Investigation Report: West Fertilizer Company Fire and Explosion

8.9 MB·English

by  U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

U.S. CHEMICAL SAFETY AND HAZARD INVESTIGATION BOARD

INVESTIGATION REPORT

FINAL
WEST FERTILIZER COMPANY FIRE AND EXPLOSION
(15 Fatalities, More Than 260 Injured)

WEST FERTILIZER COMPANY
WEST, TX
KEY ISSUES: APRIL 17, 2013
• REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
• HAZARD AWARENESS
• EMERGENCY PLANNING AND RESPONSE
• FERTILIZER GRADE AMMONIUM NITRATE STORAGE PRACTICES
• LAND USE PLANNING AND ZONING
REPORT 2013-02-I-TX
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West Fertilizer Company Final Report January 2016
Dedication
This report is dedicated to the 12 emergency responders and 3 members
of the public who lost their lives as a result of the explosion at the West
Fertilizer Company on April 17, 2013.

Morris Bridges
Perry Calvin
Jerry Dane Chapman
Cody Frank Dragoo
Kenneth Harris
Adolph Lander
James Matus
Judith Ann Monroe
Joseph Pustejovsky
Cyrus Adam Reed
Mariano C. Saldivar
Kevin William Sanders
Douglas Snokhous
Robert Snokhous
William Uptmor, Jr.
West Fertilizer Company Final Report January 2016
Contents

1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... 13
1.1 Overview ........................................................................................................................................ 13
1.2 Federal and State Response ........................................................................................................... 14
1.2.1 Joint SFMO/ATF Investigation ........................................................................................ 14
1.2.2 CSB Response ................................................................................................................... 15
2.0 BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................... 16
2.1 West Fertilizer Company ............................................................................................................... 16
2.1.1 Facility Operations Description ........................................................................................ 18
2.1.2 Facility Layout and Materials of Construction ................................................................. 23
2.1.3 Unloading of Fertilizer ...................................................................................................... 25
2.1.4 Housekeeping .................................................................................................................... 26
3.0 INCIDENT DESCRIPTION .......................................................................................................... 27
3.1 West Police Department ................................................................................................................ 27
3.2 West Volunteer Fire Department (WVFD) .................................................................................... 28
3.3 Abbott, Bruceville-Eddy, Mertens, and Navarro Mills Volunteer Fire Departments .................... 29
3.4 Consequences ................................................................................................................................. 30
3.4.1 Fatalities and Injuries ........................................................................................................ 30
3.4.2 Property Damage .............................................................................................................. 32
3.4.3 West Independent School District .................................................................................... 39
3.4.4 West Rest Haven Nursing Home ...................................................................................... 49
3.4.5 West Terrace Apartment Complex ................................................................................... 53
3.4.6 Private Residences ............................................................................................................ 54
3.4.7 Infrastructure Damage to the City of West ....................................................................... 55
4.0 INCIDENT ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................ 57
4.1 Fertilizer Grade Ammonium Nitrate (FGAN) ............................................................................... 57
4.1.1 The Fertilizer Industry ...................................................................................................... 57
4.1.2 FGAN Properties .............................................................................................................. 57
4.1.3 FGAN Hazards ................................................................................................................. 58
4.1.4 Previous Incidents Involving FGAN ................................................................................ 61
4.1.5 Historical Knowledge of FGAN Fire and Explosion Hazards .......................................... 62
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West Fertilizer Company Final Report January 2016
4.2 Factors Contributing to the Massive Fire and Explosion at the WFC ........................................... 64
4.2.1 Contamination of the FGAN Pile ..................................................................................... 64
4.2.2 Heating and Ventilation .................................................................................................... 66
4.3 Detonation Scenarios ..................................................................................................................... 68
4.3.1 Scenario 1: Detonation from the Top of the FGAN Pile .................................................. 69
4.3.2 Scenario 2: Detonation in Heated FGAN Along Exterior Wall Exposed to Fire ............. 71
4.3.3 Scenario 3: Detonation in Elevator Pit That Spread to Main FGAN Bin ......................... 73
4.4 Forensic Testing of West Fertilizer Company Samples ................................................................. 73
4.5 Blast and Impact Analysis ............................................................................................................. 78
4.5.1 Seismic Data ..................................................................................................................... 81
5.0 COMMERCIAL PROPERTY AND LIABILITY INSURANCE ................................................. 82
5.1 Triangle Insurance Coverage and Audits (2006–2010) ................................................................. 83
5.1.1 Triangle Loss Control Surveys That Did Not Include FGAN Hazards ............................ 86
5.2 U.S. Fire Insurance Coverage and Audits (2010–2013) ................................................................ 86
5.3 Insurance Claims and Other Aid after the Explosion .................................................................... 87
5.4 FGAN Facilities in Texas and the Potential for Offsite Consequences ......................................... 88
5.5 Limits of Insurance Coverage in Texas ......................................................................................... 90
5.6 Insurance Services Office Rating ................................................................................................... 94
5.6.1 Impact of the City of West Class 5 ISO Rating on the West Fertilizer Company ............ 95
6.0 INHERENTLY SAFER TECHNOLOGY ..................................................................................... 97
6.1 Alternative Formulations of FGAN ............................................................................................... 99
6.2 Inherently Safe Building Design and Storage .............................................................................. 102
7.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ........................................................................................................ 104
7.1 Firefighter Response .................................................................................................................... 105
7.2 Key Contributing Factors to Emergency Responders’ Fatality ................................................... 107
7.2.1 Lack of Incident Command System ................................................................................ 107
7.2.2 Lack of Established Incident Management System ........................................................ 108
7.2.3 Firefighter Training ......................................................................................................... 110
7.2.4 Firefighter FGAN Knowledge and Lack of HAZMAT Training ................................... 112
7.2.5 Lack of Situational Awareness and Risk Assessment Knowledge ................................. 116
7.2.6 Lack of Pre-Incident Planning at Facility ....................................................................... 117
7.3 Limited and Conflicting Technical Guidance on FGAN ............................................................. 119
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West Fertilizer Company Final Report January 2016
7.3.1 Emergency Response Guidebook ................................................................................... 120
7.3.2 Safety Data Sheets .......................................................................................................... 125
7.4 Lessons Not Learned and Lessons Learned ................................................................................. 127
7.4.1 Pre-West-Incident FGAN-Related Fires and Explosions: Lessons Not Learned ........... 127
7.4.2 Post-West Incident FGAN-Related Fire: Lessons Learned ............................................ 131
7.5 Other Post-Incident Investigation Reports Related to Firefighting .............................................. 136
7.5.1 Texas State Fire Marshal’s Office (SFMO) .................................................................... 136
7.5.2 NIOSH Findings and Recommendations ........................................................................ 137
7.6 Summary of Incident Emergency Response ................................................................................ 138
7.7 Firefighter Training Grants and Programs ................................................................................... 139
7.7.1 Need for Training ............................................................................................................ 139
7.7.2 National Firefighter Training Funds and Programs ........................................................ 142
7.7.3 National Membership Firefighter Associations .............................................................. 163
8.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................... 164
8.1 President Obama’s Executive Order 13650 ................................................................................. 164
8.2 OSHA Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard ........................................................................ 165
8.2.1 OSHA Issuance of Guidance on Explosives and Blasting Agents Standard .................. 171
8.2.2 Need for an Emphasis Program ...................................................................................... 173
8.3 Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) ............................................................... 173
8.3.1 AN Screening Thresholds ............................................................................................... 174
8.4 Safety Management Programs ..................................................................................................... 176
8.4.1 OSHA Process Safety Management Standard ................................................................ 176
8.4.2 EPA Risk Management Program Rule ........................................................................... 183
8.5 Emergency Planning .................................................................................................................... 195
8.5.1 Federal Emergency Planning .......................................................................................... 196
8.5.2 State Emergency Planning in the State of Texas ............................................................ 199
8.5.3 City Emergency Planning in the City of West ................................................................ 200
8.5.4 Other Emergency Planning Requirements ...................................................................... 204
8.6 Fire Protection Codes and Standards ........................................................................................... 205
8.6.1 National Fire Protection Association .............................................................................. 206
8.6.2 International Code Council ............................................................................................. 209
8.6.3 State Fire Codes .............................................................................................................. 210
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West Fertilizer Company Final Report January 2016
8.7 Post-Incident State and Local Regulatory Developments ............................................................ 213
8.7.1 Texas Commercial Fertilizer Rules ................................................................................ 214
8.7.2 Texas House Bill 942 ...................................................................................................... 214
8.7.3 Athens City Ordinance .................................................................................................... 215
8.8 Industry Standards ....................................................................................................................... 216
8.8.1 The Fertilizer Institute (TFI) ........................................................................................... 216
8.8.2 Agricultural Retailers Association (ARA) ...................................................................... 218
8.8.3 Product Stewardship ....................................................................................................... 218
8.8.4 Efforts to Address FGAN Hazards Post-Incident ........................................................... 220
9.0 LAND USE .................................................................................................................................. 223
9.1 Land Use Planning: An Introduction ........................................................................................... 223
9.2 The City That “Came to” the WFC Over the Years .................................................................... 224
9.3 Lack of Zoning Regulations ......................................................................................................... 227
9.3.1 Importance of Land Use Planning in Siting Communities Near Facilities Storing FGAN
and Other Hazardous Chemicals ..................................................................................... 233
9.3.2 International Perspectives ............................................................................................... 234
9.4 Efforts to Address Land Use Planning After the West Incident .................................................. 239
10.0 KEY FINDINGS .......................................................................................................................... 240
11.0 RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................. 242
12.0 APPENDIX A: REBUILDING OF THE WEST INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT ........ 250
13.0 APPENDIX B: FGAN INCIDENTS TABLES ........................................................................... 252
14.0 APPENDIX C: TFI SAFETY AND SECURITY TOOLS .......................................................... 262
15.0 APPENDIX D: RESPONSIBLEAG ............................................................................................ 264
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West Fertilizer Company Final Report January 2016
Figures
Figure 1. 2013 Overview of WFC Facility (Source: Bing Maps) ............................................................... 18
Figure 2. Grain Silos (Source: WFC Insurer) ............................................................................................. 19
Figure 3. West View of Fertilizer Building (Source: Bing Maps) .............................................................. 20
Figure 4. Fertilizer Building Overview (Source: Atlas Engineering) ......................................................... 21
Figure 5. Southwest View from Northeast Corner of Fertilizer Building (Source: WFC Insurer) ............. 21
Figure 6. Anhydrous Ammonia Storage (Source: WFC Insurer) ............................................................... 22
Figure 7. West View from East of Fertilizer Building (Source: WFC Insurer) .......................................... 23
Figure 8. Plywood Bin Wall, Post-Explosion (Source: CSB) ..................................................................... 24
Figure 9. Elevator System Recovered from Blast Debris (Source: CSB) ................................................... 25
Figure 10. Video Stills of WFC Fire and Explosion (Source: Member of the Public) ............................... 30
Figure 11. Number of Nonfatal Injuries, by Injury Type (Source: Waco-McLennan County Public Health
District) ..................................................................................................................................... 31
Figure 12. Overview of Damage to WFC Facility (Source: Texas Civil Air Patrol) .................................. 33
Figure 13. Damaged WVFD Water Tender (Source: ABS Consulting) ..................................................... 34
Figure 14. Farm Truck South of Crater, Near the Scale House (Source: ABS Consulting) ....................... 34
Figure 15. Railcar Loaded with FGAN, Destroyed and Overturned by Explosion (Source: CSB) ............ 35
Figure 16. Liquid Fertilizer Tank Damage (Source: CSB) ......................................................................... 35
Figure 17. Anhydrous Ammonia Pressure Vessels (Source: CSB) ............................................................ 36
Figure 18. Damaged Railroad Tracks Adjacent to WFC Facility (Source: CSB) ....................................... 37
Figure 19. Damaged Playground Equipment (Source: ABS Consulting) ................................................... 37
Figure 20. Damaged Basketball Goal Post at Park (Source: ABS Consulting) .......................................... 38
Figure 21. Anhydrous Ammonia Tank PRV, Post-Incident (Source: CSB) ............................................... 39
Figure 22. Proximity of WFC Facility to Schools and Other Public Structures (Source: Google Earth) ... 40
Figure 23. WIS Room Layout in Evacuation Plan (Source: CSB) ............................................................. 42
Figure 24. WIS North Hallway, Looking Toward Northeast Exit Door (Source: ABS Consulting) .......... 43
Figure 25. Glazing Hazard in WIS Room 12 (Source: ABS Consulting) ................................................... 43
Figure 26. Embedded Glass in Assignment Poster in WIS Room 12 (Source: ABS Consulting) ............. 44
Figure 27. Interior of Burned Northeast Section of WIS (Source: ABS Consulting) ................................ 44
Figure 28. WIS Gymnasium (Source: ABS Consulting) ............................................................................ 45
Figure 29. WIS Classroom 20 (Source: ABS Consulting) .......................................................................... 46
Figure 30. WHS Evacuation Map (Source: WISD) .................................................................................... 47
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West Fertilizer Company Final Report January 2016
Figure 31. WMS Layout (Source: Bing Maps) ........................................................................................... 48
Figure 32. Classroom Annex Interior Hallway and Ceiling Damage at WMS (Source: ABS Consulting) 49
Figure 33. Damage to Reagan Street Entry of West Rest Haven (Source: ABS Consulting) ..................... 50
Figure 34. Emergency Exit Floor Plan for the West Rest Haven (Source: CSB) ....................................... 52
Figure 35. Crater and Debris (left) from Fragment (right) of WFC Facility Foundation that Impacted West
Rest Haven (Source: ABS Consulting) ..................................................................................... 53
Figure 36. West Terrace Apartment Complex East Façade (Source: CSB) ................................................ 54
Figure 37. Example of Damage to Single-Family Residential Structure (Source: ABS Consulting) ......... 55
Figure 38. Initial Light Smoke (left) Followed by Dark Plume (right) (Source: Member of the Public) .. 65
Figure 39. Dark and Heavy Smoke, Rich in Soot (Source: Member of the Public) .................................. 66
Figure 40. Photographs from 7:42 pm (left) and 7:45 pm (right), Showing Transition to Lighter Smoke
and Larger Flame, Before Detonation at Approximately 7:51 pm (Source: Member of the
Public) ....................................................................................................................................... 67
Figure 41. Plume of Smoke from AN Fire in Bryan, Texas (Source: College Station Fire Department).. 68
Figure 42. Potential Explosive Train Layers on AN Pile Before Detonation (Source: CSB) ..................... 70
Figure 43. North Side of Structure Approximately 3 Minutes Before Detonation, with Dark Foreground
Objects Associated with the Bin Complex North of Fertilizer Building (Source: Member of the
Public) ....................................................................................................................................... 72
Figure 44. Solidified Fertilizer Collected from WFC Property (Approximate Location Unknown) (Source:
Forensic Laboratory) ................................................................................................................. 75
Figure 45. FGAN Prills Collected from a Railcar on WFC Property (Source: Forensic Laboratory) ........ 75
Figure 46. Farmer’s Sample of FGAN and AS Blend (Source: Forensic Laboratory) ............................... 75
Figure 47. Physical Comparison of Samples (20x) (Source: Forensic Laboratory) ................................... 77
Figure 48. Ground-Level View of WFC Explosion Crater (Source: CSB) ................................................ 79
Figure 49. WFC Explosion Crater Profile Measurements (Source: Army Corps of Engineers) ................ 80
Figure 50. Overhead View of WFC Bins, with Crater Underlay (Source: Atlas Engineering) .................. 81
Figure 51. Elevation View of Fertilizer Building, with Crater Depth (Source: Atlas Engineering) ........... 81
Figure 52. Data Recorded at Lake Whitney Station, WHTX, and Seismograph by the USGS National
Earthquake Information Center (Source: USGS) ...................................................................... 82
Figure 53. Exposed 440-Volt Electrical Wiring Identified in 2007 Survey (Source: Triangle Insurance
Company) .................................................................................................................................. 84
Figure 54. Damaged Electrical Cord Identified in 2008 Insurance Survey (Source: Triangle Insurance
Company) .................................................................................................................................. 85
Figure 55. Overhead View of a School Approximately 529 Feet from an FGAN Storage Facility (Source:
Google Earth) ............................................................................................................................ 89
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West Fertilizer Company Final Report January 2016
Figure 56. Breakdown of FGAN Storage Facilities (10,000 pounds or more) Within 1 Mile of a Texas
School (Source: CSB) ............................................................................................................... 89
Figure 57. Overhead View of a Texas FGAN Storage Facility near a Hospital, Residence, and School
(Source: Google Earth) ............................................................................................................. 90
Figure 58. Distribution of ISO Class Ratings for Cities and Communities in Texas (Source: ISO) .......... 95
Figure 59. Distribution of ISO Class Ratings for All U.S. Cities and Communities (Source: ISO) ........... 96
Figure 60. Risk Control Hierarchy (Source: CCPS) ................................................................................... 98
Figure 61. Reconstructed EDC Facility in Bryan, Texas (Source: CSB) ................................................. 104
Figure 62. Timeline of Events for Emergency Response to WFC Facility (Source: CSB) ....................... 106
Figure 63. Cover Page of 2012 Edition of ERG (Source: DOT PHMSA) ................................................ 121
Figure 64. Cover Page of 2016 Edition of ERG (Source: DOT PHMSA) ................................................ 124
Figure 65. Post-Incident Aerial View of EDC Facility Wooden Fertilizer Warehouse (Source: Bryan-
College Station Eagle) ............................................................................................................ 130
Figure 66. Dark Grey Smoke Originating from East Texas Ag Supply Facility in Downtown Athens,
Texas (Source: Athens Fire Department) ................................................................................ 133
Figure 67. Dark Smoke Combined with Flames at East Texas Ag Supply Facility in Athens, Texas
(Source: Athens Fire Department) .......................................................................................... 134
Figure 68. East Texas Ag Supply Facility’s Masonry Brick Walls, Engulfed by Fire and Smoke (Source:
Athens Fire Department) ......................................................................................................... 135
Figure 69. Comparison of Volunteer and Career Firefighter Deaths (1977–2013) (Source: NFPA) ....... 141
Figure 70. Assistance to Firefighter Grant Program Recipients in Texas (Source: FEMA) ..................... 147
Figure 71. SAFER Grant Award Recipients in Texas (Source: FEMA) .................................................. 148
Figure 72. FP&S Grant Recipients in Texas (Source: FEMA) ................................................................. 148
Figure 73. Percentage of AN Storage Facilities by Industry (Source: DHS) ............................................ 175
Figure 74. Progressive Development of West (Source: GeoSearch) ........................................................ 226
Figure 75. Aerial Photographs of the WFC Facility Before (left) and After (right) the Incident (Source:
NBC News) ............................................................................................................................. 227

Tables
Table 1. WFC Fertilizer Inventory in April 2013 ...................................................................................... 16
Table 2. Estimated Number of Students and Staff During School Hours .................................................. 41
Table 3. Infrastructure Repaired with FEMA Funding .............................................................................. 55
Table 4. Forensic Testing Results of Fertilizer Samples Collected from the WFC and the OTSC ............ 76
Table 5. Minimum Insurance Requirements in Texas ................................................................................ 92
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