Table Of ContentIRAN RESURGENT
MAHAN ABEDIN
MICHEL ELTCHANINOFF
Iran Resurgent
The Rise and Rise of the Shia State
Inside the Mind of
Marine Le Pen
HURST & COMPANY, LONDON
HURST & COMPANY, LONDON
First published in the United Kingdom in 2019 by
C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd.,
41 Great Russell Street, London, WC1B 3PL
© Mahan Abedin, 2019
Printed in India
All rights reserved.
The right of Mahan Abedin to be identified as the author of this publication
is asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, 1988.
Distributed in the United States, Canada and Latin America by Oxford
University Press, 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States
America.
A Cataloguing-in-Publication data record for this book is available from the
British Library.
ISBN: 9781849049559
www.hurstpublishers.com
CONTENTS
Introduction 1
1. Iran’s Background 13
2. Political Society 41
3. Asymmetric Capability 71
4. Iraq: Proximate Threat or Strategic Ally? 99
5. Syria: Mission Accomplished? 127
6. Iran and the Gulf: An Uneasy Equilibrium 155
7. Israel: Friend or Foe? 183
8. The USA: Confronting ‘the Great Satan’? 211
Conclusion 239
Notes 251
Index 265
INTRODUCTION
In the past two decades the Islamic Republic of Iran has emerged as
the preeminent indigenous power in the Middle East. This is despite
decades of revolutionary turmoil and isolation on the international
stage. How can this success be explained? Moreover, is this success
sustainable? These are the key questions studied in depth in this
book.
Iran’s diplomatic and strategic success is all the more remarkable
given that it has unfolded against the backdrop not only of fierce US
opposition but of equally considerable regional pushback. Both Saudi
Arabia and Israel view Iran as an enemy and have pulled no punches in
their attempts to arrest Iranian strategic momentum.
Whilst ideology is often characterised as an impediment to Iran’s
internal political development, in terms of foreign policy it has been
a key instrument of Iranian power projection. In strategic terms,
Iran’s idiosyncratic version of political Islam—born out of the 1979
revolution—is a key energiser and force multiplier.
In the last decade, this revolutionary ideology has taken distinctly
sectarian tones by its strident adoption of Shia ideology and imagery.
This has bolstered Iranian nationalism, since Shia Islam is a central
pillar of Iranian national identity. Moreover, the enthusiastic embrace
of the Shia cause has increased Iran’s appeal to the wider region’s
disenfranchised Shia community.
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IRAN RESURGENT
It is by appealing to this community and by intervening in their
conflicts with local regimes and other powers that Iran has been able
to embed itself in all of the region’s tension points, ranging from the
Gaza Strip, Yemen and Bahrain to Syria and Lebanon. Intervening in
conflicts—and thus becoming indispensable to conflict resolution—
has been a key Iranian regional policy.
Ideology is also important in that it is a constant factor in Iranian
strategic affairs, playing a consistent role through political vicissitudes
and shifts in the balance of power within the Iranian establishment.
Indeed, the nation’s revolutionary ideology has not only survived
unscathed but it has in fact strengthened against the backdrop of
considerable political instability in Tehran. From May 1997 power
in Iran has repeatedly switched hands, moving from conservatives to
reformists to populists and subsequently to the ruling centrists led by
President Hassan Rouhani.
All these political currents—and their underlying philosophies—
have widely divergent views and approaches to politics and the
economy. They have all tried to reshape the country in accordance
with their beliefs and interests, some with greater success than the
others. However, none of these currents have so much as attempted
to fundamentally reshape the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy. This
speaks to the strength and resilience of the state ideology and of the
institutions that propagate its doctrine. Institution-building has been
one of the key features of post-revolutionary Iran, and has led to the
formation of a dense institutional environment in the Islamic Republic
that guarantees complex policy development and implementation.
Institutional density also produces a consensual approach toward
policymaking, which in turn facilitates accountability, if not
transparency. In stark contrast, policymaking in pre-revolutionary Iran
was relatively straightforward, and was often developed by the Shah
and his closest advisors.
An important development in the past two decades has been the
entrenchment of hard power institutions and the tentative emergence
of an Iranian ‘deep state’. This has been a largely indigenous process,
in part reflecting the state’s institutional density. It is also a reaction by
ideological forces in the Islamic Republic to the chaos and factionalism
often associated with contemporary Iranian political society. The
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