Table Of ContentKHAOS
COMPANY
K H A O S
C O M PA N Y
A Commander’s Account and Lessons Learned
from the 2019 MAGTF Warfighting Exercise
Captain Matthew S. Hanks, USMC
with Williamson Murray, PhD
Quantico, Virginia
2021
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA
Names: Hanks, Matthew S., 1989– author. | Murray, Williamson. | Marine Corps Uni-
versity (U.S.). Press, issuing body.
Title: Khaos Company : a commander’s account and lessons learned from the 2019
MAGTF warfighting exercise / Matthew S. Hanks ; with Williamson Murray.
Other titles: Commander’s account and lessons learned from the 2019 MAGTF war-
fighting exercise
Description: Quantico, Virginia : Marine Corps University Press, 2021. |
Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “Khaos Company offers a
short story written with the intent to provide Marines with the perspective of what
it is like to operate and fight at the company- and small-unit levels in operations of
such large scale and scope. This is a story about how a small yet cohesive company
of Marines experienced chaos, friction, uncertainty, surprise, failure, success, rela-
tionships, and executed the maneuver warfare principles outlined in our doctrinal
warfighting philosophy”— Provided by publisher.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021005089 | ISBN 9781732003170 (paperback)
Subjects: LCSH: War games—California—Twentynine Palms. | United States. Marine
Corps—Infantry—Drill and tactics. | United States. Marine Corps. Marine Regiment,
8th. Battalion, 3rd. Kilo Company. | Hanks, Matthew S., 1989—Military leadership.
Classification: LCC U310 .H225 2021 | DDC 359.9/64809794—dc23 | SUDOC D
214.502:K 52
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021005089
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The production of this book and other MCUP products is graciously supported by the
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Published by
Marine Corps University Press
2044 Broadway Street
Quantico, VA 22134
1st Printing, 2021
ISBN: 978-1-7320031-7-0
THIS VOLUME IS FREELY AVAILABLE AT WWW.USMCU.EDU/MCUPRESS
CONTENTS
Foreword vii
Preface xv
Acknowledgments xix
Introduction xxi
by Williamson Murray, PhD
Chapter 1. The Calm before the Storm 3
Chapter 2. The Defense of Prospect 47
Chapter 3. The Long Night Movement 90
Chapter 4. Hidalgo City, Part I 110
Chapter 5. Hidalgo City, Part II 145
Epilogue 193
Conclusion 197
by Williamson Murray, PhD
Appendices
Appendix A. Lessons Learned 199
Appendix B. MAGTF Warfighting Exercise 212
(MWX) 1-20 Discussion Guide
Appendix C. The Origins of Khaos Company 239
Glossary of Selected Terms and Abbreviations 243
Selected Further Reading 249
Index 259
———
v
FOREWORD
For many years, we have been conducting integrated
combined arms exercises at Marine Corps Air Ground
Combat Center (MCAGCC), Twentynine Palms, Cali-
fornia. The emphasis has always been on live fire, com-
bined-arms integration with maneuver to practice the
most difficult and dangerous operation in the Marine
Corps’ repertoire. The ability to combine every means
of providing fire support for maneuver forces that are
either defending or closing with and destroying en-
emy forces is the hallmark of a professional military
force and the only place we can put it all together is at
MCAGCC.
While remaining tremendously valuable, these ex-
ercises have also engendered a mindset that could have
proven detrimental to the Corps in a conventional fight.
That mindset was that all operations are conducted like
lane training and according to a set script. It may seem
like I am overstating the description of this mentality,
but I am here to tell you that I have seen it in action in
our training venues and it cannot continue to exist. I
———
vii
commanded MCAGCC from 2016 to 2018, after re-
turning from a yearlong deployment to Iraq, where I
was the target engagement authority supporting Iraqi
forces as they tried to retake portions of their country
from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Based
on my experiences in Iraq, what I saw happening on
the desert floor there at Twentynine Palms bothered
me. As I studied the fighting in the Ukraine, I became
even more troubled by what I was seeing. Lastly, after
I read a monograph from the U.S. Army’s Combined
Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute titled We Were
Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, I
came to the conclusion that we were setting ourselves
up for failure with the approach we were taking to Ma-
rine Corps training.1 While combined arms proficiency
remains necessary, it was nowhere near sufficient for our
training and readiness needs.
During the summer of 2017, I began discussions
with the Tactical Training Exercise Control Group
(TTECG) regarding our ability to modify the Integrated
Training Exercise (ITX) to include a nonlive fire force-
on-force exercise. I also visited the U.S. Army’s National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, their Joint
Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, and
their Joint Multinational Readiness Center at Hoenfels,
Germany. I watched the conduct of their force-on-force
1 Matt M. Matthews, We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006
Hezbollah-Israeli War, Long War Series Occasional Paper 26 (Fort
Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Combined
Arms Center, 2008).
FOREWORD
———
viii
exercises, as well as the instrumentation that they use
to record every aspect of an exercise in order to play it
back to the exercise force in the way of in-stride and
post exercise after action reports. These visits left me
with the impression that we, as a Marine Corps, were
way behind the curve with regard to how professionally
we approach training. I then made a visit to the Ukraine
and spoke with their armed forces about what was hap-
pening in the eastern portion of their country. While
much of what they identified as problematic related to
their relatively low level of readiness and professional
abilities, which they are working hard to overcome, we
would have problems with some of the tactics used out
there also. For example, when they described the sit-
uation of having an armored infantry battalion com-
mander keying a handset to communicate and, within
two minutes, having rockets land on their position and
wipe out the majority of the battalion, I pictured in my
mind all the times I have seen our own commanders
holding long discussions over the radio nets.2 All of this
convinced me that the Marine Corps had to change,
and it had to happen fast.
The change started with the detailed planning re-
quired to find room in the ITX schedule without add-
ing more time to the overall exercise due to concerns
regarding increased operational tempo demands on the
Fleet. The planning also entailed identifying how we
2 Patrick Tucker, “Hacker Shows How to Break into Military Com-
munications,” Defense One, 7 August 2014.
FOREWORD
———
ix
