Table Of ContentJudgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic
LOGIC, EPISTEMOLOGY, AND THE UNITY OF SCIENCE
VOLUME 31
Editors
Shahid Rahman, University of Lille III, France
John Symons, University of Texas at El Paso, U.S.A.
Managing Editor:
Ali Abasnezhad, University of Lille III, France
Editorial Board
Jean Paul van Bendegem, Free University of Brussels, Belgium
Johan van Benthem, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Jacques Dubucs, University of Paris I-Sorbonne, France
Anne Fagot-Largeault Collège de France, France
Bas van Fraassen, Princeton University, U.S.A.
Dov Gabbay, King’s College London, U.K.
Jaakko Hintikka, Boston University, U.S.A.
Karel Lambert, University of California, Irvine, U.S.A.
Graham Priest, University of Melbourne, Australia
Gabriel Sandu, University of Helsinki, Finland
Göran Sundholm, U niversiteit Leiden, The Netherlands
Heinrich Wansing, Technical University Dresden, Germany
Timothy Williamson, Oxford University, U.K.
Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science aims to reconsider the question of the unity of science
in light of recent developments in logic. At present, no single logical, semantical or methodological
framework dominates the philosophy of science. However, the editors of this series believe that formal
techniques like, for example, independence friendly logic, dialogical logics, multimodal logics, game
theoretic semantics and linear logics, have the potential to cast new light on basic issues in the discussion
of the unity of science.
This series provides a venue where philosophers and logicians can apply speci fi c technical insights to
fundamental philosophical problems. While the series is open to a wide variety of perspectives, including
the study and analysis of argumentation and the critical discussion of the relationship between logic and
the philosophy of science, the aim is to provide an integrated picture of the scienti fi c enterprise in all its
diversity.
For further volumes:
http://www.springer.com/series/6936
Maria van der Schaar
Editor
Judgement and the Epistemic
Foundation of Logic
Editor
Maria van der Schaar
Institute of Philosophy
Leiden University
Leiden , The Netherlands
ISBN 978-94-007-5136-1 ISBN 978-94-007-5137-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-5137-8
Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London
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Preface
In September 2009, the authors of this book came together in Leiden for a workshop
called D ays of Judgement . The majority of the chapters presented here are based
upon a selection of the talks held at the Leiden workshop. Right from the start, the
idea was to show the importance of the history of the notion of judgement for philo-
sophy today. As one may learn from Wayne Martin’s book T heories of Judgment ,
Cambridge University Press, 2006, the fi eld of j udgement is broad, and one needs to
give a direction to the topic. The general idea of both the workshop and the book
presented here is to take Per Martin-Löf’s constructive type theory as a starting point,
because the notion of judgement plays a central role there. Our logical system is not
only in need of propositions; it also needs judgements in which propositions are
asserted to be true and known. According to Martin-Löf, one is entitled to make a
judgement if one has a ground for it. It is thus that the notion of judgement is related
to the notions of truth, knowledge and ground. It is precisely the relation between
these notions that has given a focus to the topic of the book presented here.
The book starts with two chapters that were not part of the workshop. In the fi rst
chapter, Martin-Löf gives a clear explanation of the way he understands the notion
of judgement, and he relates his position to that of the logical positivists. The fi rst
part of the chapter is a reprint from the paper “Veri fi cationism Then and Now”,
published in The Foundational Debate (W. DePauli-Schimanovich et al. (eds.).
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995, 187–196). Martin-Löf has added to the paper a p ostscript ,
in which he makes an amendment to the paper. Göran Sundholm was asked to write
an afterword to his paper “Constructions, Proofs and the Meaning of the Logical
Constants”, which appeared in 1983 in the J ournal of Philosophical Logic (volume
11: 151–172). In this afterword, the second chapter here, Sundholm gives an overview
of the history of constructive type theory of the last 30 years, focusing on the notions
of construction, demonstration and judgement and the ambiguities in these notions.
This afterword may help the reader to fi nd the important literature that appeared on
the notion of judgement within constructive type theory.
May, 2012
v
Contents
Preface .............................................................................................................. v
Introduction ..................................................................................................... ix
Maria van der Schaar
Part I Constructivism, Judgement and Reason
1 Veri fi cationism Then and Now ............................................................... 3
Per Martin-Löf
2 Demonstrations Versus Proofs, Being an Afterword
to Constructions, Proofs, and the Meaning
of the Logical Constants .......................................................................... 15
Göran Sundholm
3 Containment and Variation; Two Strands in the Development
of Analyticity from Aristotle to Martin-Löf ......................................... 23
Göran Sundholm
Part II Judgement and Reason in the Seventeenth Century
4 Descartes’ Theory of Judgement: Warranted Assertions,
the Key to Science ................................................................................... 39
Elodie Cassan
5 Striving, Oomph, and Intelligibility in Spinoza ................................... 49
Della Rocca Michael
vii
viii Contents
Part III Kant, Neo-Kantianism, and Bolzano
6 The Role of Wolff’s Analysis of Judgements
in Kant’s Inaugural Dissertation ........................................................... 69
Johan Blok
7 Windelband on B eurteilung ................................................................... 85
Arnaud Dewalque
8 A Priori Knowledge in Bolzano, Conceptual
Truths, and Judgements ......................................................................... 101
Stefan Roski
Part IV Husserl, Frege and Russell
9 Immanent and Real States of Affairs in Husserl’s Early
Theory of Judgement: Re fl ections on Manuscripts
from 1893/1894 and Their Background in the Logic
of Brentano and Stumpf ......................................................................... 133
Robin D. Rollinger
10 Frege and Russell on Assertion .............................................................. 151
Jeremy J. Kelly
