Is the present the key to the past or is the past the key to the present? James Hutton and Adam Smith versus Abraham Gottlob Werner and Karl Marxin interpreting history

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Geological Society of America Special Papers

Is the present the key to the past or is the past the key to the present? James
Hutton and Adam Smith versus Abraham Gottlob Werner and Karl Marx in
interpreting history

A. M. C. Sengör

Geological Society of America Special Papers 2001;355;1-52
doi: 10.1130/0-8137-2355-8.1
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Notes
Geological Society of America
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GeologicalSocietyofAmerica
SpecialPaper355
2001
Is the present the key to the past
or is the past the key to the present?
James Hutton and Adam Smith
versus Abraham Gottlob Werner and Karl Marx
in interpreting history
A.M.C.S¸engör*
· ·
I.T.Ü.MadenFakültesi,JeolojiBölümü,AAyyaazzaaggaa80626Istanbul,Turkey
ABSTRACT
Historians reconstruct the past from what is preserved.Anaive view supposes
that we can know all that happened by assuming (1) the preserved objects are all
thatexisted,and/or(2)thewholecanbereconstructedbyusingrevealedknowledge.
To the question, how do we know what we know?, the pre-Socratics answered “by
observation-basedrationalcriticism,”butthisearlyinsightwaslostuntilDavidHume
showedthefallacyofinductiveinference.
Adam Smith and James Hutton realized that interpretation of history must be
based on a comparison with the present: Smith’s economic history upon contempo-
raryhumanbehaviorandmarketdevelopment,Hutton’sgeologichistoryuponactual
landscape. In contrast,Abraham GottlobWerner taught that a visible succession of
strataisinterpretedastheresultofprogressiveaqueousdeposition,invindicationand
further development of existing general theories of progressive diminution of a uni-
versal ocean. For Karl Marx, economic history was an inevitable progressive evolu-
tion of societies from primitive to capitalist to communist, in vindication of the
conceptoffinalsalvation.BothWernerandMarxassumedthatonlytheendphaseof
thephenomenontheyinvestigatedwasavailablefordirectstudy,exceptthatMarxsaw
inunderdevelopedsocietiesmodelsofsomeoftheearlierstagesofdevelopedsocieties.
WernerandMarxwereintentoninstruction;theyassumedthattheyhaddiscovered
thelawsofhistoricalevolutionbyinductiveinference—althoughtheyunwittinglyinher-
itedreligiousprejudicesbothinmethodologyandconcepts—andneededonlytofitfur-
ther observations into them. Hutton and Smith, however, wanted to learn what had
happened.Scienceacceptsobservationsandlawsonlyprovisionally,advancingbybold
conjectures and merciless refutations.As Hutton said: “truth and error are forced to
struggletogetherintheprogressofscience;itisonlyinproportionasscienceremovesthe
erroneousconceptions…thattruthwillfinditselfestablishedinnaturalphilosophy.”
Whereas Smith and Hutton interpreted history in terms of the present,Werner
andMarxinterpretedthepresentonthebasisofhistory.
*E-mail:[email protected].
S¸engör.A.M.C.,2001,Isthepresentthekeytothepastorsi thepasthtekeytothepresent?JamesHuttonandAdamSmithversusAbrahamGottlobWerner
andKarlMarxininterpretinghistory:Boulder,Colorado,GeologicalSocietyofAmericaSpecialPaper355,62p.
1
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2 A.M.C.S¸engör
INTRODUCTION allowingconsiderableexcursionsaboutanorm(cf.Dott,1969,
p.140;Rudwick,1971;Visser,1980,p.1;Solov’ëv,1985;Jack-
Thisisabookaboutthelogicofhistoricalexplanation.Its son,1997).InLyell’slifetimeitcametobetheassumption“that
purposesi totrytosetactualismwithinthecontextofhtehis- thelawsofnaturehaveacteduniformlythroughoutalltimepast,
torical sciences in general (whatWhewell, 1837, p. 481–482) andthattheappearancesoftheearth’scrust,howeverdifficultof
called the palætiological sciences (from the Greek ππααλλααιιοοss, solution,aretobeascribedtotheuniformactionoftheselaws,
old, and ααιιττιιαα, cause; also see Whewell, 1840, p. 95) and to andnottorevolutionaryorcataclysmaloperations”(e.g.,Page,
showthatitspeculiarfecundityisaresultofitsbeingaproduct 1865, p. 449–450;continent-size floods would be considered
ofacriticalrationalviewofthegrowthofknowledge.Theway uniformitarian by Lyell’s own admission [Lyell, 1830, p. 89]).
Iproposetogoaboutitistodemonstratefirstthatthenatureof Th e wt o term s signify mostly the same thing, except in
historicalknowledgeisnodifferentfromthenatureofahistorical unusual cases; e.g. , when a large bolide hits the Earth (e.g.,
theoretical knowledge in that both are based, most commonly, Alvarezetal.,1980;Hsü,1980,1987,1989;Olsen,1986;Prinn
onincompletedatasets.Ithenpresenttheviewsoffourpromi- and Fegley, 1987; Marvin, 1990; Sharpton and Ward, 1990;
nentfigures,twofromgeologyandtwofromeconomichistory, Sharptonetal.,1993;Rocchiaetal.,1996).Fromtheviewpoint
todelineatethenatureandtounderlinethephilosophicalback- ofthetimeduringwhichsuchathinghappens,anyothersuch
ground of actualism at a time when it became accepted as the event in the history of the Eart h would be actualistic , but not
central assumption of geology. From this it will emerge that uniformitarian.ThedifferencebetweentheArcheanworldand
positivism,i.e.,theviewthatscientificknowledgecanbegained today’sworldissignificantenough(afasterspinningearthwith
byinduction(seePopper’sstatementthat“positivismisnothing aclosermoon,~25%lesssolarradiationperunitarea,heatflow
morethanageneralisationoftheideaofinduction”inPopper nearly six times th e present rate leading to faster plate motion
andKreuzer,1986,p.30;seealso¸Sengör,1996,note19)only and/or longer plate boundary length and consequently smaller
byobservinganddescribingobjectsandeventswithoutinquir- plates,productionofsuchunusualrocksasultramafickomatiites,
ing about their causes (essentially to answer the question, mostlikelyabsenceoflargecontinents,andthegeneralpoverty
“Whathappensorwhathappened?”Comte,1830[1864],espe- oflife;cf.Burke,1997,forasummary)toconsidertheArchean
cially p. 16–19; Mach, 1896, p. 268; Popper, 1980, p. 34–39, environments not actualistic , ubt the condition s isnce the
1983,p.194,note1),commonlyleadstononactualisticmethods appearance of widespread land plant s would be significantly
inhistory.Whereascriticalrationalism,i.e.,theideathatscien- like today so as to be considered actualistic (cf. Lyell, 1830,
tific knowledge grows by formulating, on any basi s whatever, p.75).However,thewholeEarthevolutionundersuchcircum-
hypothesesaboutanyaspectofastudyobject,andthentesting stanceswouldbenonuniformitarian.Itisthusunwisetousethe
them agains t observation statement s (essentially to answer the twotermsinterchangeably,e.g.,asinAllabyandAllaby(1990,
question , “How happens or how happened?” Popper, 1935, p.389).Forthedifferencebetweenactualismanduniformitari-
1980),leadstoactualism. anism and its historical development , ese Solov’ëv (1985,
Notethatinthisbook,italicsinsquarebracketsinquota- p.108–109).NeitherHuttonnorLyell(atleastnotuntil1859)
tions indicate added material (usually my commentary) not in wouldhaverecognizedthedifferenceorwouldhavethoughtit
the original. Square brackets around dates indicate dates of significant,becausehteydidnotknowthePrecambrianworld;
reprinting,republicationorreedition. they were both actualists and uniformitarians. I use actualism
in this paper for both concepts unless otherwise indicated to
ACTUALISMANDUNIFORMITARIANISM: avoid proliferation of words; when I use both actualism and
DEFINITIONANDSOMEIMPLICATIONS uniformitarianismIdosotoemphasizethedifference.
Actualism has no fixed menu. The more we learn of the
InhtisbookIusethetermactualismunderthefollowing workingsofnaturetoday,thericherthatmenubecomes.Lyell,
definition of actual given in the Oxford English Dictionary for example, was perfectly willing to consider catastrophic
(Simpson and Weiner, 1989): “Actual: existing in act or fact; events, such as a potential cataclysmic draining of the North
really acted or acting; carried out, real; opposed to potential, American Great Lakes, as being within the compass of his
possible,virtual,theoretical,ideal.Inactionorexistenceatthe thinking,providedtheyhadanexplanationwithinthefabricof
time; present, current.” Thus actualism in geology, as I see it, thepresent-dayworld.DidHutton(1788,p.242)notanticipate
refers to the hypothesis that maintains that all past geological the idea of a Messinian salinity crisis within his actualistic
action was like all present geological action. This is how the worldview?“Letusbutsupposearockplacedacrossthegutof
usage is commonly understood today (e.g.,Visser, 1980, p. 1; Gibraltar (a case nowise unnatural), and the bottom of the
Solov’ëv,1985;Jackson,1997). Mediterranean would be certainly filled with salt, becaus ehte
Bycontrast,uniformitarianism(Whewell,1832,p.126)is evaporationfromthesurfaceofthatseaexceedsthemeasureof
defined to be that hypothesis that does not allow a significant itssupply.”
deviationinnatureandrateofgeologicalprocessesthroughout The variou s kinds of uniformitarianism, as outlined by
geologicaltime;i.e.,itadvocatesasteady-stateEarth,although Gould(1965),Hooykaas(1963,p.3–4, and1970,p.7–9) and
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HuttonandSmithversusWernerandMarxininterpretinghistory 3
following them, Rudwic k 1(971), have limited relevance to sualeventscommonlytaketheformofregularlyrecurringphe-
Hutton’sorLyell’s thinking;bothwereinterestedincombating nomenaowingtothehumanpropensityofthinkingintermsof
hypothetical reconstructions of global or near global and very cycles conditioned by the natural cycles all around u s (e.g.,
rapid events of truly catastrophic dimensions (“great changes, cycles of day and night, monthly cycle of menstruation, sea-
ofakindandintensityquitedifferentfromthecommoncourseof sons, longer astronomical cycles). Primitive religion thus not
events,andwhichmaythereforebeproperlycalledcatastrophes”; onlycreatesanonactualisticimageofworldhistorycrowdedby
Whewell, 1837, p. 606, and 1857, p. 506, italics Whewell’s), unusual,evensupernatural,eventsandindividuals,butalsoan
the occurrence of which in today’s world would be unthink- artificially regular one, not perceived by considering the
able. They were simply trying to show that the geological present-dayhappenings.
processesactivetodayand, whatwasknownofhtegeological Thefirstobjectiontothisreligiousworldviewcamefrom
record then, did not necessarily require the incidence of such the pre-Socratic Ionian s Thales andAnaximander in the sixth
catastrophesinthepast. century B.C. (Burnet, 1930; Heidel, 1933 ; Kahn, 1960; de
In contrast toRudwick’s ( 1971) claim,Whewell’s (1832, Santillana, 1961; Barnes, 1981, 1987; Blumenberg, 1987;
p.126;1837,p.606–624;1857,p.506–520)polarizationofthe Popper, 1989a, 1998; Schmitz, 1988; Conche, 1991; Heuser,
debate into catastrophists versus uniformitarians faithfully 1992). Anaximander’s secular theory of Eart h history had
reflected the thinking of the two camp s (Page, 1971, p. 234; strongactualisticelements,inadditiontobeingfarlessregular
Zenger, 1986a, 1986b, which debate was distinct from that than the picture offered by mythology (see the testimonia by
between the directionalists and the steady-state theoretician Aëtius,Alexander ofAphrodisias, Hippolytus, Pseudo-Plutach,
Lyell; cf. Dott, 1969; Rudwick, 1971), when one thinks of andCensorinus,inKahn,1960,p.102–103,109–110;alsosee
Lyell’scarefullyarguedandmeticulouslydocumentedaccounts Heidel,1921).Bycontrast,alllaterreligionshaveinheritedthe
of present-day events being fully adequate in explaining what catastrophistandregularistaspectsoftheprimitivereligion.All
wethenknewofthegeologicalrecord(e.g.,Lyell,1830).This viewsthatdevelopedundertheinfluenceofthereligiousworld
isincontrastto,forexample,Pallas’ideasconcerningthesud- viewalsohavetakenoverthesamefeatures(cf.S¸engör,2000).
denupliftoftheHimalayaandtheSundaandPhilippinearchi- Inthefollowingaccount,myfrequentreferencetoreligionand
pelagos to sweep the mammoth and woolly rhinoceros tothereligiousbackgroundandprivatebeliefsofthefourhis-
carcassesintoSiberiainfrontofgiantseawaves(Pallas,1796, toriansIexamineismadewiththeseviewsinmind.Theposi-
p.158;inCarozziandCarozzi,1991,p.32),orCuvier’sadmi- tivisticworldviewinheritedthetendencytoformstrong,even
rationoftheconceptionofthepainterJohnMartin’s apocalyp- unshakable convictions concerning certain interpretations of
ticpaintingTheDeluge(1826;seeRupke,1983,Fig.7forthe naturesimilarinintensitytoreligiouscommitments,whichthe
1828 mezzotint, and Borges, 1997, p. 24–25 for the 1834 oil critical rationalist approach of the Ionian reformers made
canvas) and expressing his agreement wit h Whiston’s (1696) impossibleforthemtoadopt(seePopper,1989a,1998).
andHalley’s(1705)cometaryhypothesisoftheinundation(see
Rupke,1983a,p.77;1983b,p.40).2AlsoincontrastisLeopold DEFINITIONOFHISTORY
vonBuch’supheavaloftheAlps,sorapidastodrivetheorigi-
nally superjacent marine waters in immense cascades able to Historymaybedefinedinthreedifferentways.Themost
hurl the exotic blocks from the Alps to the top of the Jura common definition, and the one I use herein, is that it encom-
MountainsacrosstheMolasseplaininSwitzerland(vonBuch, passes all objects and events in the past. All objects are of
1827),3 or Élie de Beaumont’s (an almos t exact contemporary course also events in the sense that an event i s “anything that
ofLyell)ideaoftheupliftoftheAndessosuddenastogenerate endures at all ” (Mandelbaum, 1938, p. 222, and reference
world encircling tsunamis devastating whole continents and therein).HereIuseeventtodenoteahappening,andobjectas
accounting for the biblical deluge (Élie de Beaumont, 1830a, anentitythatcantakepartinanevent.Naturally,onlyasmall
p.232,note1;1830b,p.55–56;1831,p.261–262).Suchevents portionofformerobjectsandeventsareaccessibletousinany
arenonactualisticexamples,asopposedtoLyell’sandHutton’s way,fromwhichwecaninferonlyalimitedamount.
actualistic events, the operations of which one could still Some would prefer to limit the concept of his tory tohtis
observe today, or reasonably infer from the operations of geo- knowableportionandtoitsnarration(e.g.,Walsh,1967,p.16),
logicalagentsinthepresentday. andleaveoutofconsiderationtheunknowablepartaltogether,
soastoavoidwhatthesepeopleconsideridletalk,possiblyfol-
Religiousrootsofnonactualisticthinkinginhistory lowingWittgenstein’s (1922[1990], p. 189) advice , “Whereof
one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” I think this is
I have elsewhere argued (S¸engör, 2000) that religions in mistaken,becauseonecanhardlyeverknowwhatiseventually
preliterateculturesareformedbytransformingunusualevents knowableandwhatisnot.Historicalentitiesaredefinedonthe
and personalities in folk memory into supernatural events and basisofourunderstandingofthebehavioroftheuniverseatany
personalities and condensing them into mythologie s by elimi- one time and that understanding is in constant flux. Thus we
natingtheday-to-dayeventsbetweenthemfrommemory.Unu- canneverbeabsolutelysureofwhatwecanandcannotknow.
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4 A.M.C.S¸engör
Anothersubsetofhistory(understoodasthetotalityofthe and Umma. This is a historical account encompassing nearly
past)isthatofhumans,orevenmorerestrictively,thehistoryof twocenturiesofstrifebetweenthewt osettlements,writtenon
thought:Collingwood(1946,p.215)asserted“Allhistoryisthe thebasisofarchivalmaterial(seeKramer,1981,p.36–44).But
his tory ofhtought.” Since the romantic historian Leopold von neitherthepeoplewhodecipheredit(Poebel,1926),northose
RankeclassedhistoryasaKulturwissenschaft,mosthistorians who look upon it as an early form of historiography (e.g.,
subscribetothisrestrictiveview(Mandelbaum,1938,p.9).The Collingwood,1946,p.11–12,andreferencethere),northatone
discipline that studies history (i.e., the past) is also called by who presented it as the work of the “first historian ” (Kramer,
thatname,andsomewouldconsiderwrittenhumansocialhis- 1981, p. 36), really consider it a piece of true historiography,
tory it s sole proper occupation (von Ranke, 1880[undated] becauseitsauthor“didnotusethestraightfactualformofnar-
p.17).InthispaperIcallanybranchofhistoricalstudyofany rativeexpectedofthehistorian.Insteadhestrovetofitthehis-
sort(i.e.,apalætiologicalstudyinWhewell’ssense)historical torical events into the accepted framework of his theocratic
discipline,soastoavoidconfusionwithhistory(i.e.,thepast). worldview,thusdevelopingaratheruniqueliterarystyle,which
Arguingaboutwhathistoryisoroughttobeisnotafruit- constantlyinterweavesthedeedsofmenandgodsandoftenfails
ful occupation. Consequently, Ido not dw ell on it further, todistinguishbetweenthem”(Kramer,1981,p.38–39)andthus
except to point out that if human beings and their society are “it lacks the character of science ” (Collingwood, 1946, p. 11).
consideredamenabletoscientificinvestigation,thenIperceive Most other historians of historiography agree in placing the
no distinction in principle between studying the his tory ofhte beginningsofrealhistoriographicstudiesintothelatterphaseof
RomanEmpireandstudyingthehistoryofhteTethyanocean. the eighteenth century (e.g., Collingwood, 1946, p. 86–204;
Ithusbelieve,exactlyasdidJ.B.Burywhenhestatedthat“his- Walsh, 1967, p. 12 ; Rossi, 1984, p. 192; Clark, 1992, p. 87),
tory is a science, no less and no more ” (quoted after Walsh, styling them variously “scientific” (Collingwood and Rossi),
1967,p.35),thatanyhistoricaldisciplineisasmuchanatural “analytic”(Clark)orsimply“modern”(Kramer,1981,p.36–37).
scienceasgeologyorbiologyorphysics(S¸engör,1993):Iwould Whatseparatesmodernhistoriographyfrompremodernor
havecalledithistoricalsciencehere,butIwishtokeepnatural unscientifichistoriographyinthemindsoftheseauthorsishow
science(simplyreferredtoasscienceherein)andhistoricaldis- primarydataarehandledtogenerateanobjectivenarrative,i.e.,
cipline (that include s historical natural sciences) separate for onethateveryonewithaccesstothesamedatacancomprehend
purposesofdiscussion,andwishtodistinguishhistoricalnatural (seeDaston,2000,forahistoryofobjectivity).Thisinsistence
sciencesfromnonhistoricalones.Hereinhistoricalsciencesim- onrequiringanobjectivenarrativedrovesomehistoriansinthe
ply refers to historical natural sciences such as geology and nineteenth and twentieth centuries into a relativistic despair,
biology.Inotewithregretthatthedelightfulandveryapposite because agreement on what constitutes an objective narrative
designation “natural history” to encompass all natural histori- even of contemporary events has proved elusive (see Mandel-
cal science s has acquired so narrow (and even derogatory) a baum, 1938; Collins, 1981; Feyerabend, 1988; see Lefkowitz,
meaninginourcenturyandespeciallyintheEnglish-speaking 1996;Windschuttle,1996;Evans,1997,forthedangerouscon-
worldastorenderitsuseimpossiblehere. sequences of historical relativism fors cientific thinking; also
seeDaston,2000).Thedifferencebetweenasubjectiveandan
FUNDAMENTALPROBLEMOF objective narrative ultimately i s whether, and how effectively,
HISTORICALDISCIPLINES criticismisemployedtoassessthereliabilityofthedata.
An awareness of time and an interest in the past are Hume’sLaw
recorded in the earliest document s we have ofh uman s (e.g.,
Clark,1992).AlthoughcavepaintingsinsouthwesternFrance, Fewhistorianswhomakethedistinctionbetweenmodern
northeasternSpain,andnorthernItaly(theearliestofwhich are versusnonmodernhistoryseemawarethattheemploymentof
fromtheChauvetCaveinsouthern France,ca.32ka[Chauvet criticismisvitallydependentonthebasisofcriticism.Howare
et al., 1996; Balter, 1999] and the Fumane Cave in northern wetocriticizehistoricaldatatoimproveourinferencefromit?
Italy, between 32 and 36.5 ka [Balter, 2000]) possibly record AsBertrandRusselloncesaid,whoistotellusthattheuniverse
pastexperienceintheartists’ownlifetimeonly,theymayhave a s we see and feel it, including our memories as a whole, did
beenintendedtocarrythemessagetofuturegenerations,who not originate five minutes ago ? Hume’s (1739) revolutionary
may have visited the caves to view the diverse life situations insight“thattherecanbenodemonstrativeargumentstoprove,
recordedinthem(seeLeroi-Gourhan,1971,p.34–37;Pfeiffer, that those instances, of which we have had no experience
1982;andBalter,1999,whereintracesofchildrenvisitingthe resemble those of which we have had experience” (see Hume,
Chauvetcavehavebeenreported). 1978, p. 89 [italics his]; see also Hume, 1902, p. 32), i.e.,
This implicit indication of the awareness of, and interest “an‘ought’ cannot be deduced from an ‘is’” (Grice, 1970,
in,thepastisnearly30k.y.olderthanthefirstexplicitwritten p.89), is commonly taken to apply to inferences concerning
pieceofinformationwehave,aSumeriandocumentconcerning eventsyettohappenortoobjectsyettobeobserved.However,
the his tory ofhte border dispute between the cities of Lagash thisHume’sLawhasacruelsymmetryintimewithrespectto
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HuttonandSmithversusWernerandMarxininterpretinghistory 5
the present: it applies to inexperienced events in the past as
strongly as it does to those in the future (Fig. 1A). Hume
spelledthisoutwithcharacteristicforcefulnessinhisEnquiries
Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Prin-
ciples of Morals: “Asto past Experience, it can be allowed to
give direct and certain information of those precise objects
only,andthatpreciseperiodoftime,whichfellunderitscogni-
zance”(Hume,1777[1902],p.3;italicshis).Eventsofthepast
aregoneandifthereisnoonearoundwhoactuallyexperienced
them(andassumingtheyhaveperfectmemory),thereisnoway
toreconstructthemexceptbymakinginferencesfromwhatwe
conceivetobetheirrecord.Eveninthepresenceofeyewitnesses,
thereisnoguaranteethattheywill(orcan)renderanobjective,
reliable account of what happened. Thus, inference about the
pastcanonlybemadebyviolatingHume’sLaw;i.e.,itcanonly
be hypothetical.Any reconstruction of th e pas thterefore must
beundertakenwiththefullweightofHume’sLawinmind.
Incompletenessofthehistoricalrecord
The aim of any historical discipline is the reconstruction
of the past. The ideal past mayb e conveniently divided into
(1)objects in the past, and (2) events in the past. (Opinions in
the past I classify with objects, and the thought processes that
formed them I classify with processes.) No event (that we can
knowabout)canoccurwithoutaffectingsomeobject(atleastin
itsquantummechanicalsense),andthuseventsmaybeconsid-
ered simply as things that happen to objects. The effects of
eventsmaybetransitoryorpermanent.Transitoryeffectsarenot
commonly preserved in the historical record (unless the object
suffering from a transitory effect becomes fossilized in that
state)andformthefirstsourceofuncertaintyinthereconstruc-
tionofthepast.Ifsomethingleavesnorecord,howcanweknow
aboutit?However,evenpermanenteffectsmaynotbepreserved Figure1.A:CruelsymmetryofHume’sLaw.Withinalifespana
foravarietyofreasons.Therecordoftheeffectmaybeerased, scientistcanpracticeinductiononallobjectsthatcanbeseencom-
mutilated, or simply defaced beyond recognition. Th e object pletely.Iftheobjectistoolarge(e.g.,acontinent,aplanet,auni-
verse), or hidden in part for complete inspection (e.g., Earth’s
carryingitmaybedestroyed,deformed,orhidden.Preservation
interior,blackholes),i.e.,ifitscompleteinspectionspillsintothe
inthehistoricalrecordisoftentheexceptionratherthantherule,
future,itcannotberecognizedexceptinahypotheticalway.Thisis
asDarwin(1859,ch.9,p.279–311)astutelyobserved. theareawhereinductionis nolongerpossiblebecausetheobjectof
The walls of Constantinople loo k splendidly preserved. studyisnotcompletelyaccessible.Symmetrically,thesameapplies
Theyarestandingmonumentstotheingenuityandindustryof ifpastobjectsarenotcompletelyavailableforinspection.Evenif
theyare,appreciationoftheirsignificancemayrequireotherinduc-
thepeoplewhobuiltthemandtotheprocessoftheactualcon-
tionsthatarenotpossible,soourunderstandingoftheobjectwill
struction.Forthemostparttheygivetheirbeholdersthefeeling
foreverremainhypotheticalowingtopoorrecord.Iftheuniverseis
thatsuchmassivewallswouldasarulebepreserved.However, endless,thenitistoolargetobestudiedbyinduction,now,inthe
if we consider th e number of walled cities that ever existed in future and in the past. B: Naive symmetry of Novalis. The
historyandhowmanyofthemwecanseetoday,werealizehow astrologerscanlookintothefuturewiththesameabsoluteassur-
ancewithwhichtheminercanlookbackwardintothepast.The
small is the chance that any segment of any city wall will be
actualistandcriticalrationalisthistoriansdiscussedherein,Adam
preserved. The Constantinian walls of Constantinople have
SmithandJamesHutton,acceptedthecruelsymmetryofHume’s
mostlydisappeared(thelastsubstantialpartduringtheSeptem- Lawandtriedtodeviseschemeswherebyhistoricalknowledgemay
ber 10, 1509, earthquake;Ambraseys and Finkel, 1995, p. 38) beobtainedwithoutviolatingit.Bycontrast,theretrospectivistand
andwhatweseetodayareactuallyonlypartsoftheTheodosian positivist historians Abraham Gottlob Werner and Karl Marx
naivelytookthesymmetryofNovalisforgranted,assumingknowl-
walls (their sea and the estuarine part s have been largely
edgeofthepast,andonitsstrengthmadeconfidentpredictionsinto
destroyed). The walls ofVienna , “whic h had withstood Kara
thefuture.
Mustapha” (Suess, 1862, p. 4), fell in 1857 upon an imperial
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6 A.M.C.S¸engör
edicttobereplacedbytheRingstraße.Thus,thatveryincom- tionsintheuniverse,nouniversalstatementscouldbeverified.
plete preservation constitutes a rule is our second problem in However, because all universal scientific hypotheses have the
historicalreconstruction. form of assertions of truth applicable to all possible observa-
Notonlydowelosealltransitoryeffectsofeventsthathap- tions, if one of these is not true, the validity of the universal
penedinthepast,weevenlosemostoftherecordoftheperma- statementasawholeisnegated.Popperthusarguedthatthere
nent effects.A byproduct of this incompleteness is a deficient is a logical asymmetry concerning universal statements.They
means of time keeping. The mutilated record of past events arefalsifiableonly.
almostalwaysappearsbeforeusasajumbleofobjects,anditis Theonlypossiblewaytounderstandtheuniverseistotry
the historian’s job to divine a chronological sequence within togenerateasmanyhypothesesasquicklyaspossible,testeach
them.Wehavenoideathattheeventsthathappenedinthepast successively, and eliminate those that do not stand up to our
arethesamesortsofeventswithwhichwearefamiliar(Hume’s tests.Thosethatdostanduptoourtestsareacceptedprovision-
Law;howcanwebesurethatthewallsofConstantinoplewere ally as true descriptions of that part of the universe towhich
notbuilt,atleastinpar,tbythree-leggedpurplecreatureswith theyapply.Suchhypothesesmayreallybetruedescriptionsor,
10arms?).Thehistorianhastofindabasistoinferthesortof alternatively,wemaynothavefoundanappropriatetesttosee
eventsthathaveoccurredinthepast. wheretheyfail.Iftheyhappentobeatruedescription,theywill
Note that in the preceding discussion I concentrated only never fail any of our tests, but we still cannot ever know that
on events; parallel arguments can be developed for singular theyaretruedescriptions,simplybecausewecannotexhaustall
objects.Fewobjectsarepreservedcomplete;itismorecommon of the necessary observations to finally validate them. Once a
tofindfragmentsofobjects(e.g.,potteryfragments,manuscript hypothesis is discarded by one adverse observation, the next
fragments,wallsegments,fossilfragmentsorparts,orruinsof hypothesismusthaveasitsdatabasehtedatabaseofht eprevi-
former mountain ranges). Few object s have direct signs that ou s (failed) hypothesis plus that one adverse data point. Thus
wouldenableustoordertheminachronologicalsequence.Not ourknowledgebasegrows.4
all objects of th e past have one-to-one correspondences in the The philosophers of history and philosophers of science
worldtoday:someobjectsinthepastmaybetotallyforeignto seem to have converged on the agreement that natural science
us (such as the ultramafic komatiitic lavas of theArchean or (orscience)dealsingeneralitiesandisnotconcernedwithindi-
abstract figures among cave paintings) and the historian must vidual instances, wherea s historical disciplines are concerned
identifyandfindwaysofinterpretingthem. expressly with individual instance s (see Rickert, 1910, p. 53;
1921, p. 165; Bucher, 1936, p. 183; Popper, 1966b, p. 264).
HISTORICALDISCIPLINESVERSUS Especially in the twentieth century, most historians of the
NATURALSCIENCES human past have been adamant, a s historians, about not being
interested in pronouncing general laws that govern the course
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the chief ofhumanhistory;thatisseenasthejobofsociology(Popper,
problem of the historical disciplines is the lack of sufficient 1966b,p.264).Thejobofhumanhistoryisseenasthetruthful
data.Thisisaproblemequivalenttothelackofsufficientdata narrativ e ofhte past only, or, as Leopold von Ranke once
in the so-called nonhistorical natural science s such as physics expressed it , simply to show “how it really was”,5 probably
and chemistry. How do we discover “natural laws” in these inspiredbyLucian’sstatementthathistorian’s dutyoughttobe
sciences, when all such laws have an all-inclusive universal “tosayexactlyhowthingshappened”(inHowtoWriteHistory,
character and our observations are always limited to a vanish- quotedfromGrant,1995,p.94).
ingly small number of instances? This is a problem that has I think this distinction is mistaken , because it fails to
bothered all science philosophers from Heraclitus to th e pres- appreciatethespiritandthesymmetryofHume’sLaw.Notonly
entday,andtheonlysatisfactorysolutionthatIamawareofis arealluniversalstatementshypothetical,butallgeneralizations
thatbySirKarlPopper(1902–1994). basedoninsufficientdatamustbealsohypothetical,whetherin
Popper (1933, 1935, 1980) began with Hume’s Law and thepast,present,orfuture.Thusthelogicaldistinctionbetween
asked how is it that we seem to know so much, despite the generalizationandindividualdescriptionofentitiesthatcannot
barrierHumeerected.Poppercarefullyreviewedallattemptsat beobservedcompletelyvanishes.Thefollowingargumentmay
breakingthatbarrier,fromKanttoRussell,andsawthatallof makethiscrucialpointclearer(seeS¸engör,1993).
theofferedsolutionsreallywerenosolutionsinthattheyeither Let the universe be represented by the set U of infinite
appealedtoapriorismorassertedthatsomehowHume’sLaw numbersofpointssuchthat
was not valid, positions Popper deemed not permissible.
U={n},n=∞.
According to Popper, (1) no universal statement can be based
onfactandthereforealluniversalstatementsmustbepurecre- Let statementA assert that condition c obtains at all n. This
ationsofourreason,and(2)thatallexistentialstatements(i.e., means that we must make an infinite number of observations
“there i s …” statements) can be verified by observation. He forA to be completely verified. This in turn means that the
reasoned that because we cannot make all possible observa- statementAwithrespecttoUmustforeverremainhypothetical.
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HuttonandSmithversusWernerandMarxininterpretinghistory 7
NowletasubsetoftheuniversesetUbehtesetSandbe that this cannot be true(see Simps on, 1963; Roberts, 1996).
represented by any finite number of points larger than unity: Schliemann’s discovery of Troy is a magnificent piece of his-
⊂ toricaltheoryconstructionandtesting,asisthediscoveryofthe
S UandS={n},n>1.
pendulum motion of Lop Nor in th e eastern part of the Tarim
LetS={a,b},wherebisforsomereasonneverobservable,and basin.That motion was first surmised by the great geographer
letWbeastatementassertingthatacertainconditionqobtains BaronFerdinandvonRichthofenandfinallydiscoveredbyhis
bothataandb.ThismeansthatforWtobecompletelyverified pupil Sven Hedin (see Hedin, 1942). Geomorphological and
w e mus t observe both a and b. Because we cannot observe b, historicaldataledvonRichthofentohypothesizethatLopNor
WmustforeverremainhypotheticalwithrespecttoS. hadrecently(withinthepastseveralhundredyears)changedits
ThusthereisnologicaldifferencebetweenthestatementA place and wandered south. Sven Hedin’s detailed geomorpho-
withrespecttoUandthestatementWwithrespecttoS.How- logical, geological, and archaeological studies led him to the
ever,wehabituallycallallall-inclusivestatementsthatpertain ideathatthelakemustundergoapendulummotioneverysev-
toUuniversal,orgeneralstatements(theseincludenaturallaws), eral hundred years owing to wind ablation. In 1921, the main
and all those pertaining to S individual, or specific statements. inlet of the Lop Nor, the Kontsche Darya-Kum Darya system
The argument presented here shows that any hypothesis (now the Konqi He) underwent its last pendulum motion and
checked against insufficient information has exactly the same abruptlymigratedbacknorth.
logicalbasiswhetheritappliestoageneraloraparticularcase.6 However, not all retrodictions are so successful, and
Thispointwouldbemucheasiertograspiftheentireuniverseis therein is the power of Popper’s criterion of demarcation
considered a particular object we ares tudying and that all the betweenscientificandunscientifictheories.Stille’spreciseand
so-calledlawsofphysicsaresimplyourhypothesesformulated elaborate theory of orogeny (Stille, 1922, 1924, 1940) that
todescribethisoneparticularuniverse(i.e.,anindividualobject) reignedsupremefornearlyhalfacenturyhasbeensuccessfully
to whic h we have access.As Stokes (1998, p. 27) says, “The falsified,bothonthebasisoftheempiricalevidenceonwhichit
methodological point, however, is that a scientist will need to stoodandonthebasisoftheuntenabilityoftheworldpictureof
exercisesomeoftheinterpretativeskillsofanhistorianindecid- whichitformedanintegralpart(seeS¸engör,1991),whichwas
ingbetweentheories.”Themistakemadebythosewhoconsider showntobewrongbythedataincorporatedintoplatetectonics
history to deal exclusively with individual and therefore not aspartofitsexplananda.Stille’stheorywaswrong,butbecause
theoreticalinstancesstemsfromthefactthattheythinkhistorical it could be shown tobe w rong, it was scientific. The biblical
instancestobecompletelyknowable,atleastinprinciple.“His- floodisoneothersuchtheoryshowntobewrongonbothgeo-
toryisvaluable,tobeginwith,becauseitistrue;andthis,though logical and biological grounds (but it is commonly rendered
notthewholeofitsvalue,isthefoundationandconditionofall immune to falsification—and therefore made unscientific—by
the rest.” (Bertrand Russell, 1910[1994], p. 60; also see p. 68: appealing to theAlmighty’s power of suspending natural laws
“Thepastaloneisreal”).Whenwethinkthatmanyobjectstaken asweknowthem).Thehistoryofgeologyisfullofsuchexam-
inhistoricalresearchaspuredatahavehypotheticalcharacters, plesoffalsifiedtheories,asisthehistoryofbiologyandpaleon-
weseehowunjustifiedsuchaviewmustbe. tology.Ithusseelittlecauseforalarmconcerningthescientific
Theinsufficiencyofdatacannotbeused,however,tosup- statusofthehistoricalsciencesaccordingtoPopper’sdemarca-
port relativistic interpretations of history by pointing to the tion(1935,1980)inthelightofthesymmetryofHume’sLaw.
truismthatourknowledgeofanyobjectoreventisnotidentical Asignificantpointthatemergesfromourdiscussionsofar
withtheobjectortheevent(seethediscussioninMandelbaum, is that there is no logical difference between historical disci-
1938, p. 83–86). This is because anyh ypothetical statement plines and natural sciences, and thus there is nothing unique
madetointerpretinsufficientdatamaybetestedbyfurtherdata, about geological reasoning, to give a diametrically opposed
should suc h become available, and/or rationally discussed and answer from Dott’s to his own (1998) important question.
evencriticizedinmanyotherwayssoastomakeitmoreprefer- (However,thereisahugemoraldifferencebetweensocialhis-
ableinourapproximationstotruththananyotherstatement(see toricalsciencesversusnaturalhistoricalsciences:seeSmithas
Popper,1974,p.118–121;1980,p.206;1982,p.160;1983,p.8). interpreted by Lindgren [1969] and Popper [1966b, p. 264].)
It thus appears that both predictions and retrodictions
(cf.Dott,1998,p.17,orpostdictions,cf.Simpson,1963,p.45) HISTORICALSCIENCEINTHEHANDSOF
areequallytestable.Therehasbeenmuchconsternationamong ADAMSMITHANDJAMESHUTTON
some scientists, historians, and philosophers of science (e.g.,
Kitcher, 1982) over Popper’s claim that Darwinis msi a meta- Both Adam Smith and James Hutton (Fig. 2) are too
physicalresearchprogram(i.e.,notscientific),becauseitisnot famousasfathersofthemodernphasesoftwowell-established,
testable (Popper, 1974, p. 133–143; see Watkins, 1995, for a yet very distant, scientific disciplines ever to be considered as
criticism of this view and further notes on the relationship of contributors to the solution of a single long-standing scientific
Popper’s ideas with Darwinism). The logical argument pre- problem.Smithisuniversallyacknowledgedtobethefatherof
sentedhereshows,togetherwiththesymmetryofHume’sLaw, moderneconomics(theAdamSmithBicentenaryConferencein
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8 A.M.C.S¸engör
A B
Figure2.Actualisttheoreticiansofhistory.A:AdamSmith(1723–1790)inthesocialsciences(byanunknownartist;courtesy
oftheScottishNationalPortraitGallery).B:JamesHutton(1726–1797)inthenaturalsciences(bySirHenryRaeburn;courtesy
oftheScottishNationalPortraitGallery).
Edinburghin1990attracted11Nobellaureates,whomadeupthe thisEarthhasexisted,asaworldmaintainingplantsandanimals;
totalofitstechnicalspeakers),andHuttonissimilarlyregarded toreasonwithregardtothechangeswhichtheearthhasunder-
withrespecttomoderngeology,detractorsnotwithstanding.One gone;andtoseehowfaranendorterminationtothissystemof
isconsideredagreatsocialscientist,theotheragreatnaturalsci- thingsmaybeperceived,fromtheconsiderationofthatwhich
entist.Apartfrombeingfriends,livinginthesamesocialenvi- hasalreadycometopass”(Hutton,1975,p.3–4).Inneitherof
ronment in Edinburgh, and being among the most brilliant these questions is there any obviou s submission to revealed
luminaries of the Scottish Enlightenment, it has not been clear knowledge:Smithdidnotsurrenderhisinquiryinfavorofthe
what else they might have had in common.To myk nowledge, belief that divine providence is the source of the funds, and
noonehassuggestedthatbothworkedonacommonproblem, Huttongavenoindicationofconsultingtheavailablecomputed
although approaching it from different angles, and bot h sug- chronologie s based on biblical generations.Yet both proposed
gestedthesamesolution.Porter(1977,p.189–190)istheonly to use historical data in their investigations; Smith the written
authorIknowwhonoticedthattheybothapproachedtheirsub- record , Hutton th e rock record. I tsi in this enterpris e of using
jectonthebasisofsimilarepistemologicalconvictionsderived the datawhere Hume enters the scene for the reasons we
from the philosophy of yet another Scottish titan, their friend reviewedhere:unlessonecanmakeperfectinduction,dataare
DavidHume.ButPorterdidnotspecifytheproblemIthinkthey ofnousetogvieussecureknowledgeofgeneralitiesorofthe
solved. To understand both the problem and the solution they past. Because neither Smith nor Hutton were in a position to
offered , we must begin with Hume (Porter, 1977, p.189), the claimtobeabletomakeperfectinductions,thebesttheycould
acknowledgedleaderoftheScottishEnlightenment.7 thus do would be to pronounce mere hypotheses: they could
never claim to have attained absolute knowledge or truth.
Smith’sandHutton’sworkontheknowledgeofthepastin Would they be content with that ? Did not Dr. Smith expect to
relationtothephilosophyofDavidHume ascertain“theprincipleswhichoughttorunthroughandbethe
foundation of the laws of all nations” (Stewart, 1793[1980],
ThecommonproblemSmithandHuttontackledwasthat p.109;aquotefromtheconclusionofSmith’sTheoryofMoral
of historical knowledge. How can we know about the past? Sentiments)?And Professor Playfair (1805, p. 96) assured us
Smithneededthatknowledge“toexplaininwhathasconsisted that “Dr.Hutton dreaded nothing so much as ignorance.”
th e revenue of th e greatbody of the people, or what ha s been Unless something could be done, the fruits of their efforts
th e nature ofhtose fund s which, in different ages and nations, wouldhavebeenexposedtoHume’sjoyousridicule:“I amposi-
have supplied their annual consumption ” (Smith, 1784[1976], tive you are in the wrong in many of your speculations, espe-
p.11–12;seealsoJohnston,1977,p.7);in1785,Huttonneeded ciallywhereyouhavethemisfortunetodifferfromme”(Hume
it “to form some estimate with regard to the time the glob e of toSmith,injestinafriendlyletter,1771,inJones,1996,p.49).
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HuttonandSmithversusWernerandMarxininterpretinghistory 9
AdamSmith(1723–1790) wouldappearperfectlyequableanduniform,andsuchastheimagina-
tioncouldeasilyfollow.Thosephilosopherstransportedthemselves,in
fancy,tothecentresoftheseimaginaryCircles,andtookpleasureinsur-
BothSmithandHuttonattackedindependentlytheproblem
veyingfromhence,allthosefantasticalmotions,arranged,accordingto
of going from particulars to generals that Hume’s Treatise on
thatharmonyandorder,whichithadbeentheendofalltheirresearches
HumanNatureerectedbeforethem.Smith(1795[1980],p.125) tobestowuponthem.Here,atlast,theyenjoyedthattranquillityand
madenosecretofhisawarenessofthemagnitudeoftheproblem: reposewhichtheyhadpursuedthroughallthemazesofthisintricate
“ToexplainthenatureandtoaccountfortheoriginofgeneralIdeas, hypothesis;andheretheybeheldthis,themostbeautifulandmagnifi-
centpartofthegreattheatreofnaturesodisposedandconstructed,that
is,evenatthisday,thegreatestdifficultyinabstractphilosophy.”
they could attend , with ease and delight, to all the revolutions and
Smith devoted the whole introductory part of his History
changesthatoccurredinit.
ofAstronomy8totheproblemofinduction,reviewingthesenti-
mentsofsurprise,wonder,andadmiration.Heemphasizedthat
Smithseemstohaveimpliedthatitisthemindthatnatu-
itisnottherepetitive,thehabitual,thatleadstodiscovery,but
rally seeks tranquility, which is found in a continuously con-
the singular, the unexpected. Here Smith also very clearly
nected chain of causalities, one proceeding naturally from the
spelledoutthenecessityofhypothesestobridgegapsinknowl-
preceding,andthatifaninterruptionisintroduced,thingscould
edge. This was precisely Hutton’s position, most likely inde-
no longer be assumed to proceed from a single initial cause.
pendentlyderivedfromSmith’s,andbothwereclearlyinspired
This, he thought, is a predisposition that is learned (Smith,
byHume(seeeditor’snoteinSmith,1795[1980],p.42).
1795[1980],p.48,50):
Smith(1795[1980],p.45–46) furtherobservedinHistory
ofAstronomy:
Mankind,inthefirstagesofsociety,beforetheestablishmentoflaw,
order,andsecurity,havelittlecuriositytofindoutthosehiddenchainsof
Philosophyisthescienceoftheconnectingprinciplesofnature.Nature,
events whic h bind together the seemingly disjointed appearances of
afterthelargestexperiencethatcommonobservationcanacquire,seems
nature.Asavage,whosesubsistenceisprecarious,whoselifeisevery
toaboundwitheventswhichappearsolitaryandincoherentwithallthat
dayexposedtotherudestdangers,hasnoinclinationtoamusehimself
gobeforethem,whichthereforedisturbtheeasymovementofimagina-
withsearchingoutwhat,whendiscovered,seemstoservenootherpur-
tion;whichmakeitsideassucceedeachother,ifonemaysayso,byirreg-
posethantorenderthetheatreofnatureamoreconnectedspectacleto
ularstartsandsallies;andwhichthustend,insomemeasure,tointroduce
theimagination.…Theleisurewhichtheythenenjoyrendersthem
thoseconfusionsanddistractionsweformerlymentioned.Philosophy,by
moreattentivetotheappearancesofnature,moreobservantofhersmall-
representingtheinvisiblechainswhichbindtogetherallthesedisjointed
estirregularities,andmoredesiroustoknowwhatisthechainthatlinks
objects,endeavourstointroduceorderintothischaosofjarringanddis-
themalltogether.Thatsomesuchchainsubsistsbetwixtallherseem-
cordantappearances,toallaythistumultoftheimagination,andtorestore
inglydisjointedphaenomena,theyarenecessarilyledtoconceive.
it,whenitsurveysthegreatrevolutionsoftheuniverse,tothattoneof
tranquilityandcomposure,whichisbothmostagreeableinitself,and
mostsuitabletoitsnature.Philosophy,therefore,mayberegardedasone Smithwascarefultopraisegoodobservations,asthoseof
ofthoseartswhichaddressthemselvestotheimagination.
Daubenton and Réaumur, when he reviewed their work for the
Edinburgh Review (Smith, 1795[1980], p. 248–249). However,
Smith did not say why this tranquility is most suitable to
Smith emphasized repeatedly in his writings that perception
thenatureofnature.However,whilediscussingtheconceptof
throughthesensesistrainedandthatuntrainedsensesperceive
equalizingcirclesinPtolemy’sastronomy,Smith(1795[1980],
naturedifferentlyfromtrainedsenses.Forexample,inhisessay
p.61–62)notedthefollowing:
Of the External Senses (a piece Smith probably had written
before he read Hume:Wightman, 1980b, p. 133 ; Raphael and
Nothingcanmoreevidentlyshow,howmuchthereposeandtranquility Skinner,1980,p.16),henotedthatwelearntodistinguishsimple
oftheimaginationistheultimateendofphilosophy,thantheinvention andcompoundsensations(Smith,1795[1980],p.145).Wealso
of this Equalizing Circle. The motions of the heavenly bodie s had
learntodistinguishbetweentangibleandrepresentedandvisible
appearedinconstantandirregular,bothintheirvelocitiesandintheir
and representing shapes in vision (Smith, 1795[1980], p.151–
directions.Theyweresuch,therefore,astendedtoembarrassandcon-
foundtheimagination,wheneveritattemptedtotracethem.Theinven- 152).Inthisregardherelatedtheexperienceofacataractpatient
tionofEccentricSpheres,ofEpicycles,andoftherevolutionofthe ofDr.WilliamCheselden,whohadlearnedtotellthisdifference
centresoftheEccentricSpherestendedtoallaythisconfusion,tocon- afterheacquiredhisvision(Smith,1795[1980],p.153–154).He
necttogetherthosedisjointedappearances,andtointroduceharmony
discussed this difference between the tangible and represented
andorderintothemind’sconceptionofthemovementsofthosebodies.
andvisibleandrepresentinginTheTheoryofMoralSentiments,
It did this, however, but imperfectly; it introduced uniformity and
coherenceintotheirrealdirections.Buttheirvelocities,whensurveyed andnotedhowourmindscorrectedthefalseimagesweseefora
fromtheonlypointinwhichthevelocityofwhatmovesinaCirclecan trueperception(Smith,1756[1976],p.134–135).
be truly judged of, the centre of that Circle , still remained, in some To study the nature ofvis ion to investigate its role in the
measure, inconstant as before; and still, therefore, embarrassed the
generation of our ideas, Smith made comparative observations
imagination.Themindfounditselfsomewhatrelievedfromthisembar-
on birds that reveal much about his mode of research. His
rassment,whenitconceived,thathowirregularsoeverthemotionsof
eachofthoseCirclesmightappear,whensurveyedfromitsowncentre, attempttocheckhishypotheseswithactualfieldobservationsis
therewas,however,ineachofthem,apoint,fromwhenceitsrevolution reminiscent of the method of his friend Jame s Hutton , which