employed against Peace inVietnam on 27 January 1973.
the SouthVietnamese and their American allies. A The U.S. Navy’s intelligenceestablishment,
majorquestionwas the likelihood ofthe People’s whilesharinginthe overall national-level interpre-
Republic ofChina (PRC) or the Soviet Union tive successesandfailures, routinelyprovidedgood
(USSR) intervening directlyinthe conflict. intelligence supportto naval operatingforcesand
TheUnited States and its allies losttheVietnam savedAmericanlivesthroughouttheVietnamWar.
Warinlarge partbecauseAmericanleaders Naval intelligence enabledthe aircraftofTask Force
77 to operate effectivelyin the hotlycontested skies and Moscow have sparked a robust investigation of
ofNorth Vietnam and overthe heavilydefended Ho the events ofthe war. Numerous Russian, Chinese,
Chi Minh Trail in Laos. Timely intelligence helped and Vietnameseveterans have published memoirs,
the ocean patrol forces ofOperation MarketTime spoken publicly, and sat for interviews on their
negate the enemy’s seaborne infiltration ofwar experiences in the conflict.
materials into South Vietnam. Intelligencesupport These materials, includingthe Socialist Republic
significantlyaided the Navy’s riverine units in their ofVietnam’sofficial historyofthewar, make it
operations to denytheenemycontrol ofthe Mekong clearthat Hanoicould nothave prevailed against
Delta. Finally, naval intelligenceorganizations in the the United States had Moscowand Beijingnot
United States, inthe Western Pacific, and in South provided massiveamounts ofmilitaryassistance.
Vietnam providedvital information on the move- These Communistcountries helpedNorthVietnam
mentofCommunist forces afloat and ashore and the buildoneoftheworld’s most formidableairdefense
importation ofwar materials into NorthVietnam systems and armed Communist militaryforceswith
and Cambodia from the SovietUnion, the People’s advanced aircraft, tanks, and artillery. Chinaalso
RepublicofChina, andothernations. helped NorthVietnam rebuildthe heavilybombed
Through much ofthe Vietnam War, the railroad and road systems, bridges, and industrial
national intelligence communityhad an uneven facilities. Ofequal importance Mao Zedong’s nation
understanding ofthe other side. The Washington- eventuallydeployedover320,000 troopsto North
based agencies developed a good appraisal of Vietnam, freeingthelattercountryto send mostof
the North Vietnamese order ofbattle, support its soldiersto fight in the South. The records released
from the other Communist nations, and various afterthe ColdWaralso detailthe enemy’s intel-
enemy operational and tactical methods. On the ligence and counterintelligenceprograms, some of
other hand as Richard Helms, former head ofthe which provedespeciallyeffectivein anticipatingand
CIA, has observed, Washington failed to acquire thwartingU.S. operations.
solid intelligence on the enemy’s decision-making The high security classification ofU.S.
process at the Hanoi level. No U.S. agents pen- information relatingto the Vietnam War has
etrated the leadership circle around Ho Chi Minh. until recently limited our understanding ofhow
The intelligence organizations, including those the naval intelligence communityaccomplished
in theater, provided inconclusive evidence ofthe its secretive mission. Not onlywere day-to-day
success or failure ofU.S. attempts to interdict the operations classified, but in most cases secrecy
Ho Chi Minh Trail and the enemy’s capabilities and hampered a detailed public discussion ofmost of
intentions prior to the Tet Offensive of1968. the organization’s missions that contributed to
Since the war, scholars have been hampered by thewartime intelligence effort. Consequently, the
their inabilityto access sensitive documents held in larger Navyand national populations often had
the government offices, archives, research institu- little understanding ofeither the magnitude or
tions, and libraries ofthe DRV, USSR, and PRC. impact ofthe Navy’s multiple intelligence efforts.
So-called “Kremlinologists” and otherWestern Following U.S. government declassification efforts
analysts earned fame developing theories based spanning decades, we can at last acknowledge the
on a small amount ofcredible information from efforts that demanded intellectual acumen, dedica-
various sources. Since the end ofthe Cold War, tion to the profession, and on occasion the sacrifice
however, the release, and in some cases translation oflives. The thousands ofdeclassified documents
into English, ofhigh-level strategy and policy now available afford us ample evidence to gauge
documents housed in repositories in Hanoi, Beijing, the scope ofnaval intelligence efforts even though
some ofthe information on sources and methods of Geospatial-IntelligenceAgency, providedthefleet
intelligence remain classified. withcomprehensive imageryreadouts ofNorth
To capturethebroadscope ofmultiple naval Vietnam’s naval and othermilitarycapabilities. T
intelligenceefforts, this studydiscusses thework
ofcommandsfocusedprimarilyonthe collection
oranalysis ofintelligence,whetheror nottheyhad
theword “intelligence” intheirnames. The Naval
SecurityGroup (NSG), Naval Investigative Service
(NIS), andDirectSupportUnits (DSU), for example,
madehuge intelligence contributionstothewar
effort. These and otherorganizationsgathered dif-
ferenttypes ofintelligence, for instancesignals intel-
ligence thatincluded communications intelligence
(COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT),
humanintelligence (HUMINT), and imageryintel-
ligencefromsatellites andaircraft.
Officerandenlisted personnelengaged in
intelligencecollection oftendidtheirdangerous
butvitalwork in directcontactwiththe enemy.
Thenavalaircrews ofreconnaissanceaircraftflying
theirmissions over SoutheastAsia suffered high
casualtyrates. Forexample, the highlysecretive
Aerial Observation Squadron (VO) 67 lost20air
crewmenkilledduringonlytwo months ofsensor
emplacementmissionsoverNorthVietnam and
Laos. CombattookthelivesofSEALcommandos
and Naval Intelligence LiaisonOfficers (NILOs),
whose primarydutiesentailedgatheringintelligence
onNorthVietnameseandVietCongcombatunits
andstrongholdsandthe movementofsupplies inthe
Mekong Delta.
Notonlynavalbutnational intelligenceorgani-
zations servedthe Navy’s need foraccurate,timely
informationontheenemy. TheNational Security
Agencyand associated field sitesinthe combat
theater, includingthose ofthe Naval Security
Group, directlysupportedwarshipsand aircraft
squadrons operatingoffNorthVietnam’sshores
and inthe skiesover Haiphongand Hanoi. CIA U-2
andA-12 aircraftprovided filmofenemymilitary
concentrationsinNorthVietnam and southern
China. The NationalPhotographic Interpretation
Center (NPIC), aforerunnertotoday’sNational 3
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