Table Of ContentRoutledge
London and New York
IS man one IS
Jacques
First published 1990
by Routledge
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Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
a division of Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc.
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© 1990 Elizabeth Grosz
Printed in Great Britain by
Richard Clay Ltd, Bungay, Suffolk
AlI rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced
or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means,
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permission in writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Grosz, Elizabeth
Jacques Lacan: a feminist introduction.
l. Psychoanalysis. Lacan - Jacques, 1901-1981
L Title
150.19'5'0924
Lihrary of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Grosz, E. A. (Elizabeth A.)
Jacques Lacan: a feminist introduction/ Elizabeth Grosz.
p. cm.
lncludes bibliographicaI references.
ISBN 0 415 01399 2. - ISBN 0 415 01400 X (pbk.)
L Psychoanalysis and feminism. 2. Lacan, Jacques, 1901-198 L
L Title.
BF175.4.F45G76 1989
150.19'5'092--dc20 89-1 i 005
Introduction
Psychoanalysis and scandaI 6
Which psychoanalysis? 8
Psychoanalytic subversions 10
Psychoanalysis and feminisms 19
2 The ego and the Im:a2Inal~y 24
Freud's two views 24
The realist ego 25
The narcissistic ego 28
Lacan and the mirror phase 31
The Real preconditions of the ego 32
Vision and the specular image 35
Infantile transitivism and primordial jealousy 41
The imaginary anatomy 43
Summary 47
3 Sexuality and the symbolic order 50
Freud's two theories of sexuality 51
Sexuality and signification 58
Need, demand, and desire 59
Oedipus, the name-of-the-father, and the Other 67
The drive and the signifier 74
Summary 80
4 Language and the unconscious 82
The Freudian unconscious 82
The topography of the unconscious 83
The primary processes 87
Dream interpretation 89
The unconscious structured like a language 91
v
Contents
The signifier 93
Metaphor and metonymy 98
Lacanian algorithms of the unconscÎous 101
The paternal metaphor 103
Freud's dream of the 'Botanical Monograph' 105
Summary 113
5 Sexual relations 115
The penis and the phallus 16
The phallus and power 122
Anaclisis, narcissism, and romantic love 126
Lacan and romantic love 131
'There is no sexual relation' 137
Lacan and femininity 140
6 Lacan and femÎnism 147
Dutiful daughters 150
The semiotic and the symbolic 150
Semanalysis and psychoanalysis 154
Maternity or the avant-garde 160
Defiant women 167
Phallocentrism and sexual difference 174
Femininity and language 176
The genealogy of women 180
Seducer or seduced? 183
Conclusion 188
Notes 193
Bibliography 206
VI
The last decades of the nineteenth century witnessed an intellectual
revolution whose implications and effects are still being unravelled.
The fin de siècle upheaval could be summarized by three names
Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud - whose works define the horizon of
the contemporary knowledges of human subjectivity. Sharing little
but a suspicion that the human subject, considered as a conscious,
rational being, could no longer provide the foundation for theoreti
cal speculation, each decentred the individual's pretension to
sovereignty, seif-knowiedge, and self-mastery. Each opposed a
prevailing Cartesianism which had infiltrated Iiberalism, empir
icism, idealism, and humanism. Each distrusted the centrality and
givenness attributed to consciousness, seeing it as an effect rather
than a cause of the will to power (in Nietzsche), class relations (in
Marx), or psychical agencies (in Freud).
For Nietzsche, the critique of consciousness takes the form of an
inversion: consciousness is the consequence of corporeality or
bodily forces, social and survival strategies that have forgotten their
own history and pro cesses of formation. Reason, for example, is
not so much a quality or attribute of the mind as the result of
political or coercive struggles between various competing perspec
tives, in which one gains a (provisional, temporary, historical)
dominance. For Marx, consciousness is the consequence of a
structure of class relations that constitute it as a 'faise conscious
ness', a consciousness misled ~r untrustworthy, an ideological
consciousness which inverts and thus misrecognizes given forms of
economic and class relations. For Freud, consciousness and its self
certainty may be the end-products of unconscious psychical
'defences' - denial, disavowal, resistance. That is, consciousness is
identified with a certain mode of self-deception. The subject cannot
consciously know the material, linguistic, economic, or
Introduction
unconscious structures on which it relies and over which it may
have little or no effect. Even where an individual functions as an
agent of these structures, in no sense can he or she be considered to
control them.
These inversions of the Cartesian cogito pose a number of
questions intoierable to liberal lrqmanism - questions about the
genesis and history of the subject which cannot even be raised if the
subject or consciousness are taken as given. Until contemporary
knowledge cornes to terms with these questions - transforming the
individual's position or status from producer to product - we
rernain caught within intellectual systems that justify or rationalize
existing political norrns instead of facilitating the exploration of
other historically subordinated possibilities. If Descartes marks the
threshold of the modern concept of subjectivity, then Nietzsche,
and Freud can be seen to initiate a post modern understand
ing. This postrnodernity implies a de-naturalization and destabiliza
tion (that is, the historicization) of the subject who knows. To
invert Descartes' formulation, where there is thinking, there is no l,
no consciousness.
More directly or explicitly than eüher Nietzsche or Marx, Freud
challenges Descartes' conflation of consciousness with subjectivity.
His understanding of the unconscious, sexuality, psychical rep
resentations, and the processes involved in the constitution of the
subject challenges the Cartesian subject's status as the foundation
and source of knowledge. If the subject is necessarily incapable of
knowing itself - that is, if there is an unconscious then its daims
to found knowledge of the world on the certainty of its own
existence are also problematized. If the subject cannot know itself,
why should we believe it can know anything el se with absolute
certainty? This does not entail scepticisrn or nihilism, whereby
knowledge is impossible, but it may imply that knowledge, con
sciousness, and subjectivity need to be reconceptualized in different
terrns and assessed by new criteria not so heavily dependent on the
subject as a self-transparent being.
Freud likened his work on the unconscious to a 'Copernican
revolution', where the ego, or consciousness, like the earth itself, is
no longer mistaken for the centre of the universe.1 This book will
explore sorne of the implications of this 'Copernican revolution' for
theorizing human subjectivity, examining the ways in which a
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic perspective disrupts and
challenges many assumptions about knowledge and subjectivity
cornmon to the social sciences and humanities as weIl as in everyday
life. Freud inverts the primacy of consciousness with his postulate
of the unconscious. Lacan perforrns his own inversion: more than
2
J.'1troduction
any other post-Freudian, Lacan questions the taken-for-granted
interpretations of Freud 's texts, subverting the centrality accorded
to t he ego in ego-psychology by affirming the language-like opera
tions of the unconscious.
This book will focus largely on Lacan's contributions to a
psychoanalytic understanding of subjectivity. This means that
inevitably, given that Lacan considers his work to be a reading of
Freud's texts, Freud's own work must figure prominently. It is
virtually impossible to understand Lacan's writings without a
thorough familiarity with Freud, especially seeing that Lacan only
rarely makes explicit references or footnotes to the texts he
interrogates, preferring allusions, phrases, and metaphors instead.2
1 hope to provide sorne of this presumed background to Lacan's
seminars and papers. Given their rich allusiveness, their humour,
and complexity, 1 will not attempt a thorough or exhaustive
analysis of his work (even if it were possible), but an introductory
yet critical overview from a feminist perspective.
If Lacan remains my central concern here, his inversion of the
primacy of the ego and consciousness is itself inverted by, or
submitted to, its own 'Copernican' upheaval-this time, however, in
terms of the centrality accorded to one sex in defining the other. In
other words, while providing arguably the most sophisticated and
convincing account of subjectivity, psychoanalysis itself is neverthe
less phallocentric in its perspectives, methods, and assumptions.
The last chapters of this book will examine sorne of the ways in
which feminists have used and/ or ctiticized Lacan's model of
subjectivity and sexual difference. The earlier chapters are not free
of feminist interests, either. Feminism provides the basic criteria by
which Lacan will be assessed here. My analysis makes no daim to
objectivity, to being a neutral or disinterested discussion or dis
passionate commentary. On the contrary, 1 hope to make dear the
passions invested one way or another in the relations between
feminisms and Lacanian psychoanalysis. 1 will nevertheless attempt
to develop a more or less systematic outline of Lacan's understand
ing of psychoanalysis (chapter 1), his conception of the ego (chapter
2), the oedipus complex (chapter 3), the unconscious structured like
a language (chapter 4), the drive and sexual or amorous relations
(chapter 5). Taken together, these may serve as an introduction to
and summary of theories about the constitution of the (sexed)
subject derived from Lacan's work. Clearly, given the breadth and
scope of his labours of nearly fifty years, there is much 1 will leave
undiscussed. But, if the uninitiated reader is given access to the key
elements of his work, his other contributions also may be rendered
more accessible.
3
Introduction
Freud's work could conveniently if arbitrarily be divided into two
themes, sexuality and the unconscious. Lacan can be seen to add
the powerful insights of semiology to this Freudian bedrock.
Lacan 's understanding of the unconscious, sexuality, desire, and
identification, implies these are sites for the production and trans
gression of meaning. The unconscious is structured 'like a
language', for it is governed by the two poles of linguistic function
ing, metaphor / condensation and metonymy / displacement. Sexual
drives are the consequence of the absorption of the drive by systems
of cultural meaning, by representations (we desire objects not to
gratify our needs, but because they mean something, they have
value or significance).
While his thought has undergone considerable evolution, and has
become increasingly informed by models derived from topography,
topology, and set theory, including the M6bius strip, torus or Klein
bottle, Escher objects, Borromean knots, and other representations
of 'impossible space' i.e. the space of the structure of fantasy, in this
book 1 will focus on his best known texts in English, referring to
untranslated works only where necessary. His 'classical texts' -
those published in the Écrits (1966, sorne of which are translated in
Écrits. A Selection 1977a) and Feminine Sexuality (Mitchell and
Rose 1982) will provide my objects of analysis. These formulations
summarize the ways in which semiology and psychoanalysis recast
and criticize each other. This may also explain the mutuai fascina
tion between psychoanalysis and feminism.
My aim in this introduction to Lacan is to outline and assess his
work without, however, compromising his subversive style and his
radical impact on psychoanalysis and theories of subjectivity. The
problem posed for any introduction to :l thinker as difficult,
ambiguous, and controversial as Lacan is to represent his position
adequately and fairly, without, however, minimizing its trouble
sorne status. This may mean that sorne elements of his work which
could perhaps have been further simplified for the purposes of
exegesis will remain difficult: simplicity should not take the place of
an adequate contextualization and positioning of the material. The
framework of sexual difference provides a conceptual and political
position, not quite outside of psychoanalysis nor simply within its
tenns, from which Lacanian psychoanalysis can be critically
assessed.
This book would not have been possible without the generous
support of a number of institutions and individuals. 1 gratefully
acknowledge the financial support and thinking space given to me
in 1986 by the Humanities Research Centre, the Australian Nation
al University, under the aegis of its theme for that year, 'Feminism
4
Introduction
and the humanities'. Without this time and the calm but
0UiUUH.aL.'US
atmosphere, this book would not have been possible. Thanks here
go to Professor Jan Donaldson, Professor Graeme Clarke, Dr Sue
Sheridan, Dr Sneja Gunew, and Meaghan Morris. 1 would like to
thank the Department of General Philosophy, the University of
Sydney, where 1 am currently employed, for providing the political
and neurotic energy needed for this project. Fighting for intellectual
existence, as the department has, gives a raw edge to work that may
make the difference between a mere rehearsal of issues and a
working understanding of them. Special thanks thus must go to Dr
Paul Crittenden and Associate Professor John Burnheim for their
support and advice. The person to whom 1 owe most in the
production of this book is Dr Moira Gatens. Her generous ideas,
insights, comments, and criticisms were the true source of an that is
worthwhile here. Dr Judith Allen's comments and critical sugges
tions were also most useful in the final stages of writing. 1 am very
grateful for her insight and critical distance. Cecily Williams,
Jacqueline Reid, Terry Threadgold, Carole Pateman, Gretchen
Poiner, Barbara Caine, Caroline Sheaffer-Jones, Marie de
Lepervanche, and Virginia Spate aH provided much needed support
and encouragement during the long gestation of this book. Above
aH, I would like to thank my students, who always expected the
best, and deserve to have it (even ifI cannot provide it). Finally, this
book is dedicated to my parents, Eva and Imre Gross, with love.
E.A.G.
Sydney, 1988
5
Since its inception, psychoanalysis has exerted a fascination for
many women. It has relied on women's desire and willingness to
articulate their fantasies, wishes, and hopes. It is formed out of the
'raw materials' of women's desire to taik and Freud's desire to
listen. The relation between them has been one of mutuai fascina
tion, but one that has not always enriched both parties. Relations
between psychoanalysis and women have always been, and remain
today, highly ambivalent and fraught with difficulties. Psycho
analysis exerts an appeal for women which can also be seen as a lure
or trap, especially for those who want to challenge the social
functions and values attributed to women and femininity in our
culture (actively affirmed in psychoanalytic theory). Freud's
insights owe more than he can acknowledge to the loquacious
brilliance of his first patients, female hysterics. His conception of
psychoanalytic method remained, even to the end of his life,
remarkably close to that 'talking cure' Anna O. so astutely des
cribed. And if Freud is indebted to a vocal if hysterical femininity,
so too Lacan's earliest researches in psychoanalysis relied on the
fascinating discourse of 'madwomen' - psychotics, paranoiacs,
hysterics, mystics. 'The whole cast of characters in his early work
consists of women ... Not a single man is present. [He was a] man
who never stopped talking about women' (Clément 1983: 61).
'Fascination' may weIl be an appropriate term to use in the
context of relations between psychoanalysis and feminism, for its
etymology involves two antithetical meanings: 'to attract, irresisti
bly enchant, charm'; or 'to deprive victim of the powers of escape or
resistance by look or by presence' (OED). To fascinate is to entice
and trap, seduce and contain, a relation similar to that between the
snake and the snake-charmer, in which each charms, and traps, the
other. Mutuai fascination is always a risky business. Lacan suggests
that it is the consequence of an imaginary identification in which
the self st rives to incorporate the other in an act as aggressive as it is
6
