Table Of ContentOUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/12/2018,SPi
Knowing By Perceiving
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/12/2018,SPi
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/12/2018,SPi
Knowing By
Perceiving
Alan Millar
1
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/12/2018,SPi
3
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP,
UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford.
ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship,
andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof
OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries
©AlanMillar2019
Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted
FirstEditionpublishedin2019
Impression:1
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin
aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe
priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted
bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics
rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe
aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe
addressabove
Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform
andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress
198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
Dataavailable
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2018952833
ISBN 978–0–19–875569–2
PrintedandboundinGreatBritainby
ClaysLtd,ElcografS.p.A.
LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand
forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials
containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork.
Contents
Preface vii
I. Epistemolo窃and Philosophical Method
l. Our知让liaritywith knowledge
2. Pcrc叩tual knowledge 4
3. Why is ii 小atenquiry aims a心no心dgerather归nmeretrueKli叩 7
4. Scepticism about cone叩tua]enquiry 14
5. Phil伪ophy'$inm心lin O心plS 19
2. Justified Belief,氐asons.,and Evidence 23
l. Justi.ficdb elief 23
2. `JUSl1fiedb, eliefin GeUler c豁esand well-fo皿dedbelief 29
3. Knowledge bas叫onevidence 33
4. Standing knowle吨eof fa巫 36
5. Cinching的dence 38
6. Summary 42
3. Perception, E.'7perience, and Dir釭tR叫ism 43
1. Perceiving thin穿directly 43
2. A non-rclationahst perspective SO
3. The relallonalist challtn穿 54
4. 压perienbnlorientation 56
5. Perception, co11SCiousnesast,1 d sensations 61
6. Non七ommi血ldesrnptioos of叩erience 66
4. Perceptual Kno叫edgeand Recognitional Abilities 73
l. Experiential a`｀屯renessand appear.u1ces 73
2. Percei寸ng,thinking, and recogni功ng 77
3. Pere叩lu吐-recognillonalabilities 83
4. Pere叩血l-r如gnilionalabilities and the theory of knowledge 89
5. Perceiving-that and r叩心血lonalcontent 91
5. Perception and the Justification of BeUef 97
I. Perception and叩ricnc:e 97
2. Do experiences justify by being evidence? 99
3. lrnmediate justification 106
4. Pcrcc:pl归1 k_nowlcd驴卫cll-found如css,and rational constraint I 09
5. Access to reasons constituted by trulllS as to呻atwe perceive Lob e so 112
6. Thc}U.s仙cationfor比liefI ha1 perception can yield 114
7. McDo-w'eIoI n bo11ndaries 118
8. McDowell on intu.itional content 121
vi CONTENTS
6. Abilities, Competences, and Fallibility 125
J. Introduction 125
2. Some ordinary abilities 126
3. Havillg an ability and being reliably successful 129
4. Performances: hard and completable 131
5. Mental acts 136
6. Sosa and competence 143
7. Abilities: Further Issues 147
l. Cognitive contact and山ereach of reason 147
2. Abilities in virtue epistemology 149
3. More basic abilities? 154
4. Retreating to dispositions plain and sitnple 157
5. Individuating recognitional abilities: some complexities 160
8. Knowledge from Perceived Indicators and Background Knowledge 165
I. Introduction 165
2. rn dicators and evidei1ce 166
3. The covering generalization model 168
4. How indicators can provide clinching evidence 171
5. A puzzle about generalizations 174
6. The standit1g of accepted generalizations 176
7. More on back伊0皿d beliefs 181
8. Moore's truisms 184
9. Reason's work again 186
9. Going By What We Know 188
l. Rel伽gon what we know about knowledge 188
2. How can we gain so much from so little? 193
3. Self-understanding and the engaged standpoint 197
4. Not so radical scepticism 200
5. Radical scepticism and responsible judgement 205
References 209
Index 219
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/12/2018,SPi
Preface
Perceptual knowledge, the central topic of this book, is a paradigm of knowledge.
Whenweknowsomethingperceptuallywegraspatruthinarationalintellectualact.
That act is theexercise of ageneral ability tocometoknow truths of a certain sort
perceptually.IfIseethat,andinthatwayknowthat,thepersonenteringtheroomis
mybrother,then Iexerciseageneralability torecognize mybrotherasmybrother
from the way he looks. This ability is nothing less than a knowledge-acquisition
ability.Itconsistsinbeingabletotell,thatis,cometoknow,concerningmybrother
thatheismybrotherfromthewayhelooks.Sinceabilitiesareexercisedonlyindoing
whattheabilityisanabilitytodo,itisexercisedonlywhenIacquiresuchknowledge.
Knowledgegainedfromtheexerciseofabilitiessuchasthisisreadilyavailabletous
anditscontentsextendwellbeyondsuperficialfeaturesofthingssuchascolourand
shape.Irecognizemybrotherasmybrotherandnotmerelyasathingwithacertain
visualappearance.
Epistemologicaldiscussionsofperceptionusually focusonsomethingotherthan
knowledge.Theybeginwithconsiderationofhowbeliefsarisingfromperceptioncan
be justified. With the retreat from knowledge to justified belief there goes a retreat
fromperceptiontothesensoryexperiencesimplicatedbyperception.Indeed,onthe
most widely held approach to the topic, perception drops out of the picture other
thanasthemeansbywhichwearefurnishedwiththeexperiencesthataresupposed
tobetherealsourceofjustification—experiencesthatarenodifferentinkindfrom
those we could have had if we had been perfectly hallucinating. My first book,
Reasons and Experience (Millar 1991a), was very much in this spirit. I sought to
challenge Donald Davidson’s (1983/2001) claim that experiences (which he called
sensations)couldnotjustifybeliefs.Thisgeneralapproachtoepistemologicalissues
concerningperceptionnowseemstometobemistaken.
Themotivationtowardsacceptingadifferentviewderivedfromconsiderationofa
conception of perceptual knowledge, and a related conception of how to do epis-
temology,bothofwhichareatoddswithmuchofrecentepistemology,butseemedto
metobeeminentlyplausible.Asignificantelementinthisalternativewayofthinking
isaconceptionofreasonsandjustifiedbelief.Onthisconception,reasonstobelieve
areconstitutedbypropositionsor,moreprecisely,bytruths.Areasontobelievethat
PthatisconstitutedbythetruththatQcanbeyourreasonforbelievingthatPonlyif
you believe that Q and you believe that P for the reason that Q. On this way of
thinkingwecanmakegoodsenseofwhatittakesforonetobejustifiedinbelieving
something:youarejustifiedinbelievingthatPonlyifthereisanadequatereasonfor
youtobelievethatPandyoubelievethatPforthatreason.Underthisconception—
callitthereasonsconceptionofjustifiedbelief—wearenotatalosstounderstandhow
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/12/2018,SPi
viii
it can be that some things we believe can constitute an adequate reason to believe
something else. For they might be such that we can validly deduce something else
from them or such that they present strong evidential support for something else.
Oncewemoveawayfromtheideathatjustifiedbeliefhastodowithpropositionally
constituted reasons it is far less clear how what is supposed to provide justification
candoso.Inparticular,itislessclearhowanexperienceorcourseofexperiencecan
providejustificationforabelief.
This was anissueI addressed inReasonsandExperience.I exploitedtheidea that
havingajustifiedbeliefthatPisamatterofcompetentlybelievingthatP.Competence
was to be understood as competence in employing concepts. Just as believing some-
thing on the basis of other things one believed could be an exercise of conceptual
competence,sobelievingsomethingonthebasisofanexperiencecouldbeanexercise
ofconceptualcompetence.Icametorejectthisview,largelybecauseitisobscurehow
experiencescanstandtothingsbelievedinanyrelationthatistrulyanalogoustothe
wayinwhicha(propositionallyconstituted)reasontobelievesomethingcanstandto
thatthing.TheveryideaofcompetentlybasingabeliefthatPontheassumptionthatQ
presupposesthattheassumptionthatQstandsinanadequatereason-givingrelationto
thepropositionthatPinthat,ifitweretrue,itwouldconstituteanadequatereasonto
believe that P. Invoking competent basing would not explain justification, unless it
wereitselfexplainedintermsoftheexploitationofagraspofreason-givinglinks.Itis
obscurehowexperiencescanstandtothingsbelievedinanythinglikethereason-giving
relationinwhichassumptionscanstandtothingsbelieved.
Itseemedrighttoholdontothereasonsconceptionofjustifiedbeliefifitcouldbe
showntoserveourepistemologicalgoals.Itis,afterall,tolerablyclearandarguably
inkeepingwithcommon-sensethinking.Withrespecttoawiderangeofourbeliefs
wehaveaworkingideaofhowtojudgewhethertheyareheldforadequatereasons.
Alsosignificantwastherealizationthatthereasonsconceptioniscompatiblewithan
eminently plausible account of perceptual knowledge. This account, on which
I touched above, accords a central role to general abilities to come to know truths
of certain sorts. More specifically, it accounts for perceptual knowledge in terms of
the exercise of perceptual–recognitional abilities. Those abilities are in the neigh-
bourhoodofwhatItooktobeconceptualcompetencesinthattheyhavetodowith
themasteryofconcepts,buttheyarenothinglessthanabilitiestotell,thatis,cometo
know,ofthingsthataresomewaythattheyarethatwayfromthewaytheyappearto
one or other of our sense-modalities. In this respect they differ not just from
competences as I previously conceived them, but also from the competences or
abilities that have been invoked by contemporary virtue epistemologists, notably
John Greco and Ernest Sosa. In taking this line I unashamedly abandoned the idea
thatperceptualknowledgeistobeexplicatedintermsofanindependentlygraspable
conceptionofperceptuallyjustifiedbelief.Perceptiondoesgiverisetojustifiedbelief
but, to explain how, we need an account that differs from that which makes
justificationbyexperiencecentral.(SeeChapter5.)
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/12/2018,SPi
I was struck by, and drew encouragement from, Timothy Williamson’s (2000)
reversaloftheusualwaytothinkoftherelationbetweenknowledgeandjustification,
and his scepticism about the prospects of giving plausible reductive accounts of
knowledge in general. It came to seem obvious that, at least in its central sense,
justificationforbeliefisconferredbyknowledge.Thismeshedwiththeideathatinits
centralsenseabeliefcanbejustifiedonlyifithasasoundfoundation.Howcoulda
soundfoundationbeprovidedbysomethinglessthanwhatweknow?Yetthiswayof
thinking raised a question as to whether anything of interest can be said about
knowledge in general. Isuspect thatmuch ofthe resistancetoWilliamson’sview—
theso-calledknowledge-firstview—derivesfromthinkingthatitstandsinthewayof
saying anything substantive about what knowledge is. Williamson himself interest-
ingly explores how knowledge links up, not just with justified belief, but with, for
instance, assertion, evidence, safety, and reliability, but one reason why resistance
persists,asidefromthefrictionprovidedbytraditionofseveraldecades,isthatmany
epistemologistsaredissatisfiedwithanythinglessthanasubstantivegeneralaccount
ofknowledge,andpreferablyonethatisreductive.
Rather than attempting to formulate a highly general account of knowledge and
thenattemptingtoshedlightonknowledgeofthevariouskinds,wemightdobetter
byinvestigatingthekindswithaviewtoilluminatingwhatknowledgeisingeneral.
Perceptual knowledge is a kind of knowledge because it is characterized by a
distinctive way in which the knower grasps the truth or fact that is known. The
same applies to a certain kind of knowledge from a perceived indicator (sign), as
whenoneknowsthatfireisnearalocationbecauseonerecognizesthatthepresence
ofsmokeisasignthatfireisnearthatlocation.Iargue(Chapter8)thatwhenonehas
recognitionalknowledgeofwhatisindicatedbyaperceivedindicator,theknowledge
gained, though evidence-based, is more like perceptual knowledge than one might
initiallythink.
Ofcourse,ifweareabletotellofknowledgeofsomekindthatitisknowledgewe
must have some general conception of knowledge. Perhaps the best we can do to
articulatethatconceptionistothinkofknowledgeasbeingincognitivecontactwith
atruthorfact.Wemayseektoilluminatewhatthatcognitivecontactamountstoby
giving substantive accounts of the diverse forms that it can take. My focus on
perceptualknowledgeisinkeepingwiththisconceptionofhowtoproceed.
The bewildering variety of intuitions, theories, and methodological predilections
in contemporary philosophy demands that in making a case for the conception of
perceptual knowledge developed here, one has to consider many other issues,
including issues about method in philosophy, and in epistemology in particular.
Much of the discussion in this book is, accordingly, not just about perceptual
knowledge but about topics giving rise to positions that can be obstacles to finding
plausiblewhatIhavetosayaboutperceptualknowledge.
Mythinkingaboutperceptualknowledgehasbeenshapedbyengagementwiththe
thinkingofdisjunctivists(Millar2007,2008a,2008b).Attheheartofdisjunctivismis
