“Kantian Conceptualism,” in: Günther Abel and - Thomas Land

43 Pages·2011·0.51 MB·English

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Kantian Conceptualism
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Thomas Land
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8 Whether or not perceptual content is conceptual, and what it means to
9 saythatitis,havebeenmuch-debatedquestionsinrecentphilosophyof
10 perception. A striking fact about this debate is that Kant has been in-
11 voked on two opposing sides of it. Thus, some advocates of conceptu-
12 alism – the view that the content of a perceptual experience has the
13 structure of a proposition and must therefore involve the application
14 of concepts – have traced their position back to Kant’s theory of intu-
15 ition.1 At the same time, some proponents of nonconceptualism – the
16 view that the content of perception is not propositional in structure
17 and does not involve the application of concepts – have argued that,
18 on the contrary, Kant’s theory of intuition is a forerunner of their
19 own position.2
20 A natural reaction to this is to think that at least one side of the de-
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bate is mistaken about Kant and that careful examination of Kant’s texts
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will show this. In thispaper, I want to combine an exegetical inquiry of
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this sort with an assessment of the philosophical merits of the positions
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staked out in this debate. This project is motivated by the following
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consideration: Assuming that neither side has been reckless in claiming
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that it incorporates a central insight of Kant’s theory of intuition, the
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very fact that this theory can be invoked with some justification to sup-
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portboththeseopposingpositionsshoulditselfbeacauseforphilosoph-
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ical reflection and lead us to ask what it is about this theory that makes
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1 The most prominent advocate of this position has been John McDowell. See
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McDowell (1996), as well as the first three essays in McDowell (2009).
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2 AprominentadvocateofthispositionisRobertHannawhowantstodefenda
34 “Kantian theory of the semantic structure and psychological function of non-
35 conceptual content” (Hanna (2008), 42) and who claims that Kant did in fact
36 hold a theory of this kind: “[…] Kant is most accurately regarded […] as the
founder of non-conceptualism” (Hanna (2008), 45); see also Hanna (2005). –
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What it is for the content of a mental state to be nonconceptual (or, for that
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matter, conceptual) is itself a question on which there are various different
39 views; see Speaks (2005) for discussion. For the purposes of this paper, the
40 gloss given in the text will be sufficient.
198 Thomas Land
1 such a situation possible. It is reasonable to expect that Kant’s theory
2 combines elements which bear some affinity to those that figure in
3 the contemporary debate. Each side, we may suppose, emphasizes one
4 such element at the expense of the other. If this is right, it suggests
5 that a proper understanding of Kant’s theory might be able to show
6 how it is possible that this theory can so much as seem to combine el-
7 ementswhosecounterpartsinthecontemporarydebateappeartobein-
8 compatible.Andthis,inturn, shouldleadustoaskwhetherKant’sown
9 view, when properly interpreted, might not itself yield a third alterna-
10 tive – a position that cuts a middle path between conceptualism and
11 nonconceptualism, revealing a way of integrating commitments that at
12 first blush appear to exclude one another, yet, when properly thought
13 through, can be shown to be in fact compatible.
14 I shall argue that Kant’s theory of intuition does in fact cut such a
15 middlepathbecauseitcombinesbothaconceptualist andanonconcep-
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tualist element. As a consequence, a proper appreciation of its merits
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willputusinapositiontoseethatthereisagenuineinsightonthecon-
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ceptualist side, yet there is also a kernel of truth in the nonconceptualist
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position. The assumption that the forced alternative with which we
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seem tobe faced (of having to choose between conceptualism andnon-
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conceptualism about perception) must be rejected. It is based on an in-
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accuraterepresentationoftheavailableoptions.Rather,athirdoptionis
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available – one which combines the advantages of both positions, but
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avoids their shortcomings. I shall be concerned to show that Kant’s
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theory of intuition points the way towards this third option.
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I proceed as follows. I begin by arguing that Kant’s interest in the
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structure of perceptual content is motivated by a different question
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thanthecontemporarydebate(§1)andexplainwhatmakesthisquestion
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urgent for Kant (§§2 and 3). I then consider the answer that those non-
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conceptualists who explicitly draw on Kant – the Kantian Nonconcep-
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tualists,asIcallthem–arecommittedtoascribingtohimandshowthat
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thisanswerfails(§4).Next,Iturntoaversionofcontemporaryconcep-
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tualism that I call Propositionalism and that likewise takes itself to offer
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an updated version of Kant’s theory of intuition. I argue that Proposi-
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tionalism runs into equally serious problems (§§5 and 6). After pausing
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37 toreflectonwhatthefailureofPropositionalismshowsusaboutthena-
38 ture of the problem with which Kant is concerned (§7), I go on to out-
39 line my own reading of Kant and show how his position contains the
40 materials for a third alternative, which I call Kantian Conceptualism
Kantian Conceptualism 199
1 and which avoids the problems of Kantian Nonconceptualism and
2 Propositionalism respectively (§8).
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5 1. The Content Problem and the Question
6 of Objective Purport
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8 My goal in this paper is to argue that Kant can be understood as artic-
9 ulating a kind of conceptualism that is in important ways different from
10 theconceptualistpositionthatfiguresinthecontemporary debateabout
11 perceptual content. Kant’s brand of conceptualism makes it possible to
12 beaconceptualistwhilealsoappropriatingsomeoftheinsightsthatmo-
13 tivate contemporary nonconceptualism. This alternative construal of
14 conceptualism becomes available because Kant’s overriding concern
15 with regard to perception is distinct from the concern that is often
16 taken to be at the center of the contemporary debate.
17 ThecontemporarydebatecentersonwhatIcalltheContentProblem,
18 while Kant’s overriding concern is with what I call the Question of Ob-
19 jective Purport.3 The Content Problem concerns the similarities and dis-
20 similarities in structure between the content of conceptual thought, on
21 theonehand, andthatof perceptualexperience, ontheother.4Bycon-
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trast,theQuestionof ObjectivePurportseekstoidentifytheconditions
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that must be satisfied for perceptual experience to have a content in the
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first place.
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TwoconsiderationsservetoillustratethekindsofissuesIamgroup-
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ing here under the heading of the Content Problem. One of these con-
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cernstherelativedeterminacyofperceptionandconceptualthought re-
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spectively;theotherconcernsclassificatoryawareness.Thefirstservesas
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the point of departure for a line of argument that has led some philos-
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opherstoadoptanonconceptualistviewofperceptualcontent.Thesec-
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3 Thisclaimaboutthecontemporarydebateneedsqualification. McDowell,the
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primaryadvocateofconceptualism,has,Ithink,fromthestartbeenconcerned
34 with the Question of Objective Purport as well. But since his work has been
35 read as being primarily addressed to the Content Problem, it is fair to say
36 thatthisiswherethefocusofthedebatehasbeen.SeeBoyle(2012)forhelpful
discussion.
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4 It should be noted that it has been disputed whether perceptual experience so
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much as has a content; see, for instance, Brewer (2006).I will notaddress this
39 question in this paper, but simply follow the philosophers whose views I am
40 discussing in assuming that perceptual experience does have content.
200 Thomas Land
1 ond has led other philosophers to conclude that some form of concep-
2 tualism must be true. Let us consider each of these in turn.
3 The first consideration begins with the observation that perception
4 appears to be more determinate than conceptual thought in a sense
5 brought out by the following example: When I perceive something
6 as red, I do not perceive it as merely having some shade of red or
7 other, but as having a particular shade of red. Among the color-concepts
8 I have, there are a number of concepts of different shades of red – such
9 as ‘crimson,’ ‘maroon,’ ‘scarlet’, ‘vermillion’ – but reflection shows that
10 each of these can be further differentiated. Each of these concepts of a
11 shade of red itself covers a whole range of more determinate shades.
12 This means that even if I introduce a concept of a shade of red (for in-
13 stance, the concept‘crimson’), thisconcept will still not suffice tosingle
14 out the particular shade of red that I am perceiving hic et nunc. This con-
15 cept,inasmuchasitistheconceptofa(furtherdeterminable)shade,will
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still not be able to isolate the (fully determinate) shade of red I see here
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and now from an indefinite number of similar yet distinct shades. Con-
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cepts are, as this is often put, too coarse-grained to capture the fine-
19 grained content of our perceptual experience.5 From this one might
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conclude that, since the content of any color experience involves a sin-
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glefullydeterminateshade,thatcontentcannotbeconceptualinnature.
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Considerations of this sort lead some philosophers to attribute to per-
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ception a distinctly nonconceptual kind of content.6
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On the other hand, perception seems to involve sortal awareness;
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for instance, awareness of things as red. And this might lead one to
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think that perception involves classification and, therefore, concepts.
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Thus, to perceive something as red involves (so the argument goes)
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anapplicationoftheconcept‘__isred’.Itmayinvolveotherthingsbe-
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sides this, but if my perception is a perception of something as red,then
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the concept ‘__ is red’ is part of its content. Considerations such as this
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5 See,forinstance,Peacocke(1998).TheformulationseemstogobacktoEvans
34 (1982), 229.
35 6 Although this consideration is an important motivation for nonconceptualism,
36 itisnottheonlyonethatfiguresinthedebate.Argumentsinfavorofnoncon-
ceptualismaboutperceptionalsoappealto,amongotherthings,thedistinctive
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situation-dependenceofperception;theabilityofperceptiontoprovideinfor-
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mation to memory in a distinctive way; and the fact that perception is some-
39 thing that humans share with animals. For an overview, see Speaks (2005) as
40 well as the essays collected in Gunther (2003).
Kantian Conceptualism 201
1 motivateconceptualiststoattributetoperceptionacontentthatisofthe
2 same sort as the content of propositionally-structured thought.
3 A concern with issues of this sort – the determinacy of perceptual
4 experience as well as its classificatory character – lies at the heart of
5 whatIcalltheContentProblem.AsIsaid,thecontemporarydebatebe-
6 tweenconceptualistsandnonconceptualistsinthephilosophyofpercep-
7 tionistoalargeextentfocusedonthisproblem.Bycontrast,Kant’sdis-
8 cussionofperceptionintheFirstCritiqueisprimarilymotivatedbyadif-
9 ferent kind of problem, what I call the Question of Objective Purport.
10 The Question of Objective Purport concerns the conditions that must
11 be satisfied for perception to be about objects – or, as we might also
12 say, to have representational content – in the first place. This question
13 asks for a specification of what must be the case for perception to
14 haveanyrepresentationalcontentatall,whetheritisconceptualornon-
15 conceptualinnature.Inadifferentidiom,thisisthefamiliarquestionof
16 intentionality or “aboutness,” applied to the specific case of perception.
17 Inastraightforwardsense,theQuestionofObjectivePurportislog-
18 ically prior to the Content Problem. For the latter can only arise if it is
19 presupposedthattheformercanbeanswered.Toargueaboutthenature
20 of perceptual content is to presuppose that perception has a content.
21 The Question of Objective Purport concerns the conditions that must
22 be in place for this to be the case. Put differently, for perception to so
23 much as have a content (about whose nature one might then argue),
24 we must ascribe to perception whatever characteristics are necessary
25 toitsbeingacontentfulstate.Inseekingtoidentifythesecharacteristics,
26 theQuestionofObjectivePurportisthusconcernedwithwhatmustbe
27 the case for the Content Problem to arise in the first place.
28 Since the Question of Objective Purport is in this sense prior to the
29 Content Problem, consideration of the former may have consequences
30 for how we must approach the latter. Thus, it may turn out that ascrib-
31 ing objective purport to perceptual experience forces us to conceive of
32 its content in a particular way. Inother words, our answer to the Ques-
33 tion of Objective Purport may already constrain the range of options
34 available for addressing the Content Problem. I shall argue that this is
35 indeed so. More precisely, I shall argue that a full appreciation of the
36 Question of Objective Purport will force us to recognize a new sense
37 of ‘conceptual content,’ one that is different from the sense commonly
38 attached to this phrase in the contemporary debate. Specifically, the
39 claim is that we are entitled to attribute objective purport to perceptual
40 experience only if we ascribe to it a content that is conceptual in this
202 Thomas Land
1 new sense. Recognizing this will allow us to see that the prevailing al-
2 ternative between conceptualism and nonconceptualism does not ex-
3 haust the space of available options for solving the Content Problem.
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6 2. The Heterogeneity of Thought and Perception
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8 Kant notes that there are certain fundamental differences between
9 thinkingandperceiving.Wecanbringtheseoutbycontrastingthought
10 and perception with regard to three different aspects.
11 Thought is essentially conceptual; it is what Kant calls discursive.7
12 This means that (1) concepts are general (as opposed to singular) repre-
13 sentations;(2)conceptsareclassificatory:employingaconceptinthought
14 (or as Kant will say, in judgment) involves sorting things – that is, it in-
15 volves thinking of something as being an instance of a general kind,
16 which can, in principle, have other instances; (3) conceptual thought
17 is logically articulated, where this means that it has a kind of structure
18 that enables a thought to figure in inferences.8
19 By contrast, perception (what Kant calls intuition) according to him
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has the following three features: (1) Perception is singular: it is of indi-
21 vidual objects, rather than of general kinds.9 (2) Perception is fully deter-
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minate: it presents objectsto uswhoseproperties are determinate, rather
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thandeterminable,inthesensebroughtoutabovebytheexampleabout
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color. (3) Perception is spatio-temporally structured: the objects we per-
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ceive have a location in space and time.
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To register these three fundamental (and interrelated) differences
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between thinking and perceiving, I will speak of their heterogeneity.
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Thoughts and perceptions, or, in Kant’s terms, judgments and intu-
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itions, are heterogeneous to one another. Kant aims to do justice to
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their heterogeneity by attributing them to different capacities of the
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mind,whichhecallsunderstandingandsensibilityrespectively.Theun-
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34 7 SeeKant(1998),A68/B93.Henceforth,allreferencestoKant(1998)willgive
35 onlythepaginationofthefirst(A)andsecond(B)editions.Ihavetacitlymodi-
36 fied Guyer/Wood’s translation where appropriate.
8 See Kant (1998), A320/B376f, as well as Kant (1992), §1.
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9 An appreciation of this point is compatible with the claim, which is widely
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held,thatperceptioninvolvesclassificatoryawareness,henceconcepts.Ascon-
39 ceptualists will agree, acknowledging the singularity of perception in no way
40 decides the issue in favor of nonconceptualism.
Kantian Conceptualism 203
1 derstanding is the capacity for thought. Sensibility is the capacity for in-
2 tuition.10
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3. Intuitions Have Objective Unity
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Conceptualists and Nonconceptualists about perception – at least those
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who regard themselves as Kantian – agree that perception is not merely
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a matter of having sense-impressions. Perception purports to be of ob-
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jects. If by an impression we mean something momentary and perspec-
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tival, the agreed upon claim is that perceptual representations of objects
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cannot be just a matter of the momentary and perspectival affections of
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sensory consciousness that are afforded by impressions. Rather, the idea
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of an object is the idea of something that essentially outstrips such per-
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spectival representations. An object is something that, for instance, can
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be perceived from a variety of different spatial and temporal vantage
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points, which are, moreover, systematically related to one another.
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We can express this point by saying that an object exhibits a certain
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kind of spatio-temporal unity. If perception is to be of objects, so the
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Kantian thought runs, it must contain a consciousness of this unity.
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That is, it must in some (perhaps implicit) way be part of the content
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ofperceptionthatwhatitrepresentsareenduringthree-dimensionalob-
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jects.Forinstance,whenIseeatomatoinfrontofme,thereisasensein
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which my sensory impression is confined to the side of the tomato that
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isfacingme.IfwhatIperceiveisindeedatomato,however,thecontent
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ofmyperceptionisnotjustasurface.Itisasolid,three-dimensionalob-
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ject,which(inthenormalcourseofthings)existedpriortomyperceiv-
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ingitandwillcontinuetoexistafterwards.Andthisis,atleastimplicitly,
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part of my perceptual consciousness. In perceiving the tomato, we
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might say, I am aware of perceiving a three-dimensional object with a
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temporal history. I do not take myself to be perceiving a mere surface.11
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10 See e.g. Kant (1998), A19/B33 and A50f/B74f. It is worth noting that Kant
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takes it to be among his deepest insights to have properly appreciated the het-
34 erogeneityofperceptionandthought,asisindicatedbyhisquipthatLeibniz’s
35 chief mistake was to “intellectualize” the senses, while Locke’s mistake was to
36 “sensualize” conceptual thought. Cf. Kant (1998), A271/B327.
11 WemightputthepointbysayingthatIperceivethetomato invirtueofhav-
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ing,amongotherthings,impressionsofitsfacingsurface.Toexplainhowthisis
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possible,thatis,howtheperceptionof,forinstance,afacingsurfaceenablesthe
39 perceptionoftheobjectwhosesurfaceitis,ranksamongthecentraltasksofthe
40 philosophy of perception.
204 Thomas Land
1 WhenKantcharacterizesanintuitionasthesingularrepresentationofan
2 objectanddistinguishesintuitionsfrommeresensations,thispoint,suit-
3 ably elaborated, is what he has in mind.12
4 Wecancapturethecentralpointherebysayingthatintuitionschar-
5 acteristically exhibit a certain kind of unity. Let us call this the objective
6 unity of intuitions. This term is meant to capture the fact that intuitions
7 must have the kind of unity, whatever it is, which enables them to be
8 perceptual representations of objects. The thought then is that the ob-
9 jective unity of an intuition is not simply a function of the impressions
10 the mind receives. There must be another element, over and above the
11 impressions. And because impressions are what results from the mind’s
12 being affected, this other element cannot in turn be a product of the
13 mind’s being affected. It must have a different source.
14 For the purposes of orienting ourselves in the discussion that is to
15 follow, it will be helpful to have a concise overview of these Kantian
16 commitments. This will enable us to revisit these commitments at cru-
17 cialjuncturesofthispaperandassesshowourunderstandingofthemhas
18 evolved. Let us summarize Kant’s view of perception, to the extent that
19 it has come into view so far, by means of the following three theses:
20 (1) The Sensibility Thesis: Intuitions are the representations of sensi-
21 bility.
22 (2) The Objective Unity Thesis: Intuitions have objective unity.
23 (3) The Anti-Empiricist Thesis: Objective unity is not given.
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The Sensibility Thesis registers the fact that the ability to enjoy intu-
25
itions – that is, perceptions – requires a sensible capacity. A sensible ca-
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pacity is a capacity to have representations of an object in virtue of hav-
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ing one’s senses affected by it. It is thus what Kant calls a receptive ca-
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pacity.13 Saying that a sensible capacity is required implies that the ca-
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pacity for intuitions is specifically distinct from the capacity for thought
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and judgment, which Kant characterizes as intellectual and thereby as
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non-sensible.14 Second, the Objective Unity Thesis expresses the
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point that intuitions, as perceptions of objects, are distinct from mere
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impressions in that they exhibit a kind of unity that mere impressions
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do not have. Finally, the third thesis makes the point that this unity,
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which accounts for the objective purport of intuitions, does not itself
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12 ForKant’sinsistencethatintuitionsaredistinctfrommeresensations,seeKant
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(1998), A320/B376f.
39 13 Cf. Kant (1998), A19/B33 and A50f/B74f.
40 14 Cf. ibid.
Kantian Conceptualism 205
1 result from affections of the senses. In some yet to be determined sense,
2 ithasitssourceintheminditself, “prior”tothesenses’beingaffected. I
3 callittheAnti-EmpiricistThesissimplytoregisterthatitsetsKant’spo-
4 sition apart from a traditional Empiricism that seeks to account for per-
5 ception wholly by reference to the affections of sensibility.
6 The obvious question that must be answered by any theory of per-
7 ceptionthatiscommittedtothesethreethesesisthis:whatisthesource
8 of the objective unity that intuitions exhibit? This is accepted on both
9 sidesofthedebatebetweenthosecontemporaryconceptualistsandnon-
10 conceptualists who seek to trace their positions back to Kant. Disagree-
11 ment arises over what the correct answer to this question is. And it is
12 preciselyonthispointthat,asIshallargue,thesetwogroupsofcontem-
13 poraryKantians are not only equally mistakenabout Kant,but alsoeach
14 facetheirownphilosophicalproblems. Inthefollowing, Ishallconsider
15 in turn these attempts to inherit Kant and identify the problems that
16 each of them raises.
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19 4. Kantian Nonconceptualism
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A distinctive feature of Kant’s position is the view that sensibility, the
22
capacity for intuition, has a pure form, which is constituted by what
23 Kant calls the pure intuitions of space and time.15 This view contains
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a claim about the metaphysical nature of space and time, but I shall
25
not be concerned with that aspect of it. Rather, I will focus on the ac-
26
count of our perceptual capacities that is implicit in it.
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It suffices for our present purposes to emphasize the following three
28
characteristics of Kant’s position: First, by speaking of a form of sensi-
29
bility, Kant has in mind certain features that are constitutive of all exer-
30
cises of this capacity. That is, he is talking about features that are char-
31
acteristic of intuitions as such: all possible intuitions exhibit these fea-
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tures. Second, to say that this form of sensibility is pure, or a priori, is
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to say that it does not derive from experience and is thus independent
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of any particular perceptions.16 It is, therefore, something that does
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15 ThisviewisfamouslyelaboratedinthepartoftheFirstCritiquecalledtheTran-
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scendental Aesthetic.
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16 Kantdoesnotusetheterms‘pure’and‘apriori’synonymously,butforourpur-
39 poses we can abstract from their difference. See Kant (1998), B2f. for a state-
40 ment of this difference.
206 Thomas Land
1 not result from, or depend on, impressions. Third, when Kant introdu-
2 ces the idea of a form of intuition, he characterizes it as something in
3 which sensory impressions can be “ordered in certain relations”17. As
4 the Transcendental Aesthetic makes clear, these are spatio-temporal re-
5 lations: in virtue of being given in the pure form of intuition, empirical
6 intuitions – that is, perceptions – stand in spatio-temporal relations.18
7 This point can also be put by saying that the form of intuition confers
8 on empirical intuitions a certain kind of unity, viz. spatio-temporal
9 unity.
10 Given thesethreecharacteristics ofKant’s position, one mightthink
11 that the pure form of intuition is a suitable candidate for the role of that
12 which accounts for the objective unity of intuition: It is in virtue of the
13 pure form of intuition that perceptions exhibit spatio-temporal unity.
14 The spatio-temporal framework Kant regards as the form of intuition
15 both allows and suffices for sensory impressions to bear the kinds of sys-
16 tematicrelationstooneanotherthatarenecessaryforimpressionstoen-
17 able representations of objects. It appears therefore that the form of in-
18 tuition accounts for the objective unity of intuition.
19 ThatthisisindeedKant’spositionisthecentralclaimofaviewIcall
20 Kantian Nonconceptualism.19 According to Kantian Nonconceptual-
21 ism, what accounts for the objective unity of perceptions is precisely
22 the pure form of sensibility. Thus, Robert Hanna holds that the pure
23 forms of intuition account for a subject’s ability to locate objects in
24 space and time. This ability in turn grounds the objective purport of
25 perception, the fact that it is about objects.20
26 On Hanna’s view, the capacity to locate objects in space and time is
27 a sensible capacity. It belongs to what Kant calls sensibility. Since for
28
29 17 Kant (1998), A20/B34.
30 18 More accurately, it is what is perceived, rather than the perceiving of it, that
31 exhibitsspatio-temporalrelationsandisrepresentedasexhibitingsuchrelations.
Acts of perceiving only have temporal, but no spatial properties, for Kant.
32
19 This view has been articulated forcefully by Robert Hanna; see the references
33
in fn.2. Hanna combines an exegetical claim about Kant with a philosophical
34 claimaddressedtothecontemporarydebateaboutperceptualcontent–thelat-
35 ter claim being that Kant’s view, as interpreted by Hanna, is the correct view
36 about perceptual content. A similar exegetical view is defended in Waxman
(1991) and, more recently, in Allais (2009).
37
20 SeeHanna(2005),273:“[…]Kantissayingthatwhatdeterminesourcognitive
38
referencetotheuniquelyindividualmaterialobjectsofempirical[…]intuition-
39 al representations, are the spatiotemporal features of those representations
40 alone.”