Table Of ContentOUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/1/2020,SPi
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/1/2020,SPi
Kant’s
Transcendental
Deduction
A Cosmology of Experience
Alison Laywine
1
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/1/2020,SPi
3
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,,
UnitedKingdom
OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford.
ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship,
andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof
OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries
©AlisonLaywine
Themoralrightsoftheauthorhavebeenasserted
FirstEditionpublishedin
Impression:
Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin
aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe
priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted
bylaw,bylicenceorundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics
rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe
aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe
addressabove
Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform
andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer
PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress
MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY,UnitedStatesofAmerica
BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData
Dataavailable
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:
ISBN––––
PrintedandboundinGreatBritainby
ClaysLtd,ElcografS.p.A.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,29/1/2020,SPi
Acknowledgements
Iwouldlikefirsttoexpressmydeepgratitudetothefourpeoplewhomadethemost
material contributions to the writing of this book. I mean first of all Michel Aubé
without whose support it would not have been possible. Next I mean Michael
Friedman for his affection, unwavering support, and searching questions and
HenryAllison for generouslysharing his thoughtsandcriticisms ofa draftof what
isnowChapterTwo.Lastandfirstofall,ImeanStephenMenn—foreverything.
I would also like to express my deep gratitude to readers at Oxford University
Pressandtofriendsandcolleagueswhosestimulatingconversationhelpedmeclarify
the ideas presented in this book. I mean, in particular, Andrew Chignell (and his
students at Cornell in the winter of ), Osama Eshera, Vincenzo de Risi (and
members of the seminar he led at the Max Planck Institut in Berlin), Hannah
Ginsborg,SajjadKhubravan,EsterMacedo,DavidMerry,PeterMomtchiloff,Calvin
Normore,TobiasRosefeldt(andmembersofhisKolloquiumattheHumboldtinthe
summerof),FatemeSavadi,ElizabethShurcliffe,DanielSutherland,andDaniel
Warren.IamalsogratefultomycopyeditorPhilDinesandtheprojectmanagerwho
oversawtheproductionofthisbook,SindujaAbirami.
LetmealsoextendmythankstothePhilosophyDepartmentatMcGillUniversity
for its support over the years, and to the McGill University Library staff. I am
especiallygratefultoLonnieWeatherby.
This is the place to acknowledge that ChapterOne of this book rethinks and
repackagestwopreviouslypublishedpapers:‘KantontheSelfasModelofExperience’
in Kantian Review, volume nine, , – and ‘Kant’s Metaphysical Reflections
in the Duisburg Nachlaß’ in Kant Studien, volume , Issue , , –.
Finally,Iwishtodedicatethisbooktomymotherandfather:withallmyloveand
deepgratitude.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,27/1/2020,SPi
Introduction
Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: A Somewhat
fl
Deep-Seated Re ection
This book undertakes a study of the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of
Pure Reason—‘a somewhat deep-seated reflection’,¹ as Kant characterizes it in the
preface to the first edition (AXVI). Such studies have been undertaken before, but
IbelieveIcan shed new light on theargument. Imight justifymy claimby saying
that I havetaken account ofKant’s earlier writings—and not only those published
inhislifetime.Thatisatleastpartofwhatisdistinctiveaboutmystudy.Butother
people have done so too, and contributed much to our understanding of the text.
A notable example is Hermann de Vleeschauwer’s three volume book, La déduc-
tiontranscendantale.²SotooHenryAllison’smorerecentcontributionbythesame
title (in English),stylized in the sub-title as ‘an analytical-historical commentary’.³
If I can claim to have contributed anything, it will be by finding and elaborating
points of contact between the Transcendental Deduction and Kant’s earlier writ-
ings that have not been noticed before or that have not been taken as seriously as
perhapstheyshouldbe.TheupshotisthatItaketheTranscendentalDeductionto
be a reinterpretation of Kant’s early metaphysics.
This claim, so far as it goes, is not news. In the preface to the first edition, Kant
himselfexplicitlyencourageshisreadertoexpectareappraisalofmetaphysicsasthe
outcomeoftheCritique.Hecharacterizeshisundertaking‘notasacritiqueofbooks
and systems, but rather that of the faculty of reason itself with respect to all
knowledge it may seek independent of all experience, and hence the deciding of the
possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics as such and the determining of its
sourcesandboundaries’(AXII).Afewpageslater,heassociatesthetaskofdeciding
‘thepossibilityorimpossibilityofametaphysicsassuch’withthatoftheDeduction.
For he says that the Deduction addresses the ‘central question’ of the Critique as a
whole:‘whatandhowmuchcanbeknownbyreasonandunderstanding,independ-
entofallexperience’(AXVII).SincetheDeductionissupposedtoestablish,among
otherthings,thattheunderstandingcannotapplyitspureconceptsaprioritothings
¹ ‘eineetwastiefangelegteBetrachtung’.
² DeVleeschauwer,LaDéductiontranscendantaledansl’oeuvredeKant(Paris:LibrairieErnestLeroux,
).
³ Allison, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: an Analytical-Historical Commentary (Oxford: Oxford
UniversityPress,).
Kant’sTranscendentalDeduction:ACosmologyofExperience.AlisonLaywine,OxfordUniversityPress(2020).©AlisonLaywine.
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198748922.001.0001
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,27/1/2020,SPi
inthemselves,butonlytowhatmaybesensiblygiventous,itleadstotheconclusion
that ‘a metaphysics as such’ is not possible, at least not on the assumption that
metaphysicsisascienceofnon-sensiblethings.Thisreappraisalisthenreinforcedin
the Transcendental Dialectic, which tries to show in detail that the ideas of reason,
whentakentoapplydogmaticallytonon-sensiblethings,generatedifferentkindsof
fallacies.
EvenafterwehaverecalledthesefamiliarpointsintheCritique,muchremainsto
be said about the significance of the Transcendental Deduction for metaphysics, as
Kantunderstoodit,andtheotherwayround.Theprojectofthisbookis,atleastin
part, to spell this out. But before it can get underway, we must understand more
preciselywhatKanttookmetaphysicstobe.OtherwiseweandKantruntheriskof
talkingpasteachother.
Hereisacaseinpoint.
I might very well have chosen as the title of this book: Kant’s Metaphysics of
Experience.For that would havecapturedwhat this book is about, since it captures
whatItaketheDeductiontobeabout.Butthattitleisalreadyspokenfor.Itistheone
thatH.J.Patonpickedforhisbookin1936.⁴WhenIspeakof‘Kant’smetaphysicsof
experience’,Ihavesomethingspecificinmind.SurelyPatondoestoo.Butwhatthat
could be is not immediately obvious, because he does not say! He lays out in the
introduction his reasons for rejecting the so-called ‘Patchwork Theory’, the view
defended by Adickes, Vaihinger, and Kemp-Smith according to which the Critique
waswrittenhastilybystitchingtogetherearlierargumentsandsketchesofarguments
jotted down here and there over a long period of time. But Paton does nothing to
explainhowweshouldunderstandhisuseoftheword‘metaphysics’,muchlessthe
expression ‘metaphysics of experience’. Nor does he offer any explanation in the
openingchaptersofBookOne.TheheadingofBookOneis‘Kant’sProblem’,which
naturallyraisestheexpectationthatPatonwillstartbymotivatingKant’sprojectand
thereforehisown.Sohedoes.Buthissilenceon‘metaphysics’evenheresuggeststhat
he must have thought the meaning of this word would be obvious. This in turn
suggeststhatwemayhaveavaluablecluetohisthinkingintheheadingofthefirst
chapterofBookOne,whichis:‘AppearanceandReality’.Forwerecognizethisheading
asthetitleofthefamousbookbyBradley.
It then seems likely that Paton took ‘metaphysics’ in Bradley’s sense. Bradley
characterizes metaphysicstentatively asfollows: ‘Wemay agree, perhaps, to under-
standbymetaphysicsanattempttoknowrealityasagainstmereappearance,orthe
study of first principles or ultimate truths, or again the effort to comprehend the
universe,notsimplypiecemealorbyfragments,butsomehowasawhole.’⁵Thefirst
part of Bradley’s book is devoted to appearance: it proceeds from one dilemma to
another;itultimatelyconcludesthatthedilemmasareintractableandthattheworld
contradicts itself and so must count as appearance and not reality. The destructive
firstpartofthebookthenpavesthewaytothelengthiersecondpartwhosetaskisto
⁴ Herbert James Paton, Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience in two volumes as reprinted by (Bristol:
ThoemmesPress,).
⁵ Bradley,AppearanceandReality(London:SwanSonnenschein&Co.,),reprintedasanElibron
ClassicsbyAdamantMediaCorporationin.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,27/1/2020,SPi
’
figureoutpositivelyandconstructivelyhowrealityassuchoughttobeunderstood.
IthinkitlikelythatPatonwastryingtouseKanttosetthisprojectonitshead.The
idea would be something like this. Kant was engaged in metaphysics in Bradley’s
sense.Buthemountedacoherentargument(andnotacrazyquiltofbadlystitched
together jottings) designed to show that reality—as Bradley seems to have under-
stoodit—isfraughtwithfallacyandparadoxandthatappearanceisimmunetothese
problems.Hence,whatmetaphysicsteachesusisthatwecanhopetomakeprogress
understandingappearance,butnever‘reality’.AndthatlessoniswhatmakesKant’s
metaphysicsa‘metaphysicsofexperience’.⁶
I see no reason to quarrel with Bradley and Paton on their use of ‘metaphysics’.
They were free to frame the terms of their debate as they saw fit. But Kant himself
hadsomethingquiteelseinmind.Tobesure,thereisapointofcontactbetweenhis
understanding of metaphysics and theirs. It is suggested by the brief passages
I quoted earlier from the first edition of the Critique. For we saw that he explicitly
associates the fate of metaphysics with the question ‘what and how much can be
known by reason and understanding, independent of all experience’. Where we
discover a distinction between what can be known independent of experience and
whatcannot,we may wellexpect acomplementarydistinctionbetweenappearance
and reality. But that distinction as such is not what Kant meant by ‘metaphysics’,
evenifhehimselfmightbeunderstoodtohaveembraceditorsomethinglikeit.This
mattersformypurposes.
Metaphysics was, of course, a part of philosophy for Kant. His thinking about it
was informed by Alexander Baumgarten’s handbook on the subject. Baumgarten
definesmetaphysicsas‘thescienceofthefirstprinciplesinhumancognition’(§1).⁷
Thisformulationallbyitselfmightwellbetakentoresonatesympatheticallywiththe
⁶ ItshouldbenotedthatStrawsontoospeaksofKant’s‘metaphysicsofexperience’inTheBoundsof
Sense(London/NewYork:Routledge,1966).Infact,thatistheheadingofPartTwoofhisbook.Ihavea
hardertimemakingsenseofwhatStrawsonhasinmind,becausehespeaksinsuchbroadgeneralities.He
characterizesthetaskoftheCritiqueas‘theinvestigationofthatlimitingframeworkofideasandprinciples
the use and application of which are essential to empirical knowledge, and which are implicit in any
coherentconceptionofexperiencewhichwecanform.’Op.cit.,18.Hegoesontosaythatshouldthis
investigationsucceed, it would‘fully deservethe titleofmetaphysics’ (Strawson,Bounds ofSense, 18).
‘Metaphysics’hereisshortfor‘metaphysicsofexperience’.WhatdoesStrawsonmeanby‘metaphysics’?He
saysonlythis:‘It[sc.Kant’sinvestigation—AL]willbe,asmetaphysicswasalwayssaidtobe,themost
generalandfundamentalofstudies;anditsmethodwillbenon-empirical,orapriori,notbecause,like
transcendentmetaphysics,itclaimstobeconcernedwitharealmofobjectsinaccessibletoexperience,but
becauseit isconcernedwith theconceptual structurewhichis presupposed in all empirical inquiries.’
(Strawson,BoundsofSense,18).Sofarasitgoes,Strawson’sclaimheremaywellbetrue.Theproblemis
justthatitisvague.QuitepossiblyhemeansmuchthesamethingasPaton;quitepossiblyPatonmeans
nothingmorethanhe(Strawson)does.Bycontrast,Ibelievethatthenotionofametaphysicsorcosmology
ofexperiencecanbemadereasonablypreciseandspecific.BythetimeIamdone,however,myreadermay
discernasympatheticresonanceinsomeofmyconclusionswiththeStrawsonianideathatKantwastrying
tosetupsomekindofglobalsystemorframeworkofspatio-temporalrelationsasthebackdroptoallour
empiricalthinkingandknowledgeofobjects.IascribethissympatheticresonancetoStrawson’ssensitivity
totheelementsinKant’sTranscendentalAnalyticthatIwillarguearebestunderstoodasadaptionsbyhis
criticalphilosophyofelementsinhisearlygeneralcosmologytowhichIwillcallthereader’sattentionas
wegoalong.
⁷ Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysica, editio III (Halae Magdeburgicae: Impensis Carol. Herman.
Hemmerde,).
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,27/1/2020,SPi
characterizationofmetaphysicsas‘thestudyofprinciplesorultimatetruths’Iquoted
earlier from Bradley’s Appearance and Reality. But there is at least one important
pointofdisagreementbetweenthetwophilosophers,andquitelikelybetweenKant
andPaton,forthatmatter.
Metaphysics is a single science, for Baumgarten, but it has internal divisions,
corresponding to differences of object: ‘traced back to metaphysics [sc. as its
parts—AL]areontology,cosmology,psychologyandnatural theology’(§2).Ontol-
ogyis‘thescienceofthegeneralpredicates ofbeing’(§4),i.e.,thefirstprinciplesof
humanknowledge(§5)whichapplytoeverythingandanything.Thatiswhatmakes
ontology ‘general metaphysics’, as opposed to any of the ‘special’ branches of
metaphysics. The special branches of metaphysics are respectively the sciences of
some particular, intelligible object. Natural theology is the science of divinity, elab-
oratedbyhumanreasonunaidedbyrevelation.Rationalpsychologyisthescienceof
the human rational soul, elaborated by human reason independently of empirical
psychology.Generalcosmologyisthescienceofworldsassuch.Itisnotconcerned
withsomeparticularworld,liketheoneofwhichwehappentobeparts,butrather
the intelligible principles that would make possible any world as such. Hence, it is
independentof,andpriorto,thephysicalsciencesthatareallconcernedonewayor
anotherwithbodyandmatterasconstitutiveelementsofthisworld.ForBradley,by
contrast,theideathattheremightbemorethanoneintelligibleobjectofmetaphysics
andthatthereforemetaphysicshasinternaldivisionsisnonsense.Therecanbeonly
onereality.Itisthesingle,ultimateobjectofmetaphysics,⁸i.e.,aftermetaphysicshas
taught us how to distinguish that reality from appearance. I take Paton to agree, at
leasttotheextentofdenyingthatmetaphysicshasmorethanoneobject.Assuming
thatBradleywaswrongandKantwasright,hewouldsurelysaythattheonlyobject
metaphysics can studypositivelyis ‘experience’:butthereis onlyone experience;it
doesnothaveinternaldivisions.
Baumgarten’sthreefold division ofspecialmetaphysics accordingtoitsobjectsis
certainlyreflectedinKant’spresentationoftheTranscendentalDialectic:thesecond
bookoftheDialectichasthree‘Hauptstücke’,eachdevotedtooneofthethreespecial
branchesofmetaphysics.ButtheDialecticissupposedtoshowthattherecanbeno
knowledge of God, soul, or world independent of experience. This suggests that
Kant himself must have given up Baumgarten’s conception of metaphysics by the
1780s,evenifhe hadembracedit before then. Atany rate,itindicates thathehad
given up on special metaphysics, at least as Baumgarten understood it. Hence, it
would seem that the only part of Baumgarten’s programme Kant could have
remained positively committed to in the 1780s and thereafter was general meta-
physics.Thatidea,orsomethinglikeit,hasbeenfloatedbefore,notablybyMartin
HeideggerinKantunddasProblemderMetaphysik.Itmightbethought,then,that
⁸ Averyinterestingalternative,post-KantianviewcanbefoundinHermannLotzewhoseMetaphysik
reprisesatleastsomeofthepre-Kantianinternaldivisionsofmetaphysicsaccordingtoitsdifferentobjects.
ThusthefulltitleofhisbookisMetaphysik,dreiBücherderOntologie,KosmologieundPsychologie,ed.
GeorgMisch(Leipzig:FelixMeiner,1912)1–644.Oneisstruckbytheconspicuousabsenceofanatural
theology.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,27/1/2020,SPi
’
IamtryingtorevivethisaccountofKant’s‘metaphysicsofexperience’ratherthan
Paton’s. But that is not the case.
UnlikePaton,HeideggerunderstoodandtookseriouslyKant’srelationtoBaum-
garten’sprogramme for metaphysics. The CritiqueofPure Reason was supposedto
be,onhisreading,aradicalizationofthisprogrammefromwithin.
TheHeideggerianstorystartswiththebynowfamiliardistinctionbetweengeneral
andspecialmetaphysics.Butthisdistinctionissupposedtocashoutasadistinction
between ontology and ‘ontic’ knowledge. Ontic knowledge is about the ‘things that
are’ (die Seienden), namely the ones of greatest concern to us given that we under-
stand ourselves as finite beings with hopes for an afterlife, situated in creation as a
whole by the divine being who brought us into existence. Thus God, the human
rationalsoulandtheworldassuchare‘thethingsthatare’ofgreatestconcerntous.
This gives us the by now familiar threefold division of special metaphysics into
naturaltheology,rationalpsychology,andgeneralcosmology.Butpreciselybecause
these disciplines reflect our most significant concerns, they aspire to the greatest
possiblerigour,certainty,anddignity.Hence,theymustbegroundedonanappro-
priate philosophical infrastructure, namely ontology understood as the discipline
that determines in a universal way the being of the things that are: das Sein der
Seienden. Without this infrastructure, our hopes of philosophically elaborating our
insights into the objects of greatest concern to us will fall to pieces. Even for Wolff
andBaumgarten,then,theprospectsofsuccessfullydevelopingspecialmetaphysics
will turn on how successfully we have developed our general metaphysics. Kant’s
great merit, according to Heidegger, was to recognize that Wolff and Baumgarten
had failed to deliver on their promise. For ontology,as they conceived it, treats the
being of the things that are as just one more of the many things that are. Their
ontologycouldneverserveasagroundingofonticknowledge,becauseittookitscue
fromonticknowledgeandimplicitlyunderstooditselfinlightofsuchknowledge.It
usedasacrutchtheverythingsitwassupposedtoshoreup.Kant’sprojectwasthus
to investigate the possibility of a genuinely ontological ontology—an ontology
purgedofitsonticfalseconsciousness.⁹
ThereisnodoubtthatHeideggeroffersasalutarycorrectiontotheMarburgNeo-
Kantian reading of the first Critique. Hermann Cohen argued that the central
concern of the Critique was to establish the Geltung of the exact sciences.¹⁰ An
important consequence of Cohen’s reading was to strip Kantian philosophy of its
obvious interest in Wolffian metaphysics. This gives a false picture of the Critique.
TheexactscienceswereindeedofobviousinteresttoKant,buttheoneinterestdid
notprecludetheother.Moreover,HeideggerisrighttopointoutthatKantdidnot
regardWolffianmetaphysicsassomethingIwillcalla‘merefailure’.Ifaphilosoph-
ical programme proves to be a ‘mere failure’ for whatever reason, the appropriate
⁹ Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe I. Abteilung, Band 3, Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik
(FrankfurtamMain:VittorioKlostermann,1965)15–26.
¹⁰ Hermann Cohen, Kants Theorie der Erfahrung, zweite neubearbeitete Auflage (Berlin: Ferd.
Dümmlers Verlagsbuchhandlung Harrwitz und Gossmann, ). Cohen lays out his programme for
interpretingKantintheintroductionwherehetriestosituatetheCritiqueinthehistoryofphilosophy.
Mycharacterizationofhisprogrammeinthisparagraphiscrudeintheinterestofbeingsuccinct.
OUPCORRECTEDPROOF–FINAL,27/1/2020,SPi
responseistoabandonitandmoveontosomethingelse.OnCohen’sreadingofthe
Critique, Kant abandoned Wolffian metaphysics, because he regarded it as a ‘mere
failure’,andheturnedtotheexactsciencesandtheproblemoftheirGeltung,because
hethoughtthatwouldbemorepromising.Butsomeprojectsinphilosophyarenot
failures‘merely’.TheyarewhatIwillcall‘signalfailures’:onesthatsuggestweshould
probe deeper and that therefore prove to be opportunities to learn something
important. According to Heidegger, Kant took Wolffian metaphysics to be a signal
failure.Thequestioniswhathethoughtwecouldlearnfromit.
Heidegger’s answer is this. Kant recognized that there could be no genuinely
ontological ontology stripped of its ontic false consciousness, unless the enquiry
weredirectedtowardsitsverysource,namelythebeing,ens,thingorDaseinwhose
special concerns are on display in the three branches of special metaphysics. Kant
producedaproto-analyticofDaseinbyrevealingtheconditionsofourfinitude,i.e.,
the role played by the productive imagination in somehow mediating between
humansensibilityandtherequirementsofourfiniteunderstanding.
I agree with Heidegger that Kant took Baumgarten’s project for metaphysics to
beasignalfailureandhenceanopportunitytoprobedeeper.ButIdisagreewithhim
onthreethings.Firstofall,Heidegger’sclaimthatKantcarriedoutaproto-analytic
of Dasein gives a picture of the Critique that is just as false as Cohen’s. The textual
evidencedoesnot,onbalance,supporthisreading.Secondofall,Heideggertakesa
muchtoo‘take-it-or-leave-it’position:eitherKantisengagingwithmetaphysics,or
heisdoingErkenntnistheorie.Thedisjunctionhereisexclusive.Ithinkthatthatisa
mistake.ForKant,metaphysicsandsomethingwemightaswellcallErkenntnisthe-
orie are inextricably entwined. Third and most important of all, I think that the
relation between special and general metaphysics is much more complicated and
muchmoreinterestingthanHeideggerrealizes.
I will argue that the Transcendental Deduction reflects Kant’s engagement with
special metaphysics before 1780 in the most fundamental way, namely in the
conception of the understanding and its relation to appearances that emerges by
theendoftheDeduction(inbotheditions).Thisconceptionisinformedbytheearly
Kant’sgeneralcosmology.
Aswehaveseen,generalcosmologywasthatbranchofspecialmetaphysicswhose
taskwastoexplainwhatitistobeaworldandhowaworldassuchispossible.For
the early Kant, a world is the collection of all creatures: it exhibits unity insofar as
thesecreaturesexternallyrelatetooneanother;thisdepends,inturn,onthewayGod
decided to govern his creation. The underlying assumption is that God’s intellect
andGod’swillareperfectineveryway.God’swillexhibitsitsperfectionnotonlyby
exercisingthesupremepoweratitsdisposal,butalsobyconformingtothesupremely
wise judgements of God’s intellect. This assumption is naturally controversial. It
would be rejected by divine voluntarists, like Samuel Clarke, who would say that
God elects to do what he does, just because it pleases him and not because it is
intrinsicallywise.ButtheassumptionalsoensuresthatGod’sgovernmentofcreation
is supremely rational; this ensures that human philosophers can evaluate it on
rational grounds. Granted, we cannot understand everything, for we too are crea-
tures. Still we are creatures possessed of intellect: we know in principle, if not in
detail, what can ideally be expected of an intellect—even an intellect in the state
