Table Of ContentKISSINGER AND BRZEZINSKI
Also by Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos
WES1ERN EUROPE IN KISSINGER 'S GLOBAL STRA1 EGY
Kissinger and Brzezinski
The NSC and the Struggle for Control
of US National Security Policy
Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-21743-4 ISBN 978-1-349-21741-0 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-21741-0
© Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos 1991
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1991
All rights reserved. For information, write:
Scholarly and Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010
First published in the United States of America in 1991
ISBN 978-0-312-05743-5
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Andrianopoulos, Gerry Argyris, 1954-
Kissinger and Brzezinski : the NSC and the struggle for the control of
US national security policy / Gerry Argyris Andrianopoulos.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-312-05743-5
1. United States-Foreign relations-1969-1974. 2. United States
Foreign relations-1974-1977. 3. United States-Foreign
relations-1977-1981. 4. Kissinger, Henry, 1923--Philosophy.
5. Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 1928--Philosophy. 6. National Security
Council (U.S.). 7. United States-National security. I. Title.
E855.A85 1991
327.73-dc20 90-9133
CIP
To Marti
Contents
Preface x
Acknowledgements xi
Glossary Xlll
1 Introduction 1
Overview 1
Why Kissinger and Brzezinski? 4
Sources for the Study 9
Limitations of the Study 10
Organization of Chapters 11
2 The Philosophical Beliefs of Henry Kissinger 13
Introduction: The Content of Philosophical Beliefs 13
The Nature of Politics 13
Image of Adversaries: The USSR and the PRC 17
Image of Alliances 21
Image of the New States 25
Eventual Realization of Fundamental Political Values:
OptimismjPessimism 28
Predictability of the Political Future 30
Control of Historical Development 32
Chance (and Tragedy) in Human Affairs 34
Conclusion 35
3 The Philosophical Beliefs of Zbigniew Brzezinski 38
Introduction: The Content of Philosophical Beliefs 38
The Nature of Politics 39
Image of Adversaries: The USSR and the PRC 43
Image of Alliances 55
Image of the New States 61
Eventual Realization of Fundamental Political
Values: OptimismjPessimism 64
Predictability of the Political Future 66
Control of Historical Development 69
vii
viii Contents
Chance (and Tragedy) in Human Affairs 71
Conclusion 72
4 The Instrumental Beliefs of Henry Kissinger 76
Introduction: Notions of Correct Strategy and Tactics 76
Best Approach for Selecting Goals for Political Action 76
Most Effective Pursuit of Goals 81
Calculation, Control, and Acceptance of Risks 85
The Best" Timing" of Action 89
Utility of Different Means for Advancing
One's Interests 90
Conclusion 97
5 The Instrumental Beliefs of Zbigniew Brzezinski 100
Introduction: Notions of Correct Strategy and Tactics 100
Best Approach for Selecting Goals for Political Action 101
Most Effective Pursuit of Goals 106
Calculation, Control, and Acceptance of Risks 112
The Best" Timing" of Action 113
Utility of Different Means for Advancing
One's Interests 115
Conclusion 119
6 Kissinger Organizing Power for Decision-Making 122
Nixon/Ford and Kissinger: A Shared Perspective 122
The Question of Roles: The Adviser and
the Secretaries of State and Defense 125
The National Security Council System 127
Informal Structures: The "Backchannel" System 130
Conclusion 131
7 Brzezinski Organizing Power for Decision-Making 133
Carter and Brzezinski: A Shared Perspective 133
The Question of Roles: The Adviser and
the Secretaries of State and Defense 138
The National Security Council System 139
Informal Structures: "Friday Presidential Breakfast"
and the "V- B-B" 143
Conclusion 144
Contents IX
8 Kissinger and the Adversaries: The USSR and the PRC 147
The Need for Strategy 147
A Triangular Balance: The Opening to the PRC 150
US-Soviet Relations: From Confrontation to Detente 155
Force and Diplomacy: Detente Tested 170
Conclusion 174
9 Brzezinski and the Adversaries: The USSR and the PRC 178
The Need for Architecture 178
US-Soviet Relations: From Detente to Contestation 182
Force and Diplomacy: Detente Tested 194
A Triangular Balance: Normalization of
US-PRC Relations 201
Conclusion 212
10 Kissinger and the Allies: Seeking a Common Policy 215
The Nixon Doctrine: Genuine Partners hip 215
The Dilemmas of Common Defense: Maintaining
the Power Equilibrium 218
European Unity: Paying the Economic Price for It 227
"Selective Detente": Ostpolitik, Berlin, and the CSCE 232
The Year of Europe: Secking AtIantic Unity 240
Conclusion 245
11 Brzezinski and Alliances: Trilateral Cooperation 248
Introduction: The Challenge of Collective Leadership 248
The Need for Architecture 248
The Common Defense: The European Military Balance 250
The Threat of Selective Detente: Afghanistan and Poland 260
Conclusion 271
12 Conclusions 274
Notes 286
Select Bibliography 360
Primary Sources 360
Secondary Sources 366
Index 376
Preface
This study examines the impact of Kissinger's and Brzezinski's beliefs on
US national security policy by comparing their views on world politics
and strategy and tactics for achieving national goals, and then analyzing
the consistency of those beliefs with their recommendations and/or actions
while serving as National Security Advisers. They were selected for this
study because: (a) a major purpose of their academic writings was to
influence policy; and (b) they were appointed by Nixon and Carter,
respectively, on the basis of policy beliefs shared with the two presi
dents. Despite apparent divergences, this study found that Kissinger and
Brzezinski both believed that the greatest threat to peace is Moscow' sand
Peking's commitment to world-wide communist expansion, that divergent
national interests undermine cooperation even among allies, and that the
exploitation of Third World conflicts by Moscow and Peking would
eventually undermine peace. They also believed that, within limits, man
can shape history. For them, national goals should be selected on the basis
of power-realist, non-ideological, and strategic approaches, and could be
effectively pursued through power, leadership, the linkage of issues, the
use of force and diplomacy, and the rapid application of power in the
protracted conflict with the East. However, they disagreed about the neces
sity of injecting morality into policymaking and had different conceptions
of leadership. This study found that, while in office, Kissinger's and
Brzezinski's recommendations and/or actions were especially consistent
with their beliefs about Moscow's and Peking's negative impact on global
stability and their conceptions of power, diplomacy, linkage, and leader
ship. Indeed, those conceptions were clearly evident in their organization
of the National Security Council system and more informal policymaking
structures and their handling of relations with allies, the USSR, and the
PRC. Moreover, since leaving office they have been making proposals
consistent with their beliefs. The fact that the consistency is encountered
repeatedly in a sequence of interrelated recommendations and/or actions by
Kissinger and Brzezinski while in and out of office, permits the conclusion
that their policymaking behavior was, indeed, strongly influenced by their
conceptions and beliefs.
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