Table Of ContentKANT'S THEORY OF SCIENCE
KANT'S
THEORY OF SCIENCE
Gordon G. Brittan,Jr.
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY
Copyright © 1978 by Princeton University Press
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". . . to cognize anything a priori is to cognize it from
its mere possibility. But the possibility of determinate na
tural things cannot be cognized from their mere concepts; from
these concepts the possibility of the thought (that it does
not contradict itself) can indeed be cognized, but not the
possibility of the object as a natural thing, which can be
given (as existing) outside of the thought. Therefore, in order
to cognize the possibility of determinate natural things, and
hence to cognize them a priori, there is further required that
the intuition corresponding to the concept be given a priori,
i.e., that the concept be constructed. Now, rational cognition
through the construction of concepts is mathematical. A pure
philosophy of nature in general, i.e., one that only investi
gates what constitutes the concept of a nature in general, may
indeed be possible without mathematics; but a pure doctrine
of nature concerning determinate natural things . . . is possible
only by means of mathematics. And since in every doctrine
of nature only so much science proper is to be found as
there is a priori cognition in it, a doctrine of nature will
contain only so much science proper as there is applied
mathematics in it."
METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
NATURAL SCIENCE
Preface
It is not necessary to come from the West to be bound ines
capably to one's own history. Philosophers, too, beat on,
boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.
Inevitably they carry some of the present with them. There is
at least this much truth to Croce's dictum that all history is
contemporary history.
In this study, I have tried to reconstruct rationally Kant's
theory of science, drawing largely on the Critique of Pure Rea
son and downplaying the fact that his position changed and
developed over the years. If anything justifies my title, it is
the attempt to give a general account of this "theory" and to
show how, for Kant, it clarifies the relations between philos
ophy and science. At the same time, the title "Kant's Theory
of Science" is both too broad and too narrow. It is too broad
because there are many features of Kant's theory of science,
particularly having to do with methodological questions and
the role of reason in its regulative aspect, about which I have
said very little. There is already an excellent discussion of
these questions and this role in Gerd Buchdahl's Metaphysics
and the Philosophy of Science. The title is too narrow because
the differences between Kant's theory of science and his more
general metaphysics of experience are ones of detail and em
phasis only. What I have to say about the former should il
luminate the latter as well.
The reconstruction has been guided by three criteria of
adequacy formulated by Professor Wolfgang Stegmiiller.1 He
asks that a reconstructed philosophical theory be presented (1)
in such a way that it remains in accordance with the basic
1 In a pair of clarifying papers, "Towards a Rational Reconstruction of
Kant's Metaphysics of Experience," Ratio, i, 1967, pp. 1-32, and n, 1968, pp.
1-37. Professor Stegmiiller has also directed my attention to some little-
known but extremely interesting lectures on Kant given by Professor Hein-
rich Scholz in the winter semester, 1943-1944, at the University of Miinster,
very much in the same spirit as my study, if not always with the same results.
viii PREFACE
ideas of the philosopher; (2) as far as possible in precise terms;
(3) if possible, as a consistent theory. I would supplement the
first criterion, as does Stegmiiller, with the proviso that the
original text be first analyzed carefully and respected
throughout,2 and extend the third to read "as a consistent and
unified theory." There are inconsistencies in Kant's theory; he
never denied it. But a problem deeper than exposing or at
tempting to resolve such inconsistencies is to see how the var
ious themes he develops fit together. In the case of the theory
of science, this comes down to trying to develop a unified ac
count of Kant's philosophy of mathematics and his philoso
phy of physics or, from a different point of view, to relate the
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to the Critique of
Pure Reason.
It is also the case that to reconstruct a philosophical position
is to make clear the structure of argument that supports it,
and this involves as a natural consequence entering into ques
tions of logical theory. A great deal of attention has been de
voted to Leibniz's conception of logic, even to the extent of
saying, as does Russell, that his metaphysics reflects certain
deeply held beliefs about logical form. But comparatively lit
tle attention has been devoted to Kant's logical doctrines,
apart from routine derogatory remarks about the Table of
Judgments in the first Critique and the notorious comment
that logic had not advanced a step beyond Aristotle.3 In part,
this neglect stems from the fact that Kant, unlike Leibniz,
made no distinctive contribution to the history of logic. More
important is the fact that some of Kant's most interesting log
ical doctrines are no more than implicit in his work, and can
2 I have not hesitated to use contemporary ideas in the attempt to clarify
Kant's position; but I have also tried to make clear which of these ideas are in
the text and which are introduced from outside in the attempt to cast light on
it.
3 A comment belied by Kant's efforts to break out of the traditional
framework, in his essay "On the false subtlety of the four figures of the syl
logism," for example, more importantly but less systematically when he
finds the framework cramping, as in his discussion of the first two An
timonies in the Critique of Pure Reason, where he proposes a distinction be
tween "analytical" and "dialectical" contradictories.
PREFACE IX
be attributed to him only inferentially. Yet, as I hope to
show, they provide important axes and motives of his posi
tion.
Understanding Kant's logical theory has been greatly facili
tated by a number of recent technical developments. I have
tried to make use of these developments, in an informal way,
without presupposing any extensive technical background on
the part of the reader. Indeed, my own interest in Kant's
theory of science was in part prompted by these devel
opments, and the light they shed on the positivist objections
to that theory, just as the interest of the neo-Kantians of Mar
burg was in part prompted by developments in physics
around the turn of the century.
Most books on Kant grow out of a more or less sustained at
tempt to teach the Critique of Pure Reason. So did this one. I
owe a debt of thanks especially to students in seminars at the
University of California, Irvine, and the Claremont Graduate
School for their help in what often proved to be a cooperative
project.
I owe a debt of thanks as well to former colleagues in the
philosophy department at Irvine. In the preface to his book,
Mind and Art, Guy Sircello has summarized eloquently what it
meant to be a member of that department. A present col
league, James W. Allard, has been kind enough to read
through several chapters and has made some valuable com
ments.
A quartet of philosophers have, as teachers and friends,
shaped my intellectual development. I would like to thank
them while at the same time discharging them of any respon
sibility for the ways in which their influences are embodied
here. It is fair to say that the position of each is, in important
respects, Kantian. Donald Davidson provided the general
philosophical framework, particularly as concerns its anti-
reductionist impulse. Jaakko Hintikka introduced me to Kant
and to the possibilities of exploiting developments in logic to
the better understanding of the history of philosophy. Bas
van Fraassen supplied some of the developments here
